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Abstract 
 
This thesis proposes a comparative approach to the writings of Antonin Artaud and 
Walter Benjamin. It is centred on the conceptualisation of the unconscious, and the 
two themes that derived from it in the writings of Artaud and Benjamin: magic and 
experience. The thesis departs from the Freudian understanding of the unconscious to 
explore the surrealist approach to this notion. It takes into account Freud’s recourse to 
a broad basis of non-scientific expertise, as well as the different inputs of 
psychoanalysis, occultism and marxism in the constitution of surrealism. From this 
scenario it questions whether the unconscious is a liberating dimension of psychic 
life, or a limiting source of experience. The answers, different and unique, that the 
works of Artaud and Benjamin offer in their discussions of the role of the 
unconscious structure this project thematically. Above all, magic appears as a 
recurrent theme in the definition of experience, following the change in traditional 
configurations precipitated, significantly but not exclusively, by the work of Freud. 
The outcome of the present thesis identifies the affinities and dissimilarities between 
the writings of Artaud and Benjamin. The positive and constructive aspect of their 
formulations on magic and experience represents the high point of this comparison. 
They concern the progressive reconstruction of conditions for experience, in 
particular through the exploration of the field of language. The writings of Artaud and 
Benjamin express the necessary occupation with both the negative and positive 
aspects of the problem of experience at the present time. 
1. INTRODUCION 
Antonin Artaud and Walter Benjamin, two well-known authors from the first half of 
the twentieth century, were figures embedded in the philosophical and cultural problems of 
their era. The vast range of their elaborations on themes such as literature, politics, cinema 
and theatre are marked, however, by the development of a personal point of view, a singular 
perspective that neither immerses itself completely in the subject in question, nor makes itself 
entirely explicit through it. The results of this attitude in the two writers are radically 
different. Nevertheless, an underlying kinship can be found in their texts, one that this work 
relates, above all, to the changes that affected the notion of experience, and its material 
possibilities, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 The common philosophical understanding of experience at the time held that human 
beings were able to formulate a satisfactory understanding of themselves and the world. The 
most prominent trends of this understanding were represented by idealism and empiricism, 
with a particular dominance of the synthesis proposed by Immanuel Kant in Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft (“Critique of Pure Reason,” 1871). Correlated to this belief in the possibility of an 
enlightened command of oneself, and a positive transformation of the world, was the idea of 
material and spiritual progress that derived, just like the philosophical approaches mentioned 
above, from the precepts of the enlightenment. The natural progress of humankind, and the 
expected control of nature never actually took place in the terms envisioned by the 
eighteenth-century movement. The idea of man related to it, later assuming the form of 
humanism, seems to have had a more lasting destiny. 
 According to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in Dialektik der Aufklärung 
(“Dialectic of Enlightenment,” 1944), the enlightenment already contained the seeds of its 
own limitation. It envisioned the emancipated man as he who, with the help of science and 
technology, takes complete control of nature. But the knowledge produced by the 
enlightenment, by means of de-mystification of the world — according to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, “it wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge” (1) — 
produced a unique and exclusive version of reality, which became a further form of “false 
clarity.” As the authors state: “myth becomes enlightenment and nature mere objectivity” 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 6). This attitude means, in the final analysis, that the enlightenment 
was only able to recognise things to the extent that it could manipulate them. For Adorno and 
Horkheimer, that is one of the reasons why the movement, despite presenting itself as the 
bastion of freedom, gave way to attitudes of repression and domination. 
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 While Adorno and Horkheimer connect the enlightenment to the European twentieth 
century wars and fascism, they also point to the absence in it of a larger understanding of 
psychic life, one capable of including aspects not identified with reason. Sigmund Freud is 
the figure who brought this understanding prominently to light. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century, he established a theory on dreams as a highly complex activity of the mind. In 
particular in Die Traumdeutung (“The Interpretation of Dreams,” 1900), the meaning of 
dreams is sought in a work of analysis connecting their apparent content to ideas that appear 
disguised. What dreams conceal and at the same time reveal is an important dimension of 
psychic activity, different from consciousness. According to Freud, this dimension was 
broader and more influential than any other aspect of mental life — Freud describes the 
unconscious as “the true psychical reality” (Dreams 607) — and it sheltered people’s most 
fundamental impulses and drives. 
 The dream process, according to Freud, accesses remote and recent memories, in 
order to dramatise an idea to the dreamer. This dramatisation is imagistic in nature: the dream 
“thinks” in images. The unconscious is here defined only through resemblance, but it is the 
concept on which Freud’s theory is based. According to a formulation from 1933, “it is filled 
with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organisation, produces no collective 
will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual” (Freud Lectures 105-
6). From this account, the unconscious appears as an unco-ordinated arrangement of drives, 
regulated by the tendency to seek their discharge. It finds, therefore, a permanent obstacle in 
its way to consciousness. The dream is precisely a point in which a connection between the 
conscious and unconscious aspects of reality takes place. The same can be said of mind 
formations such as psychosomatic symptoms, jokes and lapses. 
 However negative, Freud’s discovery would impact on many fields in both science 
and culture, and was fundamental to the set of changes taking place in the early twentieth 
century. Once imaginary formations began to be understood as possible emissaries of psychic 
truth, the role of the unconscious dimension in intellectual and artistic production, often 
underestimated, found through Freudian formulations a form of rehabilitation. Amongst the 
tendencies that followed and expanded Freudian propositions are the avant-garde movements 
of the first decades of the twentieth century in Europe, in which Artaud and Benjamin took 
part. The forms of their participation were distinct: Artaud as an active member in the 
twenties, and Benjamin as a critic and observer in the late twenties and thirties. Surrealism, in 
particular, envisioned the unconscious as an important element in the systematic exploration 
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of the contents lying beyond dominant forms of rationality and culture. In this context, Freud 
represented, to the surrealist movement, a powerful revelation. As André Breton states in 
“Manifeste du Surréalisme” (1924): “si les profondeurs de notre esprit recèlent d’étranges 
forces capables d’augmenter celles de la surface, ou de lutter victorieusement contre elles, il 
y a tout intérêt à les capter (…) pour les soumettre ensuite, s’il y a lieu, au contrôle de notre 
raison”1 (Manifestes 20). 
 The ambiguous character of the surrealist explorations of the unconscious is evident: 
at the same time an incursion into a life beyond reason and an urge to include it amongst the 
recognisable human faculties. Despite Freud’s insistence on a distinction between dream and 
reality — or material and psychical reality — the surrealists envisioned the Freudian 
unconscious as an invitation to confuse such boundaries, giving the importance attested to the 
unconscious to all psychic matters. Freud had frequently had recourse to a varied store of 
non-scientific expertise while attempting to establish his theory as a recognised scientific 
field. This is a trend that the surrealists, as heirs to romanticism, were also willing to explore 
in their confrontation of reason and the “reigning logic.” For them, it couldn’t be more 
suitable that the unconscious should make its way to consciousness through dreams. 
Conducive spaces for the privileging of the imaginary and the marvellous, dreams were 
associated with non-rational forms of thought, mystic inspirations and clairvoyance.  
 Surrealism deliberately reaches beyond the boundaries of Freud’s doctrine, while also 
bringing contributions from nineteenth-century parapsychology and occultism to the fore. Its 
concern with the establishment of a new order of things, presumably of a broader and more 
flexible nature, took the form of a surrealist mystique, a topic to which Artaud made a 
particular contribution. The surrealist rehabilitation of excluded forms of knowledge, 
inaugurated by the unconscious, included all that “sous couleur de civilisation, sous prétexte 
de progrès, on est parvenu à bannir de l’esprit”2 (Breton Manifestes 20). The thematisation of 
occultism, madness and oriental culture, and the different approaches to the matter of 
otherness, can be considered a part of surrealism’s exploration of pre-scientific knowledge. 
They also refused a set of social institutions, paving the way for concrete fights, which 
culminated in a commitment to communism in the late twenties. Stripped of its scientific 
character, the unconscious dimension was an important source for the construction of a 
                                                            
1 “if the depths of our minds conceal strange forces capable of increasing those on the surface, or victoriously 
fighting against them, there is all the more interest in having them captured … in order to submit them, if 
applicable, to the control of reason”. All quotes were translated by me, with the assistance of Katy Stone and 
Rachael McGill. 
2 “under the guise of civilisation, under the pretext of progress, we managed to banish from the spirit” 
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revolutionary reality. 
The original and controversial conjunction represented by the approach of surrealism 
to the unconscious, psychoanalysis, unconventional forms of knowledge and the methods and 
ideology of dialectic materialism exerted decisive influence on the works of Artaud and 
Benjamin. They are heirs to this intellectual trend that made use of the Freudian notion of the 
unconscious through the avant-garde and surrealist enterprise. More importantly, their 
writings questioned the traditional notion of experience, as expressed in the world view of the 
epoch, and participated in the re-emergence of forms of mysticism in the twentieth century.3 
These gestures, according to Evelyne Grossman in “Modernes Déshumanités” (2012), were 
part of “la recherché constante d’une sortie de la finitude de l’humain”4 (Déhumanités 49). In 
practical terms, Artaud and Benjamin criticised the presumption of supremacy of a self-
centred, fully intentional and conscious human being. They appeal particularly for a 
“spiritualisation” of life and thought, as opposed to the scientific and individualising 
tendencies of the time.5 
The interpretations that Benjamin and Artaud elaborated on the conditions of 
experience and magic in the twentieth century derive partially from their very different 
backgrounds. In fact, the writings of both authors are frequently approached from the point of 
view of their lives. This highlights a common critical bias that is at times facilitated by their 
own style and subjects. The discussion of the lives of Artaud and Benjamin, while it should 
not over-code their writings, is nevertheless able to provide elements of correspondence with 
them. That is, a form of communication that emerges from the confrontation of life and text. 
Having this in mind, some biographical landmarks are highlighted. 
Walter Benedix Schönflies Benjamin was born in 1892 to a prosperous Jewish family 
based in Berlin.6 He was the eldest of three children. Benjamin’s father worked as an antiques 
                                                            
3 The term mysticism, just like magic, alludes to a set of beliefs that prescind from immediate verification and 
logical explanation. Historically, such terms evoke the moment at which practices that were once constituent of 
the social sphere became estranged from it, and no longer integrated the tissue of experience. After the 
emergence of science, they designate prescientific forms of knowledge, such as folklore and popular culture, 
and the modern attempts to restore the value of such knowledge through rites evoking the magic worldview. A 
further discussion can be found in the forth chapter of this work (p. 115-207). 
4 “search for a constant output of the human finitude” 
5 The notion of spirit is privileged, throughout this work, over terms such as mind, intellect and soul. Our use, in 
consonance with the writings of Artaud and Benjamin, corresponds to the Greek pneuma, the German Geist and 
the French esprit or élan vital. It expresses the ideas of breath of life and vital spark. The call for 
“spiritualisation,” in this context, suggests the necessity to turn to substancial and non-evident aspects of live. 
6 The information summarised here is taken from Osborne and Charles’ entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, and Scholem’s Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship. The biographical data on Artaud comes 
from the notes by Grossman to the volume Œuvres (Ed. Quarto). 
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trader, owning a number of investments, through which he guaranteed the family a high 
standard of living. Like many during that period, Benjamin’s family followed the path of 
assimilation indicated by enlightened Judaism two centuries earlier. At the age of 13, 
Benjamin was sent to a boarding school in Thuringia. There he was introduced to the liberal 
reformist tendencies that would define his younger years. He became involved with what is 
today known as Die Deutsche Jugendbewegung (“The German Youth Movement”). In its 
journal, Der Anfang (“The Beginning”), he published his first essays, around 1910. 
Benjamin’s texts concerned, for the most part, the theme of awakening of the younger 
generation, in relation to a spiritual transformation of society.  
Later Benjamin attended the universities of Freiburg and Berlin, focusing his studies 
on philosophy. He remained active in the youth movement until 1914, when he denounced its 
leader, Gustav Wyneken, for supporting the war efforts. In 1915 Benjamin started a life-long 
relationship with Gershom Scholem, a fellow student at Berlin and a future Kabbalist, with 
whom Benjamin discussed Judaism in particular. At the age of 27, he defended his doctoral 
dissertation on German Romanticism at the University of Bern. Benjamin’s 
Habilitationsschrift (thesis allowing entry to the academic profession), however, was rejected 
in 1925 on charges of incomprehensibility. It versed on the subject of the German Trauerspiel 
(“Mourning Play”), and an excerpt of it was published soon after with acclaim. An academic 
career being an impossibility for him, Benjamin worked on demand for literary journals, 
receiving lifelong financial support from his father. 
In the mid-twenties, Benjamin’s interests turned to marxism, a decision inspired by 
his reading of Georg Lukács, his friendship with Bertolt Brecht, and a visit to Moscow in 
1926-7. The orientation of his work, from that period on, concerned the conjunction of 
different cultural analyses with the precepts of historical materialism, rather than being a 
work located within such precepts. In 1933, after a period of comings and goings, Benjamin 
left Germany for the last time. He travelled in exile through several European cities, 
sojourning in Paris for the longest period. In the thirties, he was supported by the Institut für 
Sozialforschung (“Institute for Social Research”), submitting his articles for the meticulous 
criticism of the group, and particularly of his friends Adorno and Horkheimer. During the 
war, he spent some time in a French concentration camp, after which he undertook failed 
ventures to leave the continent. Benjamin passed away in 1940, supposedly having 
committed suicide, during an escape attempt at the border city of Port Bou, Spain. 
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Antonin Marie Joseph Paul Artaud was born in Marseille in 1896, the eldest son of a 
trader family. The majority of Artaud’s brothers and sisters were stillborn or died very young. 
While Artaud’s father was French, his mother came from a multi-ethnic family based in 
Turkey. As a consequence, Artaud was in contact, from an early age, with Turkish, Greek 
and Italian, of which he learned to speak the last two. As a teenager, he suffered from an 
unidentifiable disease, consisting of confusion, pain and anxiety. From 1915 onwards, Artaud 
spent time in nursing homes. The diagnoses he received were usually vague, such as 
neurasthenia and hereditary syphilis. During these stays he was administered drugs to relieve 
his pain, including laudanum and opium. In 1916, Artaud published his first poems. The 
activity of writing was to remain continuous in the years to come. 
In 1920, Artaud met the psychiatrist Édouard Toulouse, with whom he established an 
intellectual kinship. Artaud moved to the outskirts of Paris, to live in Toulouse’s quarters. At 
this point, he painted, drew and wrote, encouraged by the physician and his wife, and 
frequently published in their journal, Demain (“Tomorrow”). His interests in theatre and 
dadaism led him to engage, particularly through the figure of Max Jacob, with the Parisian 
artistic scene. From that point on, Artaud was part of the theatre company Atelier, and started 
his long and profitable relationship with theatre. He actively participated in different aspects 
of the production of plays, and freuquently appeared as an actor in them. In 1923, Artaud 
published the first issue of Bilboquet (“Cup-and-ball”), a journal written entirely by him. In 
the personal sphere, he experienced financial difficulties, while his health problems became 
characterised by the sensation of paralysis.  
The year 1924 saw Artaud’s cinema début, the publication of “Correspondence avec 
Jacques Rivière,” and, as a result of the latter, his first contact with the surrealists, whose 
group he joined immediately. In 1925, Artaud was an active member, publishing in the 
journal La Révolution Surréaliste (“The Surrealist Revolution”), as well as books of his own, 
such as L’Ombilic des Limbes (“Umbilical Limbo”) and Le Pèse-Nerfs (“Nerve Scales”). By 
the end of the year, differences within the surrealist group started to emerge around the form 
to be taken by the surrealist revolution, leading to the formal expulsion of Artaud in 1927. 
Artaud and Breton, one of the central figures of the movement, remained in contact. Their 
relationship of mutual support, marked by a few periods of disagreement, would last all their 
lives.  
In 1925, Artaud had already started working to establish the “Théatre Alfred Jarry,” 
that would function until 1930. He remained involved with theatre and cinema for many 
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years, and these art forms, to a great extent, offered him the financial and spiritual means to 
keep working. For some time in the thirties, Artaud carried out various trips. He travelled to 
Mexico in 1936, where he spoke at a series of conferences on surrealism and theatre, and 
spent some time with the Tarahumaras tribe. On his return, he continued to work on various 
texts and exhibitions, sojourning with friends or on the streets. In 1937 he undertook a trip to 
Ireland with very few financial resources. His letters of this period attest to the experiencing 
of a great mystic exaltation. Artaud was arrested and deported to France, met in Le Havre and 
sent to a psychiatric hospital. This was the beginning of a period spent in several psychiatric 
institutions, which only ended in 1947. In the meantime, despite dreadful living conditions, 
Artaud wrote and drew almost uninterruptedly, and many of his books were published while 
he remained hospitalised. He was released and returned to Paris in the first months of 1947. 
One year later, he died of rectal cancer, aggravated by his poor living conditions. 
The public biographical data of Artaud and Benjamin give no evidence of a meeting 
between the two. Despite being contemporaries, they did not mention each other, at least as 
far as this writer is aware, during their life time. They at times frequented the same milieu, 
particularly the surrealist circles in Paris in the late twenties and early thirties. Perhaps they 
could have crossed paths there or in Marseille on a few occasions in the thirties, but no sign 
of any such meeting has been found. Amongst the few critics who have discussed the absence 
of references between them, Rainer Nägele, in The Cambridge Companion to Walter 
Benjamin (2004), points to some similar aspects to be found in their views on surrealism. 
While identifying in Benjamin’s essay on the avant-garde movement the reference to a crisis 
in the European intelligentsia, Nägele states: 
Walter Benjamin does not mention the fact that at least one French writer, 
Antonin Artaud, shares the same perspective, insisting on the high stakes of 
writing beyond the limits of aesthetic concerns. It is indeed one of the most 
puzzling aspects of Benjamin’s essay on Surrealism and his other writings on 
the French scene, that, as far as I know, there is not one single mentioning of 
Artaud. To be sure, Artaud had ruptured his relations with the Surrealists, but 
precisely because he saw their potential and their limits in the same terms as 
Benjamin. (175f) 
The present work hols that the terms in which Artaud and Benjamin expressed their criticism 
to surrealism were not exactly the same. They point to a similar orientation in Artaud’s and 
Benjamin’s engagement with the movement, and the form of experience it produced. 
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As in the case of surrealism, the elements that link Artaud and Benjamin are also 
those that distance them. They are, for instance, the relationship with avant-garde 
movements, the acknowledgement of the crisis of enlightened reason, the input of magic in 
the constitution of a form of critique. While the themes, and, at times, even the notions used 
by them are the same or analogous, there is a stark difference in the nature of the writings of 
Artaud and Benjamin. This distance underscores their works, giving rise to different tones, 
different uses of language, which, while perhaps not completely incompatible, are not 
siblings.  
The comparison of Artaud and Benjamin does not aim at reconciling their differences, 
let alone erasing unsolved problems that emerge from the examination of them. The notion of 
image, on these grounds, offers an unequivocal starting point. From Freud’s definition of the 
dream as an imagistic dramatisation of the commitment between unconscious wishes and 
conscious life (Dreams 79; 87), to Benjamin’s appeal to the political sphere “reserved one 
hundred percent for images” (Surrealism 191), and Artaud’s evocation of the clear language 
of images in the thematisation of la Chair (“the Flesh”) (Œuvres 148), this notion pervades 
these author’s most important formulations. Also relevant to this issue is the surrealist 
“collection of images” from the unconscious, highlighting the articulation of an experience 
both imaginative and revolutionary. 
The notion of image evoked in such contexts designates much more than an aesthetic 
sign. According to Didi-Huberman in Survivance des Lucioles (2009), it refers to the 
figuration, the act of rendre présent (“rendering present”) something real, historical, and even 
oneself. Psychic and mental images are the most representative of this understanding, and 
cannot be separated from the process in which they are engendered. Didi-Huberman relates 
images to the imagination — “ce travail producteur d’images pour la pensée”7 (52) —, 
suggesting that in ways of imagining lie ways of being political. As in a flash of lightening, 
images open the way to action. The writings of both Benjamin and Artaud, while they startle 
the reader with images, require imagination as part of the reader’s engagement. Not in order 
to decodify metaphors, but to take part in the sensitive interplay between the production of 
images and forms of living. 
 Moreover, if Benjamin and Artaud testify to the decay and absence of traditional 
experience, their attempts to construct new forms from this diagnosis are permeated by 
images. Artaud’s point of departure is the excruciating feeling that dominates his experience, 
                                                            
7 “the work that produces images for thought” 
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from which he acquires a radical perspective on the discontinuities of thought. Writing 
appears as one possibility of figuration, that is, the acquiring of distance from the 
fundamental distance within his own being. It is the dramatisation of this position that brings 
images to the front. Artaud is then confronted with an untranslatable knowledge, a terrible 
wisdom that accesses at once the imagination and the fundamental problems of living. This 
form of knowledge represents a thread, a point of connection amidst the eternal separation of 
instances of life. It is, for the most part, fragile and not comforting to Artaud. It represents, 
nevertheless, a step on the path towards the establishment of a corps vivant (“living body”). 
As Artaud states, his concern is with “une révolution de la conscience qui nous permettra de 
guérir la vie”8 (Œuvres 728). The activities of figuration and dramatisation are vital to this 
endeavour.  
 In Benjamin’s writings, the problematisation of experience, while it takes into 
consideration the decay of a mystical world view, points to the reminiscent presence of magic 
in the current forms of living. Images are a privileged form of trace of this disappearing 
world view. According to Benjamin, they operate outside the chronological order, and are 
capable of both recovering and dispersing a forgotten or repressed past. By doing so, images 
are able to provoke a transformation of the present. Benjamin states: “the past can be seized 
only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen 
again” (Theses 255). Surrealism, cinema and literary writing are some of the fields through 
which Benjamin investigates this reminiscent sphere, leading him to his ambiguous diagnosis 
on the impossibility of experience, but also the possible reconstruction of it, in a new, 
“synthetic” form.  
 The comparison between Artaud and Benjamin allows for an understanding of the 
extent to which the deviation and dramatisation performed by images in relation to pre-
established situations plays an active part in building the conditions for a transformative 
experience. The dimension of the unconscious, permeated by images, appears in their works 
under different facets, of which those grouped under the notions of magic and experience are 
privileged in this work. What will become evident in the pages to follow, once again, is that 
the approaches of both authors are radically different. While Benjamin’s world view, and 
particularly his vision on language, is hermeneutically oriented, aiming, ultimately, at the 
restoration of an interpretation that allows the unveiling of potentially transformative 
significations, Artaud’s is the heir of a tragic orientation of thought, concerned with the 
                                                            
8 “a revolution of consciousness that will allow us to heal life” 
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irrecoverable fragmentation of the soul, preventing the formation of absolute meaning. 
Although Benjamin does not envision any ultimate resolution or restoration, and indeed at 
times expresses the fragmented dimension as the only experienceable one, and although 
Artaud recurrently nourishes ideas of recuperation and the joining of fragments into some 
new form of consistency, the thoughts’ horizon of the two writers cannot be matched.  
 The interest of this work lies in capturing the formulations that emerge from the 
positioning of the writings of Artaud and Benjamin side by side. The positive, constructive 
aspect of their works represents the high point of this endeavor. It concerns Artaud’s and 
Benjamin’s attempts to overcome the darker aspects of the changes related to the field of 
experience in the twentieth century. Although traditional forms of experience were no longer 
available, and the dissolution in understanding of thought and the self had reached a point of 
no return, new conditions for experience were being slowly and tentatively constructed. 
Artaud and Benjamin give a testimony of radically different, but connected, forms of this 
construction. 
 Additionally to the different philosophical orientations, the formal dissimilarities 
between the writings of Benjamin and Artaud are illuminated by their comparison. Because 
the nature of their writings is very different, the point of departure of this work required the 
establishment of a common basis for analysis. While, for Artaud, writing is an act that cannot 
be merely operated on and about certain subject, but has instead to be “incarnated,” Benjamin 
addresses his subjects of investigation in a more traditional fashion. Therefore, if the role of 
the distanced critic seems to fit Benjamin quite comfortably, Artaud intends to merge in the 
same act the roles of writer and critic, the actor and the spectator. According to Grossman, 
Artaud “pratiquera toute sa vie ce qu’il appelle ‘la culture en action.’ La littérature est donc 
un acte, la mise en jeu de forces, l’inverse d’une consommation à distance.”9 (Œuvres 25).  
While Artaud opposes the idea that culture and life are separate fields, Benjamin, in 
contrast, is supposed to have aspired to the position of “the only true critic of German 
literature” (Arendt 4). As a consequence of these dissimilarities, which once again reflect the 
fundamental differences between Artaud and Benjamin, the interpretation of the notions of 
the unconscious, experience and magic in this work are the result of an effort that is at least 
partially interpretative towards their writings, while hopefully having remained true to their 
ideas. 
                                                            
9 “will practice all his life what he calls ‘culture in action.’ Literature is thus an act, the invocation of forces, the 
inverse of a distant consummation.” 
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 The theme of a comparison between Artaud and Benjamin propose some further 
questions. Artaud’s texts seem to require a particular positioning on the part of the reader, 
questioning as they do the very nature of the writing process. Artaud problematises, for 
instance, the reader’s conscious and unconscious engagement in his writings. In what 
concerns the engagement of this work, the emphasis is on bringing out his living legacy, that 
is, his consistent commitment with the constitution of vital forms of living. This opposes the 
interpretations that emphasise impotence and suffering in Artaud’s writings, without 
highlighting the other facets of the tragic experience: of ecstasy, fury and passion. In relation 
to Benjamin, the question is that of escaping psychological and apolitical frameworks, 
particularly the search for a character to assign meaning to the “fragmented work.” The aim 
here is to reveal Benjamin’s at times erroneous, but always innovating, search for new forms 
of experience and political action, to take place at the crossroads between a disenchanted 
world and the remaining traces of magic. 
 Finally, the present work intends to approach the writings of Artaud and Benjamin 
through a comparative framework focused on the conceptualisation of the unconscious, 
particularly through the themes that derived from it in the work of the two writers: magic and 
experience. The research proposition concerns the intricate relationship of the notion 
proposed by Freud with the mystical aspect of both authors’ writings, in order to propose the 
“image” of experience that permeates their accounts of modernity. It argues that the Freudian 
approach to the unconscious is a fundament of their works, although it is explored in contexts 
and directions distant from the precepts established by the Viennese psychiatrist. Also present 
in the surrealist perspective, these “estranged” tendencies do not coincide completely in the 
views of Artaud and Benjamin. They point to similar interests, and allow a criticism of 
different aspects of their writings. 
 Departing from the Freudian understanding of the unconscious in The Interpretation 
of Dreams, this work explores the surrealist definition of this same notion, particulary 
through the writings of Breton. It includes the different inputs of psychoanalysis and 
occultism in surrealism, as well as Breton’s attempt to integrate the discoveries of Freud with 
the precepts of dialectic materialism. It considers that, from Freud’s recourse to a broad basis 
of non-scientific expertise to establish his theory in the scientific field, to the concurrent 
influence of recent psychoanalytic theory and occultism in surrealism, the question that have 
remained open is whether the unconscious’ relation to magic is a conditional or a determinant 
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one. From this issue derives the more general elucidation, evoked in the writings of Artaud 
and Benjamin, of whether the unconscious is a liberating or a limiting source of experience.  
The answers, different and unique, that the works of Artaud and Benjamin offer in 
their discussions of the role of the unconscious, and, through it, of the spiritual and magical 
sphere of life in the constitution of experience structure this work chronologically and 
thematically. Magic appears, in the writings of Artaud and Benjamin, as a recurrent theme in 
the exploration of the forms of and means towards achieving truthful and significant 
experience, in opposition to the chronic condition that these authors name the dispossession 
or decay of experience. Artaud and Benjamin work, to some extent, against the grain of the 
scientific tendency of Freud’s writings, as well as being in disagreement with some aspects of 
the incursion of surrealism into discussions of unconscious potentialities. Nevertheless, while 
both writers depart from the scenario established by these two trends, they also resort to them 
at various points in their work.  
Artaud and Benjamin approached the unconscious as a sphere that shelters what 
magic and astrology used to reveal. While it operates as a substitute or remnant of this 
dimension in the secularised world, it is also engaged in manoeuvres that undermine 
individual and social development. Magical powers are mobilised either towards radical 
change or, conversely, towards the prevention of the conditions for this transformation. 
Within this framework, the field of magic undergoes a transformation, from having a 
restricted and almost marginal role, to participating in both authors’ speculations on 
processes that affect the whole of society. While for Benjamin this transformation takes the 
form of an engagement in organising the communist revolution, in Artaud it is a revolt 
against all forms of oppression, both material and spiritual. As mentioned above, both authors 
explore this connection through the theme of images.  
Permeated by the exploration of the magic or mystical dimension of life, Artaud’s and 
Benjamin’s investigations into experience not only elaborate a radical diagnosis of the 
conditions of living in modernity, but also outlines the different forms taken by this notion 
following the crisis of traditional definitions precipitated by the work of Freud. Artaud and 
Benjamin envision, through a combination of forms of communion and solitude, represented 
by language or writing, and religion or spiritual transcendence, the possibility of both 
dramatising and gaining distance from the negative diagnosis of contemporary experience, in 
order to engender the procedural construction of new forms of it.  
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In this context, language appears as related to an “original” sphere, in which both the 
fragmented and decayed forms of experience are explored through the idea of the trace. In 
relation to language, the fundamental distance separating the writings of Artaud and 
Benjamin becomes once again evident. If this distance does not constitute an estrangement, 
this is partially due to both having attempted to create new forms of consistency from their 
analyses of the thresholds of experience, of the emergence of a “new consciousness” of the 
fading of traditional forms. The kinship or parenté between the works of Artaud and 
Benjamin, in this regard, concern the connecting of underlying tendencies, instead of the 
establishing of identities. 
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PART I 
The Unconscious: From Sigmund Freud to the Avant-Garde Movements 
 
  
 
Hartmann 15 
2. THE DISCLOSURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 
In the theory progressively elaborated by Sigmund Freud in the book The 
Interpretation of Dreams, two instances of the psychical life — here understood in the 
original Greek sense of psukhē (Psyche), i.e. the breath of life, the human soul — are 
described. One of these instances, today familiar in popular discourse, is itself unconscious, 
remote from rational thinking, and unable to emerge without the intervention of the second 
instance, that of consciousness (Freud Dreams 169). However, despite making use of a 
negative definition of the unconscious, Freud considered this dimension to have a much 
larger role in human life than the conscious one (Freud Dreams 607). His theory, initially 
dramatically rejected by both the general public and specialists, has come to exert influence 
on a number of intellectual fields. In its philosophical aspect, for instance, the notion of 
unconscious becomes the umbrella beneath which a variety of phenomena, hitherto only 
marginal in the history of thought, can be explored. 
In the framework of the present text, analysis of Freud’s first extensive work, The 
Interpretation of Dreams, is privileged over a more comprehensive examination of several of 
his writings. This is due to the inaugural nature of the book’s presentation of Freud’s notion 
of the unconscious, as well as its significant cultural impact. It represents the line that 
connects Freud and the avant-garde movements, particularly surrealism, to the complex 
unfolding of the unconscious dimension of experience in the works of Antonin Artaud and 
Walter Benjamin. No less important here is the fact that, in the book in question, the notion of 
the unconscious is “revealed” throughout via Freud’s exploration of the dream, that eternally-
disputed subject that became a crucial part of the work of the Surrealists and also of the 
cultural milieu that fed into both Artaud and Benjamin’s writings. 
Moreover, as an inaugural work in the field of psychoanalysis, The Interpretation of 
Dreams is an exemplary dramatisation of the way in which control of the domain of valid 
knowledge was under dispute: Science was pitted against a vast and disparate body of non-
scientific wisdom, from traditional lore accumulated and transmitted over centuries, to more 
recent developments in mysticism and popular culture. This is particularly interesting when 
considered in the context of the later establishment of science as the principal, and arguably 
single, source of truth and valuable knowledge in the twentieth century. One of the central 
aims of the present work is therefore to demonstrate the survival of one facet of the 
conflictive development of the notion of the unconscious in the works of authors relevant to 
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the twentieth century. They are, in this sense, the enduring connection between a dimension 
beyond rationality and elements of prescientific thinking about the soul. 
This approach follows the logical development of Freud’s book, taking into account 
the intricate and multifold nature of its genealogy. In doing so it hopes, on the one hand, to 
render the different elements involved in the complex emergence of the concept of the 
unconscious visible; and, on the other hand, to demonstrate the parallel operation of two 
fields of reference in Freud’s theory, namely a scientific and a non-scientific one. It begins by 
briefly contextualising The Interpretation of Dreams in relation to both Freud’s own 
trajectory and the recent ancestry of the unconscious in the history of thought. This is 
followed by a review of the presentation of the unconscious through the course of the book, 
paying special attention to those elements that contradict the dominant tone of the work, that 
of a dialogical process between writer and the reader, leading to a recognition of Freud’s 
postulates. The third section of this text focuses on a few elements that point to the singular 
place occupied by prescientific notions in Freud’s work. Through analysis of these, it 
attempts to characterise the ambiguous status of such elements in the early expression of 
psychoanalytic theory, a status that would influence the treatment of the notion of the 
unconscious throughout the twentieth century. 
In conclusion, the thesis proposed here with regard to the emergence of the 
unconscious in Freud’s theory is that it is as close to nineteenth century science as it is to 
prescientific thinking on dreams and other psychical formations. In methodological terms, 
Freud’s approach differs enormously from that of either of these fields. However, a defining 
element seems to lie in the fact that Freud, when writing The Interpretation of Dreams, was 
eager to be accepted by the ruling scientists of his time, a desire which necessitated the 
limited space assigned to non-scientific wisdom in his theory. Artaud and Benjamin, on the 
other hand, work against the grain of this scientific trend, presenting an experience of 
unconsciousness immersed in the remnants of magic and mystical practices. 
 
2.1. Freud and the Theory of Dreams 
According to the French psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu (11), the book that Sigmund 
Freud expected to provide him with great personal and professional recognition, took eight 
years to sell out its first edition. The Interpretation of Dreams — originally titled Die 
Traumdeutung — represented a departure from the short essays and reviews Freud had 
published before 1899. From accounts of animal physiology to clinical medicine and 
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neurology, the psychiatrist’s trajectory can be traced back through these rarely-read early 
publications (Freud Three Essays 223-257). First as a laboratory technician, later as a hospital 
clinician, Freud wrote about topics that were relatively significant to the fields of physiology 
and medicine at the time. The nature of scientific discovery at the end of the nineteenth 
century, for instance, can be charted through Freud’s studies of cocaine, which were gathered 
together in a paper in 1884. In this case, believing in the effective therapeutic use of the 
substance, Freud recommended it to colleagues and patients. This was unfortunately partly 
responsible for the early death of one of his colleagues, Ernst Fleischl. Although not an 
exceptional fact in the nineteenth century medical field, this event precipitated intense 
feelings of both lack of recognition and guilt on the part of Freud (Anzieu 13). He displayed 
such reactions at different points in his life, including during his sleep, as he later made 
public in The Interpretation of Dreams. 
Freud’s interest in the functioning of the psychical life became decisive when, in 
1885, he travelled to Paris to study under the French psychiatrist Jean-Martin Charcot, who 
was famous for the use of hypnosis in the treatment of hysteria (Souza and Endo 47). Back in 
Vienna, he resigned from his position at the hospital in order to devote himself completely to 
private practice, while starting to treat nervous diseases with hypnotic suggestion (Freud 
Three Essays 4). It was through his fellow psychiatrist Josef Breuer, and the much-discussed 
case of Anna O. — originally Bertha Pappenheim — that Freud became acquainted with the 
concept of the retrogression of neurotic symptoms once the patient had “freely” addressed the 
afflicted manifestations and, particularly, after he or she had recalled the original experiences 
related to them (Freud Hysteria 262-3). This was named cathartic analysis by Breuer and 
Freud, and is characterised by its orientation towards the patient’s expression of emotions, 
leading to those supposedly present at the original scene of trauma and later repressed. 
Hypnosis, in this case, was the tool used to suspend the critical instance that prevented such 
emotions from emerging. 
According to Souza and Endo (48-9), Freud began to adopt the cathartic method in his 
practice, subsequently altering it once he abandoned the use of hypnosis. His collaboration 
with Breuer, however, proved to be prolific. The two published Studies on Hysteria in 1895, 
introducing the idea that symptoms of this illness were symbolic representations of traumatic 
memories, often of a sexual nature (Freud Hysteria 210). This was not the first book 
published by Freud. In 1891 On Aphasia: A Critical Study had appeared, in which Freud 
reviewed previous theories on brain damage and challenged them using clinical material. It 
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was, however, the first of his works to have a psychological orientation. It is worth noting in 
this context that Freud and Breuer would later disagree on the importance of sexual aspects in 
the aetiology of mental conditions (Souza and Endo 44). In any case, Studies on Hysteria 
represented Freud’s commitment to the analysis of psychical afflictions through approaching 
hidden aspects of the mind, precisely ten years after he made his decisive journey to Paris.  
The year following the book’s publication, 1896, was significant in Freud’s life and 
work. This was due above all to the death of his father, an event that engendered, after a 
period of deep sadness, what the author called his process of self-analysis (Freud Drafts 257). 
Through this, Freud would put to the test his recent theories on the functioning of the mind, 
paying particular attention to dreams. However, the self-analysis was not a solitary process. 
Instead, it was based largely on Freud’s constant exchange with the German otolaryngologist 
Wilhelm Fliess, his main supporter and close friend at the time (Souza and Endo 51). Due to 
findings obtained through this process, Freud abandoned, for instance, the trauma theory of 
neurosis, while recognising the importance of infantile sexuality. In the same year, according 
to letters exchanged between Freud and Fliess, the structure behind The Interpretation of 
Dreams had already been sketched (Freud Drafts 233-9). The book, however, was not 
completed until three years later, in 1899. Freud dated it 1900, intending to situate it in a new 
era. And indeed, in relation to previous theories of dreams, the work of Freud did inaugurate 
a new period, based on the establishment of a distinction between the manifest and the latent 
contents of dreams. It is in the “gap” opened up by this distinction that Freud makes his 
major contribution to the understanding of the Psyche, the notion of unconscious. 
Freud was not a pioneer of his times when it came to dealing with the notion of the 
unconscious (Kirchner 684). As pointed out by Arnim Regenbogen, “the history of the 
unconscious can be understood both as the history of a philosophical problem 
(Problemgeschichte) and as the history of a concept (Begriffsgeschichte)” (Nicholls and 
Liebscher 3). While the concept of the unconscious is quite recent in the history of thought, 
the philosophical problem concerning the existence of such a dimension can be dated back to 
ancient times. In the latter case, according to Nicholls and Liebscher in Thinking the 
Unconscious: Nineteenth-Century German Thought, the problematic extends from Buddha, 
Plato and Plotinus, through the writings of the Middle Ages, up to its modern expression 
(Nicholls and Liebscher 4). In the former case, the concept’s complex genealogy in 
nineteenth-century German philosophy and literature is immediately evident. This is the 
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context from which the work of Freud emerged. Here follows a short recapitulation of this 
genealogy, largely based on the retrospective proposed by Nicholls and Liebscher (3-25).  
The first text to use the word Unbewußtseyn (“unconsciousness”) is widely accepted 
to be Ernst Platner’s Philosophical Aphorisms (1776). Its framework, however, is far from 
original. Platner’s approach inherited its structure from the writings of philosophers such as 
René Descartes, John Locke and Gottfried Leibniz, who in turn influenced and responded to 
each other’s work (Nicholls and Liebscher 6). Briefly, the reception of Descartes in England 
and Germany resulted in various assertions regarding the impossibility of limiting the human 
experience to rational consciousness and thought. The definition of what might lie beyond 
this dimension, however, was not thoroughly established. For Leibniz, for instance, this 
sphere was concerned with the multiplicity of perception of which the human being is 
capable, elements of which must necessarily exist at a level beneath consciousness, the so-
called petites perceptions (Kirchner 684). It was Leibniz who ultimately established a 
German philosophical discourse on the unconscious, with Platner and Christian Wolff 
amongst his prominent successors. If, for Wolff, the unconscious manifests itself in the 
failure to differentiate what is perceived by the human senses, leading to the “darkness of 
thoughts,” for Platner, it includes ideas both with and without consciousness, characterised as 
intrinsic parts of the soul’s life. 
Alongside the Leibnizian tradition, Kant’s ideas also contributed to establishing the 
nineteenth century discourse on the unconscious. Despite their blatant differences, in 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, published in 1798 — but probably written 
between 1781 and 1787 —, Kant formulated a notion of obscured ideas that is very close to 
the theories of Leibniz. He mentions the existence of representations without consciousness, 
pointing to a sphere of intuitions and sensations that would go on to inspire the speculations 
of Romantic writers. His later works on critical philosophy, however, focus almost 
exclusively on the exploration of reason, leaving little space for the darkness he once 
envisioned, or at least reserving a much more privileged role for the faculty of understanding 
than for the sensibility of the self. The transcendental idealism formulated by Kant, however, 
would lead to a tradition in which a divided “I” — an object of inner sense or intuition at the 
same time as it is a subject thinking through the operations of understanding — is at times 
minimised in favour of what is often conceived as the “not-I.” An example is Friedrich 
Schelling’s attempt at a Kantian project in System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), in 
which the term unconscious is used in connection with subjectivity, freedom and nature. This 
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relative “empowerment” of the not-I would remain important in the works of Schiller, 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, before entering, directly or indirectly, into the work of Freud. 
The philosopher Eduard von Hartmann also occupied a prominent place in the field of 
speculation on the unconscious in the German-speaking world of the nineteenth century. His 
book Philosophy of the Unconscious, published in 1869, appeared in eleven editions and was 
supplanted only by Freud’s work as the chief theory in the public sphere. Despite the public 
acclamation he received, however, Hartmann was severely criticised by the academic elites of 
the time, as was Freud some decades later (Nicholls and Liebscher 1). The author described 
the unconscious in terms of the Absolute, an all-inclusive whole that is both will and idea, 
suffering and order (Hartmann E. 58-60). On a practical level, he considered the role of this 
dimension in a large range of fields including language, religion, history and social life. On 
an abstract level, the two poles of the unconscious were described as being exchanged along 
the world’s development and as being responsible for the intercalation of pleasure and pain in 
the human experience. Finally, as summarised by Henri Ellemberger, Hartmann’s approach 
traversed different fields of knowledge, in that he distinguished three layers of 
unconsciousness:  
(1) the absolute unconscious, which constitutes the substance of the universe 
and is the source of the other forms of the unconscious; (2) the physiological 
unconscious … at work in the origin, development and evolution of living 
beings, including man; (3) the relative or psychological unconscious, which 
lies at the source of our conscious mental life. (Ellemberger 210) 
It is remarkable how little the unconscious described by Hartmann resembles the 
scattered, though strict, philosophical approaches of Leibniz, Kant and their followers. With 
Philosophy of the Unconscious, the unconscious was elevated from being a notion that had 
been modestly and carefully put forward, and been relegated to a secondary place in the rank 
of philosophical matters, to a comprehensive idea, present at every level of experience, from 
the origin of all things to everyday life. Hartmann was therefore responsible for a 
popularisation of the term within academic and public spheres, paving the way for Freud’s 
work, even if their definitions of it consistently differed. It is worth noting here that, in 
addition to the comprehensive approach that distinguishes his work from both that of Freud 
and of the other authors previously mentioned, Hartmann was a pessimist. He believed that 
the resolution of the two poles of unconsciousness constituted a voluntary departure from 
life, that is, the triumph of idea over will (Hartmann E. 386).  
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The context in which Hartmann’s work appeared, of laboured philosophical 
approaches on the one hand and growing popular interest on the other, is characteristic of 
how the notion of the unconscious was viewed in the nineteenth century. Nietzsche, in 1873, 
expressed it ironically thus: “In the entire world one does not speak of the unconscious since, 
according to its essence, it is unknown; only in Berlin does one speak of and know something 
about it, and explain to us what actually sets it apart” (262). In this sense the work of 
Hartmann, a Berlin-based transcendental realist, is the exception in terms of nineteenth 
century philosophical treatment of the unconscious. It emerged in a cultural atmosphere that 
could conceive of and receive such thematisation, albeit subjecting it to sharp academic 
criticism. 
 
2.2. Die Traumdeutung 
Considering the medical context within which Freud develops most of his ideas, 
together with the philosophical approaches to non-consciousness prevalent in the German-
speaking world at the time, The Interpretation of Dreams emerges as a radically different 
account of the unconscious that is, however, not without ancestry. Freud himself opened his 
book with a review of previous texts on dreams, establishing a very different lineage to that 
presented above, with the exception of references to Hartmann and Kant (Freud Dreams 35-
120). In both cases, however, Freud acknowledges no influence. In the case of Kant, he refers 
to his affirmations that dreams give a glimpse into one’s inner nature, and that they are 
connected to mental illnesses (Freud Dreams 98; 115). In the case of Hartmann, Freud 
highlights his pessimism, asserting that, in common with other observers, the German 
philosopher envisions dreams as painful experiences (Freud Dreams 159). The first 
remarkable feature of The Interpretation of Dreams, then, is its open intention to take its 
place as part of a field of scientific research. As Freud himself states in 1904, while 
presenting the notion of the unconscious to his readers, “please do not be afraid that this is 
going to land us in the depths of philosophical obscurities. Our unconscious is not quite the 
same thing as that of philosophers” (Freud Three Essays 266). However, while showing that 
his orientation is principally scientific, Freud could not completely obscure the humanistic 
aspect of his work.  
In fact, as pointed out by Bruno Bettelheim in Freud and Man’s Soul (1983), a word 
often used by Freud to designate his object of study and its dynamics was Seele (“soul”), a 
notion that, together with its derivatives, virtually disappeared in James Strachey’s 
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translation. It has been most frequently translated as “mind,” which fits well with Freud’s 
scientific aspirations. However, it also obscures the original context, that of a non-alienated 
relationship between the intellectual and the emotional aspects of life. , The dream, for 
instance, was described as the result of Seelentätigkeit (“the soul’s activity”). In fact, 
Strachey recognised having translated psychisch as psychical and seelisch as mental, even 
though he believed them to be synonymous (Strachey xix). On this point, Bettelheim (4) 
contends that the fact that Strachey was personally designated, together with Alix Strachey, as 
the English translator of Freud’s oeuvre, did not prevent him from producing mistranslations. 
Moreover, Freud and his daughter Anna Freud personally supervised the process, hampering 
posthumous criticism.  
This shift of emphasis leaves the reader of the Standard Edition with the general 
impression that Freud’s work was relatively abstract and depersonalised (Bettelheim 10). 
Another reason for this, of a more cultural nature, could be the distance separating readers 
from the context in which The Interpretation of Dreams was written. The metaphors used by 
Freud, for instance, demand some knowledge of the German used in Vienna, and the literary 
and mythological references evoked throughout the book require familiarity with classical 
literature (Bettelheim 37). Strachey, in the General Preface to the Standard Edition, mentions 
Freud’s knowledge of the Greek and Latin classics, as well as the literatures of Germany, 
England, France and Spain. On this point, he states that: “most of his allusions may have 
been immediately intelligible to his contemporaries in Vienna, but are quite beyond the range 
of a modern English-speaking reader” (Strachey xvi). Also relevant is the particular place 
occupied by psychoanalysis within the field of modern science at the time, a field in which 
philosophy and scientific research were still not completely distinct areas of study, but were 
engaged in a constant struggle for delimitation. 
In the section of Die Traumdeutung presenting the review of scientific literature 
dealing with the problems of dreams Freud can therefore be seen giving an account of what 
are for the most part medical and psychological essays published in the fifty years previous to 
1899.10 The few “philosophical” works he approaches are mostly secondary literature on 
ancient philosophy and books on mythology. In these cases he gives only schematic accounts 
of their understanding of dreams, considering the reader to be acquainted with such material. 
The bibliographical narrative produced by Freud highlights, on the one hand, the general 
                                                            
10 In newer editions of the book, however, Freud incorporated later publications, specifically those reacting to 
The Interpretation of Dreams. 
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medical understanding that dreams are irrelevant activities of the mind that hold no special 
meaning, and on the other hand, the belief that the production of dreams is related to causes 
outside mental life, from disturbances of sleep to internal organic sensations related to illness. 
Concerning the material of dreams, the bibliography generally places their origin in waking 
experience, considering that dreams bring into play no more than fragments of this, in a 
visual format. There is, therefore, the recognition that dreams “think” essentially in images, 
and construct a situation from them. For many authors, dreams simply “hallucinate” the 
information from waking life, the act of dreaming being considered to be outside the limits of 
the authority of the self. 
On the moral sense of dreams the authors brought up by Freud diverge. Whereas for 
some “the purer the life, the purer the dream” (Freud Dreams 95), for others the morality in 
dreams has a specific psychical source, making the dreamer free of responsibility for them. 
The first view is related to the belief that dreams are the language of truth, as was evident in 
the use of dreams in inquisition trials, for example. In the second approach it is the instinctive 
man who is revealed by the dream, a man subjected to his passions once his will has been 
suspended. All this is reflected in different theories of the function of dreaming. Freud 
distinguishes three of them, according to which: 1) the whole of psychical activity continues 
in dreams, but producing different results influenced by the state of sleep; 2) dreams imply a 
lowering of psychical activities, an impoverishment of connections; 3) dreams have the 
capacity to carry out special psychical activities (Freud Dreams 102-9). One can see how 
each of these approaches has different implications for the role and the assessment of dreams. 
In the first, no special value is attached to the act of dreaming, and no particular reason is 
offered as to why one should dream. In the second case, dreams are conceived as being the 
result of a weakened state of mind and therefore cannot be expected to hold any particularly 
significant meaning. It is in the third case that something exceptional is attributed to dreams, 
leading to assumptions that range from the liberation of the imagination to healing and 
artistic functions within the dreaming act. 
Finally, on the relation between dreams and mental diseases, Freud states briefly that 
for some authors there is a close connection between the two, in consonance with the view 
that dreams are part of a chaotic functioning of the mind. In some cases the dream is seen 
either as the cause of the madness, or as its first manifestation. Some of the philosophical 
approaches that Freud brings up in his literature review of dreams also appear at this point, 
including Kant’s quote that “the madman is a waking dreamer” (Dreams 115), as well as 
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Schopenhauer’s two-fold description of dream as a brief madness, and madness as a long 
dream. 
Freud’s own position in relation to the sources he describes is not immediately clear, 
despite the fact that throughout the literature review he makes both favourable and hostile 
comments. The review serves more than anything as the platform from which Freud can 
launch his own project, starting, in the book’s second chapter, with the direct presentation of 
one of his own dreams and his interpretation of it. However, one should point to the place 
occupied by Freud’s opinions in the bibliographic narrative he establishes. First of all, dreams 
obviously hold a meaning for Freud, and moreover have significance for the understanding of 
an individual’s whole psychical life. In this sense external causes, such as a noise disturbing 
sleep or a physiological malaise, might have an influence on the formation of dreams, but this 
is nothing compared to the power of psychical forces. These usually proceed from an alliance 
between a recent waking experience and a remote memory inaccessible to consciousness, the 
latter being more important in the formation of the dream. For Freud, some of the mind’s 
activities simply continue to function during sleep, while others are diminished. Crucial, 
however, is the fact that dreams present special features because they operate using the same 
mental tools as waking life, but in a different fashion. The morality that society imposes on 
the dreamer can therefore not be of the same nature as that imposed on the waking man; 
dreams may be said to speak the truth, but it is a truth of another order, cloaked in its own 
particular disguises. 
The fact that dreams can be interpreted is, according to Freud, the key contribution 
made by his theory in relation to the previous approaches he analyses. This assumption finds 
no parallels in the dominant dream theories of the nineteenth century. However, the 
exception, brought up by Freud, of Karl Albert Scherner, must be highlighted. In Das Leben 
des Traumes (“The Life of the Dream,” 1861), the author points to the fact that human 
imagination makes use of symbolism in the construction of dreams, and that such symbols 
are therefore interpretable. Scherner is particularly attached to a few specific elements of 
dream representation, related to the dreamer’s internal organs. In this sense, he makes an 
attempt at interpreting dreams that is similar, in many ways, to prescientific dream-
interpretation based on fixed symbols. As we will see, this is not very distant from Freud’s 
ambiguous approach to dream symbolism. However, as Freud himself points out, no function 
is attached to symbols in Scherner’s account, and by extension, no function is suggested for 
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the dream. In this sense, Freud’s theory does bring a new emphasis when contrasted with the 
dominant dream theories of the nineteenth century. 
This makes Freud perhaps the first author, in the context of enlightened knowledge, to 
make a systematic effort towards determining the significance of the dream in relation to 
general psychical life. Through dreams, he established a whole new approach on the 
functioning of the mind, an approach that, as mentioned above, was particularly innovative 
because of its systematic exposition of the unconscious. In Studies on Hysteria, Freud had 
defined, together with Breuer, the actual psychical force of unsuspected traumas from the 
patient’s past. In The Interpretation of Dreams, the role of the unconscious in a large 
spectrum of mental activities is established, including those that form part of the regular 
functioning of the mind. In Freud’s words, dreams are a universal fact, and their 
interpretation is “the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind” 
(Dreams 604). 
Curiously, though, in The Interpretation of Dreams there is the sense that the notion of 
the unconscious emerged unintentionally, as a side effect of the investigation of dreams. 
Freud’s literature review shows that the unconscious is far from being his initial target. The 
structure of the book invites the reader to follow Freud’s incursion, step-by-step, into the 
dream universe. He offers careful and consecutive descriptions of dream phenomena, 
lucubration on their significance and refutation of his hypothesis until a synthesis is 
proposed, usually not of a permanent nature. In this regard, Freud’s style is remarkably 
dialectical, clear and convincing, as many critics have pointed out. According to Stéphane 
Mosès, it transforms the reader into a singular addressee, who incarnates, through the text, 
the author’s opposite number. This dialogical structure displays some principles of Freud’s 
theory of knowledge, namely that the truth can never be apprehended in the abstract sphere of 
ideas, but “qu’elles se déploient tout d’abord au cours du processus de l’échange linguistique 
entre deux sujets”11 (Mosès Rêves 37). 
This seems to be the case in The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud imagines his reader 
to be sceptical and averse to his propositions. In his dialogue with this opponent, he appears 
to present and work through his arguments completely exhaustively, though in fact this is 
rarely the case. The impression usually left for the reader is that the author has pre-empted all 
possible holes that might be picked in in his theory, or at least enough of these to make the 
reader carry on reading. In this way, after an extensive literary review on dreams, the content 
                                                            
11 “That they first of all unfold in the process of linguistic exchange between two subjects” 
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of which he largely dismisses, Freud presents the reader with the thorough analysis of one of 
his own dreams, a “specimen dream.” 
 
2.3. Dream and Wish-Fulfillment 
In the first interpretation of a dream presented by Freud, through which he claims to 
reveal the millennial secret of this psychical phenomenon, a very particular process takes 
place.12 It seems, at first, very improbable that Freud’s interpretation can be accurate. He 
begins by defining the work of interpretation as the replacement of the dream “by something 
which fits into the chain of one’s mental acts” (Dreams 121). Such a formulation is the result 
of associations that the dreamer “freely” establishes from the dream’s content. Freud also 
reports two previous existing approaches to dream interpretation: the replacement of the 
dream’s content by an intelligible and in certain aspects analogous one, as in the case of the 
prediction of the future through dreams; and the decoding method, which translates specific 
signs into arbitrary meanings, as in the case of the dream manuals. Criticism of Freud points 
to the absence of scientific treatment of the subject in both cases. In other words, the 
application of these approaches as credible dream-interpretation theories is considerably 
restricted, despite their similarities with the Freudian method. 
Freud’s own approach is not immediately graspable. As Studies on Hysteria tells us, a 
dream can be part of the psychical chain that refers to the memory of a pathological idea. 
Once the element in the patient’s mental life from which this idea originated is revealed, the 
pathological arrangement tends to collapse. In the presentation of the inaugural analysis of 
his own dream, however, Freud remarks that it is the dream of “an approximately normal 
person” (Dreams 129). This is in the context of the reasons given by the author for not having 
privileged the dreams of patients in his analysis, in order to emphasise the universality he 
intends to attach to his theory.13 In contrast to Freud's previous considerations on dreams, 
therefore, The Interpretation of Dreams proposes that dreams are formed from materials that 
are not necessarily pathological in nature. They usually represent a particular state of affairs 
as the dreamer would have wished it to be, and in this sense they represent a commitment 
towards the fulfilment of a wish. 
                                                            
12 For the description and full interpretation of the dream, see Freud Dreams 130-44. 
13 In other sections of the book, however, Freud analyses various patient’s dreams, starting from the fourth 
chapter. 
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The presentation of the dream begins with a preamble, which gives an account of 
some of the events that took place the day before the dream. This is followed by a 
transcription of the narrative of the dream, produced after waking. Once this dream narrative 
is established, the analysis pursues the separation of the dream into its constituent parts and 
the elucidation of associations brought up by each part. Initially, the interpretation consists of 
contextualising the dream in terms of the events of the previous day, which function as 
starting points for the associations. According to Freud, feelings or scenes evoked by such 
events usually lead to the latent content of the dream. Freud suggests that traces of the 
previous day appear in the dream because they somehow continue to occupy mental activity 
until the state of sleep occurs. The elements evoked through these associations, in turn, 
usually relate to significant past experiences of the dreamer, as well as to his/her expectations 
for the near future.  
What Freud’s specimen dream presents, briefly, are distorted versions of such recent 
and remote elements. Through the act of associating, Freud is able to develop awareness of 
his current feelings in relation to past experiences, in a way that proves the extent to which 
their significance and power remains active in the present. Other important features of the 
dream are the replacement of one person in reality for another in the dreams, as well as the 
use of exact opposites in relation to values and feelings, presenting the situation as the 
dreamer would have wished it to be. The path from the associations to the analysis, as 
evidenced by these examples, is never obvious. Freud connects different elements of his past 
and present experiences in order to determine to which event or emotion a certain element of 
the dream refers. Also particularly important in Freud's method are the exact words in which 
the dream is described, which usually lead to the original incidence of a verbal expression or 
usage, whether from the context of popular culture or from the dreamer’s own experience. In 
this sense the narration of the dream is part of the elaboration that takes place in the dream 
itself.  
The scene dramatised in Freud's dream represents a revenge enacted on two people 
who had previously hurt his self-image. The dream achieves this by presenting a situation in 
which these people are proven to be wrong or discredited. Through his dream, Freud felt 
reassured that he was right, crediting, as he did, great significance to the dream. In other 
words, it fulfilled certain wishes on the part of the dreamer, wishes that were prompted by, 
but did not originate from, the events of the previous day. In addition, the conclusion the 
dream intended to bring in relation to recent events was that the dreamer had no 
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responsibility for a certain condition in a patient, but someone else did. In order to do this, it 
referred to other earlier situations in which the dreamer had his ability questioned, and 
presented them as proof of him not being wrong. Following consideration of all of this, Freud 
is convinced he has discovered the meaning of dreams, even if at this point he has guided the 
reader through the analysis of no more than his specimen dream, believed to be exemplary. 
On the one hand, the detailed description of his associations present a convincing frame for 
the final interpretation, even after Freud has admitted the occultation of certain “indiscreet” 
information. On the other hand, the egoistic character of the dream's motivation and scenes 
seems to demand further investigation. 
Wish-fulfilment, therefore, attainable through a tortuous interpretative path, is a 
fundament of Freud’s theory. In order to give more consistency to his argument, he first 
presents what he considers to be simple dreams. Before that, however, one is reminded of an 
important distinction. As pointed out above, Freud insists on discrimination between the 
manifest and the latent content of dreams. The manifest content is what occurs in the dream, 
namely the source of the narrative established after waking; the ideas behind the dream’s 
construction, on the other hand, are its latent content. These ideas or thoughts precede the 
dream’s existence, and are to be extracted from its manifest content through an analytic 
process. As Freud schematically states, the extrapolation from latent to manifest content is the 
work of the dream. The inverse operation is what the process of analysis intends to undertake. 
In order to further access the dream’s latent content, therefore, Freud starts by 
considering children’s dreams, in which the manifest content has a clear proximity to an 
expressed wish from waking life. Freud provides examples that demonstrate how children 
usually dream of what they desire, creating a situation in which the wish figures as fulfilled. 
The dreaming figuration of the desire usually operates through sensorial and visual situations. 
As an example, Freud describes a situation in which his daughter was heard calling out, while 
asleep, for strawberries, omelette and pudding, precisely after being prevented from eating 
during the day due to an illness. According to Freud, these were her favourite foods. In this 
sense, the child’s psychical life is portrayed as much less complex than the adult’s: it seems to 
lack many of the critical systems that prevent the expression of certain contents in adults. In 
the adult, what Freud terms the dream-work operates much more sophisticated 
transformations. The first example that Freud shares in this regard is the compression of 
different elements of waking life into one in the dream.  
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This is related to the theme of distortion in dreams, a motif approached by Freud from 
the perspective of wish-fulfilment. If dreams are the fulfilment of a wish, he asks, how and 
why does the dream-work operate so many distortions in the adult’s dream, instead of 
presenting the wish plainly and simply, as is the case in the dreams of children? The answer, 
one can suppose, lies in a critical system that prevents the passage of certain mind contents 
into consciousness, during the day as well as during the night. Freud explains the reason for 
such a phenomenon in the following terms: if the wish-fulfilment is unrecognisable, “there 
must have existed some inclination to put up a defence against the wish” (Dreams 166). 
Seeking a social parallel for this internal event, the author refers to the common act of 
dissimulation or “politeness” amongst people of differing social classes, which prevents the 
free expression of certain issues.  
In this context Freud also quotes one of his favourite passages from Goethe’s Faust: 
“Das Beste, was du wissen kannst / Darfst du den Buben doch nicht sagen“14 (Dreams 166). 
This saying refers to politeness in social relations, but also to the fact that Freud, during the 
presentation of his theory, is compelled to stay silent about his most intimate experiences and, 
specially, the sexual character of his dreams, even if they hold the key to his insights. It is 
also not gratuitous that the phrase from Faust was pronounced by Mephistopheles, with 
whom Freud seems to have identified himself, in the sense that he is bringing to the field of 
science the darkest human impulses, such as those which appear in dreams, leading to the 
attribution, by his critics, of a “diabolic” element to him (Mosès Rêves 110). 
The prevention of the expression of certain contents in these situations is what Freud 
terms “censorship.”  He further exemplifies his usage with a political example, that of the 
writer who has to disguise truths about those in authority in order to prevent the suppression 
of his words. With these two examples, Freud describes the formation of dreams in terms of 
truth and disguise, pointing to the ultimate necessity of the latter in situations in which the 
truth is unbearable, or even dangerous. He presents different life scenarios, featuring various 
degrees of normality, with the intention of affirming the necessity of a filter or disguise that 
guarantees the existence of at least a version of psychical truth (better than no truth at all). 
The existence of a restricting system in mental life, moreover, is the raison d’être of 
psychoanalysis, in the sense that this discipline intends to systematise knowledge capable of 
decoding the distorted messages transmitted by the soul about its contents, as well as working 
                                                            
14 “The best of what you know may not be told to boys”  
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towards the construction of a social space within which such expressions can be made and 
studied. 
Freud here describes two instances of the operation of the psychical apparatus,15 both 
of which play a role in the formation of dreams and other mental activities. The action of the 
first instance is in itself unconscious and cannot appear in consciousness without the 
intervention of the second instance. Between the two, the element of censorship prevents the 
passage of material that might be unpleasant or shocking to the subject, even if this is content 
constructed by the person himself or herself, and based on past experience. Of the two 
psychical forces that give shape to the dream: “one of these constructs the wish which is 
expressed by the dream, while the other exercises a censorship upon this dream-wish … 
forcibly bringing about a distortion in the expression of the wish” (Dreams 168). 
Consciousness is thus conceived as a sense organ able to perceive data originating from 
elsewhere, that is, the unconscious wish that precipitates the dream. The action of 
consciousness in relation to the formation of the dream is therefore not creative, but 
defensive. 
Having guided the reader through the analysis of a specimen dream, with all of its 
indiscretions and improbable associations, and having discussed the discovery of disguised 
wish-fulfilment and the necessity of censorship over the soul, Freud proposes the following 
modified formula for the definition of dreams: “a dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a 
(suppressed or repressed) wish” (Dreams 183). But what is the nature of the wish, and how 
does it enter the construction of the dream? His identification of the wish as stemming from 
the unconscious allows Freud to delineate the reach of this dimension much more clearly. 
These are the developments that led his theory to become a major influence on twentieth 
century culture. 
 
2.4. The Material of Dreams 
From superficial daily experiences to deep egoistical wishes, “dreams can select their 
material from any part of the dreamer’s life, provided only that there’s a train of thought 
linking the experience of the dream-day (the ‘recent’ impressions) with the earlier ones” 
(Dreams 192). In relation to such recent impressions, even the lay observer can conclude that 
                                                            
15  Remembering that Freud did not use a technical nomenclature that included the German word geistig 
(“mental”), as the English translation suggests. Instead he made use of seelisch, as in his reference to the soul’s 
organisation in die seelische Organisation, usually translated as “mental apparatus.” The Greek-derived Psyche, 
according to Freud, is closer to the meaning of Seele. 
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dreams have a preference for the unimportant details of waking life. From the analysis of 
many dreams, his patients’ and his own, Freud concludes that the reason for this preference 
lies in the necessity for some sort of displacement, since “ideas which originally had only a 
weak charge of intensity take over the charge from ideas which were originally intensely 
cathected” (Dreams 200).16 This is one of the first mentions Freud makes of the existence of 
psychical energy and its role in the functioning of the mind. Dreams are the combination of 
these two categories of material, from recent and from remote experiences. Energy 
transference allows them to become a lasting mind formation. 
The material of dreams can stem from different sources, from one or several recent 
and psychically significant experiences, or from internally significant experiences, as long as 
they are combined into a unity, however “absurd” of this unity might appear. For Freud, 
internal experiences, in other words, experiences that are not immediately accessible to 
consciousness, are often traced back to childhood. In fact, according to the author, “the 
deeper one carries the analysis of a dream, the more often one comes upon the track of 
experiences in childhood which have played a part among the sources of that dream’s latent 
content” (Dreams 219). In the various dreams analysed in this section of the book, Freud 
revisits scenes from his childhood that he considers to have played a founding role in his 
personality. Such scenes are most commonly remembered as part of the process of dream 
interpretation, even if they do not seem to have been completely forgotten before this 
exercise. 
The great emphasis given to childhood experiences is continually apparent in Freud’s 
writing. At times, he comes close to claiming a total prevalence of infantile scenes in the 
dramatisation of a dream. On this point Mosès (Rêves 100-6) highlights the figure of the 
revenants, i.e. characters “coming back” from childhood memories at various moments in 
one’s life, as ghosts that perpetually “haunt the scene.” According to the author, the word 
revenant, employed by Freud in the context of a dream interpretation, has two main usages in 
the French language: it may designate a spirit or figure from another world (especially the 
world of the dead) that enters into our world, or it may refer to someone returning home after 
a long period of absence.  
The dream in question is given the title “Non vixit” by Freud (Freud Dreams 430-4; 
488). In it Freud gives expression to his wish for the death of some of his work colleagues, 
                                                            
16 Note that the original word for cathexis, a Greek term chosen by Strachey, was Besetzung. Many criticise this 
as unnecessarily esoteric, since other English options were available, such as “charge.” 
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who in this context are haunted by the ghost of his first enemy in life, a boy with whom 
Freud used to play. According to this childhood memory, the criteria for the resolution of a 
conflict, and the establishment of the power balance between the two children, lay in the 
establishment of “who came first.” Similarly, in Freud’s understanding of his career, the 
question of who came first proves to be very important, providing appropriate material for 
dreams and other symptomatic formations in association with this infantile scene. As Mosès 
puts it: “à cet égard, la totalité des personnages du rêve “Non vixit” (mais cela vaut pour ceux 
du rêve en général et même de l’inconscient) ne seraient en réalité que les réincarnations 
d’une préhistorie archaïche, c’est à dire … des Revenants”17 (Rêves 100-1). 
Since they are part of an archaic pre-history stored unconsciously, the revenants are 
not only figures connected with early childhood experiences relating to antagonism and the 
consequent questioning of one’s primal right of existence, but also characters from a distant 
time and world, such as the world of the past. As Mosès (105) states, in the context of the 
reception of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud himself was also a revenant, especially in 
relation to the dominant scientific ideas of the time, with which he intended to combine other 
sources of knowledge. These originated, on the one hand, from mythology and popular 
culture, and on the other, from the recondite parts of the soul, vide the sexual elements of his 
theory. 
On this concern Freud is content to state, at the end of the section on the material of 
dreams: “every dream was linked in its manifest content with recent experiences and in its 
latent content with the most ancient experiences” (Dreams 239). In fact, despite highlighting 
the importance of infantile experiences, Freud later added footnotes to subsequent editions of 
The Interpretation of Dreams in which he proposes alternative interpretations to the ones 
presented in the main text. These interpretations usually relate to mythological or literary 
aspects, and are described as “further interpretative material” or “another interpretation.” 
While mythology was always one of Freud’s sources, the frequency with which he mentioned 
it increased over the years, in tune with certain developments in his theories that will be 
examined below. 
As well as infantile material, Freud also establishes the purport of somatic sources in 
dreams, a controversial theme in the literature he analyses at the beginning of his book. It is 
through this approach that Freud characterises dreams as the guardians of sleep: when a 
                                                            
17 “in this regard, all the characters in the dream ‘Non vixit’ (but this applies to those in dreams in general and 
even in the unconscious) would actually be reincarnations of an archaic prehistory, i.e. ... Revenants” 
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somatic input threatens to interrupt the individual’s sleep, the dream usually incorporates this 
element into the dream formation, presenting the urge in question as satisfied. The classic 
example used by Freud is that of the sensation of thirst participating in the formation of a 
dream, leading to representations such as the dreamer swallowing down water in great gulps. 
Freud treats somatic sources as sort of second-rate dream formation materials, in contrast 
with many nineteenth-century authors, who presented them as the main reason for dreams.  
When dealing with what he calls “typical dreams,” i.e. dreams that almost everyone 
dreams alike, Freud adopts the ambiguous attitude that he also displays in his discussion of 
the symbolism of dreams. On the one hand, he claims it is impossible to interpret another 
person’s dream unless that person is prepared to “communicate to us the unconscious 
thoughts that lie behind its content” (Dreams 259). This seems to make the use of symbolic 
interpretation impractical. On the other hand, if the dreamer has employed symbolic elements 
in the content of the dream, Freud considers it possible to make use of this “second and 
auxiliary method of dream interpretation” (Dreams 260f). The determination of whether or 
not there are symbolic elements in the dream, as well as of the possible meaning of such 
elements, is part of the task of the interpreter. 
Freud goes on to make various attempts at interpreting certain types of dream, such as 
dreams in which the individual is pictured as naked, and dreams in which the subject 
witnesses the death of a loved one. In these examples, Freud identifies the dream’s wishes as 
feelings of shame from childhood and egoistic impulses. What takes shape here is Freud’s 
famous and infamous Oedipus complex, an emotional and behavioural pattern built on 
childhood experiences and re-enacted through symbolism, though going beyond it in terms of 
complexity. According to Freud, the Oedipus complex can be structured according to 
different variants that define its meaning but are not universally interpretable, even if the 
general pattern is to some extent.  
The first mention Freud makes in relation to this psychical structure comes after a 
long digression beginning with the observation that dreams about the death of parents usually 
represent the parent of the same sex as the dreamer. At this point Freud states the following: 
“I cannot pretend that this is universally so, but the preponderance … is so evident that it 
requires to be explained by a factor of general importance” (Dreams 273-4). The author 
traces a brief cultural map of the hostility concealed in the relationship between parents and 
children, starting from mythology and legend — the devouring of his children by Kronos and 
the emasculation inflicted by Zeus on his father — and moving on to cultural practices of 
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middle-class families in the nineteenth century, in which parents only reluctantly give 
independence to their children. The examples also include cases of psychoneuroses, in which 
Freud observed the early emergence of death wishes towards parents, more precisely after the 
awakening of both sexual wishes and the child’s affection for the parent of the opposite sex. 
The legend of Oedipus is then presented as a confirmation of Freud’s assumption that 
has come down from antiquity, that is, “a legend whose profound and universal power to 
move can only be understood if the hypothesis I have put forward in regard to the psychology 
of children has an equally universal validity” (Dreams 278). In other words, according to 
Freud, the legend’s ability to affect us can only be explained through the trans-generational 
recurrence of its plot, which mirrors the hypothesis formulated by Freud. The legend’s great 
value, accordingly, lies in the fact that it casts light on human history, as well as on the 
evolution of religion and morality. In Jacques Rancière’s words, the “legendary material” 
presented by Oedipus is universalised by Freud in two ways: “comme explicitation de désirs 
infantiles universels et universellement réprimés, mais aussi comme forme exemplaire de 
révélation d’un secret caché”18 (15). The Oedipus complex in Freud’s theory operates on two 
levels. One is strictly related to the inhibited affections the child has for one parent, while the 
other is concerned with the tragedy of living in error without being aware of it. Regarding 
this second aspect, the combination of blindness and progressive revelation, together with the 
conduct of Oedipus throughout this process, is comparable to the work of psychoanalysis on 
the contents of the unconscious. 
In Freud’s theory, as in the legend, desires of the sort experienced by Oedipus can 
only be accompanied by feelings of repulsion and disgust, leading to horror and self-
punishment, as expressed in the tragedy. Here Freud is alluding not only to the emotions that 
take place between two generations, but also to the strong resistance that this part of his book 
met with from readers. In order to support his assertions, in the 1914 edition Freud included a 
section on Shakespeare’s Hamlet, pointing out that, despite important differences, this 
tragedy “has its roots in the same soil as Oedipus Rex”19 (Dreams 282). In a sort of defensive 
move, however Freud remarks, that all creative writings are open to more than one 
interpretation, and that his attempt was to interpret the deepest motives of the writer. As noted 
by Rancière (11), perhaps more than just material to be interpreted, Freud finds in literature 
and art a sphere in which a certain unconscious mode of thinking already operates effectively. 
                                                            
18 “as a demonstration of universal and universally repressed infantile desires, but also as an exemplary form of 
revelation of a hidden secret” 
19 Previously to 1914, the section on Hamlet was included as a footnote. 
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The material of dreams, therefore, may vary from irrelevant details from recent 
waking life to abstract arrangements transmitted through tradition. The unconscious is home 
to an inexhaustible and fluid range of experiences. Its different formations, however, some of 
which come into contact with consciousness, are ultimately arranged according to a logic 
defined by the individual. One thing seems to stand out in the study of unconscious material 
in Freud’s dream interpretations: that it is the most remote, usually infantile, memories which 
seem to provide the non-rigid pattern for adult experience. The interactions of the different 
sources that feed into consciousness and unconsciousness, resulting in the thought-formations 
that reach the waking spirit, point to the complexity of the mind’s dynamics. The ways in 
which the dream works on the materials available to it, therefore, reveal the kinds of activities 
that psychical life is capable of. The dream, according to Freud, illuminates the soul. 
 
2.5. The Dream-Work 
Unlike other theories, psychoanalysis searched for the meaning of the dream in the 
material dramatised in it. Having introduced the notion of dream-thoughts, i.e. the latent 
content of dreams, Freud defines the task of interpretation as that of investigating the links 
between the manifest and the latent contents of dreams or, more precisely, “of tracing out the 
processes by which the latter have been changed into the former” (Dreams 295). It is through 
this process that the dream’s mode of expression can be understood, as well as its relation to 
the unconscious dimension of life. 
The first thing that becomes clear to an observer comparing dream-thoughts with 
dream-contents is that the latter are usually more condensed than the former. In other words, 
if one compares the quantity of memories and experiences that lie behind every dream scene 
with the scene itself, a work of condensation seems to have taken place. This condensation 
gives the impression of having been a process of omission, since “the dream is not a faithful 
translation or a point-for-point projection of the dream-thoughts, but a highly incomplete and 
fragmentary version of them” (Dreams 298). In fact, dream-thoughts and dream-contents are 
presented by Freud as being two different modes of expression of the same material, the 
latent content having been transcribed into another “language,” the manifest content, the laws 
of which must be studied and revealed.  
So what is the connection between the elements present in the manifest content of the 
dream and the dream-thoughts? If the condensation takes place through a process of 
omission, why do certain elements remain expressed in the dream, and not others? First of 
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all, as Freud stresses throughout the analysis of different dreams in this section, the elements 
of a dream are determined by dream-thoughts repeated many times over. In other words, it is 
not that every individual dream-thought finds a separate representation in the dream, but that 
the whole mass of dream-thoughts are subjected to a process whereby “those elements which 
have the most numerous and strongest supports acquire the right of entry into the dream-
content” (Dreams 302). In other words, a multiplicity of connections links the two instances, 
and that is precisely part of the process of condensation. 
Here Freud reminds us of an example from his specimen dream. In it a patient, Irma, 
was translated into a collective image that grouped together three people: a patient, Freud’s 
daughter and one of his acquaintances. All of these figures, according to the author, were 
“concealed” behind the figure of Irma, which was then required to contain a number of 
contradictory features. The condensation process had sacrificed the other figures: everything 
that reminded the dreamer of them had been passed to Irma. A collective figure can also be 
produced through the conjunction of features of two or more people in the dream, as for 
example when a figure bears the name and the physical characteristics of one person together 
with the psychical features of another. According to Freud there is always, however, a single 
feature shared by the two. Freud (Dreams 311) here mentions the Galton pictures as 
illustrations of condensation.20 In these portraits, two or more family members have their 
images projected onto one photographic plate, in order to emphasise similar features and to 
distinguish others. 
According to Freud, it is when words are expressed in dreams that the work of 
condensation can be at its clearest. Considering that words are treated in dreams as concrete 
things, they are apt to be combined in the same way as other elements, giving birth to 
neologisms. Freud describes a variety of dreams that feature not only neologisms but also 
lapses and scrambling of words. The same syllabic “chemistry” appears in waking life in the 
form of jokes, and it’s no coincidence, Freud tells us, that many dreams are amusing, given 
the similar conditions in which dreams and jokes are constructed. Both formations are forced 
into finding a creative way to express of unconscious material, since the most direct route is 
barred. 
The other feature of dream-work observable in Freud’s analysis of latent and manifest 
materials is that certain elements of the dream-thoughts are displaced. While assuming 
                                                            
20 Francis Galton [1822-1911] was an English artist and scientist. The technique of “composite portraiture” was 
originally devised in order to investigate the “average face.” 
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central importance in the latent contents, in the dream they may appear as relatively 
insignificant: “the dream is, as it were, differently centred from the dream-thoughts” (Dreams 
322). Freud takes this to mean that what is presented in dreams is not necessarily what is 
most important in dream-thoughts, but rather what occurs repeatedly in them. In common 
with its treatment of events from the previous day, the dream-work privileges material of low 
psychical value, which then gains a higher value in a displacement of energy as other related 
instances “buy their way” into the dream. After this has occurred, the dream no longer 
resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and is more suitable to pass through the censorship 
process: “displacement is one of the chief methods by which that distortion is achieved” 
(Dreams 325). 
In consonance with the notion of displacement, Freud observes that, what the dream 
actually draws from the various dream-thoughts is their subject matter, rather than the 
connections between them. In one example, he observes that dreams “reproduce logical 
connection by simultaneity in time”21 (Dreams 330). In this sense, the fact that two elements 
are presented together in a dream usually indicates a particular link between them, or rather 
between what corresponds with them in terms of dream-thoughts. This seems to be 
particularly striking in the case of relations of opposition, which are usually disregarded in 
dreams. Dreams can combine contraries into a unity, and seem to have no difficulty in 
presenting an element by means of its wishful contrary, pointing to a certain permeability of 
opposites in the unconscious. If one thinks of common reactions such as “if only it had been 
the other way around!” in relation to a disagreeable event or memory, it is plausible that the 
act of disregarding, uniting or reversing opposites may give expression to the fulfilment of a 
wish. It is in this context that Freud delivers his advice to the analyst to revert some elements 
of the dream if it resists interpretation.  
A study of historical linguistics would suggest the notion has more ancient origins. In 
a footnote added to the book in 1911, Freud refers to a pamphlet of Abel,22 entitled The 
Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words (1884). In it the author reviews the origin of 
antithetical meanings in ancient languages, particularly Ancient Egyptian. According to Abel, 
in the first instance such languages “have only a single word to describe the two contraries at 
the extreme ends of a series of qualities or activities (e.g. ‘strong-weak,’ ‘old-young,’ ‘far-
                                                            
21  Emphasis in the original. Unless indicated, the emphases are identically reproduced in the quotations 
throughout this work. 
22 Karl Abel [1837-1906] was a German comparative philologist. His investigations of the Egyptian-Semitic-
Indo-European roots were acclaimed at the time. 
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near,’ ‘blind-sever’)” (Dreams 334f). For Freud, this further confirmed his conviction that his 
ideas on the nature of the unconscious were correct. According to Abel, it was only in the 
second phase of their development that these languages distinguished contraries, by making 
small modifications to the original words. The ancient languages, in this sense, mirror the 
treatment of oppositions of the unconscious, opening the way for Freud to later connect 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis. 
Closely related to this is the fact that similarity is the only logical relation represented 
in dreams. According to Freud, this relation is somehow assisted by the work of 
condensation, since it helps to reduce the number of elements contained in the dream.  The 
composite figures created by the agglomeration of similar elements, as mentioned above, 
form their own new images. This is sometimes responsible for the fantastic or absurd 
character acquired by dreams, representing figures “which could never have been objects of 
actual perception” (Dreams 339). This takes place in accordance with the necessity, on the 
part of the dream-formation, to escape censorship, as well as being a result of the fact that 
composite figures allow for the integration of elements usually not accepted as part of one’s 
Psyche. 
Freud attributes one of the most remarked-upon features of dreams, that of the 
presence of fantastic features — traditionally discussed in relation to the theme of 
imagination — to the operation of dream-work on completely non-fantastic material. In this 
sense, the fantastic appearance of dreams is above all the effect of dream-distortion. As 
mentioned above, the material of dreams might be composed of trans-individual and even 
tradition-transmitted elements. The creative arrangements produced by the dream-work, 
however, have to be understood as effects of the combining of the available materials, 
independently of their origin. Moreover, Freud states that dream-thoughts are never absurd in 
themselves, instead “the dream work produces absurd dreams and dreams containing 
individual absurd elements if it is faced with the necessity of representing any criticism, 
ridicule or derision which may be present in the dream-thoughts” (Dreams 452). Absurdity 
being the result of a contradiction in the dream-material, dreams are often more profound the 
crazier they seem.  
In the same sense, as mentioned above, the intensity with which the different elements 
of dream-thoughts are represented in dreams varies, and does not coincide with the 
importance given to them in the latent content. The opposite is in fact usually the case. Freud 
makes use of a Nietzschean expression in this context, stating that “a complete 
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‘transvaluation of all psychical values’ takes place between the material of the dream-
thoughts and the dream” (Dreams 345), even if what seems to be taking place is more an 
inversion than a transvaluation. Regarding the multiple-determination of elements entering a 
dream, Freud concludes that the elements reaching the dream form the starting-point for the 
numerous trains of thought that constitute the interpretation process. This logic implies that 
the work of condensation must have been more intense at the points at which more trains of 
thought are produced in the analysis process. With this statement, Freud opens up an 
ambiguity of causality that is not at all uncommon in his oeuvre. The dream-work apparently 
relates to all material more or less independently of its origin, importance and value, but it 
also seems to be more sensitive to quantitative features in dream-thoughts than to qualitative 
ones. 
A third factor must also be added to condensation and displacement in the process of 
dream-formation. Freud calls it “considerations of representability.” That is, the preference 
for visual representations in dreams, which are described as richer in associations than 
conceptual ones. According to Freud, a dream-thought is not usable by the dream-work while 
still in an abstract form; “but once it has been transformed into pictorial language, contrasts 
and identifications of the kind which the dream-work requires … can be established more 
easily than before” (Dreams 354). The visual appeal of dreams is a direct result of the 
attractiveness of visual content to the dream-work while undertaking its selection process. 
The transformation of conceptual material into images also forms part of the requirements of 
the censorship process. It is curious to note, in this regard, that the value Freud gives to words 
in dreams seems to stand in contrast to his emphasis of the importance of visual features. It 
could be said that Freud characterises the visual aspect of dreams as part of what is 
misleading about them, since it is only through words, during the narration of the dream, that 
one can access to its real meaning and the psychical benefits of that understanding. It is 
precisely due to their abundance of associations that images are not a good aid to the analytic 
process, despite being the “original” form of the dream. Freud identifies the seeks the tracks 
to the dream’s meaning as being the verbal connections that emanate, accurately though in 
limited form, from the dream-content, within the strict borders of “free association.” 
The fourth and final aspect involved in the construction of dreams is secondary 
revision. This is perhaps best understood through consideration of the idea that sometimes 
appears in dreams in the form of the phrase “Is this only a dream?”. According to Freud, this 
happens when an element of the dream bypasses the censorship process, preventing it from 
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interfering with the dream-content in order to soften it. As a result, “the dream loses its 
appearance of absurdity and disconnectedness and approximates to the model of an 
intelligible experience” (Dreams 495).  The critical function of secondary revision is never 
completely “asleep,” even in the midst of dreaming. In practice, one activity of the dream-
work is filling in the gaps in the dream-structure. In fact, the waking mind seems to act 
towards perceptions in a very similar way, namely establishing order, setting up relations and 
creating a more or less intelligible whole.  
According to Freud, in dreams it is actually “normal thinking” that interferes with the 
demand for coherence, showing the continuity of some mental functions between the states of 
sleep and waking. This fourth aspect of the dream-work, therefore, plays a smaller part in the 
dream-formation than the other three. Despite being present from the first activities that lead 
to the formation of dreams, it does not play a major role in the process of selection and 
combination of materials. In fact, all four functions of dream-work exert their influence 
through “preferences and selections from psychical material in the dream-thoughts that has 
already being formed” (Dreams 496). They very rarely perform a creative role, in the sense 
that they do not come up with new dream-material, and instead work with what is available in 
the dream-thoughts.  
Briefly, therefore, two separate functions guide mental activity during the 
construction of a dream: the production of dream-thoughts and their transformation into the 
content of the dream. Dream-thoughts, according to Freud, are rational constructs formed 
with the “expenditure of all the psychical energy of which we are capable” (Dreams 510), i.e. 
they form part of mental processes that, while they have not become conscious themselves, 
also give rise to conscious thoughts. The second function, on the other hand, the 
transformation of unconscious thoughts into the content of the dream, is peculiar to dream-
life. In this context Freud highlights the particularity of dream-work in comparison with 
conscious mind activities: the former does not judge or calculate, but “restrict itself to giving 
things a new form” (Dreams 510). Freud also points to the impossibility of comparing these 
two activities. Despite the interference of “gap-filling” functions, such as secondary revision, 
Freud insists that dream-work is fundamentally different in nature from waking thought. 
Dream-work, through all of its features, can be said to act towards the evasion of the 
censorship imposed on unconscious elements that try to make their way towards 
consciousness. In order to accomplish this goal, it performs the condensation of materials and 
the displacement of psychical energy from one element to another, so that the content of the 
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dream does not resemble the dream-thoughts. It presents the dream in a visual format that is 
allowed passage through the censorship process as an innocent entertainment for the sleeping 
mind. Finally, the logical relations between the thoughts are given representation in a specific 
format characteristic of dreams. Consequently, as a result of the process of its creation, the 
dream is conceived by Freud as a mind formation that has its roots in unconscious, 
mythological and primeval sources. Due to a quasi-conscious critical barrier, however, most 
of these elements are discarded or compounded into a montage ultimately constructed to 
deceive the sleeping mind. 
 
2.6. Why Does One Dream? 
In his final attempt to tie together all of the theories in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
Freud admits that one cannot explain the psychical processes taking place in dreams, “since 
to explain a thing means to trace it back to something already known” (Dreams 515). In other 
words, Freud concedes that his theory is lacking an established psychological knowledge-
base from which to approach the examination of dreams. Determined to still do so, however, 
he speculates on the functioning of the mind from the perspective of the elements presented 
in the previous chapters of his book, and proposes a new systematisation of the general 
operation of the Psyche, to which he gives the schematic title of ψ-system. 
The idea proposed by Freud is that the soul’s apparatus be imagined as a compound 
instrument, the components of which are called “systems.” These systems are not necessarily 
arranged in a spatial order. For schematic purposes, however, it can be imagined that during a 
psychical process, excitation passes through them in a temporal order. The apparatus has, in 
addition, a sense of direction, since every psychical activity starts from stimuli and ends in 
innervations, the term used for any system of nerves. More precisely, according to Freud, “at 
the sensory end there lies a system which receives perceptions; at the motor end there lies 
another, which opens the gateway to motor activity” (Dreams 539).  
When a perception impinges on us, a trace of it is left behind. This can be described 
as a “memory-trace.” It cannot be part of the same system involved in its perception, 
otherwise that system, which Freud calls Pcpt. (Perception), would not be able to remain 
constantly sensible to stimulus. 23  Thus, behind the Pcpt. lies another system, this one 
                                                            
23  The curious nomenclature designed by Freud for the psychic systems seems to serve the purpose of 
preventing the direct identification between his schematization of mind function and the actual mind function. 
However this does not detract from the fact that at some point the schematization supplants what it is referring 
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occupied with the registering of excitations as traces, called Mnem. (Mnemonic). The Mnem. 
system not only retains the content of a perception, but also the connections it has with other 
memories, constituting associations. Consequently, while the Pcpt. system provides the 
multiplicity of elements of consciousness, and cannot be obstructed by the accumulation of 
perceptions, the traces contained in the Mnem. are in themselves unconscious. 
Applying this system to his theory of dreams, Freud stresses that two agencies 
participate in the dream-formation, one occupied with the creation of dream-thoughts, and the 
other with the conversion of these thoughts into the dream format. The second agency, a 
“critical agency,” operates in closer proximity to consciousness than to the unconscious, since 
it has similarities with the operations of waking life. When these agencies are replaced by 
systems, this critical element operates at the motor end of the apparatus, that is to say, “after” 
the registering of perceptions as memories and on the way towards their discharge as 
innervations. This last system before the motor end is what Freud calls “the preconscious” or 
Pcs., “to indicate that the excitatory processes occurring in it can enter consciousness without 
further impediment provided that certain other conditions are fulfilled” (Dreams 542). The 
system lying behind it is therefore “the unconscious” or Ucs., since it has no access to 
consciousness except via the Pcs. system.  
 The impetus for the construction of a dream comes from the Ucs., and “like all other 
thought-structures, this dream-instigator will make an effort to advance into the Pcs. and 
from there to obtain access to consciousness” (Dreams 543). As previously mentioned, 
however, this path is barred by the critical system, which inflicts censorship on the contents 
intending to enter consciousness. So how does this impetus proceed in order to fulfil its 
intention? First, there is the fact that the resistance is lowered during sleep, since even the 
critical system has, in some sense, to sleep. Even in its weakened state, however, it allows the 
passage of only a few inoffensive dreams. The only explanation that Freud can propose for 
this problem is to suppose that at this point the excitation moves backwards towards the 
sensory end of the apparatus, reaching the perceptual system, thereby returning to the raw 
material of thought and the traces of previous experiences that lie beyond consciousness. At 
this point the excitation or thought-formation acquires a visual character, linking with 
memories couched in visual form close to the Pcpt., memories that were suppressed or did 
not become conscious. These connections happen not least due to the fact that these thoughts 
have connections to memories which participated in their formation. The most constitutive 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
to, since Freud does not give any further explanation of the terms chosen. The words in parenthesis, therefore, 
are not originally from Freud. 
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memories, usually from childhood, are the most attractive for the expression of unconscious 
wishes. Not least, in this case, because childhood memories are more likely to have been 
stored in a visual or acoustic form. In this sense, Freud describes a dream as a “substitute for 
an infantile scene modified by being transferred on to a recent experience” (Dreams 547). 
Traces of recent experiences are then selected for their ability to give rise to the 
revival of these infantile scenes, through the transference of energy taking place between 
them and the formation of the unconscious, as described above. As part of this process, the 
childhood memory somehow becomes concealed behind the recent idea. The regression of 
the excitation towards the perceptual system (Pcpt.) is the effect of the resistance of the 
preconscious system (Pcs.), but also of the attraction exercised by the presence of memory, 
which possesses a large amount of sensory force. What the state of sleep actually facilitates, 
in this context, is the moving of excitations in the contrary direction performed during 
wakefulness, which is usually from perceptions to discharge in consciousness. The dream can 
therefore be seen as a sort of revival of the instinctual impulses that usually dominate the 
early human condition of childhood, together with the methods of expression available at that 
time.  
For Freud, as mentioned above, dreams generally arise from the emergence of 
unconscious wishes striving to reach consciousness. They begin by connecting with 
mnemonic traces of the current day, namely traces of the waking mind’s activity that have 
retained a certain amount of psychical energy, probably because they evoked or referred to 
certain unconscious contents. This process implies a transfer of energy from the latter to the 
former. The energy held within the unconscious wishes, which usually stem from infantile or 
other constitutive experiences, is stronger than that possessed by recent elements of the mind. 
This is why dream formation features the conjunction of usually quasi-irrelevant traces of the 
previous day with unconscious wishes.  
Freud goes on to explain that this linking process usually takes place during the day. A 
coalition of wishes and memories is formed, as described above, then tries to force its way 
through the preconscious system towards consciousness, where it meets with the resistance of 
the critical element, fully-functioning at this point, which thus exerts a censorship on this 
mind-formation to the point of imposing a deformation or distortion onto it. This censorship, 
is triggered by the feeling of displeasure or anxiety that the topic or the wish deriving from it 
provoke in the system and, ultimately, in the subject. The formation originally rejected by the 
censorship could become an obsessive idea or delusion in consciousness if it was not halted, 
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during sleep, by the sleeping state of the preconscious. The preconscious interrupts the 
activity of thinking, so that the formation cannot advance as a thought. As mentioned above, 
it enters a regressive path where it becomes attached to groups of memories. These take the 
form of unconscious scenes, and will give the dream-formation the attributes of 
representability. Having become perceptual, the formation is able to evade the censorship and 
the preconscious state of sleep. In other words: as a perception, the dream-formation is able 
to excite consciousness, and is therefore treated by the preconscious in the same fashion as 
anything else perceived. Finally, the dream is submitted to a second revision, concerned with 
its relative intelligibility.  
One can see how the formation of the dream brings different elements concerned with 
the functioning of the mind into play, giving a privileged role to the critical system, which is 
central to Freud’s theory of thought. The censorship is actually what prevents humans from 
living an instinctual life, as well as what allows the development of abstract thinking. 
Accordingly, it is what develops the latest in life. Indeed Freud observes that this system is 
practically absent in children, providing a reason for why children’s dreams express the 
fulfilment of a wish with little or no distortion. The idea of censorship, moreover, is in 
accordance with the conception of the dream as the guardian of sleep: if something abrupt or 
outrageous emerges in the dream, sleep might be interrupted. Dreams need to appear, at least 
at first glance, to be inoffensive formations of the mind for the subject experiencing them. 
This is in fact the case for all mind-formations in Freud’s theory: a strict censorship process is 
also imposed on unconscious issues during the waking functioning of the mind. 
In such a compound systematisation, temporal function is working at full capacity. 
Freud remarks that this is an obligation inflicted by the requirement of a minimum level of 
intelligibility. In reality, he believes, what takes place is a simultaneous exploring of more 
than one path by the excitation, until it acquires the most suitable form to pass through 
censorship. It is important for an understanding of Freud’s system to recognise that this 
process in its entirety, like all other psychical structures, is a compromise: “it is in the service 
of both of the two systems, since it fulfils the two wishes” (Dreams 577). In other words, the 
dream discharges the unconscious excitation from which it originates, at the same time as 
preserving the sleep of the preconscious system in return for a small amount of its work, 
namely that allowing the passage to consciousness under certain conditions. The reason why 
one dreams, therefore, is the need to give expression to an unconscious wish in a way that is 
better accomplished during the state of sleep.  
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The wish that motivates the dream, in addition, usually involves the revival of the 
earlier instinctual life, which can be revisited through the dream without the risks usually 
implied in such a revival. In this context Freud expresses one of his famous assertions 
connecting phylogenesis and ontogenesis: “Behind this childhood of the individual we are 
promised a picture of a phylogenetic childhood — a picture of the development of the human 
race” (Dreams 550). According to this vision, the development of the individual is a 
recapitulation of the development of human beings as a whole.  
Freud envisions, specifically, a revelation of “archaic treasures” through dream 
interpretation, which apparently re-situates his theory in close proximity to ancient theories 
on dreams. According to Freud, the discovery of the continuing influence of early instinctual 
life in adult experience, through its appearance in dreams, is a form of preservation of traces 
of instinctual life from the early stages of the human race. In this sense, the revelation of what 
is “psychically innate” in humankind would align psychoanalysis with other sciences 
concerned with the uncovering and reconstruction of earlier periods of human existence. 
Despite Freud’s s method being very different from the mystical explorations of mind paths 
undertaken by older theorists, he shares their goal, based on the belief that the human mind is 
ultimately analogous to nature, i.e. the physical forces regarded as causing and regulating the 
phenomena of the world.  
In a general sense, therefore, the analysis of dreams allowed Freud to develop a 
system to explain the functioning of the mind beyond the state of sleep, often through 
complementing his dream interpretations with observations from his work with neurotic 
patients. In a comparison of the dreams of “normal” subjects with those of people with 
mental impairments, The Interpretation of Dreams tells us: “Flectere si nequeo superos, 
Acheronta movebo”24 (Virgil qtd. in Dreams 604). Freud uses this word-play to reject the low 
status reserved for the interpretation of dreams in the history of thought, and declare it  “the 
royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind”25 (Dreams 604). But the 
phrase is also a reflection on the functioning of the soul, which, according to Freud, is able to 
mobilise repressed instinctual impulses, thereby both shaking up and integrating higher 
thought. 
                                                            
24 “If I cannot bend the Higher powers, I will move the Infernal Regions.” In Virgil’s poem, Juno enunciates this 
phrase in a moment of desperation, when she fails to get help from the gods and must turn to the infernal 
regions. It suggests, according to Bettelheim (69), that if the superior world (consciousness) does not respond to 
the human drives, the underworld of the unconscious will shake it up. 
25 Emphasis added. 
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2.7. The Exceptional Life of the Unconscious 
From the insertion of dreams into a schematic explanation of mind functioning one 
learns how the activities of the unconscious are focused on the fulfilment of wishes, with the 
unconscious impulses making use of the system in order to find discharge in consciousness. 
However, if these unconscious drives meet the censorship function without finding a means 
of discharge, they are retained in their repressed state. In this case, such formations are not 
completely inaccessible to the psychical system, but are able to influence mind functioning 
during unconsciousness. This schematic explanation of psychical life therefore shows how 
the most complex levels of thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness.  
The closing movement performed by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams is an 
attempt at replacing a topographical way of representing the unconscious with a dynamic 
one. He stresses that “ideas, thoughts and psychical structures in general must never be 
regarded as localised in organic elements of the nervous system but rather, as one might say, 
between them” (Dreams 606). In Freud’s words, the objects of inner perceptions are virtual 
objects, akin to the image produced in a telescope by the passage of light beams. 
Consequently, mind objects can be said to be no more than interstitial. It is in this kind of 
consideration, according to Freud, that the paths of the physician and the philosopher 
converge. The speculation on the unconscious undertaken by both professions could produce 
a common ground for further developments on the subject. For this to happen, both sides 
would have to “recognise that the term ‘unconscious psychical processes’ is ‘the appropriate 
and justified expression of a solidly established fact’” (Dreams 616). In the context of a still 
hesitant reception for the notion of the unconscious in academic spheres, the author of The 
Interpretation of Dreams is not willing for his discoveries to go un-noticed. 
Freud believed he had contributed towards this development of a common ground 
regarding knowledge of psychical life, in particular through his demonstration that 
complicated thought processes, such as the dream, can occur without the help of the subject’s 
consciousness, but in association with instances of it. For that assumption to take place, as his 
method exposes, one must feel comfortable to proceed by inference from a conscious effect, 
which is the only way to learn of the existence of unconscious formations, to the unconscious 
psychical process itself. In a departure from the approaches to dreams that had appeared 
before, Freud is also responsible for a differentiation of different parts within the 
unconscious, one part being inadmissible to consciousness, the other being able to reach the 
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conscious mind after having fulfilled certain rules — namely, in his terms, the systems Ucs. 
and Pcs. In this scenario, consciousness is presented as no more than a sense-organ, 
susceptible to excitation in response to contents external to it but unable, like the perceptive 
system, to retain traces of alterations provoked by such perceptions. Thoughts are occupied 
only with the connections between different contents present in consciousness. 
From these assumptions Freud affirms that, since every conscious process can be 
traced back to its unconscious origin, the unconscious must be the larger sphere of psychical 
life, “the true psychical reality” (Dreams 607) in fact. But due to the censorship imposed on 
this reality, it remains as unknown to humans as the reality of the external world is; both 
accessing consciousness through certain filters. In this movement of the book, Freud isolates 
the psychological system in relation to each of these “realities,” the material and the 
psychical, treating them as equally inaccessible to human beings. This seems to be a retreat 
from his previous position, closer to general relativism, in which everything outside 
consciousness was considered unknown, despite the fact that, up to this point, material reality 
had not suffered any questioning of this kind, additionally being considered the ultimate 
source of dream-material in the form of memories of experiences. 
At the same time, Freud speaks of an “unconscious thinking” that is not restricted to 
dream activities, but it plays an important role in both the sleeping and the waking mind. On 
the one hand, a dream is a form of expression of impulses active but censored during the day. 
This chimes with older beliefs relating to uncontrolled and indestructible forces producing 
dreams. On the other hand, however, the same dream is a continuation and complementing of 
the waking life, merging in deep unconscious thoughts in order to give birth to an authentic 
mind formation. In this scenario, Freud takes care to allocate equal importance to conscious 
and unconscious life. Despite affirming that the unconscious is the true and larger psychical 
reality, he assigns to consciousness the control over all contents that might gain access to 
knowledge, as well as to the contents of “material reality.” 
This is reinforced when he author considers the ethical implications of the theories in 
The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud first highlights that he had not deeply considered “this 
side of the problem,” then evokes a dictum from Plato: “the virtuous man is content to dream 
what a wicked man does.” This is what seems to guide the Freudian approach to the theme of 
sublimation and general thought, in which he considers such “elevated” formations to be 
interesting supplanters of instinctual wishes, as the dream also is. In order to give further 
weight to this view, Freud discusses whether one should attribute reality to unconscious 
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wishes, again affirming the “two-realities” model: “If we look at unconscious wishes reduced 
to their most fundamental and truest shape, we shall have to conclude, no doubt, that 
psychical reality is a particular form of existence not to be confused with material reality” 
(Dreams 614).  
In this sense, according to Freud, a man’s actions, and not his various mind 
formations, should be enough to determinate his character. Consequently, while the 
unconscious is at the centre of psychical life, it should not be held responsible for its actions, 
i.e. the expression of unconscious impulses forms part of the psychical reality, not to the 
factual one. This expresses the singular place assigned to the unconscious from the outset in 
Freudian theory: a special, limited and not fully accessible dimension of life, which is 
nevertheless at the basis of all human actions. The work of psychoanalysis, therefore, is to 
discover ways in which this life might be encouraged to make appearances in the factual 
world, finding outlets for the discharge of its energy there, without however completely 
disrupting the terms in which a subject structures his or her experience. In other words, the 
expression of unconscious contents is always subject to the limitations imposed on it by 
conscious life, even if it tries to disrupt and change such limitations. Freud’s theory, however, 
has the capacity to call attention to such unconscious contents and to their strength and 
significance in psychical life. His work is an exhortation to explore and to “release” this 
dimension of life. 
Two elements from the last section of Freud’s book, entitled “The Unconscious and 
Consciousness – Reality” (Dreams 605-15), played a key part in what came to be his legacy. 
The first refers to the extent to which the barriers separating psychical and factual life are 
contingent. Freud says: “when the mode of functioning of the mental apparatus is rightly 
appreciated and the relation between the conscious and the unconscious understood, the 
greater part of what is ethically objectionable in our dream and phantasy lives will be found 
to disappear” (Dreams 614). 
Here Freud seems to be pointing to the existence of conditions which restrict not only 
the full appreciation of the functioning of the psychical life, but also a more general 
understanding of the effects of such functioning in terms of social rules and morals. The 
historical conditions in which The Interpretation of Dreams emerged, as discussed above, 
offered a limited openness, of complex and fragile construction, towards thematisation of 
what might lie beyond the rational mind. The strong criticism levied at the ideas expressed in 
the book, however, especially those regarding the importance of sexual and infantile aspects 
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to his thought, can be partially interpreted as a sign of historical resistance. Freud sought an 
understanding of the human mind through revealing the powers of the unconscious by 
immersing himself in the turgid waters of dreams. This came with a cost. The author himself 
was aware of the “price to be paid” for having brought to scientific attention material that 
previously lay outside its margins.  
This cost has two dimensions. The first is related to the cultural sphere, briefly 
described above, in which the idea of a role for the unconscious was only slowly gaining 
territory, particularly through the work of Hartmann. On this concern, Freud expanded, in the 
reach of his work, the place assigned to the unconscious in cultural life. The other dimension 
is related to resistance at a psychological level, an opposition to the idea that such 
troublesome impulses might form the basis of life. This particular element has the feature of 
mingling a social diagnosis with a psychoanalytic precept, namely the theory that unpleasant 
contents are repressed, and that one resists revisiting them. But the tendency to reduce 
criticism to psychological resistance, as dramatised by Freud himself in the end of his book, 
arguably had more nefarious than beneficial effects for psychoanalysis: there was a tendency 
to despise even the most accurate criticism and opposition, although these were simply part 
of the conditions required for the acceptance and diffusion of psychoanalysis. The vein 
opened by Freud that allowed the incursion into “dream and phantasy lives,” a vein that was 
able to transcend moral objections, experienced not only social and cultural impediments, but 
also the resistance of psychoanalysis itself. 
The second element to emphasise concerning Freud’s legacy is his intriguing 
evocation, in the last paragraph and the appendix of The Interpretation of Dreams, of a 
relationship between dreams and premonition. It appears in the following informal fashion, as 
if from nowhere, at the beginning of the book’s final paragraph: “And the value of dreams for 
giving us knowledge of the future? There is of course no question of that” (Dreams 615). 
While disregarding the use of dreams as speculations on the future, and emphasising that the 
knowledge they offer is usually related to the past, Freud considers that as presentations of a 
fulfilled wish, dreams are, in a way, leading us into the future. “But this future, stated Freud, 
which the dreamer pictures as the present, has been moulded by his indestructible wish into a 
perfect likeness of the past” (Dreams 615). This “indestructible wish” related to the past was 
to be the object of much speculation, not least because, as mentioned above, the unconscious 
as revealed by Freud led to the exploration of ambiguous areas of psychical life in directions 
that did not coincide with his vision. The Freudian commitment to an almost exclusive 
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referencing of dream material to childhood experiences, for example, did not always remain 
intact. It was as if Freud had guided the reader, by the hand, into an unknown landscape: 
despite his guidance being indispensable, once there, interaction with the new space happens 
independently of the guide. One is, however, always compelled to return to Freud’s writings 
once the unconscious landscape shows new and unexpected facets. 
It is remarkable that Freud, having started his book by setting himself up in opposition 
to incorrect accounts of the world of dreams, including mystical interpretations, finishes the 
volume with an ambiguous account of the relationship between dreams and premonition. As 
well as this, in the central part of the book, he presents superstition and popular culture as 
“closer to the truth” than the ruling scientific approach. From this one can surmise that 
Freud’s intention to situate his theory within the norms of nineteenth century science — 
which required the repudiation of superstitious beliefs — did not preclude his recurrent 
realisation, throughout The Interpretation of Dreams, of the similitudes between his own 
approach and prescientific accounts of the nature of human experience, as well as their 
common basis of core source material. The unconscious, in fact, is the dimension in which 
Freud locates all of these elements, scientific and prescientific. 
 
 2.8. One or Two Lives? 
 In Les Vases Communicants (1932), André Breton proposes an alternative analysis of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century theories regarding dreams, with special attention to that 
proposed by Freud. He highlights the extraordinary vicissitudes experienced by the subject in 
the past, not only in terms of the ascription of a minor place to it in the history of thought, but 
also of the way it was commonly presented by different writers, from mystics to 
philosophers, in the most obscure and ambiguous fashion. According to Breton, Freud 
himself did not resist the temptation to declare the nature of the unconscious to be as 
unknown to us as external reality, and in so doing he aligned himself with the majority of 
authors before him (Breton Vases 18). This failure to take a stand against the reluctance to 
approach the problem of dreams might seem surprising coming from Freud, especially if one 
considers the advancements he proposed in relation to the dream’s importance to psychical 
life. In fact, as mentioned above, Freud’s attitude towards the relationship between waking 
life and dream life, or the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of the Psyche, is 
ambiguous at best. This section tries to clarify some of these elements by considering the 
activity of day-dreaming, as discussed in The Interpretation of Dreams. 
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 According to Freud, day-dreams, or waking fantasies, are the fulfilment of wishes just 
as dreams are. Considered to be harmless enough to occupy consciousness for short intervals 
of time, day-dreams also suffer a minimal logical revision, which seems to work in the same 
way as it does in dreams. They also present distortions and displacements of the original 
material, but on a minor scale. The difference between a day-dream and a delirium, in turn, 
lies in the fact that, in the latter, the censorship function makes no attempt to conceal its 
operation; it deletes the non-approved excerpts leaving disconnected material behind. 
Daydreams, however, give expression to certain wishes without overly arousing the attention 
of consciousness, since they are at the same time unusual and consistent with other mind 
formations. Day-dreams do not leave the impression of an actual experience, since, unlike in 
dreams, the thoughts in day-dreams are not transformed into sensory images (Dreams 537). 
What daydreams do, however, is allow the presence of unconscious contents within 
conscious thought, albeit only for short periods of time. 
 The power of day-dreaming, therefore, lies in the contents it brings up from 
unconscious thoughts, contents that usually amaze and surprise as much as they are 
disregarded. Their ideational material, according to Freud (Dreams 496), is also formed 
mostly from childhood impressions. Both dreams and day-dreams provide insight into more 
primitive ways of looking at things, allowing contact with traces of experiences that form 
“the core of our being.” Such ancient and foundational elements, being unconscious and 
therefore primal to the formation of conscious thought, can neither be destroyed nor 
inhibited. They remain at the basis of life without ever having to touch consciousness, despite 
the latter’s continuous attempts to conceal them and thwart their emergence. It is now 
generally acknowledged that the supposition and systematic exploration of such a dimension 
by Freud is a rich proposition that changes our understanding of human nature. 
 Many who followed Freud attempted to privilege the exploration and expression of 
this larger sphere of being, from which a truer self might emerge. In this context they pursued 
Freud’s statement that “it is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being 
conscious” towards the “true psychical reality” (Dreams 607). Freud’s full statement 
continues as follows, after affirming that a conscious thought is only a remote effect of an 
unconscious process: 
The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as 
much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as 
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incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world 
by the communications of our sense organs. (Dreams 607) 
 At the heart of this statement lies an attempt to remove the unconscious dimension 
from the uncertain field in which it had been placed so far in relation to consciousness. With 
that in mind, Freud seems to be ready to sacrifice some of the common understandings to 
which his own work gives expression. In so doing, his intention is explicitly to restore the old 
antithesis between conscious life and dream life to “legitimate proportions,” through the 
assertion that they are at least equal in relation to the access one may have to them.  
 In what seems to be a rhetorical tool, Freud appears throughout the book to genuinely 
believe, that the tacit reliance of humans on the existence of the factual world through 
consciousness should not prevent them from admitting the existence of something that is not 
perceived and recognised by this consciousness in the same way that the factual world is. 
This is a key problem for Freud in the context of scepticism towards his theory, which 
ultimately states that the unconscious is the basis of both waking and dream life, being active 
“during the day no less than during the night” (Dreams 608). On the subject of how this 
dimension is “revealed” by the interpretation of dreams, as well as of its relationship with 
other instances of mind, Freud stresses in another section that “the core of our being, 
consisting of unconscious wishful impulses, remains inaccessible to the understanding and 
inhibition of the preconscious” (Dreams 599). In other words, in order to reach the centre of 
psychical life, one must give up one’s reliance on consciousness. 
 This way of presenting things might be appropriate if it were not for the fact that this 
centre is unattainable. That is, the final aim of psychoanalysis is not the revelation of the 
unconscious as part of conscious life. Rather, it is the retracing of those unconscious thoughts 
that happened to reach consciousness, in the process suffering modifications to their 
unconscious form. Freud attests to the impossibility of accessing the unconscious through any 
method other than consciousness. It would likewise be impossible to trace back an 
unconscious thought if not through the work of censorship, which is active during both 
wakefulness and sleep. Precisely because of these features, the unconscious force can only be 
investigated in relation to conscious life. Therefore, if, on the one hand, dreams, day-dreams, 
and other formations that give a partial access to the unconscious are described by Freud as 
no more than a faint expression of an already-transformed portion of their constitutive 
materials, on the other hand, they can, as others as well as Freud have noted, offer a taste (if 
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not a form of experience) of the life of the soul which is somehow free from the limitations 
and moral impositions of consciousness.  
 Here is a key expression of another important aspect of Freud’s theory, namely the 
theme of ambiguity. This could arguably be at the root of The Interpretation of Dreams, as 
well as of much psychoanalytic theory. From the child’s ambiguous first emotions towards 
the nurturing figure — an affective pattern to be resumed throughout the adult’s life — to the 
view of the unconscious as a part of psychical life graspable through effects taking place in 
an instance which is, in many ways, its opposite, the ambivalent character of Freud’s 
postulates seems to be an intrinsic and irresolvable part of his theory, a part that many refer to 
as being related to the ambiguous nature of his object. On the other hand, when submitted to 
a dialectical point of view, such aspect acquires the character of the intrinsic inseparability of 
apparent contradictions, which are both constituent parts of the whole.26 
 One remarkable element from the book neatly illustrates this state of affairs. Freud 
(Dreams 144-5) confesses to being incapable, either through embarrassment or fear of 
scandal, or out of respect for the characters of his dreams, of fulfilling the interpretation of 
the dreams on which his theory is ultimately based. By not revealing “the best of what he 
knows,” Freud relies upon the dialogical process of the book, a process related to the theory 
of knowledge in psychoanalysis. As mentioned above, the knowledge on dreams is being 
constituted within the discourse itself, not outside it, in the same way that a patient, in 
dialogue with a therapist, constitutes his or her psychical history during the treatment. The 
pedagogical and exemplary content of Freud’s interpretations shows that, despite being 
lacunar, these interpretations are able to constitute a convincing approach to the elements 
they do take into consideration, provided the reader accepts the invitation to be part of this 
dialogic process.  
 In fact, this implicit agreement between writer and reader is the only element that can 
offer a provisional resolution to the problem of the ambiguous propositions contained in The 
Interpretation of Dreams. Hopefully, this does not mean that all readers should become 
prototype patients: what is demanded by this reading process is arguably not that one begins 
analysis, but that one agrees to question, together with Freud, the nature of some of the 
phenomena of psychical life. In this “psychoanalytical dialogue,” to use an expression from 
Mosès (Rêves 37), there is no abstract truth to be apprehended, only the display of the process 
                                                            
26 On this concern, Breton’s criticism of Freud in Les Vases Communicants, to be explored in the next chapter, 
is informative.  
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of discovering a possible truth. This mise-en-scène of psychoanalysis through the course of 
his book is precisely what calls the idea of objective knowledge into question, in favour of an 
expertise built exclusively on inter-subjectivity. In this sense, Freud proposes a new form of 
knowledge that differs from the ruling scientific methods, and that relies on a dialogical 
process instead of an objective one. 
 In this context, Freud’s insistence on the necessary separation of psychical and 
material existence points to the impossibility of using his theory to establish any resolution 
between the life of the dream and the factual life, or superposition of one over the other. 
Accordingly, psychoanalysis is more interested in the reality built up by a personal narrative, 
than in the one taking place beyond consciousness. The fact that Freud’s theory is committed 
to the expression of the unconscious locates it firmly within the context of general trends in 
Western modernity, in which the pre-eminence of the subject, even if it is a non-conscious 
subject, is emphasised. 
 
 2.9. The Magic of The Interpretation of Dreams 
 According to Mosès (Rêves 55), as a consequence of its reliance on language, 
psychoanalysis suffers from the kind of distrust aimed at all practices that cannot refer to 
evidence from the “outside world.” In this sense, the discipline created by Freud is similar to 
mythology. As Mosès goes on to point out, since the logic they both employ predicates 
linguistic immanence, they must be approached as narrations in which one can engage in 
order to possibly rewrite, complete or transform the contents. In psychoanalysis as much as in 
mythology, a question arises concerning the efficacy of the language they use, which operates 
between different levels of psychical life and, in the case of the former, from the depths of 
unconscious memories to the current flow of conscious thoughts.  
 This efficacy is related to the ability of language to change reality, placing the use of 
language in psychoanalysis in close proximity to ancient descriptions of the power of the 
word to enchant. This magical feature is described by Freud to have left remnants in 
contemporary speech, and it is clearly present, in a modern guise, in the dialogic process of 
psychoanalysis. Freud gives simple examples of the ability of words to interfere in factual 
situations, such as in determining people’s emotions, in transmitting knowledge, and in 
establishing one’s judgments and opinions. Through all of these, he highlights the power 
attributed to language in the discipline he created, a potential arising from its magical 
potential. 
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 Other than the clinical techniques of medicine, language is the field in which the 
Freudian interpretation of dreams can be most easily related to other practices. Perhaps the 
most obvious such connection is the similarity of the treatment of the dream-narrative with 
the practice of Hermeneutics. The method of interpretation developed by Freud begins with 
the translation of a sequence of images into a written report, and followed by the 
contextualisation of the dream in a series of events, just as in hermeneutical methods.  The 
proper interpretation process, in turn, intends to reach the unconscious thoughts behind the 
appearance of the dream, departing from the words in which the dream was expressed. 
Mosès, in this context, speaks of a re-translation of the dream’s manifest content into its 
latent ideas, that is to say, “le travail d’interprétation consiste donc à ramener le contenu 
apparent du rêve à un autre, caché”27 (Rêves 115), a process which reveals the incongruous 
content of unconscious thoughts. This multiple transposition from one kind of content to 
another through the investigation of the apport of language is constitutive to the act of 
interpretation in Freud’s theory. It also forms part of the traditional hermeneutic method. 
 Such correspondences can shed new light on the relationship between the discipline 
Freud is delineating, psychoanalysis, and the various areas of study he refers to as “science.” 
In The Interpretation of Dreams, the process by which Freud’s theory is established as a valid 
form of knowledge involves the presentation of its interrelation with all the other disciplines 
discussed. As Mosès (Rêves 65) stresses, Freud is differentiating his work both from ancestral 
and popular knowledge on dreams and from the sceptical science of the turn of the century. 
An example of this occurs in a passage from the book in which he confesses a change in his 
opinion regarding lay knowledge on the meaning of dreams, which he initially considered to 
be of no use for scientific purposes:  
Thus one might feel tempted to agree with the philosophers and the 
psychiatrists and, like them, rule out the problem of dream-interpretation as a 
purely fanciful task. But I have been taught better. I have been driven to 
realise that here once more we have one of those not infrequent cases in which 
an ancient and jealously held popular belief seems to be nearer the truth than 
the judgment of the prevalent science of today. (Freud Dreams 124-5) 
 If on the one hand Freud is bemoaning to the rigidity of contemporary science, on the 
other he acknowledges the lack of rigour in the assertions of popular culture. In the case of 
                                                            
27 “the work of interpretation consists therefore in bringing the apparent content of the dream back to another, 
hidden content” 
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science, Freud resents its inability to produce a new kind of knowledge, into which ideas 
from non-scientific fields might be integrated. In this sense he considers medicine to be 
particularly conservative when compared with other fields in which positivist parameters 
were being revolutionised, such as physics. But at the same time he is unable to recede from 
the scientific parameters that, according to himself, allow for the generalisation and 
validation of his theory. In this sense, Freud’s work occupies a middle ground. The scientific 
work undertaken throughout The Interpretation of Dreams is not in complete accordance with 
the dominant scientific methods of the nineteenth century, making it wrong to assume that 
Freud’s scientific intentions completely superpose his use of sources from popular and 
ancient culture. At the same time, science is the arena within which he seeks acceptance of 
his discoveries, and he is consequently engaged in a struggle to change its norms. There are 
two operative notions of science in the book, which can be summarised as the dominant 
science and the science practiced by Freud.  
 One might also expect the operation of two versions of mysticism in the book, namely 
the one in which Freud finds the intuitions that are closest to the propositions of 
psychoanalysis, and the one that inaccurately attributes sense to dreams as well as to other 
psychical phenomena, usually making use of fixed symbolism and the treatment of signs. As 
with the two varieties science, the two types of reference to prescientific knowledge are at 
many points indiscernible. It is only from the treatment they receive through the course of the 
book that distinctions can be made. Accordingly, the ancient methods of dream interpretation 
based on fixed significations, should, according to Freud, be disregarded, while the presence 
of accurate dream interpretations in popular culture points in the other direction. On many 
occasions, when dealing with such material, Freud does not express a fixed opinion. 
 As Mosès has noted, “il ne s’agit pas pour lui [Freud] de retourner naïvement à des 
formes de pensée prérationelles … mais plutôt de les intégrer, un peu comme des citations, 
dans son propre discours scientifique” 28  (Rêves 67). One important expression of such 
integration is to be found in the claim that the primal phase of psychical development is 
analogous to the most archaic periods in the history of humanity. This analogy serves as a 
model of how the integration of non-scientific material works in Freudian theory: the 
references to ancient understandings of nature are related to the primal dimension of life, that 
is to say, the dimension that appears first in human development, the unconscious. In this 
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incorporating them, in the form of quotations, in his own scientific discourse” 
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construction, the secondary process of the constitution of consciousness and rationality 
comes later in both individual development and in “civilisation,” or human evolution. 
However schematic, Freud envisions this relation as more than an analogy, asserting that the 
exploration of the unconscious may contribute to the study of ancient forms of living. The 
hypothesis behind this statement supports the idea that the unconscious holds traces of 
previous ways of life, being the bearer of the perception of causal relations between different 
elements in nature. Needless to say, such a world vision, in its completeness, is unattainable 
nowadays, no matter how many traces of it have been left. 
 In Freud’s book, the subject that best expresses this hypothesis is symbolism. 
Examining the methods of interpretation disregarded by Freud as “non-scientific” and non-
generalisable in The Interpretation of Dreams, one finds that, despite numerous differences, 
these methods have much in common with his technique of interpretation.29 Firstly, in the 
cryptographic method the interpretation is performed with the help of a precise code 
engaging with the text of the dream, which is considered as a form of encrypted writing. The 
dream-text is thus translated into another text with the help of the lexicon. The treatment of a 
dream as a coded wording that has to be translated is not far from the transposition of the 
manifest content of dreams into dream-thoughts, showing the latent content of the dream as 
the decoded result of interpretation.  
 In another method mentioned by Freud, that linked to Artemidorus of Daldis,30 the 
pattern of similarities continues. This interpretive technique is defined in the following terms: 
“a thing in a dream means what it recalls to the mind - to the dream-interpreter’s mind” 
(Dreams 123f). The method of association in this case is remarkably similar to the Freudian 
one, despite the fact that in the latter the associations should be established by the dreamer. 
Additionally, the interpreter in this practice takes into account the circumstances in which the 
dreamer finds himself. He then formulates an interpretation using skills acquired over an 
extensive practice, such as intuition and imagination. Despite having the last word, therefore, 
the interpreter cannot be said to act arbitrarily in his definition of the meaning of the dream. 
 Finally, in the symbolic method of interpretation the dream is considered to be a 
distorted reflection of reality. The interpreter has thus to establish the analogies between the 
elements presented in the dream and those to which these elements refer, with the ultimate 
goal of making the language of the dream intelligible. Also called “symbolic,” this theory is 
                                                            
29 For a broader description of such methods, please see Freud Dreams 122-5. 
30 Also known as Ephesius, Artemidorus of Daldis was a Greek diviner who lived in the second century. He is 
the author of the five-volumed Oneirocritica, on the interpretation of dreams. 
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different from the approach to symbols presented by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
as outlined below. Their similitudes are detectable, however, for example in the fact that both 
involve the revelation of a hidden sense, which is revealed through the establishment of the 
links connecting the distorted material with the original material. Freud’s disregard for such 
theories, therefore, concerns only their non-scientific nature, since in all other features they 
display much affinity with his approach. Freud explains that such “popular procedures” 
cannot “be employed for a scientific treatment of the subject” (Dreams 124). The 
acknowledgement of the similarities falls to the reader to observe. 
 A further step towards realisation of the closeness of his theory to marginal scientific 
knowledge is made in Freud’s proposition of the use of symbolism for the interpretation of 
dreams. This element is representative of the conjunction of different sources in his theory, 
amongst them popular culture, in the form of common word usage. On this subject, Freud 
mentions various examples, including the correctness of ordinary wording regarding the 
recognition of dreams as the fulfilment of wishes, especially in the form of adages, as well as 
in the use of foreign languages for the interpretation of specific words in dreams. An example 
of the first case would be the following: “‘What,’ asks the proverb, ‘do geese dream of?’ The 
answer: ‘Of corn.’” (Freud Dreams 157). On the subject of the use of foreign languages, 
Freud proposes, for instance, that the word “box,” appearing in the dream of a German 
speaker, can be related to the German term Büchse (“receptacle”), used vulgarly to refer to 
the female genitalia (Freud Dreams 178; 376). In these cases, the determination of a 
relatively common source for the meaning of the psychical formations again takes place in 
the field of language.  
 In the same fashion, the emergence of symbolism in dreams, according to Freud, 
points to a general presence of symbols in unconscious ideations. Sexual symbolism, for 
example, “is to be found in folklore, and in popular myths, legends, linguistic idioms, 
proverbial wisdom and current jokes, to a more complete extent than in dreams” (Dreams 
365). Curiously, in this case the broader presence of symbolism in its different cultural 
manifestations seems to serve for Freud as a guarantee of the legitimacy of his claims 
regarding access to dream symbols. If such symbols also find expression in media other than 
the dream, Freud seems to argue, their validity must be unquestionable. The same logic is 
apparent when the reception of literary works is used to legitimate Freud’s theory of the 
Oedipus complex. In these cases, the cultural phenomena work as justification for the validity 
of the scientific postulates. 
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 Moreover, it is precisely in relation to sexual symbolism in dreams, an element that 
increases in importance in Freud’s theories over the years, that a discussion takes place about 
whether symbols occur with a fixed meaning, or whether their significance can vary 
according to the dreamer and the circumstances surrounding the dream. Here Freud questions 
the very definition of symbol, concluding that it does not generally act as a direct form of 
representation connecting two or more elements. In Freud’s conceptualisation the element 
represented in the dream is concealed, throwing light upon the symbolic relation. According 
to Freud, “Things that are symbolically connected today were probably united in the 
prehistoric times by conceptual and linguistic identity. The symbolic relation seems to be a 
relic and a mark of former identity” (Dreams 365). Freud establishes a theory of a common 
original language, in consonance with his interpretation of separate words in dreams, and a 
concept of extra-sensorial similarities that were once perceived by human beings and are 
retained today in the form of unconscious traces that emerge in dreams and other psychical 
formations. Although these ideas are remarkably remote from any possible verification, for 
Freud they form part of the above-mentioned scientific legitimacy, which he sets in 
opposition to “symbolic” methods that makes use of arbitrary codes. In other words, science 
at the time, as today, allowed itself to believe in unprovable things. In addition, Freud saw the 
unconscious as the dimension in which such unprovable things were revealed, the dimension 
that was at the same time “a relic and a mark.” 
 One should not forget, however, that, for Freud, symbols are not limited to ancient 
identities, but continue to evolve in relation to objects of present day life. Once Freud has set 
down some precautionary rules, he mentions a few symbols that seem to have a fixed 
meaning. The examples are familiar today. They include the idea that boxes, ovens, 
cupboards and hollow objects stand for women in dream-thoughts, while all kinds of 
elongated objects refer to the male sexual organ, and the climbing of stairs and ladders 
symbolises the sexual act (Freud Dreams 367). The origin of such findings is the recurrence 
of these symbols in dreams analysed by Freud and his fellow psychoanalysts.31 This element 
might leave room for the supposition that such symbolism is characteristic of the epoch and 
culture in which Freud lived, as well as the psychoanalytic framework. In a further attempt to 
legitimise his clinical findings, Freud integrates mythology and folklore into his symbolic 
scenario, naming beasts and different animals as symbols of elements that include genitals, 
                                                            
31 According to Bettelheim (51), on this subject in particular, the English translation tends to generalise what in 
Freud’s usage is a specific instance. From der Ofen (“the oven”) and ein Weib (“a woman”) in the original, the 
translation becomes “ovens” representing “women.” 
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men, women and also children (the latter represented by small creatures appearing in dreams) 
(Freud Dreams 370). 
 As arbitrary as this aspect of the theory might seem, Freud’s approach to symbolism 
intends to adopt a “combined technique,” at least in relation to the ancient symbolic method 
of interpretation. In this, the dreamer’s associations and the interpreter’s knowledge of 
symbols — as well as the dreamer’s, one might add — should be taken into account. Once 
again we find Freud drawing on a non-scientific source of information (the symbolism of 
latent thoughts as traces of a former identity from prehistoric times) and combining it with a 
“scientific” method of investigation (psychoanalysis, according to the terms of scientific 
knowledge as defined by Freud). Freud tells us:  
Regard for scientific criticism forbids our returning to the arbitrary judgment 
of the dream-interpreter, as it was employed in ancient times … We are thus 
obliged, in dealing with those elements of the dream-content which must be 
recognised as symbolic, to adopt a combined technique. (Dreams 366) 
 The use of the words “forbids” and “obliged” might indicate a rhetorical rather than a 
de facto aspect to Freud’s view, since the inclination towards science occupies a prime 
position in the book, as previously discussed. However, his approach to symbolism denotes, 
perhaps more clearly than other sections of the book, the extent to which the integration of 
elements of the worldview of earlier phases of the development of psychical life, as well as of 
contemporary experiences that hark back to such views, are a constitutive and indispensable 
part of his theory. In fact, if dreams can “go back” to primitive phases in the evolution of 
language, symbolism and pictorial significance, Freud’s theorisation of the unconscious is 
more than just a practical grounding based on clinical work and self-analysis. The world 
views related to ancient mystical experiences, and described as part of the unconscious in the 
form of traces, are equally central to the theory. These traces, he tells us, integrate human 
experience and can at times reach consciousness. In them, the interpretation of dreams finds a 
legitimate and important source, which also connects it with the fields of mythology, folklore 
and symbolism.  
 Bettelheim establishes a connection between the title of Freud’s book (Die 
Traumdeutung) and that of other fields of knowledge, such as Astrology (Sterndeutung). He 
argues that the German word Deutung designates an attempt at elucidating a meaning, rather 
than at making it explicit, somewhat like the English term “interpretation.” Sterndeutung and 
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Traumdeutung deal with ancient experimental efforts to make sense of something. More 
precisely, Bettelheim states: 
By giving his book a title that he knew must evoke associations to the ancient 
but still popular superstitious and fantastic attempts to make sense of 
incomprehensible phenomena, Freud indicated that he did not shun efforts to 
make sense out of what all serious-minded, scientifically inclined people were 
convinced was utter nonsense. (Bettelheim 67) 
 The relationship of Freud’s work to bodies of non-scientific knowledge, therefore 
passes through many phases, some of which are apparent in The Interpretation of Dreams. 
Freud’s own prescientific beliefs were superseded by his growing effort to integrate the 
“mystical” discoveries of psychoanalysis into scientific patterns. However the process that 
led to his disclosure of the unconscious in the context of modern knowledge and civilisation 
brought with it traces of various non-modern beliefs. The establishment of psychoanalysis in 
the twentieth century has erased many of these traces.  
 Detouring back to Breton’s Les Vases Communicants, dream theorists are divided into 
three groups. The first includes the “more or less conscious” followers of a rough materialism 
that does not distinguish dream from the reality. The second group those of a positivist 
inclination, who see the dream as a degradation of waking activities. The third is formed of 
the idealists, who see dreams as “precious liberations” from waking life and assign to them a 
superior activity of mind (Breton Vases 16-7). It is perhaps not so striking to observe that 
Freud, despite his eloquent scientific efforts, must be placed, within Breton’s scheme, in the 
third category, together with the mystics. This view marks the appropriation of Freud by the 
surrealists. 
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 3. SURREALISM, THE AVANT-GARDE AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 
 In 1932, when Breton and Freud were exchanging letters, Europe was steeped in the 
maudlin mood of the interwar years, a time marked by the growth of a mainstream culture of 
consumerism, which attempted to counteract the misery and hunger left behind by the First 
World War. The euphoria that marked the end of the conflict proved to be superficial, a 
delusion that could no longer be maintained once states started to prepare the next war. Freud 
was by this time a renowned psychoanalyst and intellectual who did not fear the possible 
effects of Hitler’s rise to power, while Breton was the key figure of surrealism, an important 
cultural phenomena committed, on its own terms, to the communist revolution.  
 Freud represented, to the surrealist movement in general, a potential revelation. 
According to Maurice Nadeau, in Histoire du Surréalisme (1964), “Une immense espoir est 
né. Les surréalistes trouvent dans les découvertes de Freud une solution provisoire.”32 (16). 
As André Breton states in 1924, Freud’s work represented the end of an era of disregard for 
the dream in philosophical, physiological and even artistic spheres. Surrealism took part in 
this movement of rediscovery, but with a very different project. As stated in the first 
“Manifeste du Surréalisme” (1924), if the movement intended to capture the forces at the 
depths of the human mind, it did so in order to fight those at the surface, that is in order to 
submit them to the control of reason (Breton Manifestes 20). 
Surrealité means the amalgamation of instances of dream and reality to form an 
“absolute reality” (Breton Manifestes 24). Despite Freud’s insistence on a distinction between 
the two dimensions, the surrealists took his theories as an invitation to explore these 
boundaries, recognising the importance attested to the unconscious in all psychic matters. 
Surrealism deliberately reaches beyond the boundaries of Freud’s doctrine, while also 
bringing contributions of nineteenth-century parapsychology and different forms of occultism 
to the fore. Moreover, after 1927, it was the part played by surrealism in the social revolution 
taking place at the time that instigated the promising encounter between the theories of Freud 
and Marx. 
Surrealism must also be inserted into the avant-garde current that was flowing 
through Europe in the early twentieth century. Heir of the artistic Secession Movements, as 
well as part of a larger political awareness of the context that had led Europe to the wars, this 
movement combined heterogeneous manifestations of the will to break with current cultural 
values. In surrealism, the avant-garde is defined as “une attitude de vie intransigeante, fondée 
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sur une conception du monde et de l’homme qui n’est pas celle de l’époque, mais en avant 
d’elle”33 (Nadeau 116). The theme of progress, as defined by bourgeois society at the time, 
becomes one of the touchstones of the movement. While futurism, for instance, believes that 
technical progress occupies a leading role as part of a necessary renewal of society, both 
moral and behavioural, dadaists and surrealists condemn the belief that a technically 
advanced civilisation is the unquestionably positive outcome of past struggles, let alone a 
desirable future. 
Together with this negation of certain modern ideologies, surrealism questions in 
particular the dominance of science in the quest for knowledge. It initiates a search for other 
sources that allow an appreciation of the “true value of life,” sources lying outside the 
normalising framework of logic. In this sense, surrealism recovers, alongside Freud’s official 
legacy and in spite of the psychiatrist’s own methods, the kind of references he tried to 
subsume to science. The thematisation of occultism, madness and oriental culture, and the 
different approaches to the matter of otherness, can be considered a part of surrealism’s 
exploration of pre-scientific knowledge. 
The movement’s attempt to enlarge the comprehension of the real and potential role 
of the unconscious in human experience, particularly in relation to waking life, is an 
interesting off-shoot of psychoanalytic theory. This attempt gives space in particular to the 
expression of aspects such as the disinterested play of thought, the fearlessness of 
imagination and the immersive fantasy. In all this is implied the possibility that one can be, at 
least temporarily, outside the world of judgment and exempt from social censure, as in a 
continuous monologue of free association. In other words, surrealism proposes the experience 
of the unconscious “in its pure form” (Manifestes 36). 
The effort to prove the compatibility between the interpretation of dreams and a 
revolutionary perspective, undertaken by Breton in the Second Manifesto and, most 
particularly, in the book Les Vases Communicants (1932), establishes some meeting points 
between trends of marxism and the surrealist elaboration of the legacy of Freud. More than 
anything, however, it exposes theoretical clashes. The discussion, including its 
contradictions, finds echoes in the work of Benjamin, not least when he seeks to create a 
useable fusion of magical awareness and dialectic materialism, that is, to draw attention to 
the magical aspect of words and objects capable of enhancing the revolution (Löwy Estudos). 
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those of the current time, but which prefigure it” 
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At the same time, it is pertinent to see how the change in orientation of surrealism 
towards marxism provoked a conflict with the precepts defended by the movement up to that 
point, that is 1926. One aspect of this conflict is expressed in the impossibility for the 
surrealists of continuing to defend the exclusivity of a revolution of the spirit in the face of 
the marxist’s conception of revolution, with its key facet of class struggle. Artaud’s vision 
grows incompatible with the position assumed by the surrealists from 1928, when the forms 
of revolution, social life and personal attitudes become prescribed by the movement’s 
appropriation of marxism. This, in turn, is largely defined by a belief in the necessity of an 
intellectual vanguard capable of leading the masses towards the development of its own class 
consciousness. 
In view of this context, this chapter aims to explore the various developments in the 
approach of surrealism to the notion of the unconscious, here chiefly defined by the first and 
the second surrealist manifestos (1924 and 1930), together with Breton’s book on dreams, 
Les Vases Communicants (1932). In order to propose a contextual understanding of the 
movement’s precepts, it briefly explores the scene of European avant-garde movements, 
which broke with many of the values rejected by the surrealists in the works of Freud and his 
contemporaries. It offers the hypothesis that the original and controversial conjunction 
represented by the approach of surrealism to the unconscious, psychoanalysis, 
unconventional forms of knowledge and the methods and ideology of dialectic materialism 
was an important influence on the works of Artaud and Benjamin. 
 
 3.1. The Europe of Avant-Garde Movements 
Europe immediately prior to the First World War was a continent engaged in an 
accelerated process of industrialisation. Following the technical revolution of the mid 
nineteenth century, a mass of workers was emerging as the new population of cities, while 
certain older modes of existence were gradually disappearing. It is within this context, in 
which a relative optimism followed the profusion of technical developments and gradually 
fed international disputes for markets, that the emergence of the earliest European avant-
garde movements can be located. 
The promise of progress related to modernity, which can be traced back to the 
enlightenment movement, persisted in the technological history of the twentieth-century. 
However, disputes over colonies and the First World War had begun to unsettle the 
assumption. According to Evans, expectations surrounding the war were connected with 
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previous experiences of conflicts, in which rapid advances were established through a few 
important clashes, and without the cost of many lives. The First World War, however, took 
four years to be over, and brought with it, alongside an unexpected level of physical 
destruction, the destruction of certain notions previously innocently accepted, such as an 
ideological optimism towards the use of machinery. 
The war crystallised the astonishing level of the human capacity for destruction, as 
well as the casualness with which this power could and would be put into action. Moreover, 
the values on which the war was primarily based became for the most part untenable after its 
occurrence. The grand, romantic justifications that pictured it as a duel for honour, for 
instance, and even as a means towards finding some meaning in existence, became less 
convincing in the face of such heavy losses. Nevertheless, nationalist appeals about strength 
and domination still continued to find favour. 
In general, the sense of disillusionment towards the traditional values of European 
civilisation was strong. According to Nadeau (12-13), post-1918 Europe experienced 
multiple failures. These included the fact that political regimes proved incapable of 
organising their forces for anything other than war, while science came up with discoveries 
that perfected different killing machines and philosophers sought to justify men in uniforms. 
Such tendencies were fed by the nationalism and rivalry encouraged by states at war, which 
at the same time unquestioningly followed the world-view demanded by the apparatus of war 
in many different fields of knowledge.  
The avant-garde movements rejected the values of a civilisation that presented itself 
as heir to an unquestionably superior culture and mentality, while at the same time promoting 
increasing inequality, ostracism and destruction. However, while futurism praised the 
technological developments as the elements capable of constructing a more dynamic and 
organic society, even associating its activities with the Italian fascism, dadaism and 
surrealism expressed defiance towards the ideology of progress. These two movements were 
profoundly disgusted by a civilisation that had happily embraced war, and come out of it with 
laws and morals the surrealists found repugnant. All of the movements had in common the 
will for and the belief in a transformation at various levels of society. 
 
 3.2. Futurism: The Enlightenment of Speed 
The vision of futurism, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, saw humanity being 
pushed towards an absolute, although still vague, liberation. According to Mario Verdone (9), 
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when life acquired an accelerated rhythm, resilience and power it began to progressively 
change the aesthetic make up of society. As Filippo Marinetti stated in Fondazione e 
Manifesto del Futurismo (“Futurist Foundation and Manifesto,” 1909): “we affirm that the 
world’s magnificence has been enriched by a new beauty: the beauty of speed”34 (Marinetti 
qtd. in Verdone 84). In order to understand the aesthetics of this new framework, the soul 
should “once again become pure; the eye must be free from the veil of atavism and culture”35 
(Marinetti qtd. in Verdone 87).  
Marinetti’s fictional book Tripoli’s Battle (1911), for instance, was a futurist 
evocation of the machinery-like values that he believed should replace sentimentalism and 
other traditional values evoked by works of art. One excerpt, relating to the novel’s feminine 
character, gives the following description: “you are, small machine gun, a charming woman, 
and sinister, and divine, at the wheel of an invisible hundred-horses chestnut, roaring with 
outbursts of impatience” 36  (Marinetti qtd. in Verdone 89). Alongside the stereotyping 
approach to the woman as a malicious and impetuous figure, an alignment between 
instinctive features of humanity and machinery was evident, an ideal sought by the futurists 
not only in literature and the arts, but ultimately in life.  
The desire to link human features with the flat, bright, functional objects so recently 
created was, according to Marinetti, a question of intuition. Futurist calls for “lyrics in 
matter,” for instance, arose from a belief in the necessity of a return to nature, and away from 
established culture, since the former was the source of human intuition. The human intuitive 
ability was moreover the key to surpassing the hostility between human flesh and metal 
engines, in an ideal mixture of nature and technique that evoked the ideals of the 
enlightenment movement, which saw the control of nature as a potential breakthrough for 
humanity. The futurists proclaimed themselves the new Signori della Luce (“Masters of the 
Light”), primitivists with a new sensibility connected to the lucidity of the sun (Verdone 88). 
The negation of tradition and past models played a central role in the futurist’s battle 
for a new form of intelligibility. This negation was related not only to a desire to administer a 
shock to a world seen as lethargic, but also to a wish to create a space for new generations, 
that is, in this case, the futurists themselves, defined as those who saw the inevitable internal 
                                                            
34 “noi affermiamo che la magnificenza del mondo si è arricchita di una bellezza nuova: la bellezza della 
velocità” 
35 “(…) bisogna che l’anima ridiventi pura; che l’occhio si liberi dal velo di cui l’hanno coperto l’atavismo e la 
cultura” 
36  “voi siete, piccola mitragliatrice, una donna affascinante, e sinistra, e divina, al volante di un'invisibile 
centocavalli, che rugge con scoppi d'impazienza” 
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changes brought by the advent of industrialisation. In this sense, the Italian movement was 
unique amongst the avant-garde groups in that it envisioned machines as the most relevant 
element of the new society, through which the establishment of new values can arise. The 
desire to dismantle the current culture, however, was an element of futurism that would also 
be taken up by other movements. The question of precisely which tradition was being 
discarded is elucidated by the manifesto quoted above. In it the futurists expressed their 
desire to destroy museums, libraries and all kinds of shelter for institutional memory. 
Comparing museums with cemeteries, the movement rejected what it saw as the unproductive 
reverential place occupied by cultural establishments in society: they were places one should 
visit once a year in order to salute the dead, and no more.  
The futurists regarded themselves as activists, but intend to adopt an activism 
informed by what they called the “angularity” of things, an alternative to traditional forms of 
appreciation of objects. Futurist activism is intended to act as a rather violent reminder of the 
colourfulness of life, in opposition to the lifelessness of institutional culture. Moreover, in a 
gesture that is less easily grasped today, but makes sense within the premises of the 
movement, Marinetti and his group envisioned war as the highest expression of the conflict 
of things, as a spontaneous eruption of possibilities that embodied an attempted solution to 
the problem of life in motion (Verdone 63). 
The futurists could conceive of no possible co-existence between past and future. The 
admiration of works of art from the past was, according to them, a waste of the best of human 
abilities, and as harmful as “prolonged paternal protection for young spirits.” The present, 
alongside a constant projection towards times to come, was in itself the movement. The 
futurist disregard for the accounting of time was expressed in another excerpt from the 
Manifesto: “Time and Space died yesterday. We are already living in the absolute, since we 
have already created the eternal omnipresent speed.”37 (Marinetti qtd. in Verdone 84). It is 
easy to see how such a vision could coincide with that of fascism, in which a halt in 
chronological time was involved in the establishment of a perfect social form. Velocity, in 
this sense, is responsible for an enlargement of sensibility that should be followed to the 
letter. 
For the futurists, the act of publishing their manifestos in newspapers was of crucial 
importance in showing the consonance of avant-garde ideas with the instantaneous 
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velocità omnipresente.” 
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information of daily news. Futurist techniques of promotion illustrated this well. Narratives 
of the group’s activities were distributed in different media, creating abundant exposure, 
which, despite the questionable level of acceptance they enjoyed, served to popularise the 
movement, as did with brand new products and simplified news of distant worlds. Such 
strategies were alien to the arts establishment of the time; they were seen as making dubious 
use of an appeal to motivations other than recognition of artistic quality. Avant-garde 
criticism of establishment culture was also aimed at the functioning of the artistic world. 
Futurism advocated a complete disregard for public and success, at least in any traditional 
form. The only criticism of interest to the movement was the evaluation of their work as a 
cultural commodity.  
As an exasperated form of modernism, futurism was full of the originality and 
extravagance that would feature in other avant-garde movements. And indeed, according to 
its participants, it was not a school but a trend, a forward momentum that transcended its 
members and its time. It is clear, therefore, that some of its perceptions and aspirations were 
shared with dadaism and surrealism. However, futurism was distinct in its urge for novelty 
and admiration of machinery, and its envisioning of war as an appropriate form of 
“cleansing”: a pairing of man and machine in a spontaneous eruption of new possibilities. 
This fact inevitably precluded the recognition of a legacy, or even continuity, between other 
avant-garde projects and the futurist “new world.” 
 
 3.3. Destructive Dada 
 When dadaism emerged in 1916, the disconnectedness it advocated became part of an 
already-established ethos. Dadaists affirmed their intentions to break from previous forms of 
art and convention, by advocating spontaneity and active simplicity. The story is often told of 
Tristan Tzara, Jean Arp and Richard Huelsenbeck “finding” the word dada from the random 
sliding of a paper knife between the pages of a dictionary. Dada presented itself as the urge to 
disorder any established order, to destroy any previous form or formula, to laugh at all 
seriousness and respectability. The movement expressed an acute sense of the arbitrariness of 
recognition and success, as well as of the generally short duration of these phenomena. It 
asserted, for instance, “que notre anti-dogmatisme est aussi exclusiviste que le fonctionnaire 
et que nous ne sommes pas libres et crions liberté”38 (Tzara Lampisteries 15). 
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In many ways, dadaism evolved in opposition to futurism. Emerging in the middle of 
the First World War, and mostly amongst immigrants living or taking refuge in Switzerland, 
it positioned itself clearly against the conflict and as belonging to a generation that had 
inherited its damage. However, both movements had in common what would become some 
of the diffused emblems of the European avant-garde. These include contempt for past 
models and traditions, especially in the artistic sphere, the systematic dissemination of ideas 
through popular media, and the search for new forms of expression that dispense with 
immediate comprehensibility and, ultimately, with public recognition.  
When set against futurism, perhaps the most distinguishing feature of dadaism is its 
self-irony. In this, the dadaists aligned themselves neither with previous nor with 
contemporary social trends. Dada, as they often called, could be defined as a spirit of revolt 
against all conformity, a hatred of systems, and a philosophy operating through spontaneity 
and decomposition. According to the famous formula of Raoul Hausmann, member of the 
German branch, “DADA is what you can make out of yourself” (Herbst), expressing the new 
kind of mentality that included the arts in what was seen as the search for a new ethics. For 
Georges Hugnet, in turn, the movement also gathered “ceux qui, par le mépris de la logique 
et la négation érigée en système, par le scandale et le rire dans leur attitude devant la vie et 
devant l’art, participèrent de cet état d’esprit visant au renversement de toutes les valeurs 
admises”39 (Hugnet 73) 
This passage reveals the new features that the disregard for past traditions acquired in 
dadaism. As well as a rejection of institutionalised culture and values, it was a state of mind 
that rejected the guidance of logic and was based on systematic negation. Tzara, in 
“Manifeste Dada 1918,” expresses it thus: 
Que chaque homme crie: il y a un grand travail destructif, négatif, à 
accomplir. Balayer, nettoyer. La propreté de l'individu s'affirme après l'état de 
folie, de folie agressive, complète, d'un monde laissé entre les mains des 
bandits qui déchirent et détruisent les siècles. Sans but ni dessein, sans 
organisation: la folie indomptable, la décomposition.40 (Tzara Lampisteries 
33) 
                                                            
39 “those who, through their contempt for logic and systematic denial, through scandal and humour in their 
attitude to life and art, participated in this state of mind that aimed to overthrow all accepted values” 
40 “Let each man proclaim: there is a great negative work of destruction to be accomplished. We must sweep 
and clean. Affirm the cleanliness of the individual after the state of madness, aggressive complete madness of a 
world abandoned to the hands of bandits, who rend one another and destroy the centuries. With neither aim nor 
plan, without organization: uncontrollable madness, decomposition.” 
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Here, the sense of revolt and the negative work of destruction, very dear to dadaism, was 
amusingly paraphrased using a watchword, so fashionable in periods of war. The use of the 
term “cleanliness,” moreover, marked dada’s commitment to getting rid of old values, more 
than with establishing new ones. This activity was likened to a mad state of mind, apparently 
incomprehensible from the exterior, whose actors were envisioned as “bandits.” Curiously 
enough, Tzara’s text could fit a futurist motto if it was not for the appearance of the concept 
of “foolishness.” The wish to get rid of previous values through a foolish activity implied the 
prevention of the establishment of new ones, since such activity was developed “with neither 
aim nor plan.” Futurism, conversely, as seen above, positively proposed new social values. 
The particularity of dada lies in its desire to abolish convention through a break with 
the past, considered to be a source of disappointments, but also by promoting a break with the 
future. More precisely, in this case, this is the future foreseen by the particular past that the 
movement rejects. The expressions contre le future (“against the future”) and abolition du 
future (“abolition of the future”) (Tzara Lampisteries 15, 35) appear in the context of 
discussion of the inevitable transience of all beliefs. They criticised the values based on a 
measurement of the supposed worth of human acts, the so-called great deeds capable of 
deliberately and systematically leading humanity towards a progressive future. The dadaist 
opposition to the future was therefore linked with its opposition to vanguardist “prophets.” 
For dadaism, an actual novel future should not be systematically investigated, since this 
already implied a predetermination of it. Together with its disconnectedness, what 
distinguished dada most strongly from previous and contemporaneous movements was its 
traumatic experience of the war. The ideology of progress, as defended by the futurists, was 
profoundly discredited. Its related promises of a positive domination in the re-establishment 
of equality amongst men, and fulfilment of material needs in a near and reachable future were 
likewise rejected.  
 In sum, the dadaist movement sought, on various levels, to be a shock to the European 
culture of the time. Its open hostility to the established social order was a consequence of the 
carnage of war. In complete opposition to the futurist’s praise for technical development, 
dada proposed an absolute derogation of progressive values. The interwar period would make 
the dadaist tone even more strident. Surrealism was at the same time the continuation and the 
transformation of dada’s cry for suspicion, destruction and illogicality. 
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 3.4. Surrealism and the Enlarged Reality 
 The first issues of the magazine Littérature — edited by André Breton, Louis Aragon 
and Philippe Soupault from 1919 to 1924 — already proclaim the intention to revisit certain 
traditional values, as well as to question the understanding of the concept of artistic creation 
(Nadeau 27). Specifically, they promote the appreciation of new trends in the field that gives 
the periodical its name. In 1920, however, the work was somewhat derailed by the arrival of 
Tzara in Paris. Tzara began to steer the course of Littérature towards dadaist precepts. The 
Parisian dada was born, and it gave a home to the restless tendencies that were already 
animating the group. The divergences between dada and the earlier association, however, 
would soon emerge. 
 As soon as 1921, Breton evinced a concern with the establishment of more “efficient” 
and less anarchic ways of approaching the issues occupying the movement (Nadeau 31). To 
some extent, the destructive character of dada created a limitation for its participants. As 
Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes explains, surrealism came to be “une solution intelligente au 
drame interne du mouvement dada”41 (qtd. in Fauchereau 24). Instead of disregarding the 
constituted forms of art in general, as dadaism proposed, Breton and his friends intended to 
attack the official representatives of contemporary cultural expression, incarnated by those 
they saw to have betrayed “la cause de l’esprit et de l’homme”42 (Nadeau 31).  
 Remarkably, the break between the two movements first became apparent through an 
event that took the form of a trial, that is Le Procès Barrès.43 In this, while the emerging 
surrealist movement tasked itself with judging those who had denigrated or prevented the 
development of a free spirit in France, the dadaists demonstrated no faith in justice or 
judgment at all, even their own a burlesque representation of justice. Dadaists saw themselves 
as no better than those being judged, all humans ultimately “striving for the same piece of 
bread.” From such discrepancies it is clear that the surrealists intended to be taken seriously, 
while the dadaists retained a stance of permanent defiance and contempt, including towards 
themselves.  
 It was in 1922 that a formal rupture took place. The new group openly intended to 
“construct from destruction,” without however abandoning their corrosive criticism of the 
culture surrounding them. After the break, Littérature continued to be published until 1924, 
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42 “the cause of the spirit and of man” 
43 For more, please see Fauchereau 15-24. 
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giving voice to the new current. It claimed a nearly forgotten lineage of French poets as 
predecessors, as well as some of the darker products of romanticism. In this regard the latter 
is considered more as a Weltanschauung (“world-view”) — that formulated, according to 
Michael Löwy, a cultural criticism of modern capitalist civilisation (Incêndio 18) — than as a 
literary movement. On the other hand, as Umberto Eco (95) suggests, the twentieth-century 
avant-garde movements also defied the Romantic idea of genius and “creation from 
nothingness,” while making use of techniques such as collage, and, one could add, automatic 
writing. Yet the surrealists made use of these texts to praise the obscure, strange and 
mysterious aspects of experience. The surrealist movement, therefore, had as a starting point 
the acknowledgment of a much larger reality than that one perceived by consciousness. 
 Fascinated by the world of reverie as revealed by Freud, the surrealists intended to 
live and encourage the experience of the entire and complete man, who finally displayed his 
obscurities in the open. The means of achieving this experience, however, was not pre-
determined. According to Nadeau, it could be summarised thus: “laisser s’exprimer ‘l’hôte 
inconnu’ dans sa profondeur, dans sa totalité, automatiquement”44 (17). In this sense, the 
Freudian concept of the unconscious, i.e. the rediscovered attributes of the “unknown host,” 
paved the way for the investigation of a whole new dimension of the psyche, one that the 
surrealists, at this point, saw as an important weapon in their fight against the reigning logic. 
Freud was of course not alone in exploring this new perspective. Discoveries taking place in 
other fields of knowledge, most notably physics, also helped create an atmosphere of 
suspicion towards traditional notions of sense and causality. The unstable economic and 
political situation in interwar Europe also played a part.  
 It is important to note that the search for l’homme entière (“the entire man”) had 
already begun much earlier. From 1919, before Tzara’s arrival in Paris, immersed in an 
atmosphere of distrust of rationality, the group around Littérature had been undertaking 
collective experiments in which altered states of consciousness were provoked. They also 
visited mediums and clairvoyants, in blatant defiance of the scientific order of the day. These 
experiments were attempts to achieve the fusion of action and reverie they envisioned as the 
ultimate surréalité. In the flux of words and partial phrases that emerged in such states, they 
noticed surprising meanings, which they interpreted as coming from unexplored and purer 
parts of the mind.  
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These were the first experiments with automatism, a technique the surrealists 
priviledged other forms of expression. A mode intended to follow the speed of thinking as it 
emerges, automatism sought the release of a primitive and emotional “poetry” free from the 
rational constructs of culture. This rejection of the contents dictated by convention, along 
with the disregard for aesthetics and morals, aligned surrealism with other avant-garde 
movements. What strongly distinguished it from them, however, was its intention to go 
beyond the boundaries of reason, in the search for an absolute reality as an alternative to the 
modern world. In addition, surrealists defined their common sensibility as a certain state of 
fury. Their concern, at least during the first years of activity, was with the life of the spirit, 
and the creation of open, non-conformist ways of developing its possibilities.  
After the break with dadaism, the surrealist group was formally founded. Breton, by 
dint of his personal charisma and intellectual force, could be said to have been its centre. As 
well as the surrealists manifestos, published in 1924 and 1930,45 the group expressed its 
vision through both the Bureau des Recherches Surréalistes (“Bureau of Surrealist 
Research”) and the periodical La Révolution Surréaliste. The first manifesto, in particular, 
marked the irruption of surrealism on the avant-garde scene, as well as promptly 
distinguished its singular nature, which combined a systematic character with obscure 
spiritual activities. 
 
 3.5. “Manifeste du Surréalisme,” 1924. 
 “L’homme, ce rêveur définitif, de jour en jour plus mécontent de son sort, fait avec 
peine le tour des objets dont il a été amené à faire usage, et que lui a livrés sa nonchalance, ou 
son effort” 46  (Breton Manifestes 13). The first “Manifeste du Surréalisme” opens thus, 
picturing man as a dissatisfied figure, placed amongst objects he is constrained to make use 
of, and compelled to make an effort to try his chance in life. This man is described as being 
attuned to his adventures and misfortunes, but affected by neither regret nor bad conscience. 
If he has any lucidity, Breton alleges in the manifesto, it is in thinking of his childhood. This 
part of life, destroyed as it may be, retains its attractiveness in adulthood. In infancy, man can 
                                                            
45 The short document “Prolégomènes à une Troisième Manifeste du Surréalisme ou Non,” published in 1942, is 
not analysed here. It is more often interpreted as an assessment of the later movement than as a statement of a 
new direction. For more, please see Breton (Manifestes 149-62). 
46 “Man, that inveterate dreamer, daily more discontent with his destiny, has trouble assessing the objects he has 
been led to use, objects that his nonchalance has brought his way, or that he has earned through his own efforts.” 
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find an experience free from severity, in which “les pires conditions matérielles sont 
excellentes”47 (Manifestes 14). 
 By growing up, man is forced to abandon part of the territory he once dreamed of 
conquering. Life imposes restrictions on him to which he yields. For Breton, the faculty of 
imagination in particular suffers from such limitations. It gradually becomes merely a 
utilitarian instrument, leaving man to his own destiny. At times, he will try to rediscover his 
creative abilities, for instance when in love. He then experiences a sense of expropriation of 
his own life, which is patent in his inability to respond to a spiritual urge because his 
everyday experience has become completely focussed on practical achievements.  
 Breton declares: “chère imagination, ce que j’aime surtout en toi, c’est que tu ne 
pardonnes pas”48 (Manifestes 14). Neglect of the imaginative ability leads to problems in 
accessing it, meaning it is not fully available to man throughout his life. As well as being 
conceived of as precious, the imagination is also linked to the concept of freedom, which 
appears in the manifesto as the expression of Breton’s “seule aspiration légitime” 49 
(Manifestes 14). He identifies the pleasures bestowed by the imagination on insane people, 
for instance, as the result of their ability to immerse themselves in it. They are able to 
experience a complete disregard for criticism and opinion from the external world, and a 
relative indifference towards corrupt behaviours directed towards them, due to the fact that 
they live permanently within their delusions and hallucinations. 
 This is the liberty espoused by the manifesto: indifference to the moral behaviour and 
dictates of society, together with an enjoyment of the pleasures of imagination. A realistic 
attitude is described by Breton in strictly negative terms. He critiques the attention given to 
the empty, weak moments of life, the ultimate expression of this being modern novels. 
According to Breton, these writings display “l’intraitable manie qui consiste à ramener 
l’inconnu au connu, au classable”50 (Manifestes 19). The detailing and explanations offered 
by the novel are responsible for a reduction in force of the act the author intended to transmit. 
According to the manifesto, the source of life lies in the pure disinterested act, not in its 
rationalisation. 
                                                            
47 “the worst material conditions are excellent” 
48 “beloved imagination, what I like most in you is your unsparing quality” 
49 “only legitimate ambition” 
50 “the incurable mania of wanting to make the unknown known, classifiable” 
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 Breton professes: “nous vivons encore sur le règne de la logique”51 (Manifestes 19). 
In this reign, experience itself is limited by the focus on immediate utility, which does not 
allow for the exploration of unexpected aspects of life. The pattern of explication seen in 
novels allows no place for the unknown, elusive or fleeting aspects of human experience. The 
revelation of the unconscious by Freud is announced in this context as the act of bringing to 
light the most important part of intellectual life. Breton suggests that “l’imagination est peut-
être sur le point de reprendre ses droits”52 (Manifestes 20). As his metaphors suggest, he 
seeks the exposure of the unconscious domain. The means of achieving this are at this point 
unclear, but have been the subject of exploration by both poets and sages. 
 One route is known, however; that explored by Freud, the dimension of dreams. 
According to Breton, there is no reason why one should attribute more certainty to waking 
reality than to dreams, or to make it a privileged object for the exploration of different layers 
of experience. “Selon toute apparance le rêve est continu et porte trace d’organisation. Seule 
la mémoire s’arroge le droit d’y faire des coupures.”53 (Manifestes 21). At the same time, 
“nous n’avons à tout instant des réalités qu’une figuration distincte, dont la coordination est 
affaire de volonté”54 (Manifestes 21-2). Breton points to the fragmentary character of both 
reality and dream, raising the dream to the level of an experience capable of containing a 
truth about life, at least to the same degree that as consciousness can.  
 It is not only within dreams or within consciousness that the issue of continuity-
discontinuity is at stake. Breton is also aware of the apparent exclusiveness of these two 
dimensions: reality becomes submerged and inaccessible to memory whilst one is dreaming; 
the dream quickly dissolves on waking. Freud, as mentioned above, recognises the 
emergence of fragments of reality in dreams, while the opposite cannot be said to be the case, 
at least not in the strict sense of dreams taking place whilst one is awake, with the particular 
exception of daydreaming (Dreams 200). Breton, however, seems to situate the dream within 
a large range of imaginative activities, which can be in full operation during the day, 
alongside consciousness.  
 Analysing waking life, Breton notes that the stability and balance traditionally 
identified with it are relative. The spirit only rarely expresses itself and when it does, this is 
                                                            
51 “we are still living under the reign of logic” 
52 “imagination is perhaps on the point of reclaiming its rights” 
53 “Within the limits where they operate (or are thought to operate) dreams give every evidence of being 
continuous and show signs of organization. Memory alone arrogates to itself the right to excerpt from dreams.” 
54 “at any given moment we have only a distinct notion of realities, the coordination of which is a question of 
will” 
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commonly the result of an effect something else has had on it. For Breton, there is no 
guarantee that this effect, usually attributed to mere subjectivity or to an extrinsic cause such 
as destiny, is not connected to the world of dreams. In fact, Breton questions the very reason 
that “confère au rêve cette allure naturelle, me fait accueillir sans réserves une foule 
d’épisodes don’t l’étrangeté à l’heure où j’écrit me foudroierait?”55 (Manifestes 24). In other 
words, the dream might hold a certainty that is only apparently when fully present in 
consciousness. Certainty, in any case, should not be attributed only to events and feelings that 
take place during waking life. 
 Breton believes that developing a collective awareness of dreams, beginning with the 
registering of prominent elements in them, can contribute to a better appreciation of their 
importance, as well of as the values they embody, which seem to bear little relation to those 
of consciousness. It is in this context that Breton first uses the word that forms the title of the 
manifesto and the movement it describes: “je crois à la résolution future de ces deux états, en 
apparence si contradictoires, que sont le rêve et la réalité, en une sorte de réalité absolue, de 
surréalité, si l’on peut ainsi dire” 56  (Manifestes 24). He seeks the resolution of the 
discontinuity between the two states of dream and reality, through the promotion of an 
absolute reality that can include both dimensions in a new form. The concept of the 
merveilleux (“marvellous”) becomes a kind of touchstone for the activities and analysis of the 
surrealists, since it encompasses the world of dreams as well as the whole spectrum of 
imagination in reality. 
 As an example of a work fully engaged with the marvellous, Breton offers the novel 
The Monk, by English novelist and dramatist Matthew G. Lewis. Originally published in 
1796 and translated by Artaud in 1931, it is described as a piece infused with a passion for 
eternity, and filled with “ce qui de l’esprit aspire à quitter le sol” 57  (Manifestes 25). 
Representations of temptation and enchantment, for instance, feature in the book not as 
extraordinary absurdities, but as natural elements of life, part of the activities of a critical 
spirit. This referencing of previous works of literature forms part of Breton’s efforts to situate 
surrealism within the historical development of a certain current of sensibility, which appears 
in literary writings as well as in other works of art, and predates the emergence of the 
movement itself. Surrealism, therefore, is not to be seen as one more avant-garde trend 
                                                            
55 “makes dreams seem so natural, and allows me to welcome unreservedly a welter of episodes so strange that 
they could confound me now as I write?” 
56 “I believe in the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, 
into a kind of absolute reality, a surreality, if one may so speak” 
57 “what in the spirit aspires to leave the ground” 
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intending to break with tradition. Its claim to a continuity with the works from previous 
epochs is meant to reinforce its validity. The Monk is an example of one of its major 
concurrent “influences,” that of romanticism. 
 Breton highlights the existence of the marvellous character claimed by surrealism at 
different points in time, pointing out that it has not been homogeneous: 
Le merveilleux n’est pas le même à toutes les époques; il participe 
obscurément d’une sorte de révélation générale don’t le détail seul nous 
parvient: ce sont les ruines romantiques, le mannequin moderne ou tout 
autre symbole propre à remuer la sensibilité humaine durant un temps.58  
(Manifestes 26)  
The relics of the affections of previous eras, the effects of an on-going current of disquietude, 
the role of ecstasy and dream through human history; all of these are elements also claimed 
by surrealism as part of the backdrop to its own productions, and to its perspective on 
modernity. The members of the movement at the time are presented by Breton through a 
scenario that combines the ruins of an ancient castle with the comforts of modern life, and 
merges his own daydreams with the visions of actual people, presented simply as mes amis 
(“my friends”). Possible objections to this format are anticipated by Breton: in fact he does 
not live in a castle, but at Fontaine street in Paris. He considers the cathegory of poetic lie, 
and replies to his own conter-arguments: “c’est vraiment à notre fantaisie que nous vivons, 
quand nous y sommes”59 (Manifestes 28). 
 Another version of this precept would read: when one is actually living, one is living 
inside fantasies. The practice of poetry, according to Breton, should be a well-informed guide 
to such a life. That is, not a vacuous act of lyric expression, but a movement engendered by 
constant creation within the domain of poetic imagination. For the surrealists, as discussed 
above, one of the paths leading to this realm is available in situations freed from extrinsic 
influences, such as the state of being close to sleep. Breton testifies to having himself 
experienced the organic generation of distinct phrases while in such a state. They appear to 
arrive “from nowhere,” and are usually followed by a succession of sentences expressed in a 
rhythm resembling la pensée parlée (“the spoken thought”). In another comparison, Breton 
associates such manifestations with the monologue endorsed by psychoanalysis, a discourse 
                                                            
58 “The marvelous is not the same in every period of history: it partakes in some obscure way of a sort of general 
revelation only the fragments of which come down to us: they are the romantic ruins, the modern mannequin, or 
any other symbol capable of affecting the human sensibility for a period of time.” 
59 “it is really is our imagination that we live, when we are in it” 
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“sur lequel l’esprit critique du sujet ne fasse porter aucun jugement, qui ne s’embarrasse, par 
suite, d’aucune réticence” 60  (Manifestes 33). To live the poetic life of immersive and 
continuous fantasy, therefore, is to live outside the world of judgement, exempt from censure, 
as if in a monologue of free association. As will become apparent, the contempt for 
literariness also finds unexpected expression here. 
 To contextualise the possibility of spontaneous poetry, Breton concludes: “la vitesse 
de la pensée n’est pas supérieure à celle de la parole”61 (Manifestes 33). One could, in 
principle, write and express in words the precise operation of thought. At the core of the 
surrealist exploration of altered states of consciousness is a conception of the pure spirit, 
which, through its own actions, can be captured, in disinterested, reflective situations. The 
profusion of words and images produced through these activities is related to the more 
philosophical act of “céder la place à tout ce qu’il y a d’admissible, de légitime au monde”62 
(Manifestes 35). Neither l’écriture de la pensée (“the writing of thought”) nor la pensée 
parlée (“the spoken thought”) are free from impurity, however. This can include defects in 
construction, repetitions and clichés. Breton attributes these “weaknesses” to suggestions and 
distractions coming from outside thought itself, a fact that does not prevent the particular 
emotion or the picturesque features of its wordy formations from taking place, nor from 
convincing the surrealists of the existence of a poetic vein outside conscious life. 
 The antecedents of such forms can be located within types of poetic production that 
had been explored before the emergence of surrealism. Breton’s poetry, for instance, was 
concerned with giving brief accounts of events in the form of recipes, cuttings and 
advertising, as well as with exposing the blank space between the lines by filling it with 
tangential words. If, on the one hand, these techniques had much in common with the 
products of dadaism, on the other hand they were related to a movement that took place in the 
poetic field itself. This was precipitated by Guillaume Apollinaire, a poet whose innovative 
work greatly influenced the avant-garde movements. Apollinaire is from whom the term 
surréalisme was taken. 
 Breton having claimed the right to use the term surrealism in the particular sense 
described above, the movement’s famous definition in the manifesto reads as follows: 
                                                            
60 “without any intervention on the part of the critical faculties, a monologue consequently unencumbered by the 
slightest inhibition” 
61 “the speed of thought is no greater than the speed of speech” 
62 “give way to everything that is admissible, everything legitimate in the world” 
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SURRÉALISME, n.m. Automatisme psychique pur par lequel on se propose 
d'exprimer, soit verbalement, soit par écrit, soit de toute autre manière, le 
fonctionnement réel de la pensée. Dictée de la pensée, en l'absence de tout 
contrôle exercé par la raison, en dehors de toute préoccupation esthétique ou 
morale.63 (Breton Manifestes 36) 
The term automatisme refers to this mode of production taking place at the boundaries of 
consciousness, which can be expressed through different means. The absence of rational 
control and the lack of preoccupation with aesthetic concerns also form part of this practical 
definition, followed by an assertion of a fundamental belief in the omnipotence of dreams, in 
the disinterested play of thought, in “la réalité supérieure de certaines formes de association 
négligées jusqu’a lui”64 (Manifestes 36). The definition of surrealism is of a psychic activity 
occupied with the expressions of the spirit, particularly when detached from external 
determinations.  
 Breton lists public figures who, in one way or another, though never definitively, 
were surrealists before the movement’s emergence, declaring them the bastions of a spiritual 
trend now being resumed through the movement. Among them are the writers Lautréamont, 
Sade, Poe, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Jarry, Swift, Rabbe and Roussel, and the artists Picasso, 
Chirico, Picabia and Duchamp (Manifest 37-8). The contemporary surrealists claim to be no 
more than human recording devices: they have no talent in the literary sense, but serve as 
receptacles for the dictation of thoughts. The result of such availability is described by Breton 
as the production of strong unexpected images, perhaps the best emblems of the contents of 
the spirit, which might be transposed to words or into any other plastic representation. 
 This activity relies on the inexhaustible nature of thought. Or, according to Breton, “à 
chaque seconde il est une phrase étrangère à notre pensée consciente qui ne demande qu’à 
s’extérioriser”65 (Manifestes 41). The strangeness of the thought formations should not be 
ordered or corrected by consciousness, since the invisible connections amongst them are part 
of the mysterious operations of the spirit. At the same time, surrealistic activity requires 
certain simplicity, that is, a disinterest in any supposed personal ability that allows complete 
passivity in relation to one’s own thought creations. It is through the atmosphere created in 
                                                            
63 “SURREALISM, n. Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express — verbally, by 
means of the written word, or in any other manner — the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by the thought, 
in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern.” 
64 “the superior reality of certain forms of previously neglected associations” 
65 “every passing second there is a sentence unknown to our consciousness, which is simply crying out to be 
heard” 
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such a state that “l’esprit se convainc peu à peu de la réalité suprême de ces images”66 
(Manifestes 49), an effect which leads to an enlarged awareness of reality. Breton reminds us 
of a formula devised by the German romanticist Novalis, according to which an ideal series 
of events runs in parallel with actual events, allowing for the possible modification of 
particular facts as you go along (Manifestes 51).  
 One example of this “supplementing” of the actual experience is related to childhood, 
and helps to clarify Breton’s assertion that singular features of infancy can be recovered in 
adult life. In his words: “l’esprit qui plonge dans le surréalisme revit avec exaltation la 
meilleure part de son enfance”67 (Manifestes 52). Childhood is considered by the surrealists 
to be of great fecundity, and close to what they call la vraie vie (“real life”). It is the time “où 
tout concourait cependant à la possession efficace, et sans aléas, de soi-même”68 (Manifestes 
52). The unusual combinations arising in surrealistic images can also be correlated with the 
state of childhood, in which genuine horror is commonly accompanied by thrill, and lurid 
monsters incarnate marvellous figures of thought. The effective possession of oneself, in this 
sense, does not come with rational thinking, but instead with the fearless exploration of one’s 
imagination. 
 Surrealistic assemblages of different contents, whether in the form of words or 
images, are often humorous. They include the instant jokes brought up by the association of 
titles and fragments of titles cut from newspapers (Breton Manifestes 54-6). The comic 
features that emerge through these unexpected lyrical juxtapositions draw their power from a 
questioning of the facts of everyday life through rearranging them, showing the questionable 
relevance of such tacitly accepted forms of communication. Another part of the surrealistic 
gesture consists of revealing the multiple facets of things, as a means of pointing to a much 
broader existence within the existence we know of. It exposes the profession of abundant 
contents that are not necessarily or usually perceived, but that nevertheless exist.  
 Since the movement’s intention is not merely to question reality, but to question the 
way in which it is represented, the refusal of dogmatism runs parallel to the surrealist 
commitment to invention, as well as to the minimal attention it devotes to consciousness. 
According to Briony Fer, surrealism’s aim above all is to work “from the point of view of the 
unconscious” (176). Considering the ambiguous nature of the latter, surrealist experiments 
are at constant risk of being high jacked either by incomprehensibility or by convention. 
                                                            
66 “the spirit gradually becomes convinced of the supreme reality of these images” 
67 “the spirit which plunges into surrealism relives with glowing excitement the best part of its childhood” 
68 “where everything nevertheless conspires to bring about the effective, risk-free possession of oneself” 
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However, in its references to childhood and to the power of dreams, the first manifesto 
expresses a profound admiration for situations in which life is exempt from the control of 
rationality and conscious thinking. In this sense, infancy is generally understood in the same 
terms in which Freud describes it in The Interpretation of Dreams, that is, as the period in 
which instinctual impulses dominate and imaginative powers find almost no restriction 
(Freud Dreams 547). Equally compelling to the surrealists are the pervasiveness of fantasies, 
the uncanny truth coming from dreams, the marvellous life of the spirit; all of these notions 
are central to the Freudian approach to the unconscious.  
 While the idea of pure and automatic psychic activity might seem to have been 
inspired by this same source, for Freud, the life of the spirit in its totality cannot be accessed. 
The attempt of surrealists to envision a resolution between the unconscious life and the 
material one could not be more distant from the perspective of Freud. According to the latter, 
any attempt at voluntarily excogitating the effects of the unconscious is a contradiction in 
terms, since all unconscious formations would suffer the interference of censorship (Dreams 
166). The surrealist gesture intends to repeat that performed by Freud some decades before, 
of allowing hideous contents to come to light. However, it does this by extrapolating what in 
Freud’s own theory had remained obscure, the unconscious “in its pure form.” 
 The commitment of surrealism to breaking with rationality aligns it with other bodies 
of thought, beyond those evoked by psychoanalysis. The movement’s attraction to mysticism 
and occultism can be described as another facet of this commitment. As the manifesto tells 
us: “sous couleur de civilisation, sous prétexte de progrès, on est parvenu à bannir de l’esprit 
tout ce qui se peut taxer à tort ou à raison de superstition, de chimère; à proscrire tout mode 
de recherche de la verité qui n’est pas conforme à l’usage”69 (Manifestes 20). Curiously, this 
extract echoes Freudian claims about the correctness of popular and ancestral knowledge on 
dreams, which were completely disregarded by modern science (Freud Dreams 124-5).  
 As detailed in the previous chapter, Freud integrates such marginal contents into his 
own scientific discourse. Surrealism seems to be attempting the same in relation to occult 
practices, by engendering a discourse that is also self-instituting. However, while Freud 
focuses on getting his work accepted by a scientific community, and therefore promotes the 
submission of popular culture to the test of science, the surrealists seek the establishment of 
enlarged perception of reality, of which the unconscious, to some extent stripped of its 
                                                            
69 “under the pretense of civilization and progress, we have managed to banish from the mind everything that 
may rightly or wrongly be termed superstition, or fancy; forbidden is any kind of search for truth which does not 
conform with accepted practices” 
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scientific character, is an important source. Accordingly, Breton closes the first manifesto 
with the following words: “C’est vivre et cesser de vivre qui sont des solutions imaginaires. 
L’existence est ailleurs.”70 (Manifestes 60). To live in this other existence, unconcerned with 
questions of living and dying, and, therefore, with rationality and necessity, is the critical aim 
of surrealism in its first manifesto. 
 
 3.6. The Second Surrealist Manifesto, 1930 
 Six years after the “Manifeste du Surréalisme” had appeared, a second manifesto 
emerged, informed by the mood of the time leading up to the Second World War. Much had 
changed in the social milieu since 1924, and also within the surrealist group, with early 
experiences having given way to accomplishments. Many surrealist writings had by then 
been published, and the magazine La Revolution Surréaliste was appearing periodically. At 
the same time, the group had acknowledged the existence of surrealist painting. Its public 
activities had been marked by scandals, in which the polemic opinions of the members took 
centre stage. 
 In accordance with the first manifesto, the years following 1924 saw the so-called 
surrealist revolution being explicitly located in the field of ideas, beyond political battles. The 
following excerpt from an internal document, dated 1925, is exemplary: “la réalité immédiate 
de la révolution surréaliste n’est pas tellement de changer quoi que ce soit à l’ordre physique 
et apparent des choses que de créer un mouvement dans les esprits”71 (Artaud Œuvres 155). 
The movement defined its goal as that of creating a new kind of mysticism, a new order of 
thinking, a collective myth. According to Nadeau (71), the use of such terms exposes the 
intention of surrealism to move towards concrete matters, these being expressed, however, 
through the form of myth. 
 The Moroccan War contributed to a change in orientation. In 1925, in order to form a 
front of support for the rebels, the surrealists aligned themselves with communists and other 
sympathiser groups. From these meetings, issues of political economy began to enter the 
discourse of surrealism. The spiritual revolution, therefore, started to take the form of a social 
revolution, while the initial idealism of the movement's precepts was gradually replaced by 
dialectical materialism (Nadeau 86). Through Breton’s particular admiration for the Russian 
                                                            
70 “It is living and ceasing to live that are imaginary solutions. Existence is elsewhere.” 
71 “the immediate reality of the surrealist revolution is not so much in changing anything related to the physical 
and apparent order of things, as to create a movement in men’s minds” 
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revolutionary Leon Trotsky, surrealism manifested its intention to conceive of revolution 
solely in the form of economic and social transformation. Russia was incorporated into the 
pre-existing admiration of the surrealists for the Orient. 
 In 1927, the movement allied itself to the French Communist Party without however 
giving up its status of a separate group. This move resulted in the expulsion of some of its 
most important members, such as Artaud, Soupault and Naville. In the political sphere, the 
superficial post-war euphoria was definitively over, and states were resuming conflictual 
dynamics. The “Seconde Manifeste du Surréalisme” attempted to deal with this switch in the 
movement’s revolutionary perspective, while at the same time reinforcing some of the trends 
present from its inception.  
  Interestingly, the manifesto opens with the reproduction of an extract from the 
Journal de l’Aliénation Mentale (“Journal of Mental Alienation”), in which the psychiatrist 
Paul Abély calls on his colleagues to react to what he defines as a danger exogène 
(“exogenous hazard”) to the psychiatric practice. This refers specifically to a passage from 
Breton’s novel Nadja (1928), in which the author offers a suggestion to the insane: to make 
use of any phase of remission to kill people from the psychiatric service, preferably doctors. 
After blaming the psychiatrists’ own passivity for the proliferation of such “insolences,” 
Abély invokes society’s responsibility to protect these professionals, precisely from what 
they supposedly protect society from, that is the mentally ill: “cette societé semble oublier 
quelquefois la reciprocité des ces devoirs”72 (Abély qtd. in Breton Manifestes 69). The piece 
is accordingly titled “Légitime Défense.” 
 This open “attack” coming from the psychiatric profession is followed in the 
manifesto by a discussion between a group of psychiatrists, reproduced by Breton. Here the 
group gives a verbose definition of surrealism as part of the framework of European 
weaknesses. The comic seriousness of these assertions exposes the disturbance caused by 
surrealism in fields that should not, in principle, be concerned by its activities. In response to 
this, Breton re-situates the movement’s goal as the attempt to provoke, intellectually as well 
as morally, “une crise de conscience de l’espèce la plus générale et la plus grave” 73 
(Manifestes 72). 
 In other words, surrealism should provoke the revelation of artificially fixed 
dichotomies — those forming the basis of psychiatric assumptions, for instance — which are 
                                                            
72 “this society seems at times to forget the reciprocity of these duties” 
73 “a crisis of conscience of the most general and serious kind” 
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responsible for the propagation of impoverished ideas about the means of revolution. The fact 
that all dichotomies have a point of indiscernibility provides the overlap between the 
movement’s fight for a generalised revolution and the Freudian notion of the unconscious. It 
is only following the determination of the point of encounter, at which all divergences 
coincide and where contraries become the same, that various social structures lose their 
meaning. It is here that the quest for a positive social form should begin. 
 In times of desperation, as Breton underlined in the Preface to the manifesto,74 the 
themes of indocility, revolt and violence must be approached unambiguously. From its 
defence of the act of randomly shooting into the crowd, to its strong criticism of bourgeois 
values, the second manifesto bears the traces of the nervousness with which the movement 
faced the horizon of the new “catastrophe” represented by the Second World War. Breton 
justifies the harsh judgment meted out to surrealism’s antecedents, as well as the criticism of 
its former members, as the expression of intransigence “à l’égard d’un appareil de 
conservation sociale”75 (Manifestes 77). On this concern, he states: 
Tout est à faire, tous les moyens doivent être bons à employer pour ruiner les 
idées de famille, de patrie, de religion. La position surréaliste a beau être, sous 
ce rapport, assez connue, encore faut-il qu’on sache qu’elle ne comporte pas 
d’accommodements.76 (Manifestes 77-8)  
It is in relation to this impossibility of “accommodation” or flexibility that the case of 
expelled members is discussed. 
 Artaud, who had been part of the surrealist movement since 1924, having directed the 
Bureau des Recherches Surréalistes and participated extensively in the group’s activities and 
publications, is the first object of Breton’s attack in the manifesto. Breton evokes the 
occasion on which the surrealists protested Artaud’s staging of a play by Strindberg, 
claiming, amongst other things, that it had been motivated by reasons other than the artistic. 
At the time, the surrealists professed to fight “sous toutes leurs formes l’indifférence 
poétique, la distraction de l’art … la spéculation pure”77 (Manifestes 78). In fact, it seems that 
the reason behind Artaud’s expulsion had more to do with his defense of the idea that the 
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See Breton Manifestes 63-5. 
75 “concerning an apparatus of social preservation” 
76 “Everything remains to be done, every means must be worth trying, in order to lay waste to the ideas of 
family, country, religion. No matter how well known the surrealist position may be. With respect to this matter, 
still, it must be stressed that on this point there is no room for compromise.” 
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revolution should be conceived in purely spiritual terms, than with any artistic quarrel. The 
details of Artaud’s expulsion being related elsewhere,78 its prominence in the manifesto is 
surprising. Some lines from Artaud himself, claiming a lack of honour on the part of the 
surrealists, are quoted and reacted against. The recording of such apparently petty details 
attests to the high esteem in which Artaud and Breton held each other, and the degree to 
which they were personally affected by the rupture. The only other response from an 
excluded member quoted in the manifesto is that of Soupault (Breton Manifestes 83). 
 A derogatory tone characterises this whole section of the document. It enumerates 
different former members, together with their misdeeds, all of which are described as being 
no longer part of surrealism. The criticism inflicted of them, as mentioned above, relates 
largely to the recent and important “addition” made to the surrealist movement, described by 
Breton as the deepening of existing precepts, namely, the political direction taken by 
surrealism and its embracing of communism.  
 Breton opens this section of the manifesto with praise for the contributions of thinkers 
such as Hegel, Marx, Hartmann and Freud to the general understanding of humanity, then 
goes on to make the following statement: “je pense qu’on ne se étonnera pas de voir le 
surréalisme, chemin faisant, s’appliquer à autre chose qu’à la résolution d’un problème 
psychologique, si intéressant soit-il”79 (Manifestes 88). Although the movement considers its 
application to psychological matters to have been a fruitful trajectory, Breton feels that the 
time for something else has arrived. A question is posed in the second manifesto concerning 
the social regime, and whether this regime should be accepted or rejected. This question 
guides the different analyses that emerge in the later sections of the text, including the 
assessment of surrealism itself.  
 In theoretical terms, Breton envisions the general tendency of surrealism as analogous 
to the tendency of historical materialism. That is, the starting point of both is the avortement 
colossal (“colossal abortion”) undertaken by the Hegelian system, namely the negation of the 
disbelief in the material world promoted by idealism. In this sense, materialism is the 
negation of a negation, a movement towards a concrete understanding of reality and history. 
What surrealism intends to contribute to this vision is “de lui fournir des possibilités de 
                                                            
78 In the pamphlet Au Grand Jour (1927), signed by Breton and others. This theme is approached in detail 
below, in the pages 152-9 and 169-79. 
79 “I don’t think it would be surprising to see surrealism, in time, applied to something other than the solving of 
a psychological problem, as interesting as that may be” 
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application nullement concurrentes dans le domaine conscient” 80  (Manifestes 89). More 
precisely, it aims to approach with the problems of love, dreams, insanity, art and religion 
through the use of a dialectic method. 
 The passionate discrediting of the former members of the surrealist movement is 
extended, in the subsequent pages of the manifesto, to the members of the French Communist 
Party and the intellectuals surrounding them. It is a response to the contempt they directed 
towards the surrealists, which is described by Breton as transient in relation to the actual 
revolution, the result of the selfish aspirations of some individuals. He attributes their 
mediocre acts “bien plutôt dans une perte progressive de conscience que dans l’explosion 
d’une raison soudaine”81 (Manifestes 94). Surrealism is described as the agent of a form of 
contrôle des idées (“control of ideas”), in the absence of which such intellectuals would be 
free to give expression to their latent individual ambition. Here the negative connotation 
given to the expression perte de conscience (“loss of consciousness”) displays the new 
direction taken by surrealism in relation to consciousness as a result of its adherence to the 
principles of historical materialism. Becoming aware of one’s position within the capitalist 
process of production, i.e. la prise de conscience de classe, is an important value for the 
communist revolution. The surrealists believe that a certain level of idea control is necessary 
to prevent individual needs from overshadowing collective interests. In this context, a 
concept such as “loss of consciousness” can only be negative, despite the group having used 
similar phrases with a positive connotation in the past. 
 The surrealists go on to assign themselves an avant-gardist role, this time in relation 
to the proletariat, that is, according to the classic definition, those who do not own their 
means of production, but have to sell their labour power to survive (Marx and Engels 19). 
This position can be inferred from statements such as the following: “notre intervention … ne 
tend qu’à mettre en garde les esprits sérieux contre un petit nombre d’individus que, par 
expérience, nous savons être des niais, des fumistes ou des intrigants mais, de toute manière, 
des êtres révolutionnairement malintentionés”82 (Manifestes 99-100). By assuming the role of 
guide, the surrealist movement repeats, on a smaller scale, the founding intention of 
communist political parties. According to Lukács (40), the Party structure is the bearer of the 
proletariat’s class consciousness, as well as of the consciousness of its historical vocation. 
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81 “rather to a loss of consciousness than to a sudden outburst of reason” 
82 “our intervention ... only intends to warn serious minds against a small number of individuals who, from 
experience, we know to be fools, phonies or plotters, in any case, persons malicious to the revolution” 
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Not as an “organisational” structure, however, but in the sense that this consciousness, 
through articulating its demands, creates a new reality, that of the Party. This guiding role was 
however necessarily limited by the bourgeois background of most of the intellectuals of the 
pre-revolutionary period, which made them unable to relate to the aspirations of the 
proletarian class. In relation to this, Breton asserts, with reference to Trotsky,83 that the notion 
of a “proletarian culture” can only be grasped through analogies and in terms of an antithesis 
to the bourgeois establishment, for the reason that such a culture does not yet exist. The 
limitations of the guiding role were therefore quite perceptible, even to the surrealists. 
 On the subject of the impossibility of discerning, a priori, between revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary forces, the manifesto interestingly proposes a return to the original 
surrealist investigations, since, it claims, the problems of social action are no different from 
“un problème plus général que le surréalisme s’est mis en devoir de soulever et qui est celui 
de l’expression humaine sous toutes ses formes” 84  (Manifestes 101). In other words, 
surrealism envisions its revolutionary task as that of dealing with the problem of language. 
Breton points to the interesting, but so far rather timid, experiments in the rampage of words 
promoted by dada and by surrealism itself. The effects of these experiments include upheaval 
in traditional poetic value-systems and the destruction of the illusion of tacit understanding. 
Despite its new engagement with communism, therefore, surrealism surprisingly judges there 
to be no need for it to review the methods it has used so far. 
 Furthermore, according to Breton, this “marxist form” of surrealism “n’entend pas 
faire bon marché de la critique freudienne des idées”85 (Manifestes 109). Instead it celebrates 
“la donné freudienne”: the important contribution of Freud to the critique of the dominance 
of rational thinking. That is, whilst adhering to the marxist discourse, which praises, perhaps 
above all, awareness of the material conditions of existence, Breton does not discard the 
critique of pure rationality. It is important to notice in this context that the marxist notion of 
consciousness corresponds neither to a psychological nor to an empirically measureable one. 
In fact, according to Lukács, “regarded abstractly and formally, class consciousness implies a 
class-conditioned unconsciousness of one’s own socio-historical and economic condition” 
(History 52). That is to say, it implies the “imputation” of reactions to a particular position in 
the process of production; the thoughts men “would have in a particular situation if they were 
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able to access it and the interests arising from it” (Lukács History 51). In this sense, the 
accomplishment of class consciousness means filling the gap between this “imputed” 
consciousness and the psychological one.  
 The surrealist manifesto highlights the human desire to express itself through 
creation, as well as destruction. This desire is described by Freud in terms of sublimation, the 
“gifted” solution to the impossibility of transmuting human phantasies into reality. This 
notion represents the transformation of the dream-life into artistic creation, allowing the 
establishment of a connection between reality and phantasy (Freud qtd. in Breton Manifestes 
110). In this sense, the “artistic gift,” for Freud, is, psychologically speaking, a mystery. 
Breton, however, seeks to challenge its “sacredness,” not only in terms of Freud’s theory, but 
also of a general intellectual elitism. 
 He defines inspiration as the moment in which one’s spirit is released from its 
bondage to rational solutions. Such episodes of relative awareness are often experienced as a 
kind of possession, recognisable from the “courtcircuit qu’elle provoque entre une idée 
donnée et sa répondante”86 (Manifestes 111). Surrealism, according to Breton, has done its 
utmost to multiply these short-circuits, in order to reproduce the moments in which 
“l’homme, en proie à une émotion particulière, est soudain empoigné par ce ‘plus fort que lui’ 
qui le jette, à son corps défendant, dans l’immortel” 87  (Manifestes 111). In this sense, 
inspiration is strictly related to the unconscious, since it results in the expression of the 
passive life of intelligence, in moments in which “pure” psychic activity takes precedence 
over the abstract will towards self-signification. It also corresponds to an awareness of the 
possibility of removal from rational thinking, the existence of a meaningful life beyond lucid 
control.  
 This ambiguous “solution” to the problem of inspiration recalls Freudian attempts at 
demonstrating the existence of the unconscious, while at the same time declaring its complete 
dependence on conscious formations. The solution is of a singular dialectic nature: if 
inspiration is a short circuit amidst logical thinking, it is also an awareness of this possible 
exemption from it. This definition allows Breton to make use of both sets of nomenclatures 
within surrealist discourse: awareness and unconsciousness, activity and passivity, direction 
and disposability. 
                                                            
86 “short circuit that it [inspiration] causes between a given idea and its respondent” 
87 “man, when plagued by a particular emotion, is suddenly caught by something that is ‘stronger than him,’ 
which will throw him, against his will, towards the immortal” 
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 For Breton, surrealism should make itself responsible for the expression of this 
elusive imaginative life, by allowing it to emerge through the activities of automatic writing 
and dream narration, the two forms privileged by the surrealists in their attempts to express 
the full resources of the spirit. Since such resources exist in a state of disregard for 
premeditated activities, as well as for the social values relating to them, they are described as 
gratuitous thinking. In Breton’s words, this is a féerie intérieure (“inner magic”), which can 
be obtained through methods accessible to everyone (Manifestes 112f). He goes on to 
emphasise the accessibility of these surrealist methods. 
 It is at this point that Breton presents an analogy between the goal of surrealism and 
that of another field of knowledge distinct from marxism. This has been present since the first 
manifesto, as discussed above, and here appears under the name recherches alchimiques 
(“alchemical researches”) (Manifestes 124). The analogy is established in the following 
terms:  
La pierre philosophale n’est rien autre que ce qui devait permettre à 
l’imagination de l’homme de prendre sur toutes choses une revanche éclatante 
et nous voici de nouveau, après de siècles de domestication de l’esprit et de 
résignation folle, à tenter d’affranchir définitivement cette imagination par le 
“long, immense, raisonné dérèglement de tous les sens” et le reste. 88 
(Manifestes 124) 
Here Breton reprises the theme of imagination in relation to the material world, in order to 
assert again the necessity of provoking the derangement of all the senses. Alchemy is offered 
as a model of this disturbance, one engendered through a long and reasoned process. The 
important new point that he makes here is that strictly reproducible methods should be used 
in the search for knowledge.  
 The expression alchimie du verbe (“word alchemy”), taken from Arthur Rimbaud’s 
Une Saison en Enfer (1873), is used in the second manifesto to link the surrealist view of 
language, as specified above, with the need to provoke, through the imaginative powers, a 
reconfiguration of the world. In its “magic experiences with words,” to use an expression 
from Benjamin (Surrealism 145), surrealism is close to the Kabbalah, in which the word is no 
less than the model for the soul’s creation, and leads to the revolutionary pursuit of man’s 
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over all things, and here we are again, after centuries of spiritual domestication and insane resignation, trying to 
definitively free our imagination, through a ‘long, immense, reasoned derangement of all the senses’ and the 
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liberation from exploitative conditions through the reinvention of his or her relationship with 
the material world. 
 This approximation to the occult has many effects. The question of malediction, for 
example, evoked mainly through the writings of Lautréamont, leads the surrealists to a 
renewal of their commitment to disregard for public opinion. This takes on the aspect of an 
effort to prevent the public from taking part in the deeper aspects of the movement. 
According to Breton, “il importe de réitérer et de maintenir ici le ‘Maranatha’ des alchimistes, 
placé au seuil de l’oeuvre pour arrêter les profanes”89 (Manifestes 127). The Maranatha is an 
Aramaic formula that, in the Christian context, corresponds to a blessing — that is, “The 
Lord is coming!” — whilst, in alchemical writings, it functions as a curse (Stavish 197). The 
word appears in the latter context in the Bible, at the end of Paul’s first letter to the 
Corinthians: “If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha.” 
“Anathema” here means “cursed”: the people who do not embrace God on his imminent 
return to earth shall be cursed. Breton, for his part, is probably referring to both the curse and 
the protection that is seen to be the effect of the cryptic aspect of alchemical writings. As with 
alchemy, he seems to suggest that the ordinary public must be prevented from knowing the 
secrets of surrealism, in order to avoid a diminution of its powers. 
 This leads to the famous formula demanding the occultation of surrealism: “JE 
DEMANDE L’OCCULTATION PROFONDE, VÉRITABLE DU SURRÉALISME”90 (Manifestes 128). 
The background to this, as well as the above-mentioned risk of normalisation in the public 
sphere, is the need to recognise the contributions of astrology and métapsychique 
(“metapsychology”) within the frame of modern science (Manifestes 128f). The second 
manifesto testifies, as the first did in relation to dreams, to the importance of acknowledging 
supernatural powers, such as those of mediums, which, though rare, according to the 
surrealists, do exist.  
This rehabilitation of excluded forms of knowledge appears, for instance, in 
references to famous names in alchemy and hermeticism, alongside Sade and Lautréamont, in 
Breton’s writings in particular. According to Michel Carrouges (22), these elements are not 
just traces of esotericism displayed as a sign of erudition, but should be recognised as 
cornerstones of the movement, inspiring its fundamental notions. However, if surrealism 
praises mysticism, it also repels any traditional form of spiritualism. As Nadeau puts it, “il ne 
                                                            
89 “it is important here to reiterate and maintain the ‘Maranatha’ of the alchemists, to place it at the threshold of 
the work to prevent the entry of the profane” 
90 “I DEMAND THE PROFOUND, TRUE OCCULTATION OF SURREALISM” 
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servait à rien d’avoir ramené l’inspiration sur la terre pour s’évader à nouveau dans le 
surnaturel”91 (50). 
 If at some times the occultist aspect of surrealism seems to be based on actual 
mystical practices, which take place outside of and independently from the movement, at 
others it is clear that the kind of alchemy practiced by the surrealists is of a different type. 
The expression “mental alchemy” (Manifestes 131) points to this. It is used to compare the 
precautions taken by magicians before undertaking alchemical activities with the measures 
required to enter, as the surrealists do, into “mental alchemical” duties. This refers to a 
necessary moral asepsis that, according to Benjamin, prevents surrealism from becoming 
assimilable by bourgeois morality (Surrealism 154).  
 Another aspect of the surrealist vision of revolution is close to a concept of revelation. 
The theme of love is key to this context. It is initially accessed through the feminine figure, 
which is described as somehow containing “tout ce qu’il y a de merveilleux et de trouble”92 
(Manifestes 129f) in the world. Love is then endorsed as the activity capable of unifying, 
under the same symbol, the ideas of both the salvation and the perdition of the spirit. Clearly 
understood solely from a masculine perspective, and necessarily addressed to a woman, love 
seems to be, for the surrealists, one of the only activities remaining that can reconcile men 
with life. It provides a reflection of the spirit which is only partial, and which cannot be 
controlled. Breton conceives love “comme le lieu d’occultation idéale de toute pensée”93 
(Manifestes 130f), an occultation that allows for the coincidence of opposites. 
 The call for occultation reveals a belief in secrets that surrealism, at least to some 
extent, is also intending to reveal. The contradiction lies in the fact that these secrets exist yet 
are both accessible and inaccessible to everyone. The surrealist movement, as a methodical 
process that attempts to bring hideous contents to light, without however diluting their magic, 
represents an experience that maintains the dialectic existence of such ambivalences. While 
there are points of convergence between the second manifesto’s call to revolution and its 
elaboration of the legacy of Freud — such as the indiscernibility of false dichotomies — the 
themes of prise de conscience and contrôle des idées inevitably clash with the claim for crise 
de conscience, not to mention with the concepts of féerie intérieure and courtcircuit logique. 
It can be said that the psychic life as described by Freud is certainly an influence in the 
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92 “all that is wonderful and disturbed” 
93 “as the ideal place for the occultation of all thought” 
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determination of this particular version of the conscious-unconscious dynamic, but not the 
only one. 
 Recapping some of the fundamental aspects of surrealism, Breton ends the second 
manifesto with an abstract call for the conflation of traditional definitions of being and non-
being. At the same time, he calls on men to assume their freedom, in defiance of all the 
failures of history. These aspects are both connected to the role of surrealism as the 
revolution’s avant-garde — according to which it must direct intellectual forces towards the 
inevitable insurgence — as well as to its leading role in the acknowledgment of alchemical 
interferences in the “natural” order of things, including the spirit.  
 The surrealist engagement with issues of the spirit, especially in terms of so-called 
“human expression,” merges with its commitment to a socio-political process that goes 
beyond its own activities, namely that represented by communism. The integration of 
occultist sources together with the other fields previously explored by the movement is part 
of the effort to enrich the revolutionary process with aspects that go beyond those 
experienced by consciousness. Despite all of these trends, the idea of revolution occupies 
centre stage. If the final lines of the first manifesto professed existence to be elsewhere — 
“l’existence est ailleurs” (Manifestes 60) —, the second manifesto closes on quite a different 
note. It urges men to revolt, to use ideas as weapons against different forms of “bestiality,” 
and finally, to welcome the discharge of guns, once defeated, “comme un feu de salve”94 
(Manifestes 137). At once salutation and salvo of guns, defeat contains either the beginning 
of a new world or the real possibility of its end. There is no sign of a world elsewhere, 
however. On the threshold of the Second World War, surrealism aspires to merge the 
dimensions of human fantasy, mystical power and social revolution, with its feet still planted 
on the ground.  
 
3.7. Breton’s Dreams: Between Freud and Marx 
The goal of Breton’s book Les Vases Communicants, written between 1931 and 1932, 
is to show that the interpretation of dreams is compatible with a revolutionary perspective. 
This intention is announced in the following terms: “la conversion de plus en plus nécessaire 
… de l’imaginé au vécu ou plus exactement au devoir-vivre”95 (Breton Vases 10-1). The 
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work investigates the means of directing the “constitutive forces” of dreams towards 
“experiences to come,” leading to the discovery of new ways of living. References to Freud 
and excerpts from Marx, Engels and particularly Lenin, are abundant. Breton’s approach 
moves through a heterodox reading of these authors and culminates with a personal account 
of dreams, daydreams and fantasies. 
As part of this, Breton offers his own definition of dreams. He sees them as 
“essentially movement” in dialectic sense, their content moving from real contradictions to a 
resolution through the taking of an action (Breton Vases 59). The dream can reveal the past as 
much as it can expose the future, since it encompasses the moving nature of psychic life. 
Here the emergence of a marxist component takes the form of an engagement with Hegel. In 
fact, as Gérard Durozoi explains in “Les Vases Communicants: Marx-Freud” (1992), at the 
time of the book’s publication, the affiliation between Hegel and Marx was perceived as a 
peaceful kinship. The issue of a so-called “epistemological rupture” initiated by Marx over 
Hegelian dialectics, much present in today’s discourse, would emerge only decades later, 
particularly with Louis Althusser’s Pour Marx (1965). 
In Les Vases Communicants, both the understanding of the dimension of dreams and 
the task of their interpretation take part in the surrealist conception of the entire man, in its 
full imaginative and revolutionary aspects. Curiously, Breton opens his book with the figure 
of the French Sinologist Marquis d’Hervey de Saint-Denis, who reported his experiences of 
provoking and guiding his own dreams in Les Rêves et les Moyens de les Diriger (1867). 
Breton presents Saint-Denis in a positive light, while reproaching the lack of rigour of the 
Marquis’ methods. This figure will not be unfamiliar to the reader of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. Freud’s account of Saint-Denis deals with his “premonitory” dreams, which Freud 
sees, unsurprisingly, as the result of the dream’s ability to access unconscious memories 
(Dreams 571). Just like Freud after him, the Marquis stated that even the most chaotic dreams 
have a sense, and can be explained. But in the most remarkable feature of his accounts, 
namely the capacity to guide dreams, Freud sees no more than the preconscious wish to 
observe dreams overlapping with the wish to sleep. 
Breton’s choice of Saint Denis for the opening of Les Vases Communicants is 
unequivocal. One the one hand, it allows him to launch a notion of dreams based on a 
collaboration between conscious and unconscious features, that is, rational command and 
unconscious imagination. On the other, it makes explicit his move beyond Freudian ideas 
towards a more comprehensive understanding of dream interpretation, one that includes a 
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dialectical approach — and therefore does not exclude a connection with the future. In this 
context, Breton criticises Freud’s conceptualisation of the continuity between dream and 
waking life as a back-and-forth movement (Breton Vases 20).  
Freud, having recognised the principle of conciliation of contraries, as well as the 
unconscious basis of human “mystic” beliefs, then seems to retreat by affirming that psychic 
reality should not be confused with material reality. This move is a great disappointment to 
Breton, particularly in the context of Freud’s innovative formulations on dreams. It is not 
Breton’s only objection, however. Freud’s approach to prophetic dreams in particular strikes 
Breton as lacking a dialectic understanding, a recurrent theme in Les Vases Communicants. 
That is, the conception that the future might be foreseen through the dream’s resolution of 
contradictions is absent from Freud’s considerations. 
Another lacuna in Freud’s theory identified by Breton leads him to elaborate on an 
important branch of his approach on dreams. Where Freud hesitates in offering up intimate 
information, and indeed leaves the interpretation of many of his dreams patently incomplete 
due to an apparent fear of infamy, Breton rushes to announce his intention to break down the 
mur de la vie privé (“privacy wall”), namely this “barrage social derrière lequel il est entendu 
que l’homme, sans coupable indiscrétion, ne peut chercher à rien voir”96 (Vases 28).  
Breton’s gesture is more likely intended as a provocation against the accusation of 
indiscretion, than a naive belief that a voluntary attempt to trespassing this social barrier 
might be successful without the intervention of certain filters. In other words, Breton’s move 
crosses the limits of politesse, but not the barriers of unconscious censorship. What lies 
behind it, unsurprisingly, is far from extraordinary, pointing to the fact that Freud’s reticence 
might have been more stylistic than honour-related. It is nevertheless undeniable, as Breton 
himself emphasises (Vases 29), that the role played by sexual concerns is almost absent in 
Freud’s analysis of his own dreams, while it is quite abundant in the interpretations he offers 
of the dreams of other people. 
Considering these and other objections, therefore, Breton’s evaluation of Freud’s 
theory on dreams is up to this point quite negative. In his view, what should be retained from 
Freud’s theory is the method of interpretation, due to both its originality in relation to 
previous theories and its practical character, derived from the psychiatrist’s work in the 
domain of mental disorders (Breton Vases 28). However, beneath Breton’s tone of contempt 
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lies the influence of Freud’s theory on Les Vases Communicants, not to mention on Breton’s 
general approach to the theme of dreams.  
The nature of the questions posed by Breton while interpreting dreams, and the very 
fact that he attempts to “fill” some lacunae in Freud’s theory, act as a tribute. Declaring that 
he intends to extrapolate from the theory of the Viennese psychiatrist, Breton looks also to 
authors mentioned by Freud in the bibliographic review of The Interpretation of Dreams. 
Breton therefore quotes from sources such as Volkelt, Hildebrandt, Ellis and Saint-Denis, 
sometimes reaffirming and sometimes explicitly opposing Freud’s authority on the subject. 
At the same time, he points out the insufficiencies in the theories of these authors in relation 
to the attempts of both Freud and himself. Breton’s literature review forms the backdrop to 
his own approach on dreams, which has the basic elements of Freud’s theory as a constituent 
part. 
Similarly, quotations from Lenin are used to “unmask” the bourgeois constraints of 
many attempts at interpreting dreams, as well as at determining the exact relationship 
between dream life and waking experience. This is particularly significant, as expected, in 
relation to Freud. In one of these cases, for instance, Breton criticises Freud’s “manque à peu 
près complet de conception dialectique”97 (Vases 20). In this contenxt, he makes use of a 
quotation from Lenin, according to which the educated bourgeoisie makes use of refined 
tactics to keep knowledge associated to certain beliefs, which in the masses are engendered 
either by ignorance or by the contradictions of capitalism (Vases 21). Freud is designated part 
in the intellectual bourgeois attempt to prevent the working classes from participating in the 
production of knowledge, in particular because he does not realise the fundamental role 
played by contradictions in the construction of knowledge itself. 
This criticism is related both to Breton’s dialectic definition of dreams, as described 
above, and to his belief in the dream’s role in the processes of realisation and prise de 
conscience (“realisation”). Breton describes the dream thus: “a la très courte échelle du jour 
de vingt-quatre heures, il aide l’homme à accomplir le saut vital”98 (Vases 59). Breton is 
particularly interested in the relationship that can be established between dreams and actions, 
i.e. in how the formulations used by the former can give way to the latter. In order to 
investigate this association, he analyses some of his own dreams and waking activities in the 
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Hartmann 96 
light of dialectics, by resuming the theme of a continuation of waking activity in the dream, 
which was made explicit in the first surrealist manifesto. 
Breton rejects the idea that we go into exile every night, remaining outside the limits 
of the self during sleep. Supporting this argument is a consideration of time in dreams. Here 
Breton makes use of a quote from the British physician Haverlock Ellis, according to which, 
in the waking state as well as in the dreaming one, an intense emotion provokes the sense of a 
loss of time. If this is equally true of both states, according to Breton, “Le temps et l’espace 
du rêve sont donc bien le temps et l’espace réels: ‘La chronologie est-elle obligatoire? Non!’ 
(Lénine)”99 (Vases 62). That is, in a rough use of dialectics — which needs, in Breton’s view, 
to replace the common formal mindset — neither time nor space can be measured absolutely 
when dreams and reality are treated separately, but only when considered in relation to each 
other. The use of a quotation from Lenin in this context is intended to support the analysis of 
the dream from an “exterior” and dialectic-revolutionary point of view. In this sense, the 
absence of chronology can be related to what Benjamin calls the “explosion in the continuum 
of history” (Theses 261) that is caused by revolutionary action. 
At this point one might ask whether the dialectic materialism assumed by the 
surrealist movement in the late twenties differs from their general dialectic point of view, 
which had been present in terms of the search for an analytical synthesis of contraries, and 
expressed through Breton’s admiration for Hegel from his student days onwards (Durozoi 
32). If one takes, for instance, the call for a resolution of the discontinuity between dream and 
reality, which should be attained through the promotion of an absolute reality (surreality), one 
sees that the precepts presented in Les Vases Communicants had already been expressed from 
the time of the first manifesto (Breton Manifestes 24).  
Therefore, as the group develops and embraces communism, what seems to be at 
stake is not the adoption of a philosophical point of view, but of a positive form of social 
revolt, that is, as mentioned above, a criticism of a social regime and the struggle for another. 
Specifically, while advocating the negation of idealism in favour of a concrete understanding 
of reality and history, as presented in the second manifesto, Breton points to the 
transformation of Hegel performed by Marx, that of the abandonment of an analytical theory 
for a revolutionary one. The contradictions within surrealism resulting from this new 
direction should be related not to the adoption of a dialectic point of view, which already 
existed and which did not suffer significant modifications, but to the assumption of a 
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necessarily practical aspect of communism, which cannot be separated from the vanguardist 
trend adopted by the movement.  
However, even on the long-explored theme of the resolution of dream and reality, 
some small variations are introduced in Les Vases Communicants in relation to previous 
approaches. According to Breton, the assumption that the world of dreams and the real world 
do not differ much from each other does not negate the task of “faire apercevoir sur quelles 
différences de relief et d’intensité repose la distinction qui peut être faite entre les opérations 
véritables et les opérations illusoires”100 (Vases 70). This distinction remains important for the 
determination of what are illusory operations. A quote from Engels about the phantasmatic 
figures created by the clergy and cultivated by oppressed people is relevant here: these 
figures are described as “les mauvais produits d’un mauvais régime social”101 (Engels qtd. in 
Breton Vases 62). In this sense, the idea of the illusory acquires a counter-revolutionary 
character, which should be distinguished from the imaginative source that Breton refers to, 
and aims to put at the service of the revolution.  
The final distinguishing criterion of the illusory is expressed through a quote from the 
mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré, who features amongst the heterogeneous group 
of authors quoted in the book. According to him, the objects around us “sont réels en ce que 
les sensations qu’ils nous ont fait éprouver nous apparaissent comme unies par je ne sais quel 
ciment indestructible et non par un hasard d’un jour”102 (Poincaré qtd. in Breton Vases 76). 
The principle is therefore defined through a sensation, which has practical effects on human 
behaviour. According to Breton, the indication of the existence of this “cement” connecting 
all perceptions lies in human habit. Through the regular practices executed by people in 
everyday life comes the sensation that the objects surrounding them are real. For Breton, this 
habit is “lui seul qui préside, pour ce monde, au prétendu mystère de son non-effacement”103 
(Vases 76). 
This “alleged mystery” centres on the belief that the world exists only to the extent 
that it is perceived, in fact a very anti-materialistic notion. Here one finds a shred of idealism 
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and illusory operations” 
101 “the bad products of a bad culture” 
102 “are real in that the sensations they provoke in us appear to be united by some sort of indestructible cement, 
and not by chance” 
103 “the only part that exits, for this world, of the alleged mystery of its own un-fading presence” 
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in the “communist” Breton.104 He then describes a structure that assures passage between the 
dream and reality, that is, the existence of a capillary fabric or tissu capillaire connecting the 
two dimensions (Breton Vases 161). The importance of the distinction between dream and 
reality thereafter assumes a secondary role to the tasks the movement assigns to itself. Breton 
uses a metaphor to remind his reader of these: “jeter un fil conducteur entre les mondes par 
trop dissociés de la veille et du sommeil, de la réalité extérieure et intérieure, de la raison et 
de la folie, du calme de la connaissance et de l’amour, de la vie pour la vie et de la révolution, 
etc.”105 (Vases 103). 
Here one can see the recapitulation of various surrealist mottos, united in the familiar task of 
building conditions in which presumably opposing spheres of life can convergence. This is an 
attempt to approach the radical transformation of the world, but also to interpret it in the most 
complete form. For Breton, this should be the dual goal of surrealism: transformation and 
interpretation. Every mistake in the interpretations made by men gives rise to a mistake in the 
interpretation of the world, which becomes an obstacle to its transformation (Vases 152). 
 Before this transformation can be achieved, there are all sorts of prejudices to be 
overcome, whose origin Breton situates, without hesitation, within the individual 
unconscious. “La transformation sociale ne sera vraiment effective et complète que le jour où 
l’on en aura fini avec ces germes corrupteurs. On n’en finira avec eux qu’en acceptant, pour 
pouvoir l’intégrer à celle de l’être collectif, de réhabiliter l’étude du moi.”106 (Breton Vases 
152). At this point, clearly directing his efforts towards the psychological dimension of 
revolution, Breton expresses the possibility of transformation as contingent upon an 
understanding of its psychological barriers, in a move that gestures towards the appearance at 
the time of Die Massenpsychologie des Faschismus (“The Mass Psychology of Fascism,” 
1933), by Wilhelm Reich. Moreover, the shape to be given to this étude du moi (“study of the 
self”) is not that of psychoanalysis. Instead, it is an exploration of the unusual, uncertain 
paths to knowledge contained in mystical practices, paths that should, according to Breton, be 
left open, despite all the disdain directed towards them by civilized culture. 
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 If on the one hand Breton seems to align himself with the traditional idea of the 
revolutionary vanguard — that is, “agir sur le prolétariat pour élever son niveau de 
conscience”107 (Vases 142) — on the other hand he diagnoses a missing link in this very 
action: that of desire, the feature capable of effectively uniting men’s wishes so that they may 
confront a world that does not correspond with their feelings. The previous experience 
acquired by the surrealist movement in the field of human affections allows it to assume a 
connecting role for this in relation to dreams and revolution. The dream’s illumination of 
characters and objects effects a restitution of the sensible world; it allows one to revive, to 
come to one’s senses in relation to material experience. 
 The sphere of emotions is vital to Breton’s attempt to conflate the real and the 
imaginary dimensions of life, as was already apparent in the first surrealist manifesto. The 
dream is the experience that best expresses emotion: 
Rien ne me paraît de nature à mieux illuminer la sphère du sentiment, à 
laquelle le rêve appartient en propre, ce qui le désigne électivement comme 
terrain d’expérience dès qu’il s’agit, comme il continuera toujours à s’agir, de 
sonder la nature individuelle entière dans le sens total qu’elle peut avoir de 
son passé, de son présent et de son avenir.108 (Breton Vases 165-6)  
The dream is at the core of Breton’s revolutionary discourse, the place in which men’s 
emotions and desires can be grasped in their clearest form. It is through dreams that one’s 
past, present and future experiences can be probed. This too is a dialectical conception, since 
“le désir révèle le devoir être”109 (Durozoi 42). 
Breton’s definition of dreams is of an essential human activity, through which all 
beings, animate or inanimate, can participate in the existence of the dreamer. The author 
emphasises the importance of the dream amidst the destruction and euphoria of European 
post-war society, by saying that, in the dream, “le monde entier se recompose, dans son 
principe essentiel, à partir de lui [l’homme]”110 (Vases 160). This statement refers again to 
Breton’s ambiguous conception of reality, at times that of a materialist, at times that of an 
idealist. Unlike Freud, for whom the unconscious “is as unknown to us as the reality of the 
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108 “Nothing seems to better illuminate the sphere of emotions than the dream, making it an elective terrain for 
experiences through which it can, and will always, continue to probe the entire nature of the individual in the 
most complete sense, with awareness of its past, its present and its future.” 
109 “desire reveals the must-be” 
110 “the whole world is recomposed, in its essential principle, from him [the human being]” 
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external world” (Freud Dreams 607), Breton seems to believe in the relative attainability of 
both. Accordingly, he states that “ce monde extérieur, pour moi tout voilé qu’il fut, n’était pas 
brouillé avec le soleil”111 (Vases 125). This is a reference to a comment by Nerval on the 
absence of the sun in dreams: for Nerval, poetically speaking, light is much clearer “away 
from the sun,” as it is in all the details of reality “revealed” by dreams. Breton attests to his 
belief in a type of reality that can only be described as surreality. In this reality, the exterior 
and interior worlds, both attainable and real, share more than a few features. They exist in as 
far as our sensibility is able to perceive them. 
Breton affirms the constant exchange between the material of dreams and of waking 
life, promoting an articulation of both the subjective and objective aspects of experience. He 
is at his most revolutionary in Les Vases Communicants when he confesses the very banal 
behaviours, the meanderings of desire, everything pertaining to his concrete existence. 
Presented as the result of the intention to “reveal everything” — in contrast with Freud — 
this aspect is what he considers to be missing from the general revolutionary discourse. It is 
also the recapitulation of his claim for a complete man, this time also sought for 
revolutionary reasons.  
Breton’s attempt to building a case for the study of the individual, particularly through 
dreams, with revolution as the ultimate aim, links him with others, also oriented towards an 
encounter between the theories of Freud and Marx. According to Löwy in Morning Star, this 
is one of the currents that runs beneath orthodox marxism, “a kind of thought which is 
fascinated by certain cultural forms of the precapitalist past and which rejects the cold, 
abstract rationality of modern industrial civilization.” This marxism, like that of Benjamin 
and of Ernst Bloch, does not exclude the envisioning of the future through the eyes of the 
unconscious. That is, the unconscious is conceived not only in relation to the past, but also to 
times to come. 
Breton’s fusion of Marx and Freud in Les Vases Communicants, however, is weighted 
towards marxism. According to Durozoi (33), this is related to Breton’s eagerness to show a 
full commitment to the cause, since his engagement had more than once been questioned by 
the French Communist Party. At the same time, the fact that his approach of Freud 
occasionally sounds like an apology can be accounted for by noting not only the virtual 
absence of references to the Austrian psychiatrist amongst communist groups, but also 
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Breton’s assessment of Freud as an “esprit philosophiquement assez inculte”112 (Breton Vases 
28). This alleged lack of a sustainable philosophical basis in Freud is what Breton intends to 
overcome through the use of dialectic materialism, while at the same time enriching the 
revolutionary cause through a greater understanding of concrete emotional experience. The 
question of whether Breton accomplishes this goal is relativised through his frequent 
designation of his attempt as “experimental.” Years later, in fact, Breton would dismiss the 
importance given to materialism in the book, suggesting that the dialectic between imaginary 
and real was its most important element (Durozoi 45-6). The appendix to Les Vases 
Communicants reproduces part of the correspondence exchanged between Breton and Freud 
in 1932, which will be discussed below.  
In his book’s conclusion, Breton returns to the familiar call for the establishment of 
both a new man and a new world through surrealism. Its agent is the poet: “le poète à venir 
surmontera l’idée déprimante du divorce irréparable de l’action et du rêve”113 (Vases 170). 
According to Breton, only this figure will be able to execute the magical act of transposition, 
that is the immediate unconscious mediation between the internal and the external 
dimensions of experience. We return to the power of language. In a sense, for the surrealists, 
this was always the material of work, the territory for transformation, the voice of another 
world within this one. 
 
 3.8. A Troubled Heritage 
 According to Branco Aleksić in “Freud et les Surréalistes, ses ‘Fous Intégraux’” 
(2011), Freud and Breton first met in Vienna in 1921, after which they kept up a sparse 
correspondence through the twenties, consisting mainly of Breton sending his books and 
Freud sending letters of acknowledgment (Aleksić 96). In 1932 Breton sent Les Vases 
Communicants to Vienna. Freud then answered with a more extensive letter, in which he 
referred to the use of his theory in the book, thereby beginning the exchange that is partially 
reproduced in the Appendix of Breton’s book (Breton Vases 173-80). 
 The correspondence, as it appears in Les Vases Communicants, consists of three 
letters sent by Freud followed by a replica by Breton.114 They start with the discussion of one 
                                                            
112 “philosophically, a somewhat uneducated spirit” 
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114 The original letters sent by Breton could not be accessed. Starobinski and Aleksić quote some extracts from 
them to be mentioned below. 
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of Breton’s first references to Freud in Les Vases Communicants. Breton must have sent the 
manuscript to Freud earlier that year, since he confesses he had not advanced much in the 
reading of it before the letter was written in December 1932. Freud responds to Breton’s 
comment on the absence of Volkelt in the bibliography of The Interpretation of Dreams: 
“Freud lui-même … semble, en matière d’interprétation symbolique du rêve, n’avoir fait que 
reprendre à son compte les idées de Volkelt, auteur sur qui la bibliographie établie à la fin de 
son livre reste assez significativement muette”115 (Breton Vases 18) 
 It is not possible to know whether the manuscript sent to Freud in 1932 contained this 
passage exactly as above, but a note added by Breton indicating the page referred to by Freud 
in the edition quoted from above argues positively for this. Freud, for his part, claims to have 
acknowledged, in various passages of his book, the contribution of Volkelt, despite admitting 
that the reference is absent in the French edition of 1926. This absence leads to further 
stipulation on the part of Breton, which would be clarified by Freud as an omission 
attributable to his colleague Otto Rank, who was responsible for the bibliography of the 
German edition. 
 Despite its anecdotal character, this omission is the focal point of their short 
correspondence. However, this discussion seems to also stand for others, and Breton’s tone 
on the subject does not suggest a desire to go more deeply into these. Freud briefly mentions, 
as an aside, Breton’s criticisms of the absence of the sexual element in the analysis of the 
significance of his own dreams in The Interpretation of Dreams. According to Freud, this was 
not due to backwardness on sexual matters, but to the exceptional fact that most of his dreams 
were related to the recent death of his father (Breton Vases 175-6). Once again, this seems 
rather unconvincing, considering that none of the more than thirty personal dreams narrated 
by Freud in the book touches on sexual significations. One can suppose instead that the 
“father of psychoanalysis” did not expose his full frailties in order to sustain an authoritative 
position. Breton makes this one of the major concerns of Les Vases Communicants, as 
mentioned above: the need to trespass in the sphere of privacy. 
 Freud’s response to Breton’s comments about his use of Volkelt’s ideas takes the form 
of a “confession” regarding surrealism: 
Bien que je reçoive tant de témoignages de l’intérêt que vous et vos amis 
portez à mes recherches, moi-même je ne suis pas en état de me rendre clair ce 
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qu’est et ce que veut le surréalisme. Peut-être ne suis-je en rien fait pour le 
comprendre, moi qui suis si éloigné de l’art.116 (Freud qtd. in Breton Vases 
176) 
This assertion contains much more than a humble acknowledgement of ignorance. While 
recognising the public acclaim for surrealism, Freud also reveals his distance from and 
misgivings towards it. Not only does he indicate that the movement might be inappropriately 
aligning itself with his research he also points to its inability to make itself clearly 
understood, a quality that Freud obviously valued highly.  
 According to Jean Starobinski in the essay “Freud, Breton, Myers” (2001), Freud was 
probably convinced that the surrealists did not understand his work. However, “en homme 
bien élevé, il met le malentendu à sa charge et déclare ne pas comprendre le surréalisme”117 
(Starobinski 381). By confessing his ignorance of the world of the arts, Freud perhaps intends 
to induce from his addressee a similar confession, of his ignorance of psychoanalysis. Freud 
was certainly not in accordance with the surrealist claim that art should be no more than a 
medium, lieu de passage between desire (or unconscious wishes) and actions. Freud 
acknowledges the proximity of artistic works to unconscious matters as well as the presence 
within it of many of the problems with which psychoanalysis is concerned. However, as 
Starobinski explains, for Freud “les artistes, rêveurs supérieurs, ne peuvent qu’éprouver et 
manifester avec force ce qu’il appartiendra à la science d’interpréter dans son language 
spécifique”118 (382). Freud therefore reserves for himself, and for psychoanalysis, the role of 
the interpreter, and through this emphasises the gulf between art and science, a gulf that the 
surrealists sought to close. 
 In conclusion, the contempt evident in Freud’s declaration on surrealism is not 
surprising considering the distance he saw separating the world of arts from the world of 
science, while surrealism was occupied precisely with the transgression of such boundaries. 
This probably induced Freud, in the correspondence, to concentrate his efforts on the 
designation of their differences. The fact that Freud is presented, together with other 
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myself am not able to be clear on what surrealism is and what it means. Perhaps am I not equipped to 
understand, since I am so distant from the arts.” 
117 “being a well-brought up man, he charges himself with the misunderstanding and asserts that he did not 
understand surrealism” 
118 “artists, as superior dreamers, can only strongly feel and demonstrate that which science must interpret in its 
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“liberators” such as Sade and Marx, as a predecessor of the surrealist movement, is likely to 
have made this task feel even more relevant to him. 
 As mentioned above, Breton had also sent some of his previous books to Vienna in 
the twenties (Aleksić 96). After their first contact in 1921, when Breton visited Freud on a 
dadaist “mission” to interview him, he reported his disappointment at finding a bourgeois 
family man when he hoped to meet a figure of romantic magnetism. Nevertheless, the 
correspondence persisted. Therefore, the confession of Freud in 1932 must be related to his 
having read, or at least made some contact with, texts such as the first manifesto, Nadja 
(1928) and probably Surrealism and Painting (1928) (Aleksić 98). The unfairness of Breton’s 
accusation of plagiarism is intensified by the fact that he does not publish his own letters to 
Freud in Les Vases Communicants, one of which certainly contained his apology for the 
accusation concerning Volkert, which Freud thanks him for in his final missive.  
 If Freud is to be considered a predecessor of surrealism, the differences in the two 
approaches should be clarified. Starobinski, for instance, refers to the surrealist account of 
Freud’s concept of the unconscious using terms that were introduced in the previous chapter. 
The existence of the unconscious, in Freud’s vision of it, does not imply a necessary 
prevalence of it over other instances of the psyche. Freud is rather occupied with the 
establishment of an appropriate role for the unconscious in the functioning of psychic life 
(Freud Dreams 670). This role is very significant and is related to the cause of human actions. 
However, Freud never asserts that one should be governed by it, instead he values the filters 
imposed by consciousness, so that social life and its correlated cultural and artistic forms can 
take place. Surrealism, conversely, is a champion of the unconscious, demanding a deliberate 
re-direction of the polarity between conscious and unconscious matters. This could only 
appear to Freud as a folie, an act lying somewhere between extravagance and madness. This 
is indeed what emerges from Freud and Breton’s short correspondence. 
 If Freud seems excessively concerned about Breton’s allegation that he gave 
inadequate recognition to another author’s contribution to his theory, this is because the 
implication is that his methods are not suitably serious and rigorous. There is also the matter 
of Freud’s personal phantoms regarding the originality of his work. Regarding the first of 
these factors, Freud emphasises in the letters his discordance with Breton’s worldview, and 
with that of surrealism in general. Referring to Breton’s reproach about the omission of 
Volkelt, Freud comments: “Voilà qui est grave, qui va tout à fait à l’encontre de ma manière 
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habituelle!”119 (Freud qtd. in Breton Vases 173). That is, the accuracy which Freud claims for 
himself in regard to his work clashes with Breton’s fluid and “impertinent” style. 
 As regards the second aspect, Breton seems to be fully aware of it, and in fact 
suggests to his addressee that he has a “particular susceptibility” on the theme of his debts to 
other authors. To this Freud responds that it is doubtless “une forme de réaction contre 
l’ambition démesurée de l’enfance, heureusement surmontée”120 (Freud qtd. in Breton Vases 
175). As far as an analysis of his intellectual obsessions is concerned, then, Freud seems 
willing to make concessions. What remains in some doubt is his openness in relation to 
themes such as the limits of psychoanalysis as established by his publication of 1900, and 
subsequent undogmatic appropriations of his work, as in the case of surrealism. 
 While Breton is willing to apply the Freudian notion of the unconscious and expand it 
in previously unexplored directions, fully aware that this is not in accordance with the reach 
of Freud’s work, he maintains a relationship with the “master,” as if defying him to confront 
some aspects of his oeuvre that have remained marginal so far. What becomes clear is the 
size of the gap between their approaches, despite the historical and thematic connections they 
maintain. Hence, in response to Freud’s insistence on maintaining the borders around 
traditionally established areas of knowledge, an inheritance from rationalism that informs the 
commitment of psychoanalysis to be part of science, Breton and the surrealists provoke a 
voluntary confusion between wish and knowledge, désir and savoir. In the words of 
Starobinski: 
Breton travaille au triomphe d’un monisme à la fois magique et matérialiste, 
où l’énergie du désir puisse être mobilisée dans tous les sens, et où la 
transformation psychique des rapports avec autrui (selon Freud) et la 
transformation matérielle de la société (selon Marx et Trotski) puissent être 
entreprises dans un même élan tout ensemble instinctif et raisonné.121 (385) 
The fact that this momentum should be instinctive and rational, and should unite 
magic and materialism, constitutes a major difference between the surrealist and the Freudian 
projects. At the same time, the very existence of surrealism would not have been possible 
without the more scientifically rigorous theories of Freud. The surrealist use of the term 
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120 “a form of reaction against the overweening ambition of childhood, happily overcome” 
121 “Breton seeks to propagate a monism that is both magic and materialistic, in which the energy of desire can 
be mobilised in all directions, and in which the psychic transformation of relationships with others (according to 
Freud) and the material transformation of society (according to Marx and Trotsky) can be undertaken in one 
movement, at the same time instinctive and rational.” 
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rigueur is related to the methods which should be used for a monist approach, mainly 
conceived in opposition to the confusion evoked by dadaism on the one hand, and the 
surrender to false images of redemption on the other. 
To return to the definition of surrealism from the 1924 manifesto, quoted above, in 
which it is described as pure psychic automatism, it is salient that the terms used by Breton 
exist in both occultist and psychological contexts (Breton Manifestes 36). In the case of the 
former, automatism is, according to Nevill Drury’s Dictionary of Mysticism and the Esoteric 
Traditions (1992), acts “performed in trance without the conscious awareness of the medium” 
(26). What spiritualists see as the workings of a disincarnate entity or spirit entering the body 
of the medium, psychologists describe as a dissociation leading to manifestations from the 
unconscious.  
In the case of the psychological usage of the term, it is interesting to speculate as to 
whether it refers to Freud’s psychological theories in particular. According to Fer (52), for 
instance, the notion of automatism has its antecedents in the technique used by 
psychoanalysts and patients in order to find tracks leading to the unconscious. In The 
Interpretation of Dreams, writing indeed occupies a privileged place in the process of 
analysis. It is by writing down his dreams that Freud begins his conjecture about their 
possible significance beyond the manifest content. This suggests that the technique of 
automatic writing in surrealism might be inspired by psychoanalysis, with the difference that 
in the former it is not used as a means to help individuals to adjust to social or psychological 
norms, but to systematically deviate from them.  
However, in the psychiatric field, and particularly in France, the term has a broader 
history. For Aleksić (94), the use of automatism in surrealism comes from Pierre Janet’s 
L’Automatisme Psychique (“The Psychic Automatism,” 1889). Janet, who, like Freud, studied 
under the guidance of Charcot, sees the psyche as non-unitary and oriented towards complex 
levels of organisation (Freud Three Essays 114). He describes automatism as a process 
through which various elements that should remain subconscious acquire autonomy, as a 
consequence of the splitting of the mind into separate “consciousnesses.” Despite the 
resemblance between this discussion of the emergence of subconscious elements and 
automatic writing, this idea remains close to the dualism that the surrealists protested against 
in the “at-times monist” Freud — lamented for not having being a “full-time” monist. In 
addition, it describes automatism as negative. Meanwhile, Aleksić (95) claims that Breton’s 
intention is to apply the idea of the Freudian monologue incontrôlé (“uncontrolled 
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monologue”) or free association to surrealist discourse, suggesting a connection between this 
technique and that of automatism. For Freud, however, free association is a technique that 
works as a medium for analysis, the products of it not being valuable per se. 
For Starobinski (387), in turn, the manifesto barely invokes Freud, and refers more 
extensively to a school of psychiatry other than that represented by Janet. For him, the use of 
automatism by surrealism owes a debt to a branch of psychiatry concerned with problems 
such as somnambulism, hysteria and personality issues. It is true that Freud only rarely 
mentions the notion of automatism, in his descriptions of the work of other authors. It was 
however a common term in French psychiatric texts from the nineteenth century onwards, 
with a negative connotation. While automatism was related to low-valued psychic actions, 
such as spasms, consciousness was seen as the integrative and necessary function for the 
activity of thought to take place. The notion, then, was approached quite differently in French 
psychiatry, in the Freudian account of dream narration, and in the products of automatic 
writing created by the surrealists. 
Alongside their efforts to define a psychological system in their own terms, the 
surrealists had to find a theory to justify their championing of automatism. According to 
Starobinski (394), they chose that of Frederic Myers, an English poet who turned to 
psychological research late in life. Myers combined marvellous facts with established 
psychological theory, coming up with the idea of a “subliminal self,” a kind of valued 
unconscious. The unconscious or the subliminal self, for Myers, contains both aspects that 
connect to our animal ancestors and superior aptitudes that appear to us only occasionally — 
due to the inappropriateness of our bodies — in the form of phantoms, visions and other 
supernatural phenomena. A superior reality exists in which human beings participate only 
partially, on those occasions when the unconscious trespasses on the ordinary personality. 
Starobinski (393) situates the antecedents of this theory in the parapsychology of the 
eighteenth century. For one branch in particular, led by Franz Mesmer, the German physician 
who developed the idea of “animal magnetism,” automatism was most likely the expression 
of a possession of the human body by external forces, an “inspiration” that had more positive 
than negative connotations. This is very similar to the definition of automatism in occultist 
practices. In fact Starobinski, while establishing a historical lineage of the presence of 
mystical interests in medicine, tells us that “la parapsychologie du XIXe siècle prolonge, sous 
une forme dégradée, et avec les secours d’une théorie pseudo-physiologique, la tradition 
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millénaire de l’enthousiasme sacré et de la dictée surnaturelle de la parole poétique”122 (393). 
Surrealism is understandably comfortable in such a frame, although its vision departs from 
that of the parapsychologists by dint of its focus on the material rather than the spiritual. 
It seems that Breton intended to use the products of parapsychology in the surrealist 
argument, while entirely disregarding its methods He states in Les Vases Communicants: “il 
y’a toutes sortes de moyens de connaissance et certes l’astrologie pourrait en être un, des 
moins négligeables, à condition qu’en soient contrôlées les prémisses et qu’y soit tenu pour 
postulat ce qui est postulat”123 (Breton Vases 125). Breton envisions the “alternative” forms 
of knowledge, such as astrology, the ephemerides, as well as the products of vision, prophecy 
and telepathy, as the expressions of a larger reality. However, if it is to be placed centrally in 
the human experience, this reality should not be searched for through random 
experimentation, but through controlled methods.  
For Starobinski (398-9), in turn, it is impossible to separate the products of 
parapsychology from its methods, since in most cases the method and the anticipation 
generated by them participate in the production of the expected supernatural effects. Breton 
however proposes a new interpretation that will allow these phenomena to retain an important 
value, that of demonstrating the richness of “incarnated thought.” It is this richness to which 
automatic writing also gives expression. Instead of a communication with external forces, 
automatism is related to the dictée de la pensée (“dictation of thought”), that is, to a magical 
obedience of contents to their origin, the centre of life, wherever that may be situated. This is 
perhaps why Starobinski asserts that “de l’héritage spirite, le surréalisme ne collectionne que 
les images”124 (401), that is, figures from other cultures, other times, other states of mind, 
which can be interrogated with the purpose of enlarging consciousness. 
Starobinski claims that “sur tous ces points, le rationalisme freudien était incapable de 
donner satisfaction” 125  (402). The process of defining surrealism is testimony to the 
concurrent influence of psychoanalysis and occultism on the movement’s members. The 
“sacred enthusiasm” for the supernatural aspects of psychic life, prolonged by nineteenth-
century psychiatry and still significant in Freud’s theory of dream interpretation, is refreshed 
                                                            
122 “the parapsychology of the nineteenth century prolongs, in a degraded form, and with the aid of pseudo-
physiological theory, the old traditions of sacred enthusiasm and the supernatural dictation of poetic speech” 
123 “there are many kinds of knowledge, and astrology could certainly be one of them, amongst the most 
significant, provided its claims are monitored and what is a postulate is held as a postulate” 
124 “from the spiritualist heritage, surrealism collects no more than images” 
125 “on all these points, Freudian rationalism was unable to give a satisfactory answer” 
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by the surrealists in the form of practices that combined fabulous inspiration with automatic 
availability. The dictation of thought made men mere receptacles for marvellous contents, 
operating at the limits of reverie and concrete life. Dialectic materialism could enrich the 
meaning of concrete life, while itself being enriched by incursions into reverie. 
The notion of unconscious that emerges from the surrealist experience is detached 
from the cultural context in which it was conceived by Freud, that is, it is isolated from 
established scientific thinking as well as from the cultural milieu within which Freud’s theory 
sat. This must be related, at least partially, to the influence of the avant-garde movements, 
and their arguments for a detachment from the traditional values of a reverential, civilised, 
progressive Europe. The notion of the unconscious offered by the surrealists is however not 
free from other ideological connotations. The movement sought to expand its appeal through 
a consistently positive allure, locating itself as an infinite source for the marvellous, but also 
as a social-revolutionary form. Artaud and Benjamin push these ideas to their extreme when 
they pick up some of the threads left by the surrealists in their approach to the unconscious.  
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Artaud and Benjamin: Magic, Experience and the Unconscious 
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4. MAGIC 
In Freud’s approach, the unconscious is the sphere of psychic life that gives access to 
an ancestral and somewhat mystical past. This past, of indefinite historical character, can be 
described as a psychological and social configuration that has left remnants in the current 
setting of experience, one that can be accessed in various ways. The assumption of two 
different mind configurations, the current and the mystical one, implies two forms of 
understanding that transcend individual experience. While a few traces, to be found in the 
current mindset, guarantee access to the mystical sphere, those are mere inscriptions and are 
never readable in their totality. They are, at once, signs of survival and disappearance, of 
access and obstacle. These traces point to the process of decline of certain forms of life, while 
also acting as reminders of both the transience of cultural and social structures, and the urge 
to actively build ways of living from the discontinuity of the past. 
In the writings of Antonin Artaud and Walter Benjamin, magic appears as a recurrent 
theme in the exploration of the forms of and means towards achieving truthful and significant 
experience, in opposition to the chronic condition that these authors name the dispossession 
or decay of experience. The question that seems to guide these explorations is whether and to 
what extent magic exists in the contemporary world. Their approach to the notion of the 
unconscious, and with it the sphere of magic, seems to be embedded in the legacy left by 
Freud and the surrealists. Artaud and Benjamin work, to some extent, against the grain of the 
scientific tendency of Freud’s writings, as well as being in disagreement with some aspects of 
the incursion of surrealism into discussions of unconscious potentialities. While both writers 
depart from the scenario established by these two trends, they also resort to them at various 
points in their work.  
The notion of unconscious is related, in Artaud and Benjamin’s work, to prescientific 
forms of knowledge. It is not, however, restricted to offering access to a mythological, 
folkloric and ancestral past. The unconscious partakes in the enlargement of man’s awareness 
and field of action, at the same time as being mobilised for processes that lead to alienation 
and the prevention of individual and collective accomplishment. It is approached as a space 
that shelters what magic and astrology used to reveal, operating as a substitute or remnant of 
this dimension in the secularised world. However, it is also the sphere engaged in 
manoeuvres that undermine individual and social development. 
In the first texts approached in this chapter, Artaud’s “Excursion Psychique” (1921) 
and Benjamin’s “On Language as Such and on the Language of Men” (1915), the magical 
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dimension is expressed as “tucked away” in particular forms of contemporary life, such as 
dreams and poetry. While Benjamin’s approach to language as the aspect through which 
remains of divine powers can be exercised by men remains practically unchanged throughout 
his oeuvre, Artaud’s definition of magic in terms of practices of incantation is a undercurrent 
in his later writings, one that gains great strength in the last years of his life, while assuming a 
somewhat tragic character.  
Surrealism is the next focus of the texts approached here: they concern Artaud’s 
publications in La Révolution Surréaliste, as well as some internal documents of the 
movement, all of which date from the period between 1925 and 1926. The pamphlet À La 
Grande Nuit (1928) is also covered in this section, since it offers a lucid account of Artaud’s 
view of the movement. Together with Benjamin’s essay “Surrealism: the Latest Snapshot of 
the European Intelligentsia” (1929), they present the understanding of these authors of the 
presence of magic in surrealism. Finally, the texts “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” (1939) and “Lettre sur Lautréamont” (1946) propose a relationship between 
magic and the emerging theme of the masses or “general consciousness.” These texts are 
marked by a gloomy tone when identifying the operations in which the masses engage and 
are engaged. 
Three sections constitute this chapter. The first compares texts of Artaud and 
Benjamin from 1921 and 1915 respectively, proposing a treatment of the notion of magic as a 
trace. In the second section, the surrealist texts of Artaud and the pamphlet À La Grande Nuit 
are juxtaposed with Benjamin’s 1929 essay on surrealism. The focus is on both authors’ 
assessments of surrealism in terms of its engagement with magic and communism. Finally, in 
the third section, texts from the late thirties and forties present their view of the masses and 
their singular association with enchantment and ritual practices. Within this framework, the 
sphere of magic undergoes a transformation, from having a restricted and almost marginal 
role, to participating in both authors’ speculations on processes that affect the whole of 
society. These three sections are preceded by a short introduction to the theme of magic, in 
which some of the different status it has had through the centuries are presented. 
And finally, in the writings of Benjamin and Artaud, magic entertains a close 
relationship with the theme of transforming social structures and psychological experience. 
While for Benjamin this transformation takes the form of an engagement in organising the 
communist revolution, from the point of view of an intellectual, in Artaud it is a revolt 
against all forms of oppression, both material and spiritual. This connection is explored, by 
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both authors, through the theme of images, through which magical powers are mobilised 
either towards radical change or, conversely, towards the prevention of the conditions for this 
transformation. For Artaud, the enchantment works through the preclusion of the emergence 
of truth. For Benjamin, magic is deployed in both the enlargement of the human field of 
action and in the diversion of mass consciousness towards more self-absorbed forms of 
expression. 
As a trace that allows for a deviance from the current world, via the past and opening 
up a view towards a different future, the reminiscent magic or simply “une nouvelle sorte de 
magie”126 (Artaud Œuvres 238), retains the power of transformation that is associated, from 
its first appearances in the Old Persian term magói, to religious rites and the interpretation of 
dreams (Otto and Stausberg 16). The comparison between Artaud and Benjamin allows for 
an understanding of the extent to which, in their works, this form of “deviation” plays an 
active part in building the conditions for a transformative experience.  
 
 4.1. Magic: An Introduction 
 According to Otto and Stausberg in Defining Magic: A Reader, the etymology of the 
word “magic” relates to the ancient appellative maguš, more commonly defined by Greek 
sources through the term magói, meaning those “in charge of religious rites such as sacrifices 
and the interpretation of dreams” (Otto and Stausberg 16). The magói were also functionaries 
at the Persian court. This lent the term, once it was incorporated into the Greek language, 
connotations relating to the military dispute between Greece and Persia. It became associated 
with charlatanism, fraud and unconventional rites, a meaning that remained present for the 
Greek and Roman authors who followed. Plato, for instance, condemned magical practices 
while relating them to the worship of Gods by Persians (Otto and Stausberg 16). In the 
Roman world, on the other hand, Plotinus opposed the general negative assumption by 
proposing a theory of the operations underlying both magic practices and thought (Otto and 
Stausberg 17). 
 Once the term was picked up by Christian authors in the first centuries of the 
Common Era, its meaning suffered major modifications. Polarised with religion, it signified 
fraudulent and undesirable rituals, related to entertaining an exclusive relation with demons 
and, consequently, with Satan. This meaning represented, according to Otto and Stausberg, 
the enhancement of “the negative stereotypes already implied in the Greek and Roman 
                                                            
126 “a new form of magic” 
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understanding of ‘magic’” (17). The magician was seen as an enemy of God, while the 
“common people” were at constant risk of being put in contact with demons. Thomas 
Aquinas exemplifies this in straightforward fashion in his 1274 book Summa Theologica. 
Aquinas affirms, in his traditionally rhetorical manner: “When things are used in order to 
produce an effect, we have to ask whether this is produced naturally” (Aquinas 50). If the 
answer to this question is negative, Aquina maintains, “it follows that they are being used for 
the purpose of producing them [the effects], not as causes but only as signs, so that they come 
under the head of a compact entered into with the demonic” (50). The boundaries between 
magic and non-magic therefore become nebulous, and defined only a posteriori. 
 The work of Agrippa of Nettesheim, whose De Occulta Philosophia (or Three Books 
of Occult Philosophy) was published around 1510, also had a major impact on the 
understanding of the term. This early modern concept of magic covers, in practice, all aspects 
of human knowledge. Accordingly, in order to be a magician one should be versed in natural 
philosophy, mathematics and theology. Magic is, in this sense, “the most perfect, and chief 
science” (Agrippa 56). Consequently, anyone who intends to study and practice it cannot do 
so without being skilled in the above areas, “for there is no work that is done by mere magic, 
nor any work that is merely magical that doth not comprehend these three faculties” (Agrippa 
58).  
 The notion of natural magic is Agrippa’s most influential. It is based on the 
understanding of the world as a threefold structure:  
Seeing there is a threefold world, elementary, celestial, and intellectual, and 
every inferior is governed by its superior, and receiveth the influence of the 
virtues thereof, so that the very original, and chief Worker of all cloth by 
angels, the heavens, stars, elements, animals, plants, metals and stones convey 
from himself the virtues of omnipotency upon us. (Agrippa 55) 
The nature-based conception of Agrippa therefore structures the world in three dimensions, 
departing from the model of an omnipotent force expressing itself in all things. In this 
scheme, the elementary world corresponds to human life on earth, while the celestial refers to 
the ethereal bodies. The human mind and soul, the angels and the demons, as well as God, are 
all situated in the intellectual world. In Agrippa’s scheme, a different type of magic 
corresponds to each of these worlds.  
 For the German writer, therefore, magic “instruct us concerning the differing, and 
agreement of things amongst themselves, whence it products its wonderful effects, by uniting 
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the virtues of things through the application of them one to the other” (Agrippa 56). Since it 
includes a thorough knowledge of all aspects of nature, magic is conceived as somehow 
intrinsically “natural,” that is, related to the correlation of the elements in the existing world. 
In relation to the threefold world, natural magic makes it possible for humans to ascend to the 
other spheres. In fact, the magician is a specialist in controlling the powers of the three 
dimensions: he or she seeks the virtues of the elementary world with the assistance of the 
sciences, and of the celestial world by means of doctrines, in order to join and confirm all of 
them “with the powers of diverse intelligence, through the sacred ceremonies of religion” 
(Agrippa 55). In this third aspect of the world, an “intellectual” dimension validates the 
knowledge acquired from the other spheres, and the magic becomes ceremonial. 
 The notion of natural magic in Agrippa’s work is equated with “natural philosophy,” 
that is, the knowledge acquired from both experience and abstraction in the living world, with 
the help of the sciences. These might be strictly “scientific,” such as physics, or they might be 
of another order, as in the case of astrology or mathematics. However, such forms of existing 
knowledge are only the means: the magic ultimately has to be validated by the intellectual 
dimension implied by the existence of the soul and the higher beings. Agrippa’s notion of 
magic is therefore of mixed formation. Its main contribution lies in the establishment of a 
comprehension deeply rooted in the study of nature and the existing world. In relation to 
previous approaches, especially those of Christian writers, it enhanced an affirmative 
interpretation of magic that had started with the works of Marsilio Ficino and Pico della 
Mirandola, both authors who had already “regarded ‘magic’ as an elementary force pervading 
all sorts of natural processes” (Otto and Stausberg 17). In this sense, the tradition that 
includes Agrippa promoted the notion of magic “to the rank of a new philosophical discipline 
that ought to systematically investigate this natural force” (Otto and Stausberg 17). 
 In sum, the notion of magic emerging from Agrippa’s approach is that of a “wonderful 
virtue” containing the “most profound contemplation of most secret things” (Agrippa 56), 
things which represent the knitting together of different elements of nature through the 
powers of the superior bodies. The nineteenth-century idea of magic as the direction and 
controlling of forces of nature therefore owes much to Agrippa’s magia naturalis, as is 
apparent in the work of authors such as Helena Blavatsky. However, before the rediscovery 
of magic could take the form of an approach to the “hidden mysteries of Nature,” the 
eighteenth century account, marked by the world vision of the enlightenment, would also 
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leave its impression, and its contempt towards magical practices would continue to resonate 
in later eras. 
 In his famous Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des 
Métiers, edited between 1751 and 1780, Denis Diderot defines magic as “the daughter of 
ignorance and pride” (60). However he also distinguishes three types of magic: divine, 
natural and supernatural, identifying the latter with Agrippa’s notions of celestial and 
ceremonial magic. In fact, it is only this latter category that Diderot disdains. He begins by 
defining the general notion of magic in the following fashion: “magic, considered the science 
of the first mages, was nothing but the study of wisdom; for at the time it was well-taken” 
(Diderot 60). In a second moment, while identifying magic with ancient forms of wisdom, 
Diderot pointed to a time of decay in which men, through such knowledge, “succumb to the 
temptation to appear greater than human” (Diderot 60). It is to the knowledge emerging from 
this attempt that he attaches the meanings of “illusory and contemptible,” also relating it to 
barbarism, coarseness and savage peoples. 
 While this suggests a description of magic more characteristic of the enlightenment’s 
project, Diderot manages to keep some ambiguity through his threefold distinction. Divine 
magic, for instance, is defined in a strictly biblical manner, since it is related to the practices 
that allow the “knowledge of the plans and visions of sovereign wisdom that God (in his 
grace) has revealed to holly men filled with his spirit” (Diderot 60). Magic is considered here 
to be independent of one’s knowledge and will, a gift from God and, therefore, beyond one’s 
engagement and interest. Natural magic, in turn, is conceived as the “in-depth study of nature 
and the amazing secrets that we find there” (Diderot 60). Although apparently inoffensive, 
this latter category is also related to the superstitious tendencies of dark magic. Diderot’s 
decisive blow comes with the affirmation that humanity, with the advent of science, is 
gradually “recovering” from this kind of attitude:  
The awareness of this so-called natural magic is, even in the eyes of the 
multitude, continually retreating. Under the light of science we are, happily, 
continuously discovering the secrets and systems of nature, supported by 
many sound experiences which show humanity of what it is capable itself and 
without magic. (Diderot 61) 
 Here the distinction and even opposition between magic and science becomes clear. 
When describing what he calls “supernatural magic,” that is, what “is properly called magic” 
(Diderot 61), and which leads its subjects to an ignorance of science, Diderot has Agrippa as 
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a target. He ostensibly disqualifies the work of the medieval writer, though without going into 
detail. Characterised as a “confused heap of obscure, ambiguous and inconclusive 
principles,” and as “pathetic collections of material” (Diderot 61), Agrippa’s scholarship is 
reduced to an arbitrary system of useless practices, which are moreover a stimulus to errors 
and prejudices on the part of people. In contrast, “philosophy’s ultimate task is to finally 
disabuse humanity of these imaginary humiliations” (Diderot 62), by leading the public 
towards the recognition of scientific values. 
 Diderot adds a cultural anecdote to his encyclopaedic entry on magic, probably in 
order to prevent malignant associations. While praising the fact that “in countries where 
people think, reflect and doubt, demons play a small role and diabolical magic remains 
discredited and held in contempt” (Diderot 62) — assumingly Europe —, he goes on to 
describe medieval proceedings against sorcerers and witches as acts of people “blinded by the 
unhappy passions of envy and vengeance” (Diderot 62). It could be said that for Diderot, 
while magic is the childish system of barbaric peoples, the persecution of it represents a 
departure from reason that is no less foolish. Finally, Diderot’s conclusion is that the end of 
the horrors of the inquisition owed much to the rise of science. 
 The enlightenment’s attitude of disdain towards magic remained a major trend until 
the “rediscovery” of mysticism in the late nineteenth century. Terms such as “occultism” and 
“esotericism” would then emerge, surrounded by language that, once again, defined magic as 
the bearer of powers and hidden truths of existence. It represented, therefore, a continuation 
of the “long and on-going history of positive interpretations of the concept of ‘magic’ in 
Western history” (Otto and Stausberg 64). However a psychological aspect was added to the 
early modern vision. Magic was seen not only as the system and the practices organised 
around a particular wisdom, but also as an expression of what takes place in one’s own 
experience in relation to this structure. Helena Blavatsky is one of the main voices in this 
nascent Western esotericism. She redefined magic in line with the occult powers of nature, 
while at the same time giving it a new psychological touch, in consonance with the concerns 
of her time. 
 Blavatsky’s definition is as follows: “Magic is the science of communicating with and 
directing supernatural, supramundane Potencies, as well as of commanding those of the lower 
spheres” (Blavatsky 65-6). Here one sees the shift of focus from acquiring knowledge to 
interfering with nature through knowledge. Human beings are the bearers and masters of an 
ability that allows governance of the forces of life. The more explicit psychological aspect of 
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it is expressed in the statement that “faith (in one’s own self) is an essential element in magic, 
and existed long before other ideas which presume its existence” (Mackenzie qtd. in 
Blavatsky 66). That is, in order to be a magician one needs not only to gather all possible 
knowledge in relation to ways of understanding and governing the forces of nature, but also 
to increase one’s own mental abilities far beyond the average, “almost to madness,” for “a 
pursuit of this science implies a certain amount of isolation and an abnegation of Self” 
(Blavatsky 66). The limited number of magicians is therefore justified by the fact that this 
science is very difficult to acquire, not only in terms of learning, but also in terms of the 
psychological preparation it demands. 
 Therefore, departing from a vaguely negative origin in antiquity, the notion of magic 
acquired positive interpretations, particularly during the early modern period, which related it 
to the understanding of nature and all existing things. Following a long period of relative 
neglect, it was reanimated by Christian authors, who set it in opposition to religion and sacred 
matters. It began to emerge in the writings of authors who united under the concept of magic 
knowledge of the material and immaterial worlds and the attempt to ascend to higher levels 
of experience. The enlightenment period represented a retreat of the notion to the margins of 
valuable learning. While it was recognised as once having been part of the origins of wisdom, 
it was generally seen as a decayed and arbitrary system, leading to error.  
 Finally, the nineteenth century would see a renascence of the positive aspects of 
magic for the emerging groups occupied with esotericism, occultism and spiritual practices. 
In this context, according to Antoine Faivre in Access to Western Esotericism, nature should 
be known and experienced as alive in all its parts (Faivre 10). In order to understand the 
connections between these parts, imagination and mediation are required, including the use of 
rituals, symbols and intermediary beings. Together with the concept of transmutation, namely 
that the knowledge of magic is inseparable from one’s experience of it, these features 
characterise the approach to magical practices of the early twentieth century, the increased 
interest in which was also propelled by surrealism.  
 The surrealist approach to magic, as explored above, takes at least two different 
forms: the experience of profane forms of magic such as hypnosis and clairvoyance, and the 
conceptual appropriation of notions such as automatism and mental alchemy. The approaches 
of Artaud and Benjamin, as will become clear in the following pages, are highly influenced 
by surrealism. However, they give much subtler and deeper accounts of magic when 
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compared to the avant-movement. In this sense, both authors resurrect a number of trends 
surrounding the uses of magic that were present at different historical moments. 
 
4.2. Psychic Excursion 
The writing life of Antonin Artaud could be described as being deeply tied to 
disruption. In 1916 and 1918 he published poems and short texts, around the same time at 
which he received a diagnosis of hereditary syphilis and was required to undergo injection 
treatments. At the age of twenty-four, Artaud was entrusted by his parents to Édouard 
Toulouse, a famous psychiatrist who also dabbled as an amateur in arts and literature 
(Grossman Œuvres 1712). Toulouse edited the magazine Demain (“Tomorrow”), to which 
Artaud contributed various articles between 1921 and 1922. 
Toulouse’s psychiatric approach was guided neither by the principles of enclosure and 
constraint — which Artaud would experience a decade later — nor by the values of physical 
treatment. Having fought against psychiatric confinement himself, Toulouse proposed “open 
door” treatment, an important component of which was Artaud’s collaboration on Demain 
(Baillaud 190). Consequently, while staying at Toulouse’s clinic near Paris, Artaud wrote and 
published extensively under the encouragement of both the physician and his wife, 
Geneviève Toulouse. The texts appear in a range of different forms, from poetry to short 
essays on theatre, cinema, and art exhibitions. Most already exhibit the concise and 
passionate style later identified with Artaud. According to Grossman (Œuvres 24), the same 
can be said of his creative force, which was characterised from the beginning by an ability to 
write many different types of piece within a short period of time. 
One of the most remarkable texts written by Artaud during this period is called 
“Excursion Psychique.” It is a two-page account of the world of magic, presented in an 
outspoken manner. Written in the summer of 1921 for Demain, it ended up not being 
published. In it Artaud envisions the close connection between magic and death as a means of 
exploring the intrinsic secret of life, the mystery of existence itself. In this sense, the title 
seems to make a double allusion: both to the article’s theme and to Artaud’s digression into it. 
The piece opens with the following statement:  
Le point de départ de la magie réside dans l’incantation. Le mot de magie 
éveille confusément dans l’entendement de la plupart l’idée de pratiques 
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occultes capables d’éveiller les forces sombres de la nature et d’asservir 
jusqu’aux phantasmes de la mort. Et c’est en partie vrai.127 (Œuvres 28) 
The notion of magic as approached here is related to incantation, a theme that impregnates 
Artaud’s work as a whole. According to him, the enchanting practice of incantation is the 
“starting point” of magic. At the same time, he denies that magic is “ce fait seul de [dévoiler] 
les rapports des choses créées, de jouer aver le temps et la distance, et les antagonismes des 
élements”128 (Œuvres 28).  
By situating the original element of magic at the point of mediation, that is, where 
human actions intersect with non-human forces, Artaud’s text aligns itself with the trend of 
nineteenth-century magic, which located the source of natural magic in the self. Artaud, 
however, clearly intends to expand on the commonsensical notion of incantation, by moving 
towards the assumption of a broad group of occult practices only partially related to magic. 
The latter are “cet ensemble de pratiques quasi historiques, les attributions très précises de 
tels personnages merveilleux, cette galerie de fantômes humains, qu’on appelle magiciens, 
sorciers, derviches, fakirs”129 (Œuvres 28-9). For Artaud it is not only human desire that 
awakens in intelligence the inspiration to seek the marvellous power of magic. This group of 
ancient practices, which differ for Artaud from vulgar conjuring, is also responsible for this 
inspiration. 
Aware of the risks involved in the evocations of such figures of “mysterious flora,” 
Artaud replaces his inaugural claim that existing ideas on magic are en partie vrai (“partially 
true”) with a jesting complaint about humanity’s inability to construct general visions into 
valid notions. As it is not uncommon in Artaud’s texts, at this point he intercalates general 
assessments of the state of culture with the text’s particular theme. In this case, he does so by 
mentioning the famous grimoire attributed to Albertus Magnus,130 which Artaud describes as 
“ce régal des cuisinières hystériques”131 (Œuvres 29). Artaud rejects the set format that had 
become popular in relation to incantation practices, while at the same time advocating a strict 
                                                            
127 “The starting point of magic lies in incantation. In the mind of most people, the word ‘magic’ awakens 
confusing ideas of occult practices capable of awakening the dark forces of nature and enslaving even the ghosts 
of death. And this is partly true.” 
128 “this fact alone of [revealing] the relations between created things, of playing with time and distance, and 
with the antagonism of elements” 
129 “this set of quasi-historical practices, the careful attributions of such wonderful characters, the gallery of 
human ghosts called magicians, sorcerers, dervishes, fakirs” 
130 Les Secrets d’Albert le Grand first appeared in 1703. It is in fact wrongly attributed to the German monk 
Albertus Magnus [1193-1280], the master of St. Thomas Aquinas (Artaud Œuvres I,1 305). 
131 “this feast of hysterical culinarians” 
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distinction between magicians and chemists/conjurors. The replacement of “common sense” 
with appropriate notions — here highlighted by the distinction between “culinarians” 
(chemists/conjurors) and proper magicians — allow men to break from the confusion that 
constitutes general culture. By rejecting a banal approach to magic, the result of the recent 
resurgence of mysticism, Artaud situates the magical field elsewhere, out of sight, accessible 
only through an evocation of past figures and their rituals. 
In relation to the broad corpus of Artaud’s work, the rejection of popular culture is not 
an isolated act. What is remarkable in this early approach to magic, however, is the 
apparently ambiguous definition of the notion as based on incantation practices — a rejection 
of the transcendental viewpoint — and the privileging of a field that had nothing to do with 
popular forms of magic ritual at the time. This focus is apparent in the statement that follows 
Artaud’s evocation of past magical figures: “nous ne savons pas s’il a jamais existé dans la 
suite des jours des magiciens tels qu’il en pousse à tout bout de champ sur la terre bénie des 
Mille et une Nuits”132 (Œuvres 29). This ambivalent gesture of contempt and fascination 
towards a past and, in Artaud’s time popularised, wisdom can also to be found in surrealism, 
to which Artaud would ally himself three years later. In the same way, the attraction of 
surrealism to a new kind of mysticism, mediated by the notion of merveilleux (“marvellous”), 
incorporated the rejection of any traditional forms of spiritualism.  
Despite his rejection of figures and rituals of the time, Artaud revisits a common 
theme in nineteenth century magic, namely the connection between magic and death. Artaud 
suggests, in “Excursion Psychique,” that death is a medium for the exploration of the primal 
dimension of life. For him, it is through the investigation of death “que nous rencontrerions le 
secret de l’emprise divine et de la configuration spirituelle du monde”133 (Œuvres 29). The 
reason for that, according to Artaud, lies in the high probability that, once spirits are relieved 
of their “corporal crust” and finally capable of returning to the spiritual circuit, they are 
immediately able to penetrate the mystery of the origin of things, whatever that may be.  
The question of how one might explore the world of death remains moot. At this 
point, by establishing an association between the state of sleep and the afterlife — probably 
relating to the provisional or permanent “abandonment” of the body — Artaud announces a 
medium that allows one se promener (“to wander”) on this plane. That medium is hypnosis. 
For Artaud, this technique “délivre en nous le subconscient au visage de verre et l’envoie 
                                                            
132 “We do not know whether there ever existed, in the days following [ancient practices], magicians such as 
those that recurrently emerged from the blessed land of The Arabian Nights.” 
133 “that we encounter the secret of divine influence and of the spiritual configuration of the world” 
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s’ébattre en liberté sur les lisières de l’autre monde”134 (Œuvres 29). The intriguing reference 
to a visage de verre (“face of glass”) may be related to the sinister facial expression that 
Artaud identifies in the sleeper. Because the fixed body is “left behind” once one is no longer 
awake, and because experience in the dimensions of both sleep and hypnosis is disturbing by 
dint of lying “at the edges of the other world,” the hypnotised’s face appears as somehow 
rigid, encapsulated, trapped. After all, for Artaud, to venture into the world of magic reveals 
the “other world” in all its rigidity. Such pursuit can only be freeing in the sense that it allows 
one to get in toucht with the spiritual dimension of life.  
It is interesting to notice that in an alternative version of this same text, disseminated 
by Geneviève Toulouse and reproduced in the first book of Artaud’s Œuvres Complètes, 
hypnosis is both linked with science and set in opposition to ancient incantation practices. 
Artaud begins by conjecturing that nature, “qui a joint si miraculeusement en nous 
l’impondérable au connaissable” (Artaud Œuvres I,1 305), has left in humans a bridge to the 
unknown, that is, to the “superior” dimension of life. Artaud here introduces the idea that the 
souffle or spirit is made from the same material in both humans and this other world. 
Otherwise, he asks, how could the spirits recognise themselves, once they join the afterlife? 
This element works in the text as an argument for the supposed connection between the two 
worlds or dimensions. Acknowledging this, Artaud argues: 
Mais lorsqu’il y a une cinquantaine d’années la Science a cru avoir trouvé le 
moyen d’émouvoir l’Emmanuel Immanent, de faire converser ces 
impondérables, d’amener à la face de la conscience les signes de l’au-delà au 
moyen des miroirs, de boules, de passes et de tout l’appareil des hypnotiseurs, 
qu’a-t-elle fait du rituel ancien des pratiques magiques ou autrement dit de 
l’Incantation?135 (Artaud Œuvres I,1 305) 
 Here science is envisioned as having interfered between the two worlds, obstructing 
their communication while precisely claiming to have brought them closer. Consequently, 
even hypnosis, while it represents the efforts of science to move the immanent dimension,136 
is aligned with other senseless practices that try to bring the other world to conscious 
                                                            
134 “delivers in us the subconscious with a face of glass, and sends it to play freely at the edges of the other 
world” 
135 “But while for fifty years Science has believed it had found a way to move the Immanent Emmanuel, to 
converse these imponderables, to bring to the forefront of consciousness the signs of the beyond, by using 
mirrors, bowls, passes and all the apparatus of hypnotists, what has it made of the ancient ritual of magic 
practices, in other words, of Incantation?” 
136 The reference to “Emmanuel Immanent” could not otherwise be tracked. 
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awareness. Artaud again opposes these practices to the ancient rites of incantation, evoking 
caricatured forms of mediation: mirrors, bowls and passes. At the same time, the 
identification of “Incantation” with ancient magic rituals shows how closely connected 
Artaud understands these two dimensions to be, while the capitalised use of this and other 
words in this version of the text denotes their difference from common sense uses. Finally, if 
hypnosis is part of an artificial effort by science to bring signs of the other world to 
consciousness, and by means of caricatured methods, what else can serve as a significant 
means to explore the magic dimension? 
 Artaud finds himself at an impasse in the fact that spiritual life is misleadingly related, 
in popular culture, to the other world through practices dissimilar from Incantation in its 
original form. At the same time, this spiritual life is unable in itself to create a true connection 
with this other dimension. Artaud proposes the following: “seulement alors que nous 
fatiguons les Esprits de nos puérils radotages, de nos malsaines préoccupations et nous 
laissons asservir par eux, ils avaient trouvé le moyen de leur commander”137 (Œuvres I,1 
305). Artaud here introduces the theme of spiritual cleansing or refinement, in which the bad 
features of one’s character must be purged before the spiritual dimension can take over. This 
is a form of restoration of the original forces of the spirit, which maintains the above-
mentioned connection with the superior world. 
Artaud’s text retains a witty approach to magic rituals and beliefs. Referring to the 
manuals of magic, for instance, he argues: “il est assez évident qu’il importerait assez peu à 
l’homme de pouvoir renverser l’ordre des éléments, s’il n’avait pas de prise sur le vertigineux 
déchaînement des phantasmes de la mort”138 (Œuvres 29). Here, the reversing of elements, a 
typical alchemic theme, is mocked as an irrelevant motive in the face of the control over the 
mysteries of death. The same can be said for the reference to science, and its alleged 
seriousness and ability in relation to the imponderable features of the spirit, which results, for 
Artaud, in no more than the production of “the whole apparatus of hypnotists.” 
In these aspects, “Excursion Psychique” presents many themes that will prove to be 
central to Artaud’s oeuvre, such as the paralysed body and dispossession. Regarding the 
                                                            
137 “it is only when we wear out the Spirits with our puerile nonsense, our insalubrious concerns, and let 
ourselves be enslaved by them, that they will have found a way to control them.” — The construction proposed 
by Artaud is not very clear. We understand the last phrase as referring to the Spirits [they] commanding the 
“unhealthy” aspects of inner life [them]. These “unhealthy” aspects constitute, for Artaud, intrinsic impediments 
to the free exercising of magic powers. 
138 “it is quite clear that it would not matter much for man to be able to reverse the order of the elements, if he 
had not taken control over the vertiginous charge of the phantoms of death” 
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latter, the vision of death as a dispossession or dépouillement (“denudation”) retains in this 
context the sense of a liberation, the character of which is not necessarily positive. That is, 
while death is a privileged theme in the approach to magic, here understood as the access to 
life’s mystery, the liberation it promotes from the limiting body does not necessarily represent 
a deliverance of the soul. The particular kind of deliverance it promotes unites an experience 
of awareness and realisation with the exposure of the rigid parts of spiritual life.  
In this text, the attraction exerted by magic in relation to death is neither related to a 
morbid impulse towards the world of the dying, nor to the act of leaving life in itself. Instead, 
Artaud claims, while referring to the Ancient Egyptian knowledge of words capable to keep 
the soul within the borders between life and death, that: “c’est là que se révèle la solennelle 
puissance de l’Incantation”139 (Œuvres I,1 305). On the same lines, he states: “l’incantation a 
pu servir par la suite à capter les forces brutes de la nature, mais la grande vertu de la Magie 
réside dans la subjugation de la Mort”140 (Œuvres 29). In this sense, Artaud deviates from the 
traditional vein of natural magic, not only because he proposes incantation as a point of 
departure, but also because he situates the true scope of this practice within the investigation 
of death. In this, his approach also differs from that of the mainstream elements of the 
nineteenth-century magical renaissance. 
Finally, Artaud’s account of magic in “Excursion Psychique” focuses on a discussion 
of the practices capable of controlling the forces of death in order to understand the secret of 
life. These acts of incantation are traced back to an ancient line of characters which 
apparently no longer exist. At the same time, a recent technique, that of hypnosis, is 
highlighted as a possible medium for the exploration of the worlds of sleep, death, and 
therefore magic — even if this is expressed with reservations. In fact, Artaud proposes that 
the fascination with magic comes precisely from the possibility, attributed by him to wisdom 
from Ancient Egypt, of exploring the limits between life and death. Only as a secondary 
aspect magic should be occupied, through incantation, with collecting and directing the 
forces of nature. 
The terms in which Artaud treats the notion of magic in this early text point in 
particular to the original relationship he conceives of between this field and the “quasi-
historical” figures that once incarnated its powers, as well as to a mediating dimension 
implicated in the operation of magic. Generally speaking, however, the approach to magic in 
                                                            
139 “there the solemn power of Incantation reveals itself” 
140 “incantation has been used subsequently to capture the raw forces of nature, but the highest virtue of Magic 
lies in the subjugation of Death” 
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“Excursion Psychique” is somewhat detached compared to the tone adopted by Artaud in 
later works, when referring to different aspects of envoûtement (“enchantment”). This notion 
occupies an important place in the author’s understanding of the “constitutional infirmity of 
his being,” as well as in the humorous and correlated forms of dealing with and escaping 
from the dispossession of one’s own experience. 
Perhaps the detached tone of the text can be related to an external cause. In a letter to 
Geneviève Toulouse in September 1921, with which Artaud encloses the article for 
publication, he comments on the text: “l’ Excursion Psychique est une mise au point dans le 
mode littéraire et d’un style assagi, rien qui puisse effaroucher qui que ce soit”141 (Œuvres I,2 
87). This statement firstly draws attention to the fact that Artaud considers the text to be set in 
a literary style, the result of an effort he only rarely employs. In his own words to G. 
Toulouse: “vous savez pourtant bien la peine qu’on a à caser sa littérature”142 (Œuvres I,2 
87). In this sense, compared to other productions from the same period, this text approaches 
an abstract theme in a more concise and impersonal way, even if one can find some 
characteristic features of Artaud in it, as discussed above. Artaud also suggests that his texts 
had already provoked some form of protest or discomfort by underlining the harmlessness of 
“Excursion Psychique,” and its suitability for the magazine. 
“Excursion Psychique” proposes, in its features and particularities, the importance of 
the aspect of magic in Artaud’s world vision from very early on, even if the theme underwent 
important changes in the course of his work. The most original aspect of the text is the 
presentation of the spiritual world, accessible through incantation, as offering an experience 
of both liberation and limitation, of délivrance (“deliverance”) and dépouillement 
(“denudation”), but also of radotages (“drivel”) and caricatured rigidity. Both aspects are 
related, at this point in Artaud’s vision, to the powerful force of death. 
 
 4.3. Magic Immediacy 
 While the notion of magic in Artaud’s work is explicitly approached from very early 
on, the first writings of Benjamin are focused on the thematisation of youth, as well as of the 
means for its “awakening.” This is related to his participation in what is known today as the 
Die Deutsche Jugendbewegung (“The German Youth Movement”) in the years before the 
                                                            
141 “Psychic Excursion is focused on the literary mode and on a mature style, nothing that would frighten 
anyone” 
142 “yet you know the trouble one has finding room for one’s literature” 
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First World War. Focused on educational and cultural reform, this organisation may have 
served as a platform for the elaboration of Benjamin’s own ideas at the time, which already 
represented a mixture of values drawing from German Romanticism as well as from a free 
approach to Jewish mysticism, not to mention the reformist trend particularly influenced by 
Gustav Wyneken.143 Benjamin’s first short texts are therefore focused not so much on calls to 
action as with the reorientation of the reader’s view on society and on the need for change. 
Although the aspect of magic is not explicitly brought up by Benjamin in his early writings, it 
is however not absent. 
 As a philosophy student in Freiburg and Berlin, Benjamin published essays on 
metaphysics as well as on poetics and language. It is in particular while dealing with the latter 
subject that he introduces the notion of magic, in relation to his conception of language as a 
spiritual and ultimately divine feature of humanity. The analysis presented here focuses on 
the article “On Language as Such and on the Language of Men,” written in 1915 and 
published only posthumously. It is the result of a meditation by Benjamin on the theme of 
language, which started as a response to a conversation with Scholem initiated earlier that 
year (Scholem Friendship 43). In his text, Benjamin asserts that “all communication of 
spiritual contents is language” (Early 251), pointing to both a “spiritualist” approach to 
language and a far-reaching conceptualisation of it. However, the feature of an intimate 
address, originally directed to Scholem, is maintained throughout the text, while a number of 
assertions remain scarcely explained, as if the author was hastily trying to define, through a 
dialogue, what so far had remained unclear. 
 This dialogical character is visible from the essay’s first sentence. Benjamin is guided 
by the search for an answer to the following question: Is it possible to talk about a language 
of music, of sculpture, of technology, which is not identical with the specialised language of 
such fields? His elaboration on this issue proceeds as follows: “every manifestation of the life 
of the spirit in humanity can be understood as a kind of language” (Early 251). All the above-
mentioned expressions are thus languages, and consequently there are as many languages as 
there as are life manifestations. The reason for this diversity, according to Benjamin, lies in 
the fact that language, in these contexts, is the principle that orients the communication of the 
spiritual or intellectual contents of the subjects concerned. Therefore, sculpture 
                                                            
143 Gustav Wyneken [1875-1964] was a German educational reformer under whose guidance Benjamin studied 
between 1905 and 1906. According to Wyneken, the awakening of youth should take the form of living culture, 
which he understood to be a transformation of tradition in the light of present-day experience (Eiland 2). 
Benjamin cut short their relationship when Wyneken supported the militarisation of Germany before the war. 
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communicates in the language of sculpture, and all other spiritual contents are communicated 
in a language specific to their origin, be that living beings or matter. 
 What language communicates, for Benjamin, is the gesitiges Wesen (“spiritual 
essence”) of things (Early 253). That is, contents are not located outside language and 
expressed through language, but located in it, since what is communicable in a spiritual entity 
is its language. This communicable aspect of things is language itself. One might say, in the 
case of sculpture, for example, that what is communicable in a statue is no more than its 
sculptural language. Humans may, and often do, relate such language to the language of 
living beings, and therefore to certain ideas. In these cases, however, the communication of a 
sculpture remains strictly “sculptural.”  
 The question that then emerges for Benjamin concerns the Unmittelbarkeit 
(“immediacy”) of language: the actual and immediate communication of spiritual contents. 
How does this process take place? To whom are all these languages communicating? Because 
languages are what they communicate, their being cannot be limited: there is always an 
incommensurable aspect to every language, since instead of translating things into language, 
languages communicate the spiritual essence of things. It is precisely this last feature that can 
never be exhausted, because, despite being able to communicate itself only through language, 
reality is inexhaustible. According to Benjamin, the fact that languages communicate can be 
called magisch (“magic”) (Early 258). Magic, here used in an attributive way, is the most 
distinctive feature of this definition of language, which is capable of expressively 
transmitting spiritual essences, without depleting them or the things they express. 
 Benjamin then attempts to demonstrate the operation of “the language of men,” 
through which this immediacy takes place. He begins by highlighting the self-evident fact 
that humans speak in words. Therefore, he asserts, man “communicates his own spiritual 
being (insofar as it is communicable) by naming all other things” (Early 254). At the same 
time, the act of naming recognises that all aspects of the material world are communicating 
with men, in their own various languages, to the point that man communicates with them by 
giving them a name. That is, “if the lamp and the mountain and the fox did not communicate 
themselves to man, how could he name them? For he names them; he communicates himself 
in naming them” (Early 254). According to Benjamin, this does not constitute a form of 
anthropomorphism, being based on the fact that one knows of no other naming language than 
that of humans. If the act of naming is how humans communicate, it is also how their 
essence, reminiscent of divine powers, is expressed. 
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 Moving through Benjamin’s text, it is possible to follow the evolution of this pattern 
towards his final spiritual comprehension of language. The author interrogates the addressee 
of human communication. In other words, why do humans name things? According to a 
common notion, this is due to the necessity for communication between men. For Benjamin, 
this vision is not only equivocated, but also the product of a “bourgeois conception of 
language,” according to which men communicate themselves through names, not in them. In 
this case, it is not one’s own spiritual content that is communicated through language, but 
things themselves. In this bourgeois conception of language, the word is the means of 
communication, “its object [is] the thing, and its addressee a human being” (Early 255).  
In opposition to this, Benjamin resumes his approach as the following: “the other 
conception of language, in contrast, knows no means, no object, and no addressee of 
communication. It says: in the name, the spiritual being of man communicates itself to God” 
(Early 255). By accepting that the content of linguistic communication is the spiritual essence 
of existing things, which are, in turn, their own language as much as they are communicable, 
one arrives at the conclusion that human beings can only communicate themselves, their 
spiritual being, to a dimension able to capture this form of expression. According to 
Benjamin, this constitutes “no addressee,” indicating that God is understood here more in 
terms of a philosophical category than a religious entity. 
 This communication takes place “in the name.” Here it is possible to conjecture that, 
if the immediacy of language, namely the fact that it communicates, is designated “magic,” 
the act of naming is, in itself, of a divine nature. One does not have to go back to the book of 
Genesis, which is the reference employed by Benjamin, to surmise that the act of nomination 
retains an originative feature in relation to the nominated things. The “set of quasi-historical 
practices” related to different incantation rituals, as indicated by Artaud, maintained and re-
enacted such powers through the centuries, against the backdrop of various cultures, as the 
characters of sorciers, fakirs and dervishes illustrate. Here the use of the expression “quasi-
historical” is precise in its very indefiniteness, especially if one considers the nebulous status 
of such practices in relation to a logical account of human history.  
 The name is, therefore, “the inmost essence of language itself,” and “only for this 
reason is the spiritual essence of man, alone among all forms of spirit, entirely 
communicable” (Benjamin Early 255). In other words, the magical language that “speaks” 
from man in his ability to name things is at the same time the expression of his own essence 
and a form of communication between the essences of things. Benjamin asserts, once more, 
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that the essence of man lies in the exercising of this magical power over things, reminiscent 
of divine creative powers. Benjamin makes here a connection with the notion of revelation, 
which he defines through the following formula: the most precise and definitive expression of 
things is at the same time a purely spiritual expression. The revelation of God or the divine in 
language, therefore, is an intrinsic part of the act of naming, at the same time being a limited 
but creative human act. 
 Scholem, in his book The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish 
Spirituality, exemplifies the notion of revelation through the biblical episode in which a voice 
spoke to Moses from the Sinai. This voice, not meaningful in itself, represents “that which is 
capable of assuming meaning, which needs interpretation in the medium of language in order 
to be understood” (Scholem Messianic 50). At first incomprehensible, the voice of God 
thereby acquires a frame that renders it utterable. In judaism, particularly, that frame is 
related to tradition, which begins with the fixation of the divine expression into words, so that 
it may become comprehensible to men, before it can reach the state in which it becomes law, 
that is, a way of life determined by revelation. 
 In Benjamin’s work, the act of naming is also the provider of such a frame. Divine 
creativity, when operated by men, becomes knowledge: “man is the knower in the same 
language in which God is creator” (Early 259). It is through the essences that silently radiate 
from things that the divine word is captured by men, giving birth to knowledge. The language 
of things themselves, “from out of which the word of God silently radiates in the mute magic 
of nature” (Early 261), is translated into that of man. According to Benjamin, things “can 
communicate among one another only through a more or less material community. This 
community is immediate and infinite, like that of every linguistic communication; it is magic 
(for there is also a magic of matter)” (Early 258). 
The relative “mute magic of nature,” as mentioned above, does not exclude the 
communication of things among themselves, in the form of a community whose efficacy, like 
that of every language community, is defined by Benjamin as magic. The translation of 
nameless into name departs from a “communicating muteness” of things, which man not only 
expresses in his own language, but also transforms, by adding something to it, in the form of 
knowledge. According to Benjamin, what distinguishes the language of men from other 
languages is the use of sound. The magic lies in both the facts that things are able to 
communicate themselves and among themselves, as well as that man communicates his own 
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essence by expressing such things. Consequently, the human spiritual being is completely 
dependent on the communication of things, and intrinsically magic.  
 By the end of the article, Benjamin proposes a displacement of the notions he has 
developed thus far, arguing that the magical power within human language, that contained in 
the act of naming, is only residual. For him, this is metaphorically marked by the passage in 
the book of Genesis in which the fall from paradise takes place. As Benjamin argues: “In 
stepping outside the pure language of name, man makes language a means (that is, a 
knowledge inappropriate to him), and therefore also, in one part at any rate, a mere sign; and 
this later results in the plurality of languages” (Early 264). From being immanently magic, 
therefore, language becomes expressly magic: its instrumental aspect becomes prominent. 
However, as Oneide Perius highlights (101), the Adamic language remains present, in the 
language’s very structure, as the ideal of fair expression, that is, as a constitutive dimension 
of language. Here, as in other cases, Benjamin’s notion of origin does not refer to a 
chronological location, but locates the operation of an actual thing as a place of convergence 
of different temporalities. Benjamin’s theory of language thus distinguishes from both an 
instrumental and a mystical approach. In the first case, it is because magical immediacy, in 
his theory, remains a possibility in the structure of language. And in the second case, it is 
because for Benjamin words are not, in themselves, the essence of things, but rather the 
expression of essences. 
 In this scenario the “muteness” of nature in relation to the sound language of men 
becomes an act of mourning, the mourning of its own ability to fully communicate. That is, if 
the remaining magic aspect of language is not exercised, nature remains silent. This situation 
is close to the generalisation Benjamin earlier called the “bourgeois conception of language,” 
in which the human being is envisioned as communicating different contents through 
language, and not being in it, that is, not taking part in the communication of things. 
Consequently, in relation to the present necessary mediation of all communication, Benjamin 
asserts: “the enslavement of language in empty talk is followed by the enslavement of things 
in folly almost as its inevitable consequence” (Early 264). The author here relates to the 
bourgeoisie both the meaningless talk and the ornamental use of objects, a theme he resumes 
many times over. 
In the scenario portrayed by Benjamin, men’s entanglements with language as a 
limited and, at the same time, powerful human feature signifies the engagement with the 
residues of a magic dimension that used to be immanent. This diagnosis marks Benjamin’s 
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understanding of this notion throughout his oeuvre. The essay finishes with an interesting 
notation: “the language of nature is comparable to a secret password that each sentry passes 
to the next in his own language, but the content of the password is the sentry’s language 
itself” (Benjamin Early 267). That is, if on the one hand reality expresses itself only through 
language, on the other hand it exists to human beings solely in that they are able to express it. 
 
 4.4. Remaining Traces 
 The two texts from Artaud and Benjamin presented here allow the reader to visualise 
their early approaches to magic. They represent a starting point that was subject to both 
dispersion and restoration in their later writings. For while the theme of magic appears in 
different guises in Artaud and Benjamin’s works, some of the basic assumptions concerning it 
are already present in the essays introduced here. While Artaud locates the starting point of 
magic in practices of incantation connected both to past magical figures and the exploration 
of the theme of death, Benjamin delimitates its residual character within the human use of 
language. In formal terms, Artaud’s text is a short account apparently written expressly for 
the magazine Demain. Its style is evocative and spontaneous, in common with many texts of 
Artaud. Benjamin’s has as its starting point a dialogue with a friend, and was reworked, over 
a fairly long period, into an academic text. Bearing in mind the different scope of the two 
essays, this section is intended to provide an initial comparative approach to the authors’ 
assessment of magic, presenting the hypothesis that it is envisioned by both in terms of a 
trace. 
 In “Excursion Psychique” Artaud presents magic as intrinsically related to the themes 
of incantation and death. This implies that the encounter with the magical dimension 
encompasses an important human facet, and a depersonalisation. Acts of incantation are 
traced back to an ancient line of rituals that apparently no longer take place, while the 
exploration of the magical dimension at present might be facilitated by recent techniques, 
such as that of hypnosis. According to Artaud, all these aspects can be subsumed under the 
exploration of the limits between life and death, one that originated in Ancient Egypt and 
survived for centuries to the present day. For Benjamin, in turn, magic appears in terms of the 
immediacy of language, while the human use of it is described, through the notion of 
denomination, as the translation of the language of things into that of men. In this sense, the 
magic dimension is a survival element that maintains a relationship with a different world 
configuration. 
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Here the German word for trace, Spur, will be used to access the meaning of magic in 
the works of Artaud and Benjamin. Freud’s use of Spur clarifies its multiplicity of senses. As 
in the English equivalent, these vary in intensity and context, encompassing meanings such as 
track, lead, mark, sign and vestige. Freud, resuming his first attempts at schematising the 
psychic apparatus in The Interpretation of Dreams, uses the term to refer to the emergence of 
consciousness at the location of a memory. He asserts in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1919): “consciousness arises in place [an Stelle] of a memory trace [Erinnerungsspur]”144 
(Freud qdt. in Wiegel 104). On the one hand, it brings forward the idea of a coincidence or, 
one might also say, a dialectic relationship, between two different instances of the psychic 
life, consciousness and memory. On the other hand, there is the description of memory as a 
form of register analogous to writing, albeit one which, according to Wiegel, “is never 
readable as such and in its entirety” (105). The trace is precisely this “written” form: 
inscribed, retained and nevertheless inaccessible in its totality. 
 Benjamin’s use of the term seems to follow the same guidelines.145 That is, the magic 
traces in human language are to be understood not as fixed and forever determined signs of a 
disappearing world or dimension, but instead as inscriptions that actively imply another 
worldview, which remains present in the current one, precisely through such traces. They are, 
therefore, the surviving access point to different social and psychological configurations, 
which are subjected to re-signification as soon as they are touched upon. The access allowed 
by them, however, is only partial, due to the “decayed” character of the former world views 
contained within them. 
 Benjamin situates magic as a residue intrinsically present in the actual functioning of 
language. According to him, in activities such as reading, the remaining magical traces can 
emerge, particularly through the association of sounds. The mode of operation of this 
dimension, in this context, seems to depend on the extent to which humans access its 
potential, particularly through creativity. Benjamin understands language as an intermittent 
exercise of expression, since it cannot exhaust reality by fully expressing the essences of 
things. His theory asserts the inexhaustible character of reality, at the same time that it affirms 
the dynamism of the human spirit, in its attempts at capturing the multi-faceted aspects of the 
                                                            
144 Here the translation of Wiegel is privileged over Strachey’s, since it keeps the important sense of location 
from the original. The Standard Edition goes as follows: “Consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace” 
(Freud Standard XVIII 25). The thematisation of memory and trace can already be found, almost in the same 
terms, in The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 610. 
145 Benjamin quotes this very passage from Beyond the Pleasure Principle in the text “On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire” (1940), while proposing the notion of shock experience (Schockerlebnis) (Benjamin Motifs 160). 
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world. As Leandro Konder suggests (qtd. in Perius 104), the exercise of human abilities in 
relation to the magical aspect of language suffers at the time of writing from both abstract 
detachment and the crass empiricism with which humanity relates to things. Consequently, 
according to Konder, the creative use of words is mostly restricted to the spontaneity of 
children and the audacity of poets.  
 While Benjamin envisions traces of magic persisting in language, Artaud mentions 
actual magical practices as those through which a sense of the other world can be explored. 
His approach relates different and, at times, ambiguous, elements to magic, such as the state 
of sleep and the practice of hypnosis. The latter, for instance, while described as a medium 
that allows men “to wander in death,” has a status for Artaud that remains unclear, since it is 
also related to the “paraphernalia” brought up by Science in its attempts to “deal with the 
unknown.” The hypothesis put forward here is that the element through which a bridge 
between the worlds of magic and reality should be explored, in Artaud’s essay, is rather the 
souffle. Artaud, having defended the existence of a remaining link between the human and the 
superior dimensions, asks: “comment le souffle de l’au-delà qui est en chacun de nous, et qui 
un jour s’éveillera au souffle de l’Esprit pur, se reconnaîtrait-il s’il n’était pas d’une essence 
identique”146 (Artaud Œuvres I,1 305).  
 One must consider the possible meanings of souffle in this case. The French term 
stands for breath, puff of air, as well as for the idea of artistic and intellectual inspiration. Its 
most abstract meaning, however, is that of vital impetus, i.e. the spirit. Artaud seems to 
privilege this latter meaning, which is also consonant with uses that arise in later works. This 
does not mean, however, that souffle and esprit are interchangeable. Importantly, this early 
use of souffle seems to denote a connection not only to the “other world,” but also, in this 
particular scenario, to the quasi-historical figures united under the sign of “ancient ritual of 
magic practices” or incantation.  
Artaud asserts that if the human souffle is made from the same material as the other 
world, that is, if they share an “identical essence,” their connection is somehow given. He 
proposes two different aspects of this relation. The birth of Science is implied as having 
caused an interruption in the exchange between the human souffle and the “pure Spirit.” 
Science, for Artaud, opposes the ancient practices (Artaud Œuvres I,1 305). The souffle, 
being a trace of a different configuration of things, of the “other world,” it is in itself a 
                                                            
146 “How the breath of the afterlife, that is found in each of us, and that one day will wake up to the breath of the 
pure Spirit, would recognize itself if it was not of an identical essence [to the pure Spirit]?” 
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connective element that represents the spiritual while it integrates human nature. It is a 
remaining connection between two currently distinguished, but once potentially and virtually 
indistinguishable, dimensions. Artaud does not develop this notion any further at this point. 
In his texts from the thirties, on the other hand, the souffle acquires an interesting and even 
practical signification, becoming the means for an individual’s realisation of their vital forces 
(Œuvres 588). 
Artaud and Benjamin propose different locations where these traces have remained 
present and, therefore powerful, in contemporary experience. It is interesting to observe that, 
for Benjamin, the magical aspects of language integrate the diagnosis of a particular way of 
performing communication in modernity, which he describes as instrumental and 
“bourgeois.” This performance is connected, as mentioned above, to the “muteness” into 
which objects have fallen since language no longer entertained a close relationship with 
things, that is, since things have not been able to express their essences in language. The 
theme of a decay of reality into darkness or muteness, in which its potential powers become 
only residual, and its inner vitality can no longer be appreciated, is described by Benjamin as 
part of the processes of instrumentation of both nature and language. There seems to be a 
similarity between this process of instrumentation and the action of science described by 
Artaud. 
 The theme of spiritual refinement thus acquires another connotation. Coming, in 
Artaud’s text, after the description of scientific intervention into spiritual matters, it seems to 
signify the need to purge not only the “intrinsically” unhealthy aspects of inner life, 
mentioned as malsaines preoccupations, but also the stereotyped elements of its working, 
related to an entire apparatus which is, in Artaud’s words, destined to make “the 
imponderables converge” (Œuvres I,1 305). In this sense, the inner being made free to 
explore the limits of life and death is not only divested of single, and perhaps personal, 
preoccupations, but also of the machinery provided by repetitive social life. This is necessary 
if it is to be available to be “commanded” by spiritual life in its highest form, that is, to live a 
fulfilled psychic life. 
 In time, Artaud’s use of the word esprit in “Excursion Psychique” develops at least 
two very different connotations. Firstly, in the context of the above-mentioned refinement, 
the Esprits are identified with the unhealthy aspects of inner life, as beings that influence the 
state of the soul in a maleficent way. This use will re-appear in various Artaud texts in 
discussions of parasites de l’être (“parasites of being”), as explored below. The second usage 
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occurs in descriptions of l’Esprit pur, the pure spirit positively identified with the other 
world: the “superior dimension.” Both these connotations will give ground to a more 
prevalent meaning — that of the life of the soul, the inner being — in Artaud’s surrealist 
texts. This is also the usage employed in this text, except where otherwise indicated.147 
 If both Artaud and Benjamin connect a change or decay from one social and 
psychological configuration to another with a process of instrumentation and automation of 
social life, they are certainly not alone in doing so. This pattern of transformation has been 
approached, from different perspectives, by other authors. Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) is one important reference. It characterises modern times 
by rationalisation and intellectualisation, and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the 
world.” That is, the retreat of sublime values into the transcendental realm of mystic life or 
into the brotherliness of personal relations. It is the work of Georg Lukács, however, that 
presents more analogies with Artaud’s and Benjamin’s.  
Lukács, in the famous book The Theory of the Novel (1920), proposes two different 
modes of civilization, the integrated and the problematic, which are related, respectively, to 
the worlds of the epic and the tragedy in ancient Greece. In the first mode, life and essence 
are identical concepts. It is a rounded world, in which “there is not yet interiority, for there is 
not yet any exterior, any ‘otherness’ for the soul” (Lukács Novel 30). From the time of 
tragedy on, the substance of the world pales and it is no longer immanent, giving way to a rift 
from which the notions of creation, destiny and soul emanate. From this break in the rounded 
world, thinking emerges as an attempt to describe “inside” and “outside,” “a sign of the 
essential difference between the self and the world” (Novel 29).  
 Lukács envisions the Renaissance — he mentions Dante, Giotto and St. Thomas in 
particular— as a period in which “the world became round once more, a totality capable of 
being taken in at a glance” (Novel 37). A new equilibrium “of mutually inadequate, 
heterogeneous intensities” (Novel 38) emerged for the first time, but also for the last. Perhaps 
the synthesis proposed by authors such as Agrippa in the notion of magia naturalis can be 
considered part of this attempt at totality, in which magic permeated the very notion of 
nature. However, as “the most perfect, and chief science” (Agrippa 56), it is not immanent in 
the world. It is, in turn, an “equilibrium of mutually inadequate” elements, as Lukács puts it, 
reunited under a totality. On this concern, the Hungarian author also situates all Greek 
                                                            
147 We have decided to use the word “spirit” instead of “mind,” which would be a common English translation 
for esprit. The reason lies in the use and connotation of “mind” as associated with intelligence, consciousness 
and, ultimately, the brain, while “spirit” maintains the link with the Latin spiritus, that is breath and spirit. 
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philosophy, even when professing absolute transcendence, to be part of the dramatic or 
problematic configuration (Novel 35).  
 While referring to the first of these configurations, Lukács professes ideas that are 
close to Artaud and Benjamin’s descriptions of magic. “The world of meaning can be 
grasped, it can be taken in at a glance; all that is necessary is to find the locus that has been 
predestined for each individual” (Novel 32). In this scenario, there is no chasm to be 
overcome by creation, since, for Lukács, “the world is wide and yet it is like a home, for the 
fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars” (Novel 29).  
 The question, however, remains. Can Lukács’ notion of a “complete change in our 
concept of life and its relationship to essential being” (Novel 41-2) be analogous to what 
Benjamin and Artaud suggest in relation to the shift from a immanently magic world to one 
in which magic is contingent? According to Lukács, the section of the book in which he 
compares the modes of totality in epic and dramatic art is essentially determined by Hegel 
(Novel 15). This means that the categories he proposes are not so much historically 
significant as intended to function dialectically in relation to both the movement toward a 
recovery of a totality and the inhabitation of a fragmentary world.  
Benjamin’s description, in turn, points the magic dimension as dealing with 
mythological and theological apects. It concerns the narrative about different world 
configurations and the reminiscent power of men in relation to an immanent form of power. 
This can be said to be close to the “rounded world” proposed in Lukács’ epic configuration. 
Artaud’s notion of magic is expressed through mystic figures concerned more with their 
relationship with a superior spiritual dimension, than with a cosmogenesis. The incantation 
practices and the souffle are signs of the spiritual world in human flesh, related to a notion of 
magic that, just like magia naturalis, permeates the natural world. Artaud’s description of 
science, similar to the one historically represented by the enlightenment, intervenes in this 
world view. However, the dimension that the human spirit bridges, for Artaud, is not an epic 
one. It is a sphere made from heterogeneous elements and consisiting of a recovered totality. 
In both “Psychic Excursion” and “On Language…,” magic is approached as a 
remnant of an earlier order of things, but only to the extent that it is the effect of the 
conflictive forming of two different configurations. While these configurations are not clearly 
defined in the above texts of Artaud and Benjamin, it can be surmised that in one 
configuration magic is to be taken as an immanent aspect, while, in the other, it is only a 
detached and residual dimension. As mentioned above, it should not be assumed that one 
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form has historically replaced the other, just as consciousness, in Freud’s scheme, does not 
replace memory. The idea of trace holds, in turn, that the interaction between the two 
different dimensions has lead to the occurrence of inscriptions, which function as portents of 
magical experience. 
 This understanding aligns with that of Jeanne Marie Gagnebin in História e Narração 
em Walter Benjamin (2007), according to which Benjamin’s thematisation of the notion of 
Ursprung (“origin”) does not propose the nostalgic return to a former world, nor the 
projection of it over the current one. It instead operates a leap outside the chronological order, 
one capable of at once recovering and dispersing a forgotten or repressed past (Gagnebin 
História 10). Therefore, as a remnant, the magic dimension is at the same time a sign of 
conflictive development and a trace that allows the reactivation of some of its aspects. In this 
sense, the different configurations cannot be recovered separately. In a practical sense, this 
means that one cannot experience, through discovering the traces of magic, the ancient world 
vision in which it once integrated the very conception of life, just as one cannot escape, 
during one’s lifetime, from experiencing moments that detach from the very facts of live, that 
is, of accessing traces of a different perceptive configuration. 
Both Artaud and Benjamin saw ground-breaking potential in encounters with this 
other world or dimension of experience. To some extent, these depended upon producing a 
significant confrontation with the past, however not necessarily a historical past. This theme 
is so strong that their texts often evoke a pattern of revelation. The idea of becoming aware of 
magical traces, and of being able to explore them through appropriate media, carries a 
promise of experiencing a more fulfilling life, or ultimately of finding a more significant 
existence. A few years later Artaud stated in “Adresse au Pape” (1925): “dans ce dédale de 
murailles mouvantes et toujours déplacées, hors de toutes les formes connues de pensée, 
notre Esprit se meut, épiant ses mouvements les plus secrets et spontanés, ceux qui ont un 
caractère de révélation, cet air venu d’ailleurs”148 (Œuvres 153).  
 The question of how exactly one should explore the remaining magical dimension, 
and for which purposes, remains relatively open for both Artaud and Benjamin. Their texts 
suggest, however, that contact with the magical dimension retains the meaning of an 
encounter with the unconscious. This can be assumed from both the references to death, sleep 
and residual elements of experience, and to the precise functioning of this magical dimension, 
                                                            
148 “in this labyrinth of moving and ever-displaced walls, away from all known forms of thought, our Spirit 
moves, watching its most secret and spontaneous movements, those which have the character of revelation, of 
an air from elsewhere” — From “Lettre aux Recteurs des Universities Européennes,” published in 1925. 
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which in many senses evokes Freud’s description of unconscious memory traces. As Freud 
explains, these traces can never be experienced while unconscious. Their obscure character 
may either remain concealed, and therefore unknown, or become conscious, and 
consequently radically transformed.  
 For Benjamin, the act of naming evokes the premise proposed by Freud in relation to 
the efficacy of language. That is, language, through its ability to interfere with reality, 
demonstrates its competence to enchant. This ability is present, if garbled, in the dialogic 
process proposed by psychoanalysis. The ancient belief in changing the state of matter 
through words, mentioned above, is described by Freud as having left remnants in 
contemporary speech (Freud Dreams 365). This aspect is, once again, full of resonances with 
Benjamin’s account. If for Benjamin the act of naming is the sign of a spiritual 
communication between men and things, it is no surprise that this immediacy of language is 
named magic. The spiritual content expressed in such a denomination, consequently, is that of 
its relation to ancient meanings.  
 Despite the evidence of proximity with Freudian terms, however, Artaud and 
Benjamin’s descriptions of the means by which magic can be explored cannot be contained 
within them. Since for Benjamin magical power, even in its reminiscent form, is constitutive 
of language itself, it is not completely absent from linguistic practices, even if it suffers from 
increasingly less creative use. It remains virtually present and can be perceived in flashes, 
such as in one’s learning of language, in children’s use of words and in poetry and the arts. 
Artaud, on the other hand, proposes the states of sleep and hypnosis as channels for the 
magical dimension, while remaining suspicious of the methodic incursions into these 
proposed by scientific approaches. His recourse to ancient ritual practices and figures can be 
understood as a resort to “traditional” forms of magic, envisioned as the holders of truth in 
the field. These forms are distinguished from the practices proposed by contemporary 
“manuals of magic.” Magic remains, to some extent, inaccessible: the quasi-historical status 
of the practices evoked by Artaud makes them non-replicable. As he himself comments, it is 
impossible to know whether forces as powerful as those evoked by such figures have ever 
existed. This statement leaves the door open for both the inclusion of past and present 
magical figures, and the rejection of ordinary forms of magic. 
 And finally, Artaud and Benjamin do not perceive the traces of the magical dimension 
in modern life as sensory data to be processed by the psychic apparatus, as is the case in the 
Freudian model. As mentioned above, the traces are the cultural imprints of a different world 
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configuration which, despite being generally understood as historically completed, is 
constitutional of the present forms, and therefore in a constant dialectical relationship with 
them. Always virtually present, the traces are constantly liable to be actualised in one’s 
experience. The form taken by this actualisation becomes clear in other texts by Artaud and 
Benjamin, to be approached below. The consideration of magic as a trace illuminates the role 
of this aspect in their works, while their points of convergence and departure with the work of 
Freud is of key interest, since magic and the unconscious are commonly related in both 
Artaud and Benjamin’s writings. 
 Artaud closes his text with the following consideration: “Et j’imagine qu’il doit y 
avoir dans la mort cette inquiétude de l’homme qui dort et se demande avec angoisse si c’est 
vraiment un rêve. Affolante question.”149 (Œuvres I,1 305). In surrealist fashion, Artaud 
proposes that magic can be found in the scenario of dreams. The themes of sleep, dream and 
death once again appear to be interwoven. Considered together, Artaud’s and Benjamin’s 
approaches to the confrontation of death, and the originative power of language, can be seen 
as appeals to the theme of origins. That is, if death is the dimension through which the 
mystery of life can be understood, it is also the one in which the constitution of the existing 
world is questioned. In Artaud’s words, “c’est pourtant dans l’investigation de la mort que 
nous rencontrierons le secret de l’emprise divine et de la configuration spirituelle du 
monde”150 (Œuvres 29). 
 This theme is echoed in Benjamin’s perspective on the act of capturing and expressing 
the spiritual essence of things through language. It is while man is expressing himself that 
humanity is at the height of its spiritual relation with the inexhaustible world. Benjamin 
concludes his essay thus: “The language of an entity is the medium in which its spiritual 
being communicates itself. The uninterrupted flow of this communication runs through the 
whole of nature, from the lowest form of existence to man, and from man to God.” (Early 
267). The pervasiveness of the magic dimension is envisaged as part of the human practice of 
expressing essences through language. If the useful survival traces of magic present in this 
world appear to be the access channels to a divine dimension of humanity, through voluntary 
as well as fortuitous actions, it is an access that takes place through the dialectical 
relationship between different world views or configurations. It is in the exploration of this 
                                                            
149 “And I imagine that there must be in death this uneasiness of the man who sleeps and wonders anxiously if it 
is really a dream. A maddening issue.” 
150 “yet it is in the investigation of death that we will find the secrets of divine influence and of the spiritual 
configuration of the world”
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contingent dimension of life, in which established forms lose their definition, and the existing 
world can be genuinely questioned, that Artaud and Benjamin’s thinking meet. 
 
 4.5. The Irreducible Spirit 
 Around 1921, Artaud connects with dadaism and the first writings of Breton, Aragon 
and Soupault, the same time at which his texts appear in the magazine Demain. The first 
personal contact between Breton and Artaud takes place in late 1924, following the 
publication of “Correspondance avec Jacques Rivière,” Artaud’s exposition, in epistolary 
form, of the intricate problem of expression. Soon Artaud is collaborating on the periodical 
La Révolution Surréaliste, and, from 1925, he is assigned the direction of the Bureau des 
Recherches Surréalistes, which elucidate the precepts of the surrealistic revolution in the 
following terms: “cette révolution vise à une dévalorisation générale des valeurs, à la 
dépréciation de l’esprit … au dénivellement de la pensée”151 (Artaud Œuvres 141). At this 
point surrealism is defined as an état d’esprit dealing with the establishment of a new kind of 
mysticism, for which surrealists are considered to be living neither in the world, nor in the 
present, but “in the spirit.” Artaud is very much in line with the surrealistic project of the 
time, participating intensely in the advancing of particular issues.  
 Artaud’s first text in the surrealist periodical appears in its second issue, of January 
1925. The article’s first sentence, “le monde physique est encore là”152 (Artaud Œuvres 123), 
marks the beginning of a discourse of disintegration inspired by a painting by André Masson, 
who joined the surrealists during the same period. It is however in the third issue of La 
Révolution Surréaliste, named “1925: Fin de l’Ère Chrétienne,” that Artaud’s imprint on the 
movement is best observed. According to Pierre Naville (14), Artaud not only coordinated 
this issue, but brought to the movement a new concept of revolt. The short text “À Table” 
(“At the Table”) opens the edition with the following lines: “Quittez les cavernes de l’être. 
Venez. L’esprit souffle en dehors de l’esprit. Il est temps d’abandonner vos logis. Cédez à la 
Toute-Pensée. Le Merveilleux est à la racine de l’esprit.”153 (Artaud Œuvres 130). 
 While calling for an abandonment of the “lodgings” of being, which can be 
understood here as the spheres of logic and rationality, Artaud proposes the inventiveness of 
                                                            
151 “this revolution aims at a general devaluation of values, at the impairment of the mind ... at the unevenness of 
thought” 
152 “the physical world is still there” 
153 “Leave the caves of being. Come. The spirit blows outside the spirit. It is time to abandon your houses. Give 
way to the All-Thinking. Wonderfulness is at the root of the spirit.” 
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an “outside” dimension, corresponding to “wonderfulness” and “all-thinking.” These are to 
be found not through a detour from life, but instead in its very roots. Artaud urges an 
examination of the core of reality, the place where its principles, even the most obscure, can 
be appreciated. According to him, “à travers les fentes d’une réalité désormais inviable, parle 
un monde volontairement sibyllin”154 (Artaud Œuvres 131). Here the term sibyllin, just like 
the English “sibyl,” refers to the mythological context in which cryptic content flows from an 
oracle to be decrypted by priests.  
 Artaud refers to another world being cryptically announced in this one: from an 
unviable reality, of rational foundations, speaks another one, voluntarily obscure. The very 
notion of surrealité, as mentioned in the previous chapter, relies on the possibility of 
accessing a reality that lies within the perceptive one. In this context, the claim for “another 
world” keeps at least two meanings: the shifting from a material situation perceived as 
exhausted and limiting towards an inner dimension of marvellous features, and the 
reconstruction of reality from the imaginative and “all-thinking” aspects of experience. These 
elements are not mutually exclusive: while surrealism, when understood as a transformative 
force, has had periods of greater focus on issues of the spirit, and periods of more affinity 
with political and social reality, the understanding of the spiritual dimension did not at any 
point exclude a “material” feature, or vice versa. 
 “À Table” also presents an interesting, though obscure, distinction between different 
conceptions of “spirit.” One of these seems to be its popular use, while another corresponds 
to the use made by the surrealists. Artaud states: “qui nous juge, n’est pas né à l’esprit, à cet 
esprit que nous voulons vivre et qui est pour nous dehors de ce qui vous appelez l’esprit”155 
(Œuvres 130). The “real” spirit, according to the text, is related to a notion of eternity that 
comes through the non-impediment of spiritual activities. In this sense, Artaud situates the 
surrealists as “du dedans de l’esprit, de l’intérieur de la tête”156 (Œuvres 130). 
 As well as the two short texts by Artaud, the third issue of La Révolution Surréaliste 
is filled with important texts addressed to the Pope, the Dalai Lama and the “Schools of 
Buddha.” According to different testimonies, these texts were largely written by Artaud, 
while other surrealists proposed a few adjustments (Thévenin Œuvres I,2 234; Naville 15). 
The most remarkable aspect of them is their attack on institutions, something the surrealists 
                                                            
154 “through the slits of a now unsustainable reality, speaks a deliberately cryptic world” 
155 “those who judge us are not born in the spirit, this spirit that we want to live and that for us is outside of what 
you call the spirit” 
156 “inside the spirit, from the interior of the head” 
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had so far not undertaken. The “Adresse au Pape,” for instance, contains the following 
statement: “il n’y a Dieu, Bible ou Evangile, il n’y a pas de mots qui arrêtent l’esprit”157 
(Artaud Œuvres 133). The institutions are here understood as arbitrarily imposing a 
discontinuation of spiritual practices, whose original activity is continuous and independent 
from organised establishments. Artaud seems to have brought to the movement a strong 
impetus towards this critique. 
 While the address to the Pope expresses the alienation of religion from the spirit, that 
directed to the Dalai Lama opens with an acknowledgment of the inferiority of Occidental 
culture compared to that of the Orient, as a result of “nos esprits contaminés d’Européens”158 
(Artaud Œuvres 136). That is, while the former maintains a strict tone of scorn and reproach, 
the latter favours a positive acclamation that flirts with submission. According to Nadeau 
(72-3), this Orient mystérieux appears for the surrealists as the right emblem to express their 
opposition to the confusion of Occidental values. On the one hand, it is understood that the 
Oriental sages dismissed any form of mechanical, compartmentalised knowledge, while, on 
the other hand, they could be called “barbarian,” due to their contempt for detached forms of 
art and culture. 
 The Dalai Lama is envisioned as a superior entity, well-versed in the valuable 
knowledge of a purer, freer spirit. He is in fact called the Pape acceptable, a move that is in 
consonance with the issue’s title, “The End of the Christian Era.” The periodical’s intention 
seems to be the inauguration of a new period focused on another age-old, and no less 
traditional, religion: buddhism. The contaminated European spirit is described as follows: 
“nous sommes environnés des papes rugueux, de littérateurs, de critiques, de chiens, notre 
Esprit parmi les chiens, qui pensent immédiatement avec la terre, qui pensent 
indécrottablement dans le présent” 159  (Artaud Œuvres 136). In opposition to this, the 
teachings of the Dalai Lama are described as leading to transparent liberation, including 
detachment from the carnal world and the abolishment of suffering.  
 The text “Lettre aux Écoles du Bouddha” assumes the same tone of a call for 
“salvation” coming from a vaguely-defined Orient. It is also an address from apprentice to 
master, and abounds in formulations attesting to the Orient’s existing knowledge of ideas 
pursued by the surrealists “on this side of the world.” It describes, for instance, the current 
                                                            
157 “there is no God, no Bible, no Evangel, there are no words capable of stopping the spirit” 
158 “our contaminated European spirits” 
159 “we are surrounded by rough popes, writers, critics, dogs, our Spirit is amongst the dogs, who immediately 
think with the earth, who think hopelessly in the present” 
Hartmann 143 
suffering within Occidental culture as related to a pourriture (“rotting”) of reason, that is 
“l’Europe logique écrase l’esprit sans fin entre les marteaux de deux termes, elle ouvre et 
referme l’esprit”160 (Artaud Œuvres 140). It also presents the intellectual class as mere larvae, 
incapable of instigating transformation while so occupied with rater la vie (“missing life”).  
 The text evokes the Oriental spirits by contrast, but also establishes a broad similitude 
to surrealist thinking, since, despite it all, the surrealists “avons capté la pensée la 
meilleure”161 (Artaud Œuvres 140). The contempt for progress is another feature connecting 
both groups, here expressed through an envisioning of the Orient as a prosaic, but deeply 
spiritualised, society. That is, “comme vous, nous repoussons le progrès: venez, jetez bas nos 
maisons”162 (Œuvres 140). If the institutions of civilised Europe, on which the notion of 
progress is based, are to be destroyed, Artaud and the surrealists must also launch the quest 
for a new society. The cry is thus: “Sauvez-nous de ces larves. Inventez-nous de nouvelles 
maisons.”163 (Œuvres 140). While buddhists are seen as highly spiritualised — immersed in 
the “liberated spirit” that is so attractive to the surrealists — theirs is not seen as a form of 
incarnated life. Instead, Artaud’s text opens with the call “vous qui n’êtes pas dans la 
chair”164 (Œuvres 140). For those who happen to be “in the flesh,” like the surrealists and all 
occidentals, the only available path is the “carnal path,” at some point on which the soul may 
find its “inner land” and dedicate itself entirely to spiritual matters. 
 The mysticism of the Orient was bound to find a correspondent amongst the 
surrealists. In an account of the activities of the Bureau, which remained open to the public 
until the end of January 1925, Artaud and his colleagues re-elaborate the precepts of the 
surrealist revolution. The text first presents the themes of devaluation of values, rupture with 
logic and elaboration of a deeper order of things, then goes on to state surrealism’s need for a 
philosophy, “ou ce qui peut en tenir lieu”165 (Artaud Œuvres 141). This philosophy, according 
to Artaud, must address the investigative methodology of surrealism, and allow landmarks to 
be fixed. The document reads: “on peut, on doit admettre jusqu’à un certain point une 
mystique surréaliste, un certain ordre de croyances évasives par rapport à la raison ordinaire, 
                                                            
160 “logical Europe continuously crushes the spirit between the hammers of two terms, it opens and closes the 
spirit” 
161 “have captured the best thought” 
162 “just like you, we reject progress: come, bring down our houses” 
163 “Save us from these larvae. Let’s invent new houses for ourselves.” 
164 “you who are not in the flesh” 
165 “or something that can take its place” 
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mais toutefois bien déterminées, touchant à des points bien fixés de l’esprit”166  (Artaud 
Œuvres 141). 
 What kind of mystique could this be? At this point, surrealist philosophy seems 
indistinguishable from the yet-to-be-defined mystique. For the surrealist revolution “vise au 
reclassement spontané des choses suivant un ordre plus profond et plus fin, et impossible à 
élucider par les moyens de la raison ordinaire, mais un ordre tout de même”167 (Artaud 
Œuvres 141). The establishment of an order “all the same,” that is, an order that does not 
coincide with that of logic and rationality, but which is nevertheless well-defined, is at the 
core of this attempt. If it is a more or less organised system of beliefs derived from the 
investigative methodology of surrealism, it must take into account the phenomena that 
occupy the movement, that is, above all, phenomena transcending conscious experience.  
 The mystique can be better expressed here as a belief in the potentiality of states of 
spirit that escape the control of reason and move beyond logic, such as those expressed 
through automatic writing or daydreaming. The first lines of the document are elucidative in 
this regard: “le fait d’une révolution surréaliste dans les choses est applicable à tous les états 
de l’esprit, à tous les genres d’activité humaine, à tous les états du monde au milieu de 
l’esprit, à tous les faits établis de morale, à tous les ordres d’esprit”168 (Artaud Œuvres 141). 
Here the revolution is described as taking place “in things” and through the spirit. The 
products of the latter, however, are significant only insofar as they differ both from a chaotic 
expression of emotions and the errant character of the imagination. The surrealist sensibility, 
at this time as well as throughout its course, holds fast to its traces of organisation.  
 According to Nadeau (71), Breton summarises the surrealist activities of this time as 
moved by the fundamental ambition of “creating a collective myth.” A mystique surréaliste is 
in this sense also a myth, a narrative on the origins and functioning of surrealism. It emanates 
a new world view, which attaches significance to the discoveries being made through the 
surrealist “experiments,” and particularly the discrediting of the privileging of the rational 
mind and “civilised” institutions. Following the statement on the need for the establishment 
of a sequence of beliefs, the document reads: “le surréalisme, plutôt que des croyances, 
                                                            
166 “we can, we must, admit to a certain surrealist mystique, a certain order of evasive beliefs in relation to 
ordinary reason, but nevertheless well defined, touching on many fixed points of the spirit” 
167 “aims at the spontaneous reclassification of things, following an order that is deeper and more refined, and 
impossible to elucidate through ordinary reason, but an order nonetheless” 
168 “the fact of a surrealist revolution taking place in things is applicable to all states of mind (spirit), to all kinds 
of human activity, to all states of the world concerned with the mind, to all the facts established through morals, 
to all levels of the mind” 
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enregistre un certain ordre de répulsions”169 (Artaud Œuvres 141). Finally, the positive aspect 
of the mystique is enquired into, but not objectively defined.  
 The “Déclaration du 27 Janvier 1925,” another text largely written by Artaud, states 
that “Le SURRÉALISME n’est pas un moyen d’expression nouveau ou plus facile, ni même 
une métaphysique de la poésie; Il est un moyen de libération totale de l’esprit et de tout ce 
qui lui ressemble.”170 (Artaud Œuvres 151). Setting surrealism and literature apart, Artaud 
focuses on the theme of a “liberation of the spirit.” That is, in order to bring down the barriers 
preventing the spirit from accomplishing its full potential, surrealism makes use of abstract 
means, but also, if needed, “des marteaux matériels” 171  (Artaud Œuvres 151). In an 
anticipation of the later assumption of a material basis for the surrealist revolution, here the 
total liberation of the spirit professedly assumes a concrete facet, through, for example, the 
attacks on institutions. It is conducive to remember what Nadeau (71) noted on this subject, 
namely that such terms expose the desire of surrealism to move towards concrete matters, as 
well as to produce the specific form of concreteness that is myth. 
 It is exactly during this period that the movement approaches the theme of whether 
surrealism equates with revolution, or whether these two terms differ, inaugurating the space 
for a choice. A small group meeting on April 2, 1925 opted for a common denominator, that 
is, “un certain état de fureur”172 (Nadeau 71), the application of which was not immediately 
determined. Artaud was part of this group and, most certainly, this trend. According to the 
same document — an internally circulated resolution —, the surrealists “pensent que ce sur le 
chemin de cette fureur qu’ils sont le plus susceptibles d’atteindre ce qu’on pourrait appeler 
l’illumination surréaliste,”173 and that the spirit, moreover, “est un principe essentiellement 
irréductible et qui ne peut trouver à se fixer ni dans la vie, ni au-delà”174 (Nadeau 71f).  
 The state of fury is here assigned a central character in surrealist activity. As well as 
its conciliatory role in the above situation, it also allows for the determination of the spirit as 
a notion irreducible to any subject either in life or beyond it. This irreducibility is already 
present in early affirmations such as “nul surréaliste n’est au monde, ne se pense dans le 
                                                            
169 “Surrealism, rather than beliefs, records a certain order of repulsions” 
170 “SURREALISM is not a new or easier way of expression, or even a metaphysic of poetry; It is a means of 
total liberation of the spirit and all that resembles it.” 
171 “through material hammers” 
172 “a certain state of fury” 
173 “think that it is in the path of this fury that they are most likely to achieve what might be called the surrealist 
illumination” 
174 “is an essentially irreducible principle, that cannot be fixed either in life or beyond it” 
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présent” 175  (Artaud Œuvres 141). The connection between the state of fury and the 
expression illumination surréaliste cannot go unnoticed. It expresses a state of spiritual 
insight and clarification associated with the fury, and, if approached via buddhism, of a 
freeing awareness. One can assume, however, that the surrealist illumination takes a very 
different form from the religious one. While surrealism is immersed in its obscure mystique 
and engaged in the exploration of the “eternal” aspects of the spirit, its form of illumination 
cannot be defined a priori. Benjamin expressed this idea in 1929, in terms of a “profane 
illumination,” that is a non-religious and materialist-inspired rapture (Benjamin Surrealism 
146). 
 Along with his attack on the established system of values and thought, Artaud 
approaches another target of the revolution, the inept arrangement of human thinking. The 
direction of the surrealist revolution is professed to be a movement towards “une confusion 
absolue et renouvelée des langues” 176  (Artaud Œuvres 141). At the same time that the 
superstructure should be shaken up and “confused,” on the personal level there is a need to 
make explicit the non-rational aspects of thinking. Artaud professes to a belief that the flaws 
in thought can be revealed in a productive way. His words, directed in particular towards the 
spiritually confused, testify to “la volonté de mettre au jour les détours d’une chose mal faite, 
une volonté de croyance” 177  (Œuvres 142). That is, from the exposure of such 
discontinuations “s’installe une certaine Foi” 178  (Œuvres 142). Here Artaud attempts a 
resolution: at the same time that the surrealist, in his words, “désespère de s’atteindre 
l’esprit,”179 he is finally “dans l’espirt … et devant sa pensée le monde ne pèse pas lourd”180 
(Œuvres 141).  
 According to Artaud, it is in the intervals between thinking, in the moments of 
reabsorption of the spirit that la bête blanche (“the white beast”) of thought appears. This 
assures the surrealists, for him, of their place in the present. The last excerpt of the text is 
remarkable in expressing this position: 
Au nom de sa liberté intérieure, des exigences de sa paix, de sa perfection, de 
sa pureté, il crache sur toi, monde livré à la desséchante raison, au mimétisme 
                                                            
175 “no surrealist is in the world, nor thinks of himself in the present” 
176 “an absolute and renewed confusion of languages” 
177 “the will to uncover the detours of something done badly; a wish for belief” 
178 “a certain Faith is established” 
179 “becomes desperate to attain the spirit” 
180 “in the spirit … and before his thought the world does not feel heavy” 
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embourbé des siècles, et qui as bâti tes maisons de mots et établi tes 
répertoires de préceptes où il ne se peut plus que le surréel esprit n’explose, le 
seul qui vaille de nos déraciner.181 (Œuvres 142) 
Despising the world for its insipid devotion to rationality, the surrealists retreat and at the 
same time participate in the attempt to change the precepts that guide it. This statement is 
followed by a comment in the text in which Artaud addresses the “marginals of traditional 
thinking.” Marginality here goes hand in hand with the search for modalities of knowledge 
outside the canon, such as Oriental culture, while also aiming at nonconforming forms of 
expression such as coprolalia and aphasia.  
 In this context, it is no accident that mystic elements permeate the language used. The 
character of revelation, for instance, is described in “Lettre as Recteurs des Universités 
Européennes” through movements of the spirit that are “secrets et spontanés, ceux qui ont un 
charactère de révélation, cet air venu d’ailleurs” 182  (Artaud Œuvres 153), as mentioned 
above. A similar theme is at work in “Lettre aux Médecins-Chefs des Asiles de Fous,” in 
which physicians are criticised for considering themselves able to measure a patient’s spirit. 
References to mysteries that lie outside the limits of “une quelconque métaphysique”183 
(Œuvres 153), mysteries ungraspable to these professionals, attest once again to the obscure 
aspects of knowledge identified by Artaud and the surrealists. 
 One particular text of Artaud from this period deserves consideration in this context. 
In Le Pèse-Nerfs, a collection of texts published in August 1925, Artaud presents the 
“cosmology” surrounding his idea of writing, and particularly the suffering coming from the 
impossibility of accomplishing it. One excerpt is notable for its reference to magic: “Et il y a 
un point phosphoreux où toute la réalité se retrouve, mais changée, métamorphosée, — et par 
quoi?? — un point de magique utilisation des choses. Et je crois aux aérolithes mentaux, à 
des cosmogonies individuelles.”184 (Œuvres 162). Artaud seems to be signalling the virtual 
existence of a point at which all real things meet, but do not necessarily coincide, a point that 
                                                            
181 “On behalf of his inner freedom, of the requirements of his peace, of his perfection, of his purity, he spits on 
you, world given over to desiccating reason, to mimicry muddied by centuries, which has built your houses of 
words and set your repertoires of precepts until it is no longer possible for the surreal spirit not to explode, the 
only spirit worthy of uprooting us.” 
182 “secret and spontaneous, those with a character of revelation, with an air from elsewhere” 
183 “a whichever metaphysics” 
184 “And there is a phosphorous point where all reality comes together, but is changed, transformed, — and by 
what ?? — a point of the magic use of things. And I believe in the mental fireballs, the individual cosmogonies.” 
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can be expressed through writing. It is y a very personal cosmogony that can allow the 
conjecture of such an arrangement, whose central element remains to be defined. 
 Artaud refutes, in the same text, the traditional notion of oeuvre as the body of work 
of an author. This denial is related to the impossibility of disposing of one’s spirit in an 
instrumental and conscious sense. If there is not a body of work, the usual notions of 
language and spirit also come under scrutiny. In fact, Artaud states in a famous expression, 
that all there is is “un beau Pèse-Nerfs”185: “une sorte de station incompréhensible et toute 
droite au milieu de tout dans l’esprit”186  (Œuvres 165). As Grossman (Œuvres 65) has 
pointed out, the notion of pèse-nerfs functions as a double reference, both to the words penser 
(“to think”) and peser (“to weigh”). The surrealist Artaud oscillates between the exaltation of 
the profusion of spiritual manifestations and the profound pain of non-fulfilment, due to the 
malformation of thought. In this context, the mysticism that emerges from the exploration of 
the spirit is that of an obscure order of elements and beliefs, at the intersection between 
individual cosmogonies and collective myth. In this sense, in relation to Artaud’s texts form 
the period, the magical aspect of the spirit is at the same time nowhere to be found, and 
entrenched in essential reality. 
 The focus on the notion of spirit, particularly through the attempt at elaborating a 
collective mystique, is in fact a constant in the texts written by Artaud or with his 
collaboration in the first years of surrealism. The spirit appears as a vital element of life, 
closely connected to a notion of “essential reality” that differs from materiality. It is seen to 
be at the core of the eternal, marvellous, detached reality. While divorced from reason, in 
terms of both established forms of logical knowledge and metaphysical aspects of thought, 
this spirit is irreducible either in terms of life or the dimension beyond life. As Artaud states 
in “Fragments d’un Journal d’Enfer” (1926), “à côté de l’esprit il y a la vie, il y a l’être 
humain, dans le cercle duquel cet esprit tourne, relié avec lui par une multitude de fils…”187 
(Œuvres 178). Separated and united, spirit, being and life remain connected. The delimitation 
of a place of “all-thought,” while it nurtures Artaud’s affinities with surrealism, is also a 
factor in their separation. 
 
 
                                                            
185 “a beautiful Pèse-Nerfs” 
186 “a sort of incomprehensible station, right in the middle of everyhting in the spirit” 
187 “beside the spirit there is life, there is the human being, in the circle in which the spirit turns, connected to it 
by a host of threads …” 
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 4.6. À La Grande Nuit 
 In common with most posterior accounts, À La Grande Nuit, published in June 1927, 
casts light on Artaud’s engagement with the prominent issues for surrealism, not to mention 
his texts from the period. That his pursuit remained, up until 1927, that of a revolution of the 
spirit, is no secret. In a letter to Max Morise in April 1925, Artaud clarifies his position 
concerning the polemic of surrealism versus revolution. He states: “la question de Révolution 
était déjà résolue quand je suis arrivé parmi vous. Je n’ai jamais conçu que le Surréalisme pût 
s’occuper de la réalité.” 188  (Œuvres 156). According to Artaud, in the midst of this 
contradiction both the notion of spirit and the condition of revolt remain as guides. In this 
sense, Artaud believes that the fights to be fought concern the confrontation of aspects 
affecting the spirit’s movement along already-known paths: habits, manias and traditional 
lines of thought. A revolution, tout de même: “je ne vois pas, pour ma part, un autre but 
immédiat, un autre sens actif à donner à notre activité que révolutionnaire, mais 
révolutionnaire bien entendu dans le chaos de l’esprit”189 (Œuvres 156-7). 
 Unlike Au Grand Jour — the surrealists’ angry statement of the reasons for Artaud’s 
exclusion, published in May 1927190 —, Artaud’s own explanation is not concerned with 
personal intrigue. It focuses instead on his general vision of surrealism, in particular on what 
sets him apart. Artaud states at the beginning of the text: 
Que le surréalisme s’accorde avec la Révolution ou que la Révolution doive se 
faire en dehors et au-dessus de l’aventure surréaliste, on se demande ce que 
cela peut bien faire au monde quand on pense au peu d’influence que les 
surréalistes sont parvenus à gagner sur les mœurs et les idées de ce temps.191 
(Artaud Œuvres 236) 
Artaud challenges, from the start, the importance given to the disputes around surrealism’s 
integration with communism, at the same time asserting the continuing existence of a 
“surrealist adventure” outside this sphere. This is particularly important in the context of 
Artaud’s claims for the inclusion of aspects exterior to the official frame of surrealism — 
                                                            
188 “the problem of the revolution was already solved when I arrived amongst you. I never conceived that 
surrealism could deal with reality.” 
189 “I do not see, for my part, another immediate aim, another active meaning to give to our activity that is not 
revolutionary, but revolutionary, of course, in the chaos of the spirit” 
190 According to Grossman (Œuvres 172), the rupture between Artaud and the surrealists is effective as early as 
November 1926. Au Grand Jour is signed by Breton, Aragon, Éluard, Peret and Unik. 
191 “That surrealism is consistent with the Revolution or that the Revolution should take place outside of and 
above the surrealist adventure, one wonders what good it can do in the world, considering the little influence 
that the surrealists managed to win over the manners and ideas of this time.” 
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which he designates as being controlled by “Breton et ses adeptes”192 (Œuvres 236) — as a 
response to what he envisions as the ineffectiveness of the group. 
 This kind of differentiation between the practices and conceptions of Artaud and the 
group permeates the whole text and applies to a variety of notions, such as those of âme 
(“soul”) and révolution (“revolution”). Regarding the former, Artaud points to an interesting 
aspect of the accusation made by the surrealists, that of Artaud’s vision coinciding with “ce 
qui est le propre des débiles mentaux, des impuissants et des lâches”193  (Œuvres 235). 
Artaud’s answer is as follows: “comme si un homme qui a éprouvé une fois pour toutes les 
limites de son action, qui refuse de s’engager au-delà de ce qu’il croit en conscience être ses 
limites était moins digne d’intérêt, au point de vue révolutionnaire, que tel braillard 
imaginaire”194 (Œuvres 236f), the last term referring to the surrealist “revolutionaries.” That 
is, while for Artaud a positive notion of soul includes its flaws and debilities — which should 
be consciously considered in terms of one’s actions — for the surrealists this aspect appears 
as a defect that can prevent righteous work.  
 The disputes around the term revolution have similar connotations. For Artaud the 
communist agenda is concerned only with changing “l’armature sociale du monde” 195 
(Œuvres 236), having close to no interest in matters of the spirit, while “je sais demeurer 
éternellement douloureux et misérable au sein de mon propre charnier”196 (Œuvres 237f). 
Artaud’s demand, in relation to surrealism and to the surrealist revolution, is for a 
transformed spirit, one capable of doing justice to its potentialities and rolling back its 
impediments. Communism, in this context, would represent only a superficial change. Artaud 
also proposes a definition of revolution: “que chaque homme ne veuille rien considérer au-
delà de sa sensibilité profonde, de son moi intime, voilà pour moi le point de vue de la 
Révolution intégrale”197 (Œuvres 237f). 
 In relation to this conception, the true scope of surrealism, for Artaud, is “ce décalage 
du centre spirituel du monde, de ce dénivellement des apparences, de cette transfiguration du 
                                                            
192 “Breton and his acolytes” 
193 “that which is proper to the mentally ill, the impotent and cowards” (except taken from Au Grand Jour) 
194 “as if a man who has experienced once and for all the limits of his action, who refuses to commit beyond 
what he consciously believes to be his limits, were less worthy of interest, from the revolutionary perspective, 
than some imaginary bawler” 
195 “the world’s social armature” 
196 “I know to remain eternally in pain and miserable in my own charnel-house” 
197 “that every man should consider nothing beyond his profound sensitivity, his inner self, that for me is the 
perspective of the complete Revolution” 
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possible”198 (Œuvres 238). Assuming a rather mystic connotation, this definition deals with 
different aspects already present in a range of surrealist texts, particularly Artaud’s. However, 
it proposes a world view that is increasingly distant from that of surrealism in the late 
twenties, and ever closer to Artaud’s own. Artaud states that “toute matière commence par un 
dérangement spirituel”199 (Œuvres 238). By classifying matter as secondary to the spirit, he 
seems to want to draw the surrealists’ attention to the fact that their interest in the material 
world — in terms of historical materialism, or what Artaud names “les cadres désespérants de 
la matière”200 (Œuvres 238) — should remain subject to spiritual issues.  
The above-mentioned “transfiguration of the possible” aimed towards the creation of 
a substantial space at the margins of the concrete world. This represents a broad definition of 
spirit as conceived both by early surrealism and by Artaud. Later in the text Artaud clarifies: 
“la métamorphose extérieure est une chose à mon sens qui ne peut être donnée que par 
surcroît”201  (Œuvres 240). That the spirit-matter relationship should take the form of a 
disturbance is not surprising in this context, even less so if one considers Artaud’s convoluted 
understanding of spirit and flesh.  
 What then emerges is an interesting finding. Artaud states: “le surréalisme n’a jamais 
été pour moi qu’une nouvelle sorte de magie”202 (Œuvres 238). This new form of magic also 
has a strict relationship with the unconscious: 
L’imagination, le rêve, toute cette intense libération de l’inconscient qui a 
pour but de faire affleurer à la surface de l’âme ce qu’elle a l’habitude de tenir 
caché doit nécessairement introduire de profondes transformations dans 
l’échelle des apparences, dans la valeur de signification et le symbolisme du 
créé. Le concret tout entier change de vêture, d’écorce, ne s’applique plus aux 
mêmes gestes mentaux. L’au-delà, l’invisible repoussent la réalité. Le monde 
ne tient plus.203 (Œuvres 238) 
                                                            
198 “this shift in the spiritual centre of the world, this unevenness of appearances, this transfiguration of the 
possible” 
199 “all matters begin with a spiritual disturbance” 
200 “the hopeless frames of matter” 
201 “the external metamorphosis is something that, in my opinion, can only take place through an addition” 
202 “surrealism has never been anything other for me than a new form of magic” 
203 “The imagination, the dream, all this intense liberation of the unconscious intend to bring to the surface of 
the soul what it used to keeping hidden, must necessarily introduce profound changes at the level of 
appearances, in the value of significance and symbolism of the created. The whole concrete dimension changes 
its habits, its crust, it no longer applies to the same mental gestures. The dimension of the beyond, of the 
invisible, pushes reality. The world cannot go on.” 
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Here Artaud not only elaborates on the possible powers of surrealism, he also formulates a 
framework for a transformation that takes place when unconscious contents move into the 
material world. According to Artaud, such transformations occur through the action of 
unconscious forces when they reach the surface of the soul, that is when they become 
conscious. Implicitly meant is that the act of bringing content to the edge of reality is or 
should be listed within the activities performed by surrealism.  
 This change is described by Artaud as taking place within the appearance of things. 
The words vêture (“habits”) and écorce (“crust”) are significant for the exterior aspect of the 
transformation, while the spirit, in this case, remains an “interior” dimension. In fact, Artaud 
seems to rely on a definition of reality as essentially immutable, a dimension in which only 
superficial changes can take place. While opposing two points of view on the revolutionary 
subject, Artaud qualifies the world as “le monde étouffant où nous vivons, monde fermé et à 
tout jamais immobile”204 (Œuvres 236f). This is particularly interesting in the context of 
Artaud’s refusal to engage in such changes, or, as he describes, “pour avoir réfusé de 
m’engager au-delà de moi-même”205 (Œuvres 237f). The world of the spirit is, for Artaud, 
the only dimension in which fundamental changes can occur. In relation to it, as mentioned 
above, material mutations are no more than additions.  
 As well as expressing contempt for material changes, this position implies that the 
basis for “exterior” transformation should be properly appreciated. Described as profound 
and having effects in terms of values and symbols, the changes that take place in reality are 
pushed forward by the “invisible.” They are originated in a dimension that lies beyond 
materiality. In these terms, Artaud invalidates the possibility of a transformation that does not 
have in its genesis a change or a force in the spirit. He in fact goes further by stating that 
failure to imagine a revolution outside the frames of materiality culminates in fatalism 
towards reality. The diagnosis of this resignation is presented by Artaud as the reason behind 
the ongoing immobility of surrealism, leading to a pessimism that he and Benjamin thematise 
similarly, the latter only two years later (Benjamin Surrealism 190).  
 It is particularly in relation to this perceived sterility that Artaud’s identification of 
surrealism with magic must be understood. Magic, in this context, provides a milieu in which 
the concrete world is rich in connections with the beyond, that is a setting in which material 
changes are inseparable from spiritual circumstances. Artaud’s idea of magic, in À La Grande 
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Nuit, as in “Excursion Psychique,” includes the unconscious liberation “on the surface of the 
soul” through dreams and imaginative activities. 
 Although powerful and deep, this dimension does not seem to have an end in itself. 
Following its emergence, and the corresponding material changes it provokes, Artaud asserts, 
“on peut commencer à cribler les fantômes, à arrêter les faux semblants”206 (Œuvres 238). As 
a consequence, criteria come into view that allows the sorting of the different manifestations 
of imagination, the range of unconscious expressions. From spirit, through reality and back to 
spirit: this is the course of Artaud’s expected transformation, schematically speaking. In his 
own words: “N’importe quelle action spirituelle si elle est juste se matérialise quand il faut. 
Les conditions intérieurers de l’âme! Mais elles portent avec elles leur vêture de pierre, de 
véritable action.”207 (Œuvres 239f). While spiritual issues necessarily materialise, the interior 
conditions of the soul cannot but assume a concrete, practical form. 
 Surrealism, in this sense, remains in touch with the invisible. As opposed to the 
group’s spirit of désordre (“disorder”) and mesquine chicane (“petty chicanery”), Artaud 
claims that “Pour moi le surréalisme a toujours été une insidieuse extension de l’invisible, 
l’inconscient à portée de la main. Les trésors de l’inconscient invisible devenus palpables, 
conduisant la langue directement, d’un seul jet.”208 (Œuvres 239). These words evoke the 
“psychic automatism” so important in the first years of the movement. In a sense, Artaud has 
remained faithful to the principles of surrealism, in terms of its intention to reveal “le 
fonctionnement réel de la pensée” 209  and “la réalité supérieure de certaines formes de 
associations négligées jusqu’à lui”210 (Breton Manifestes 36). Artaud’s devotion to the spirit 
and to everything related to it is no less strong than his belief in surrealism’s ability to bring 
the unconscious “within a hand’s reach” and, directly or indirectly, to push reality towards 
change. 
 What attitude could be more sympathetic to surrealism than a judgement of the 
achievability of its promises? While detailing what is left of the “surrealist adventure,” 
Artaud claims the following: 
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De la bonne utilisation des rêves pouvait naître une nouvelle manière de 
conduire sa pensée, de se tenir au milieu des apparences. La vérité 
psychologique était dépouillée de toute excroissance parasitaire, inutile, serrée 
de beaucoup plus près. On vivait alors à coup sûr, mais c’est peut-être une loi 
de l’esprit que l’abandon de la réalité ne puisse jamais conduire qu’aux 
fantômes.211 (Artaud Œuvres 239) 
While the first phrase suggests a negative evaluation, the lines that follow describe the early 
days of surrealism in a relatively positive light. However, in a surprising turn, Artaud locates 
a departure from reality in this early period, a departure that he describes as related to the 
emergence of fantômes (“phantoms”).  
Artaud considers the inefficacy of surrealism in attaining the goals it set for itself to 
be a result of its abandonment of the cause of the spirit. What becomes clear here is that this 
assumption is valid not only with regard to surrealism’s alignment to communism, but also to 
its early disbelief in both the capacity of the spirit and its competency to provoke changes. 
Here Artaud is possibly identifying the later surrealists with fantômes, a word he seems to use 
in a negative sense in this text. Another possibility, however, is that he is pointing to the fact 
that illusory elements, i.e. the material changes, have assumed the foreground of the 
movement. 
 In more detail, for Artaud the surrealists’ claim that an alignment with communism is 
a logical development of the movement’s principles — the argument presented in the second 
manifesto and connected to Artaud’s expulsion — is a fallacy. Firstly because “l’intérieur du 
surréalisme le conduit jusqu’à la Révolution”212 (Œuvres 239), that is, the association with 
communism adds nothing to the efficacy of the movement. Secondly, because all logical 
preoccupations that are not related to the reality of one’s own being are, for Artaud, exterior 
to the internal development of a cause. On this concern Artaud asserts his refusal to submit to 
any discipline or superior morality, and considers the recent change of guidelines in the 
movement a deviation, and not a logical development, from its original principles. 
 Artaud’s conclusion is no less surprising. After having analysed his own scruples in 
relation to real action, he arrives at the judgement that he and the surrealists share the same 
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reservations on this concern. Namely, a certain pessimism towards social change, even 
though it is a pessimism that carries a grain of lucidity, and the belief in an unconscious 
spontaneity “qui pousse malgré tout à l’action”213 (Œuvres 240). According to Artaud, the 
surrealists are resolved in favour of action, at the same time that they declare themselves 
incapable of it. Artaud closes the article eloquently with the following lines: “Et moi en ce 
qui me concerne ai-je jamais dit autre chose? Avec en ma faveur tout de même des 
circonstances psychologiques et physiologiques désespérément anormales et dont, eux, ne 
sauraient se prévaloir.”214 (Œuvres 240-1). 
 Through the outlining of these deeply-rooted differences but also striking similarities, 
Artaud presents an image of surrealism that expresses both his admiration of and 
disillusionment towards the movement. Even more important is the emergence of a vision 
that, through surrealism, developed within Artaud’s own worldview, a vision full of obscure 
tones but also luminous in terms of the positions it takes. That surrealism was for Artaud a 
new form of magic is discernible in his engagement with the spiritual verve of it, one that he, 
of all the surrealists, possibly explored the most. His particular perspective on it would 
become a collective assumption, as he himself points to in a letter to Joseph Barsalou. It 
concerns the group’s incorporation of the notion of impuissance (“powerlessness”) as an 
article of faith (Artaud Œuvres 243). 
 The definition of surrealism as magic is also subject to Artaud’s understanding of the 
real problem posed to the movement as being that of life and death. He re-affirms this 
proximity in a brochure published in August 1927, “Point Final”: “il ne faudrait pas beaucoup 
appuyer sur certaines tendances intimes du surréalisme saisissable pour le faire verser dans 
l’occultisme, voire dans une sorte très particulière de magie”215 (Œuvres 241). However, the 
question of life and death is also a concrete one. Artaud testifies, in the same document, to the 
state in which he discovered surrealism — “la vie avait parfaitement réussi à me lasser”216 
(Œuvres 241) —, as well as to the movement’s assurance of sense amidst disconnectedness, 
like that offered by many forms of magic. According to Artaud, surrealism made him believe 
in the fragments offered by his thought, and to stop looking for its impossible continuity. That 
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is, “je me réapprenais à croire de nouveau en ma pensée”217 (Œuvres 241). Artaud then asks 
himself: What could be more revolutionary than a change such as this? And how much more 
could this movement have accomplished if it had continued to follow the powerful thread 
evident in these concerns? 
 Another question seems to remain open in Artaud’s account. It touches upon the 
importance of a notion of spirit, and consequently of a “magic” worldview, to his rupture 
with the surrealists. If, on the one hand, the change in focus from a revolution of the spirit to 
a revolution in the material world — even if, as discussed above, such terms are not in 
complete opposition — is the point on which both Artaud and the surrealists claim to diverge, 
on the other hand, the similarities to be found in their attitudes, precisely in relation to 
revolution and visible through Artaud’s account, seem to point in another direction. This 
might suggest a motive that lies outside notional arguments, perhaps in more personal 
concerns. Both motives, however, point to a dispute around the possibilities of transformation 
of the human spirit and the material world. This dispute occupies Artaud, the surrealists and 
also Benjamin. 
 
 4.7. A Gothic Marxism 
Benjamin devotes an enthusiastic essay to surrealism in 1929, the same year in which 
the second manifesto appears. It is known that the German author had been following the 
movement with interest in the twenties, and most particularly during his stays in Paris, in the 
summers of 1926 and 1927 (Löwy Radical 17). Little information survives, however, on 
actual contact between Benjamin and the surrealists. According to Scholem, Benjamin and 
Breton exchanged letters for a period, but these have never been retrieved (Scholem qtd. in 
Löwy Radical 17). The few remnants of this contact concern the period following Benjamin’s 
emigration to France, in 1933. Pierre Klossowski gives a short account of Benjamin’s 
attendance at the meetings of Contre-Attaque, the ephemeral fusion of groups surrounding 
Breton and Georges Bataille in 1935. His presence is evoked by Klossowski as that of a 
character showing consternation and curiosity towards the group’s activity (Klossowski 
85).218  
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With only these few anecdotes, Benjamin’s relationship with the French movement is 
better known in terms of his essay “Surrealism: The Latest Snapshot of the European 
Intelligentsia,” which was first published as three sections in Die Literarische Welt (“The 
Literary World”). By the time of its publication, surrealism already enjoyed great influence 
inside and outside avant-garde circles. Many saw the original surrealist spirit as fading away, 
however, following the expulsion of not few of its original members, and through the group’s 
courting of political revolutionaries who ultimately could not see surrealism and communism 
converging. 
 Benjamin seems to have found in surrealism a practical version of many of his beliefs. 
According to Scholem, surrealism “embodied much of what had erupted in him during the 
years just past” (Friendship 163). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this encounter 
concerns the convergence of interests in language, psychoanalysis, mysticism and historical 
materialism. Scholem goes on to say that, for Benjamin, “surrealism was something like the 
first bridge to a more positive assessment of psychoanalysis” (Friendship 163). Even if 
Benjamin does not subscribe to all surrealist attitudes and practices, his fascination with the 
movement lasted and gave birth to what is considered by many to be as his masterpiece, the 
Passagenwerk (“Arcades Project”).  
Benjamin opens the essay on surrealism by pointing to his privileged position as 
detached observer, from which he can assess the movement’s strength. He characterises 
himself as a German observer familiarised, as he puts it, with the crisis of the humanistic 
concept of freedom. In detail, the metaphor is that of the German critic locating his power 
station beside the stream of surrealism. While he attests that this stream might be meagre in 
its origin, it gains momentum with the “difference in intellectual level between France and 
Germany” (Benjamin Surrealism 177). Here could perhaps be added to the elements 
increasing the stream, the almost idealised view of France amongst some of the German 
intelligentsia, a feeling survived from the ideals of the French Revolution. Benjamin also 
points to the familiarity of the German critic — who with every sentence acquires more of 
Benjamin’s personal features — with the frantic determination “that has awakened in the 
movement to go beyond the stage of eternal discussion and, at any price, to reach a decision” 
(Surrealism 177). This feverish mood can be perceived, as discussed above, as early as 1927, 
at the time of the disputes around the notion of revolution. 
 Though Benjamin does not mention Artaud in his text, some elements of the essay 
touch on key elements of the movement in which the latter’s contribution was important. This 
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is the case with what Benjamin calls the issue of the “poetic life,” that is, surrealism’s rupture 
with the praxis that “presents the public with the literary precipitate of a certain form of 
existence while withholding that existence itself” (Surrealism 178). Nowhere is the 
proposition of the inseparability between the spirit and its creations, between the engendering 
of both existence and the work of art, stronger than in Artaud’s text. Benjamin’s own 
heterodox engagement with marxism at that time must be counted amongst the possible 
reasons for his lack of interest in what, in the broader movement, did not echo his view. To 
follow the same line of argument, while referring to the “dialectic kernel” that later evolved 
in surrealism, Benjamin qualifies the period around 1924, that of Artaud’s integration into the 
movement, as “a time when its development could not yet be foreseen” (Surrealism 178).  
 Benjamin further characterises this initial moment as focused on the precedence of 
language over meaning and the self. In his words, language has precedence over meaning 
since, in surrealism, “image and sound interpenetrated with automatic precision” (Surrealism 
178-9). As for the self, the reason lies in the fact that “dream loosens individuality like a bad 
tooth” (Surrealism 179). This vision of surrealism has echoes in at least two moments in 
Benjamin’s own work. In the first, which has already been approached here — concerning 
“On Language as Such and on the Language of Men” — Benjamin criticises the 
instrumentalisation of language and situates it as a spiritual medium of being. The second 
moment concerns the sparse but insistent references to dreams and the important threshold 
between sleeping and awakening, particularly in “One-Way Street,” written between 1924 
and 1928. Even while Benjamin defines this early “heroic period” of surrealism as thankfully 
past, he outlines similarities between the movement’s worldview and his own. 
 The theme of the loosening of the self is priviledged by Benjamin in the essay. It is 
further approached through what he calls Rausch (“intoxication”). This word had equally 
appeared in “One-Way Street,” fragment “To the Planetarium,” in the context of the magical 
relationship between ancient men and the cosmos, a relationship that disappeared in modern 
society (Benjamin One-Way 92-4). For Benjamin that relationship was rediscovered, albeit in 
a new form, in surrealism. What he defines as intoxication is strictly related to the surrealistic 
experience, as opposed to a vision of the movement as a form of literature. This intoxication 
brings about a form of illumination, which differs radically from both religious and drug-
related ecstasies. Benjamin proposes that surrealism enacts “a profane illumination 
[Erleuchtnug], a materialistic, anthropological inspiration” (Surrealism 179). “Profane” can 
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here be understood in at least two senses: as secular, non-religious; and as coming before 
religion and the sacred, as the Latin terms pro- ‘before’ and -fanun ‘temple’ indicate.  
 The examples of profane illumination brought up by Benjamin point to this double 
meaning. He speaks of love, revolt, objects and the surrealist “experiments with words” as 
the bearers of profane illuminations. In all cases, it is a “fruitful, living experience” that 
departs from the present, while retaining a secret bond with the historical facet of things. In 
outmoded objects, for instance, this is evident in their short lives, that is, in the future 
abolition that their past and present already contain. In this context, Benjamin mentions 
Aragon’s book Paysan de Paris (1926), which deals with the recent and paradoxically 
obsolete Passage de l’Opéra, which was about to be destroyed by the progressive projects of 
Haussmann. In another surrealist book, Breton’s Nadja (1928), Benjamin identifies further 
motifs of profane illumination. 
Nadja describes the unusual encounter of Breton with a mysterious female figure, 
their perambulations through Paris and the throwing open of their affections. Its nature as one 
exemplar of the books “qu’on laisse battants comme des portes” 219  (Breton Nadja 18) 
represents, in Benjamin’s view, an interesting counterpoint to the development of the cult of 
the interior by the petit bourgeois. The clarity with which Breton presents the facts 
experienced by him and Nadja, as well as the frank display of his feelings towards her, are to 
be praised as revolutionary virtues. This explicitness, according to Benjamin, “is also an 
intoxication, a moral exhibition, that we badly needed” (Surrealism 180). The next lines 
focus on surrealism’s access to spiritualism, i.e. the frequenting of clairvoyants and the 
interest in foreseeing the future, explored in some episodes in Nadja.  
  Having stated his displeasure in acknowledging such activities, Benjamin’s tone is 
almost paternalistic: “Who would not wish to see these adoptive children of revolution most 
rigorously severed from all the goings-on in the conventicles of down-at-heel dowagers, 
retired majors, and émigré profiteers?” (Surrealism 180). Here the German critic clearly no 
longer sees himself on a level below the French intelligentsia. One reason can be found in 
Benjamin’s assumption that these “mystical” interests assume a superficial, spiritualistic 
form. As pointed out by Löwy (Radical 22), the image of the “fortune-teller,” amongst other 
figures in Nadja, is presented as having more of a profane nature than a spiritual one. 
Benjamin’s mention of émigrés in this context also draws attention. Its condescending tone 
betrays Benjamin’s origins as part of a social elite, which, as much he made efforts to reframe 
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them, often surfaced. If he himself was not an émigré at this point, it is not only because his 
exile in Paris started in 1933, but also due to the classist connotation of this word. 
 If Benjamin expects no illumination from mediumship, however, he certainly shares 
the surrealist view on love. In fact, he envisions it as a distinguishing element of the 
movement, one that he relates, without hesitation, to the mystical conception of love of 
medieval authors, above all Dante. Nadja is, on this regard, just like Beatrice, the portent of a 
new life in Vita Nuova. Through both the loosening of individuality and the experiencing of 
an ecstatic transmutation, love more closely resembles an illumination than a source of sexual 
pleasure. However, as in other forms of “esoteric love,” the great power of such an encounter 
lies not in the beloved herself, but in the world surrounding her. For Benjamin, Breton “is 
closer to the things that Nadja is close to than to her” (Surrealism 181).  
 In this context, the importance of objects in surrealism is an element in which 
Benjamin finds another correspondent to one of his most cherished insights into modern life. 
Namely, that objects are part of a “topographical consciousness” that develops independently 
from people, a Dinglichkeit (“thingness”) that roams the cities in particular. The merit of 
Breton — and Aragon, it could be added — is that of having perceived the revolutionary 
energies “that appear in the ‘outmoded,’ in the first iron constructions, the first factory 
buildings, the earliest photos, the objects that have begun to be extinct” (Benjamin 
Surrealism 181). For Benjamin, it is as if the material destitution of modern life — not only 
in terms of objective material poverty, but also in relation to the fetishisation of objects, a 
theme similar to the decay of language into instrumentalisation — mirrors the social 
destitution, a hypothesis to be expanded later in this text.  
 Benjamin then describes the “trick,” not easily graspable, through which modern 
experience is converted into revolutionary experience by surrealism. “The trick by which this 
world of things is mastered — it is more proper to speak of a trick than a method — consists 
in the substitution of a political for a historical view of the past.” (Surrealism 182). Is 
Benjamin referring to the assessment of the objects’ recent past of novelty and imminent 
future of insignificance? Or is he referring to a remote past, in the sense of another time? 
What would be the “political view of the past” in question? Benjamin does not answer these 
questions. His statement is followed by a long quotation from Apollinaire, in which the latter 
calls up the dead from castles, palaces and monasteries to return to earth and mingle with “all 
the people who today are still proud of their privileges” (Apollinaire qtd. in Benjamin 
Surrealism 182). An important element of this decadent meeting is the dead being invited to 
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feel at home in contemporary automobiles and sleeping carriages. Apollinaire’s account is 
certainly ironic, signalling, on the one hand, the inner absurdity of admitting the life of the 
privileged as the portent of an era, and, on the other hand, the ongoing isolation of the 
privileged classes and their correlated objects in relation to the rest of the population, which 
“will give them short shrift” (Apollinaire qtd. in Benjamin Surrealism 182).  
 According to Benjamin, Apollinaire is who originated this technique, that is he 
substituted a political for a historical view of the past. Benjamin seems to be pointing to the 
revolutionary character of this unusual encounter between past and present, as a result of 
which both are somehow reframed. In this sense, Apollinaire’s words become, in Benjamin’s 
voice, a criticism of the bourgeoisie and its way of living. The confrontation with a 
“historical view of the past” seems to reveal the intrinsic ideology of progress espoused by 
the elite at different historical moments. The “trick” performed by the surrealists could 
perhaps be expressed in a simpler form: objects are the portent of the ruin of modern life. 
Löwy, using an equally enigmatic formula, states that this trick meant “seeing a very ‘object’ 
in terms of its future — imminent — revolutionary abolition” (Radical 20). That is, on the 
one hand, the perspective of the extinction of everything bourgeois during and after the 
communist revolution, and, on the other hand, the view of disappearing objects as the signs 
of the imminent revolution. In dialectic terms, it could be expressed thus: modernity, and with 
it capitalist society, produces the signs of its own transience and destruction even while it 
reproduces itself indefinitely. The objects, for Benjamin, are the touchstones of this process. 
 The city of Paris seems to represent, for Benjamin, the ultimate surrealist object. In an 
interesting association, he suggests that one must overrun the city’s inner strongholds “in 
order to master their fate and, in their fate, in the fate or their masses, one’s own” (Surrealism 
183). That is, through the inhabitation of city landscapes one can access the masses 
“contained” within them. Landscapes are here conceived as mirrors that retain part of what 
they reflect, in this case, urban citizens. The figure of Nadja, for Benjamin, is another 
exponent of these masses, and in this she is commanded by her “living unconsciousness.” 
The masses are here the undetermined, unorganised human element of the city, one to which 
both the surrealists and Benjamin desire access. One could not say, up to this point, that their 
interest takes the form of an immediate intention to organise the revolution. But if access to 
the masses’ fate assures an entrance to one’s own, the topography of a city is the all more 
important. In this vein, Benjamin praises the use of photographs in Nadja: “all the parts of 
Paris that appear here are places where what is between these people turns like a revolving 
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door” (Surrealism 183). The visibility of this space “in-between” gives way to the emergence 
of social activity, hopefully, for Benjamin, in the form of revolution. 
 Perhaps in a gesture that intends to clear the way for the latter, Benjamin attempts to 
dismiss misunderstandings around the term l’art pour l’art in relation to the avant-garde 
movements. He situates the literature of the avant-garde, as mentioned above, as “magical 
experiments with words, not as artistic dabbling” (Surrealism 184). While exploring language 
from within, the avant-garde relies on the magical aspect of language, with its revolutionary 
implications. In this context, although Benjamin makes no distinction between futurism, 
dadaism and surrealism, he seems to be referring to the last two in particular.220 One might 
ask what is the precise nature of the notion of magic implied in this definition. If Benjamin is 
not interested in any form of spiritualism, just as the surrealists are not interested in 
institutional forms of belief, the magic suggested here resembles the reminiscent presence of 
enchanting powers. Just as Freud describes them in relation to discourse in psychoanalysis — 
evoked by the early Benjamin in terms of the expression of essences — magic reminiscences 
seem to be key to Benjamin’s conception of profane illuminations. 
 Finally, Benjamin relaunches the questions that so fiercely occupied Artaud and the 
surrealists in the years before 1929: “Where are the conditions for revolution? In the 
changing of attitudes or of external circumstances? That is the cardinal question that 
determines the relation of politics to morality and cannot be glossed over” (Surrealism 190-
1). According to Benjamin, these questions have remained relatively open within the 
framework of surrealism. His own view is that the “communist answer,” to which the 
surrealists are very close, means absolute pessimism: “mistrust in the fate of literature, 
mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of European humanity” (Surrealism 191), 
not to mention a lack of hope in any form of reconciliation between the classes. This 
pessimism, as opposed to the dilettantish optimism of the bourgeois parties, even those on the 
left, is not a contemplative one. As Löwy puts it, it is an active attitude “totally dedicated to 
preventing, by all means possible, the advent of the worst” (Radical 20). For Benjamin, this 
is the direction that surrealism should take, that is, a full alliance with communism, and the 
embracing of pessimism. 
 The form proposed by Benjamin, however, is that of an “organised pessimism,” an 
expression that he borrows from Pierre Naville’s La Révolution et les Intellectuels (1926). 
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Benjamin praises this as an “excellent essay,” subscribing to its evaluation of the movement. 
In it, Naville, who was part of the foundation of surrealism and left it to pursue a full 
commitment to communism, calls upon the surrealists to follow his example. He identifies in 
the movement a positive pessimism towards the promises of progress of bourgeois society, 
but criticises in them “a negative and anarchist attitude” (Naville qtd. in Löwy Radical 20). 
To organise pessimism means, therefore, to abandon an anarchist attitude towards 
organisation in favour of communism. Benjamin, however, describes it in his own terms as 
the following task: “to expel moral metaphor from politics and to discover in political action 
a sphere reserved one hundred percent for images” (Surrealism 191). Before entering this 
sphere of images, it is instructive to take a glimpse at Benjamin’s position on communism. 
 As far as the essay on surrealism is concerned, Benjamin’s political stance is at first 
ambiguous. His article evokes an unusual lineage of “great anarchists” such as Dostoyevsky, 
Rimbaud and Lautréamont, as the antecedents of surrealism.221 Mikhail Bakunin, one of the 
most prominent figures of anarchism, is evoked in terms of offering a notion of freedom that 
only the surrealists were able to replace. Benjamin’s main critique of surrealism, however, is 
its hesitant alliance with communism, which, for him, should become absolute. In other 
words, surrealism should mobilise the energies of intoxication towards methodical 
preparation for the revolution (Surrealism 189).  
One possibility, therefore, is that suggested by Löwy (Radical 18): Benjamin is above 
all a proponent of a libertarian current that takes inspiration from both anarchist and 
communist sensibilities. However, the constant resort of Benjamin to marxist theory after 
1923 leads to the lasting formation of the assumptions that underlie his most important 
insights. While his constant attempts at producing new ideas and insights from this theory 
lead to anything but orthodox marxism, Benjamin remained faithful to the most important 
insights of historical materialism. The fact that he never joined the communist movement 
should not obscure this theoretical commitment, which took the form of a constant and 
creative rereading of Marx and Engels. 
 In this sense, Benjamin and the surrealists seem to have shared a singular approach to 
marxism. According to Löwy, this marxism did not exclude a “fascination with enchantment 
and the marvellous, as well as with the spellbound aspects of pre-modern cultures and 
societies” (Radical 18). Löwy names this trend “Gothic Marxism,” inspired by Margaret 
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Cohen’s book Profane Illumination, even while he reproaches her use of “gothic” as meaning 
an interest in the irrational aspects of society (Cohen 1-5).222 In any case, what Benjamin 
identifies in surrealism is “a radical concept of freedom” (Surrealism 189), related to 
mankind’s struggle for liberation in both the subjective and social aspects of life. To this aim, 
the surrealists propose their attempted conjunction of psychological and material 
transformation or, according to Starobinski, “un monisme à la fois magique et matérialiste”223 
(385). 
 The question here revolves around the success of surrealism in “welding this 
experience of freedom to the other revolutionary experience” (Benjamin Surrealism 189), 
that is the communist one. The particular task of the movement, according to Benjamin, is 
precisely the mobilisation of energies from the experience of freedom to be found in 
intoxication, towards “the methodical and disciplinary preparation for the revolution” 
(Surrealism 189). That is, if intoxication was to be considered an end in itself, limited to the 
enjoyment of its ecstatic component, this would be an undialectical experience, with no 
revolutionary consequences.  
At this point, Benjamin clarifies his vision of the ideal form that an exploration of 
intoxication should take: 
For histrionic or fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious takes 
us no further; we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize in 
it the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the 
everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday. (Surrealism 189-90) 
The mystery thus serves as a function that, through a “dialectical optic,” allows for a view of 
quotidian life in its impenetrability, in its occult facet. This dialectic is indeed close to the 
surrealist view of the occult as not part of another world, but instead experienced through the 
everyday in the form of coincidences, found objects, and not least the mystification of 
technical development. 
 Surrealist thinking transitioned, according to Benjamin, from a “highly contemplative 
attitude into revolutionary opposition” (Surrealism 185). In the organisation of pessimism, as 
suggested above, the moral metaphor is expelled from politics, leaving the space open for 
images. Just as in poetry, image and metaphor tend to collide. Without the metaphor, the 
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sphere of images is disposable, but it should not be approached through contemplation. 
According to Benjamin, for the revolutionary intelligentsia, leaving the position of 
contemplation implies, on the one hand, interrupting the artistic career, and on the other hand, 
making contact with the proletarian masses. Here again is the “organised pessimism.” The 
latter of these elements, however, can only be accomplished through an engagement with the 
sphere of imagery. The best expression of this attempt so far, according to Benjamin, is the 
joke: “for in the joke, too, in invective, in misunderstanding, in all cases where an action puts 
forth its own image and exists, absorbing and consuming it, where nearness looks with its 
own eyes, the long-sought image sphere is opened” (Surrealism 191-2). In this sphere, 
“political materialism and physical nature share the inner man, the psyche, the individual … 
with dialectical justice” (Surrealism 192). 
 Here Benjamin seems to be dealing, once again, with several issues at the same time. 
The passage from a contemplative to a revolutionary approach is re-enacted through a further 
passage, that from the metaphysical to anthropological materialism. This passage, according 
to Benjamin, cannot take place without a rupture. In other words, it leaves a residue: the 
body, whether individual or collective one. The organisation of this body, according to 
Benjamin, can only take place in the sphere of the image. This is why profane illumination is 
so important: it introduces imagery into the revolutionary process. Benjamin says: “only 
when in technology body and image so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension becomes 
bodily collective innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the collective become 
revolutionary discharge” (Surrealism 192). To understand this claim, an excerpt from another 
text of Benjamin’s is helpful, although belonging to a later phase: “Mass reproduction is 
aided specially by the reproduction of masses. In big parades and monster rallies, in sports 
events, and in war, all of which nowadays are captured by camera and sound recording, the 
masses are brought face to face with themselves.” (Benjamin Work of Art 251). 
 This seems to argue that it is only when the collective body, i.e. the masses, is able to 
perceive itself by means of an image, that it acquires consciousness of its own existence as a 
mass, and can organise itself and be organised. Benjamin is here describing the fascist 
manipulation of the masses through the technology of reproduction. The surrealists had 
opened the way for a revolutionary entrance into this sphere of imagery, one that could 
mobilise the mysterious and impenetrable aspects of everyday life, as well as the intoxicating 
energies of love and language, towards a material and psychological revolution. In this sense, 
according to Benjamin, they were the only ones to have understood the “present commands” 
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of Marx’s and Engel’s communist manifesto. Needless to say, the establishment of 
transcended reality that Benjamin envisioned as a consequence of the revolutionary discharge 
of such a collective body did not take place. Many paths of access to the energies of revolt 
have remained open, however. So has the quest for the conditions for revolution. 
 
 4.8. Magic and Pessimism 
 Artaud and Benjamin’s texts on surrealism propose an interesting relationship 
between the notions of revolt and revolution, on the one side, and magic or the mystic 
dimension of experience, on the other. In Benjamin’s approach, this subject takes the form of 
an analysis of the means through which surrealism is able to mobilise the energies of magic 
towards revolution. For Artaud it is the quest for a revolution of the spirit, and the issue of 
surrealism as a form of mystique or magic. This section intends to explore this relationship as 
it appears in Benjamin’s and Artaud’s texts, proposing a juxtaposition of their views. 
Underscoring this thematisation is the pessimism that both authors identify in a materialistic 
understanding of the world, which assumes a particular form in surrealism. They each 
illuminate different aspects of the issue, without however providing a final resolution. The 
“remedies” presented by Benjamin and Artaud to the pessimism they identify are somehow 
analogous, even if they assume different complexions. For both, to advance towards 
revolution requires an engagement with the magic and mystic aspects of life.  
 On this concern, Naville is one possible connecting thread between Artaud and 
Benjamin. Admired by Benjamin and an admirer of Artaud, Naville, in the 1975 re-edition of 
the above-mentioned book La Révolution et les Intellectuels, not only argues, like Benjamin, 
for the need to organise pessimism, but also traces the revolutionary forces of surrealism back 
to Artaud. His account of the debates in the surrealist group around 1925 forms part of the 
introduction written for the book’s republication. Referring to the first months of 1925, 
Naville states: “c’est Antonin Artaud qui nous avait entraînés, ce qui peut surprendre, sur la 
voie d’un révolte d’un nouveau genre”224 (14). Artaud was entertaining a vague sense of 
dissatisfaction in relation to the group’s activities, at the time focused on language. 
Distrustful of his own poetic attempts, and uneasy with the productions of automatic writing, 
Artaud proposed a focus on existence, on what could be found “en deçà des mots”225 (Naville 
14). 
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 This lead to the establishment of a new constellation of interests and, above all, to the 
designation of a group of adversaries. Naville is unambiguous on the role of Artaud in the 
third issue of La Révolution Surréaliste:  
A vrai dire, ce fut beaucoup plus qu’une collaboration. En peu de semaines, 
nous convînmes tous qu’Artaud apportait beaucoup de ce qui manquait assez 
gravement aux ouvertures du Manifeste du Surréalisme que Breton venait 
d’écrire et de publier: l’attaque furieuse des intuitions où la société cristallise 
ses contraintes maudites.226 (Naville 15) 
Naville proposes that Artaud caused a shift in the group’s interests, a shift towards concrete 
issues. The surprise evoked by him must be related to the subsequent development of 
Artaud’s relationship with surrealism, and, above all, to the general understanding that the 
reason behind the rupture lies in Artaud’s disinterest in concrete matters. 
 The important aspect concerning these intrigues is the acknowledgement of the role of 
Artaud in expanding the preoccupations of surrealism well beyond “l’agitation inconsciente 
ou médiumnique”227 (Naville 19). In other words, “Artaud nous sommait d’attaquer, et pas 
seulement de prospecter, et d’engager une lutte avant de récolter quoi que ce soit”228 (Naville 
19). This narrative helps to reframe not only these disputes, but also the commitment of 
Artaud to the theme of revolt and revolution. If he was responsible for the introduction of 
political perspectives that engaged the movement in “chercher dans la révolution un objectif 
défini ailleurs que dans les livres” 229  (Naville 19), Artaud’s own commitment to the 
“concrete” aspects of the revolution must be evaluated in terms of what has been defined 
before, in this work, as an engagement with issues of the spirit. 
  As previously discussed, Artaud’s notion of spirit does not exclude the material 
dimension of experience. If the exhortations made in his surrealist texts focus on a total 
liberation of the spirit, together with the consideration of all spiritual states as equally 
valuable, this must be framed in the context of an attack on the limiting rationality in vogue 
at the time, a rationality that was especially undermined by the discoveries of Freud. For 
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Artaud it was important in particular to uncover the detours of thought, the discontinuations 
that usually occupied a marginal place in the understanding of the mind. From this 
uncovering, he believed, valuable and new knowledge about the spirit could emerge, which 
might reveal aspects of its secret movements.  
 This spirit, it should be remembered, cannot be contained in physical substance, nor 
in the mind. For Artaud as well as for the surrealists, it is neither material nor transcendental. 
Particularly in À La Grande Nuit, the interpenetration of spiritual and material issues is 
expressed in terms of a continuity: the spirit necessarily materialises righteous ideas, while 
these materialisations open the way for the consideration of spiritual issues. What Artaud 
explicitly refuses is the limitation of the idea of revolution to what he calls “les cadres 
désespérants de la matière”230 (Œuvres 238). In this regard, his approach is much closer than 
it may at first seem to that of Breton, who, in “Légitime Défense” (1926), refuses to separate 
“internal reality” from the “material world.” 231  If the Breton’s position was to change 
considerably in later years, it never really took the form proposed by Naville, that of a 
complete abandonment of idealism in favour of materialism. 
 In this context, Artaud’s criticism of surrealist pessimism, expressed in terms of the 
group’s failure to imagine a revolution outside the frames of materiality, does not seem to 
contradict surrealist conceptions. Artaud’s belief is that only the spirit, in this case “the 
invisible,” can be the propellant of revolution. The surrealists abandon the primacy of the 
spiritual in relation to the material world, but do not necessarily adopt the latter as pre-
eminent. The issue seems to be more one of emphasis than of distinct worldviews. Even so, 
however, the irreducibility of both positions does not allow for an abstract resolution. 
Benjamin’s approach to the surrealist conception of materialism can be illuminating in this 
regard. 
 Benjamin identifies in surrealism a sensibility to the magical aspects of everyday life 
that could be mobilised towards revolution. He identifies the fact that the surrealists opened 
the way for a revolutionary use of the sphere of imagery — through the approach of the 
experience of intoxication — that is indispensable for the mobilisation and organisation of 
the masses. The materialism that Benjamin perceives in surrealism is, therefore, permeated 
with non-materialistic elements. The profane illumination is “a materialistic, anthropological 
inspiration” (Surrealism 179) that captures the “magic” energies of material reality. The 
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“propeller” of revolution is also the “spiritual” aspect of things, but only in the sense that it is 
perceived as encapsulated in the material world, and inseparable from it.  
 For Artaud these two dimensions are also inseparable, although, in common with the 
surrealists, he occasionally envisages detachment from the carnal world in a positive sense. 
What seems to have taken place is a shift in perspective. While the surrealists, in Benjamin’s 
vision, approach the spiritual world from the standpoint of material reality, for Artaud the 
material dimension is secondary to the spirit. Artaud’s explanation for the inefficacy of 
surrealism in attaining the goals it has set for itself, as mentioned above, is its abandonment 
of the cause of the spirit. Historically, surrealism had indeed abandoned l’esprit as the 
movement’s most important cause. The question remains of whether surrealism has ever been 
other than an attempt at monism, at times setting its store by the spirit, at times by the 
material. Artaud certainly shared this attempt, but with a more definitive focus, one that did 
not exclude the concretisation of spiritual inspirations in the form of actions and concrete 
attacks, as La Révolution Surréaliste attests. The concept of revolution, that is, the form to be 
taken by the state of revolt and fureur, seems to have alienated Artaud and the surrealists 
significantly more than did any materialistic or monist world view. 
 Another issue of interest regarding surrealism and spiritual matters is highlighted by 
Artaud in À La Grande Nuit. He says: “le surréalisme n’a jamais été pour moi qu’une 
nouvelle sorte de magie”232 (Œuvres 238). This statement resumes the topic of surrealism as a 
new form of mysticism, which had been introduced in the group’s documents from 1925. 
Artaud’s assertion is also a challenge to the surrealist embracing of materialism, which he 
perceives as a recrudescence contrary to his view of surrealism as “une insidieuse extension 
de l’invisible, l’inconscient à portée de la main”233 (Œuvres 239f). Here Artaud presents a 
polarised opposition in order to suggest that the new worldview of surrealism is devoid of the 
mysticism it once sought for itself, that of an obscure and powerful order of beliefs. While the 
surrealist submission to a materialist perspective develops, for Artaud, into an arid and static 
conception of reality, his own vision of the movement as a new form of magic provides a 
notion of reality embedded in the invisible, unconscious, spiritual aspects of life.  
 It is clear that Artaud does not envision surrealism as intrinsically magic, as the 
expression “a new form of magic” denotes. Similarly, in 1925 it was a matter of creating a 
“new form of mysticism.” In line with the hypothesis of traces presented above, Artaud and 
                                                            
232 “surrealism has never been anything other for me than a new form of magic” 
233 “an insidious extension of the unseen, the unconscious within arm’s reach” 
Hartmann 170 
the surrealists possibly consider magic as a remnant of a different social configuration, in 
relation to which “a new form of magic” can be established, rather than magic itself. 
Historically speaking, their sensibility opposes the precepts of the enlightenment, while being 
particularly attuned to themes popular during the Middle Ages and early modernity, as 
Breton’s references to love, to give one example, suggest. The form of magic they sought to 
create had to be independent from other existing forms, most probably considered to be 
decayed and spiritualistic, as Starobinski suggests in a statement that is worth reproducing 
here: “de l’héritage spirite, le surréalisme ne collectionne que les images”234 (401). That 
surrealism should form a nexus with the rich store of images it accesses through its contact 
with spiritual energies, is a claim very similar to that of Benjamin. As a new form of magic, it 
is through images that surrealism mobilises not only the spiritual energies, but also, 
potentially, the masses. 
 Despite the surrealist references to the Middle Ages, for Artaud, the ultimate status of 
magic must remain open. For Benjamin, as mentioned above, the intoxication to be found in 
surrealism is a re-enactment of the magical relationship between ancient man and the cosmos, 
a relationship that has disappeared in modern society. In “One-Way Street,” the intoxication 
or Rausch that characterised the “cosmic experience” of ancient man is described thus: “it is 
in this experience alone that we gain certain knowledge of what is nearest to us and what is 
remote to us, and never of one without the other” (Benjamin One-way 93). Here a phrase 
from Lukács on the epic civilisation is apt: “Everything in such ages is new and yet familiar, 
full of adventures and yet their own. The world is wide and yet it is like a home.” (Novel 29). 
In this order of things, the cosmos intersects with everyday experience. Benjamin identifies 
the decay of this form in “the flowering of astronomy at the beginning of the modern age” 
(One-way 92), making the link, in this instance, with the discoveries of Renaissance science.  
 The intoxication captured by surrealism is that of a new form. For Benjamin, it 
assumes a particularly profane intonation, one of materialistic inspiration. In the profane 
illumination, the material world, in its immediate presence, is united with the marvellous 
features associated with a remote point in time. The idea suggested by Löwy that surrealism, 
just like romanticism, might be imbued with “an ardent, and sometimes despairing, desire to 
re-enchant the world” (Radical 19), makes sense in the context of this wish to regain some of 
the last remaining magical energies still available in the modern world. For Benjamin, these 
energies manifest themselves in experiments with words, outmoded objects, and 
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coincidences. But they are found above all in the places where capitalist society produces the 
signs of its own transience and destruction: the capture of these forces gains its meaning in 
the context of revolution. 
 The surrealist illumination proposed by Artaud and his colleagues, on the other hand, 
is connected with what they call “a state of fury.” It expresses the spiritual insight and 
clarification gained through an exploration of the “eternal” aspects of the spirit, as well as 
through an attack on all instances of its oppression. As such, it keeps the same sense of a 
revealing and ecstatic inspiration, but without the explicit references to either cosmic 
experience or the material world in terms of places and objects. While engaging with the 
obscure set of beliefs that the surrealists associated with their “mystique” at the time, 
l’illumination surréaliste lacks a detailed elucidation. Artaud’s definition of surrealism as part 
of “ce décalage du centre spirituel du monde, de ce dénivellement des apparences, de cette 
transfiguration du possible”235 (Œuvres 238) is a good example of what might be thought of 
as a surrealist illumination.  
 In both cases, one should not forget the connection of illumination with a state of fury, 
as well as with the revolution. As mentioned above, Artaud uses his diagnosis of the surrealist 
pessimism of the late twenties to explore the issue of what the alignment with communism 
has brought to the movement. In his opinion, revolution has always been within the frame of 
surrealism. His issue is with the fact that the surrealists, as he sees it, have begun to deny that 
all revolution starts in the spirit, within the unconscious forces that reach the surface of the 
soul, and can then provoke changes in reality or the “vesture” of things. For Artaud, by 
denying the importance of the spirit, the surrealists have subscribed to a state of immobility 
and fatalism, since reality is ultimately of a static nature. Artaud identifies the reason for the 
surrealists’ pessimism as the abandonment of a “magical” understanding of reality, that is, a 
dynamic and spiritual one. At the same time, he acknowledges his own “lucid” pessimism 
towards social change. Artaud sees no difference between his and the surrealists’ conjunction 
of a disposition to action and a sense of incapacity in relation to it. More importantly, Artaud 
identifies in the association with communism a moral attitude that Benjamin also touches 
upon. Artaud’s objection to it seems to be to the submission to any form of morality that is 
not one’s own. 
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  For Benjamin, communism is the solution to the surrealist impasse over which is the 
most significant form of social change. He also identifies in pessimism a particular aspect of 
this impasse. That is, if an embracing of communism allows surrealism to differ from the 
“dilettantish optimism” of the bourgeois left, it also risks imposing a limitation on its capacity 
for action, in the form of a commitment to a deeply negative attitude related to the moral 
element of politics. Benjamin does not make clear what this moral dimension is, but his 
writings suggest this is related to the question of whether the conditions for revolution are to 
be found in a change in attitudes or in external circumstances. He says: “that is the cardinal 
question that determines the relation of politics to morality and cannot be glossed over” 
(Surrealism 191). It seems that Benjamin is for a combination of these two dimensions in the 
revolutionary cause. For Artaud, this morality can only be valid if the changing of attitudes 
somehow precedes, in terms of relevance, the transformation of external circumstances. 
 Benjamin’s definition of organised pessimism, however, takes the form not only of a 
move towards organised revolution — as opposed to the “anarchist” attitude —, it also 
embraces the concept of imagery. That is, to organise pessimism, as mentioned above, means 
“to expel moral metaphor from politics and to discover in political action a sphere reserved 
one hundred percent for images” (Surrealism 191). This notion of image encompasses much 
more than optical perceptiveness, as suggested in the discussion above about the awakening 
of the consciousness of the masses through an image-based depiction of themselves. Images 
here must be related to impressions, representations and ideas, as Benjamin’s praise of jokes 
suggests: they are described as the “best expression so far” of the attempt to contact the 
proletarian masses through images. More particularly, Benjamin’s notion of dialectic images, 
briefly discussed below, complements and enriches this description. 
 Both Artaud and Benjamin identify in the pessimistic attitude of surrealism a 
limitation to action. In Artaud, this takes the form of a conceptualisation of surrealism as “a 
new form of magic,” one that provides an understanding of reality as embedded in the 
invisible, unconscious, spiritual aspects of life. He is opposed to materialism and to a notion 
of reality as profoundly immutable and static. He considers engagement with the “invisible” 
forces of the “spiritual centre of the world” to be indispensable in the pursuit of any form of 
revolution. The inclusion of these immaterial energies in the revolutionary cause is also a 
necessity for Benjamin, even if the realms of spirit and matter are not clearly distinguished in 
his essay. For Benjamin, surrealism should fully engage with the mobilisation of the “ecstatic 
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energies” as part of its methodical preparation for the revolution. For Benjamin, unlike for 
Artaud, this implies a full commitment to communism.  
 It could be said that for both authors the advancement of the revolutionary force in 
surrealism is related to it recognising the “magic” and “spiritual” energies it has proved 
capable of mobilising, rather than committing too strictly to a pre-defined form of revolution. 
However, this is made more explicit by Artaud than it is by Benjamin. It can only be inferred 
from the latter, if one considers that the act of “expelling the moral metaphor from politics” 
in order to “discover the sphere of images” means focusing more on the experience of 
intoxication than on the Party guidelines. That pessimism should be an active attitude, in 
terms of what Löwy (Radical 20) defines as a dedication to preventing the advent of the 
worst, is another belief that can be attributed to both Artaud and Benjamin. 
 Conceptualisations of the magical, spiritual dimension of modern experience are 
envisioned, for Artaud as well as for Benjamin, in close relationship with an urge to 
transform both spiritual and material reality. They give different forms to this urge, and, in 
particular, different emphases to the elements of this relationship. A comparison of their 
views allows for a better understanding of the revolutionary aspect of Artaud’s thought, for 
instance, as a highly spiritual, but also material transformation. Naville, emphasising Artaud’s 
impact on the early phase of surrealism, points to his criticism of the surrealist “réussites 
publiques, assez mal masquées par un sourire modeste et attristé ou de subtils regrets”236(16). 
What Artaud brought to the movement also took the form of pessimism and mistrust, 
particularly of the written form, not to mention the idea of a literary career. 
 Benjamin praises the fact that surrealism allows for the loosening of individuality, 
Artaud, that it allows the ultimate expression of one’s spirit. Both reveal surrealism’s nexus 
with the rich space of images drawn from its contact with spiritual energies, the act of 
“revelation” also being an important aspect in their own thought. For Artaud, from the 
materialisation of spiritual ideas, including the exposition of the moments of discontinuation 
of thought, one is able to access different imaginative formations. For Benjamin, the sphere 
of images is key to the constitution of a potential communion of action between modern men. 
The masses, the automatisation of life and the possibility of developing one’s own thought 
are the themes through which Artaud and Benjamin investigate the notion of magic in the 
texts approached in the following section. 
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 4.9. “Lettre sur Lautréamont” 
 Isidore Ducasse, the author of Les Chants de Maldoror (1869), is the object of a 
passionate essay written by Artaud one hundred years after Ducasse’s birth. “Lettre sur 
Lautréamont” was published in 1946 by Jean Ballard in Cahiers du Sud, and reprinted in 
Suppôts et Suppliciations in 1948.237 Ducasse, who published under the pseudonym of the 
Comte de Lautréamont, seems to have lived a poor, itinerant life in the nineteenth century 
Paris. His work was damned as intolerable by the public at the time, mostly due to the 
unusual cruelty and viciousness presented in it. Ducasse died mysteriously at the age of 
twenty-four, in a Paris besieged by the Prussian army. In a sense, the defiant images he 
brought to light remained dormant for years until the surrealists helped them to re-emerge in 
elegiac praises. As mentioned above, Ducasse could be counted as one of the predecessors of 
the French avant-garde movement. An image from Les Chants de Maldoror, to mention just 
one example, appeared recurrently in Breton’s writings, as the ultimate surrealist encounter: 
that of an umbrella and a sewing machine over a dissecting table (Breton Manifestes 50). 
 Artaud’s piece appears at a time when, having been an in-patient in psychiatric 
hospitals since 1937, he was privileging the epistolary form to give expression to his ideas. 
As the letters from Suppôts et Suppliciations elucidate, around 1946 Artaud frequently 
thematises the invasion of consciousness by infamous magical practices, whose goal is to 
prevent the emergence of the potentialities of a few extraordinary minds. Artaud particularly 
relates such practices to the events that lead to his imprisonment in Dublin in 1937, the 
consequent extradition to France and the beginning of a long journey through various French 
psychiatric hospitals in the difficult years immediately before and during World War II. 
 Artaud’s thematisation of consciousness invasion can be observed, for instance, in 
letters exchanged with Breton, Henri Thomas, Anie Besnard and Marthe Robert (Œuvres XIV 
55-162). However, “Lettre sur Lautréamont” does not appear in the epistolary section of the 
book. It is one of the texts in “Fragmentations,” a segment that Artaud describes as “une 
espèce de révision haletante de la culture, une abracadabrante chevauchée du corps à travers 
tous les totems d’une culture ruinée avant d’avoir pris corps”238 (Œuvres XIV 9). Artaud 
seems to wish for the text to be received as a document of cultural analysis, rather than a 
personal plea. Its first lines are a request to the reader to recognize this distinction. 
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 The text opens in the following fashion: “Oui, j’ai des confidences à vous faire sur le 
comte impensable de Lautréamont” 239  (Artaud Œuvres XIV 32). By proposing an open 
dialogue whose elements disappear and reappear in the text, Artaud addresses the distance 
that separates him from the public, but also himself from the subject of the text, Lautréamont. 
The dossier of Œuvres Complètes tells us that the piece was composed from a few notes and 
an actual letter sent to Ballard in response to his request for a text (Artaud Œuvres XIV 185). 
Here the dialogical aspect, present at various points in Artaud’s work, assumes the form of a 
first person address, while making use of a few elements of epistolary writing, following the 
format of an open letter. The fact that Artaud chooses such a format to express his account of 
Lautréamont is significant. If the text’s first lines suggest a confession limited to the initiated, 
they also appear to assume a required, necessary public interest in Lautréamont. 
 The first subject Artaud considers is that of the remaining letters of Ducasse, in part 
due to them having retained some of the few pieces of biographical information to survive his 
death. According to Thévenin (Œuvres XIV 296), Artaud accessed Ducasse’s letters previous 
to writing his text, probably in the edition that presents Les Chants de Maldoror followed by 
epistolary writings and poems (Lautréamont 231-7). As part of his promised “confidences,” 
Artaud mentions the tone of menace, coercion and dictation in Ducasse’s letters, which he 
qualifies as extravagant and elegant. On Ducasse, Artaud declares: “il ne peut écrire une 
lettre usuelle simple sans qu’on y sente cette trépidation épileptoïde du Verbe, qui, de quoi 
qu’il puisse s’agir, ne veut pas être utilisé sans frémir” 240  (Œuvres XIV 32). It is not 
surprising that these words evoke the writings of Artaud himself. From an excerpt from 
Ducasse’s correspondence, Artaud indirectly thematises his own address of the reader. 
 The discussion is built around a detail in which Artaud identifies a surreptitious 
humour. In Ducasse’s exchange with his editor, the expression timbres de la poste substitutes 
the usual timbres-poste (“postage stamp”). The issue at stake is Ducasse’s dispatch of stamps 
in order to pay for a book by Baudelaire, and the substitution is related to using postage 
stamps as money, a usual practice at the time. According to Artaud, the reader that does not 
realise the significance of this la amid Ducasse’s words has proven to be unfit for the text. 
His opinion of this reader is: “celui-ci n’est que le goujat rétensif d’une pute, et la matière 
incarnée d’un porc”241 (Œuvres XIV 32-3). As a document of culture, Artaud’s essay is not 
                                                            
239 “Yes, I have something to confide in you about the unthinkable Count of Lautréamont” 
240 “he cannot write a simple, ordinary letter without one feeling this epileptoid trepidation of the Word, which, 
whatever it concerns, does not wish to be used without a shudder” 
241 “he is no more than the retentive lout of a whore, and the embodied material of a pig” 
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only an analysis of the state of society, it is a demand to the reader to choose a position in 
relation to its content, that of Ducasse’s destiny and the practices influencing it. 
 The main issue that occupies Artaud is the proposition that Ducasse, together with 
other poets and artists, is engaged in a clash with the bourgeoisie. Through the reference to a 
number of evil-intentioned practices and figures, the characterisation of the bourgeoisie is a 
continuum from the “imbecilic” reader, who has no clue about the subtle humour of Ducasse. 
These people incarnate the forces of bestiality in society, those interested, in Artaud’s view, 
in exploiting the artist’s heart for their own indulgence. The figurations go further, in terms of 
associations between these forces and some mystic symbols, among which we can mention 
“ce vieux singe du Ramayana”242 (Œuvres XIV 33). In an imagined dialogue between these 
forces and Lautréamont, Artaud expresses the poet’s attempt at resisting the imposition of 
normality onto his work. 
 One of Artaud’s quotations from the letters of Ducasse exemplifies the tone of his 
account. Discussing the forces trying to prevent Ducasse from attaining his true expression, 
Artaud states: “Mais Lautréamont ne se laisse pas arrêter. ‘Laisse moi, dit-il, à son éditeur, 
reprendre maintenant d’un peu haut.’ L’un peu haut de la mort, sans doute, qui, au jour 
louche, l’a emporté.”243 (Œuvres XIV 33). The note of sarcasm and the cutting from one 
narrative scenario to the other is indicative of the way Artaud approaches the story of 
Lautréamont, as if trying to express the intrinsically tormenting and humorous features of his 
life and death. Artaud’s taunting remarks are somehow in consonance with the mixture of 
devilishness and tactile humour of Les Chants de Maldoror, but more than anything they 
express the realisation of a process that intends to assault the writer through tricks that will 
lead to his destruction. 
 Artaud considers the death of Ducasse as being trop anodinement plate (“too 
anodynely flat”). In other words, “on n’a jamais considéré avec assez d’attention, et j’y 
insiste, de remords, la mort si évasivement plate du comte impensable de Lautréamont”244 
(Œuvres XIV 33). The emphasis on the word “remorse” points to the accountability of the 
                                                            
242 “this old monkey from the Ramayana” — The Ramayana is a Sanskrit epic poem in which the “monkey 
people” or Vanara form an army to help the protagonist Rama. They are depicted as amusing, childish and 
honest, and have some divine features. 
243 “But Lautréamont will not be stopped. ‘Let me,’ he says to his publisher, ‘now resume from a little way 
above. The little way above meaning his death, no doubt, which carried him off on that disreputable day.” —In 
fact, this expression is one that Ducasse addresses not to his editor, but to the banker Darasse (Artaud Œuvres 
XIV 247). 
244 “we have never considered with sufficient attention, and I stress, remorse, the evasively flat death of the 
unthinkable Count of Lautréamont” 
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general public for the death of the Count. This theme re-emerges later, not only in many of 
Artaud’s letters, in relation to himself and to other writers, but also prominently in his well-
known text “Van Gogh le Suicidé de la Societé” (1947). According to Artaud, the dull death 
of Ducasse draws attention to the mystery of his life, leading to the assumption that he was 
unwanted in this world, or at least as unwanted as Poe, Baudelaire, Nerval and Rimbaud. In 
Artaud’s words, “on a voulu l’empêcher non ouvertement mais occultement” (Œuvres XIV 
186). 
 Artaud’s analysis of the death of Ducasse assumes a tone at times sarcastic, at times 
prophetic, but always severe, a feature that is also visible in his characterisations of evil 
forces. Describing the voice that once addressed the writer, Artaud examines the difference 
between being inside and outside the norm, the former being related, quite particularly, to the 
unconscious desires of the bourgeoisie. In the text contained in the dossier of Suppôts et 
Suppliciations — another version, possibly a draft, of the same piece —, his words are: “Car 
le bourgeois hypocrite et rétensif de toute pulsation de poésie instante, en instance de 
grésillement, dit au comte de L[autréamont]: Cesse, rentre dans la norme, ton cœur bat 
d’horreur.”245 (Œuvres XIV 189). According to Artaud, Lautréamont is from the outset not 
swayed by these demands, although they demonstrate the nefarious forces directed at him. 
The mystery surrounding Ducasse’s death — the cause of which is absent from the death 
certificate —, is another sign pointing in this direction. If, in relation to his life and genius, 
“irreducible to the world,” the anonymous death of Ducasse is improper, it fits very well, 
Artaud adds, with “tout le simiesque de ce subreptice de haine par lequel la sottise bourgeoise 
escamote tous les grands renoms”246 (Œuvres XIV 34). 
 In other words, if the petty and gratuitous death of Ducasse does not echo his life, it 
echoes the narrow-minded aversion towards all that escapes the norm, such as the gratuitous 
wickedness of Les Chants de Maldoror. In Artaud’s words, this “imbécillité enracinée”247 
(Œuvres XIV 34), which, in relation to the work of the above-mentioned authors, “a peur que 
leur poésie ne sorte des livres et ne renverse la réalité”248 (Œuvres XIV 34), is the same force 
                                                            
245 “For the hypocritical bourgeois, retentive of any pulsation of instant poetry, in the moment of crackle, told 
the Count of L[autréamont]: Cease, return to the norm, your heart beats in horror.” — The texts presented in the 
dossier are composed of different versions of the final text, as well as, in this case, Artaud’s notes on Ducasse 
and drafts of letters to Ballard. 
246 “all the simian aspects of this surreptitious hate through which the stupid bourgeois leaves aside all the great 
names” 
247 “deep-rooted imbecility” 
248 “is afraid that their poetry might leave books and upset reality” 
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that has interned some of them (here referring particularly to psychiatric hospitals). The 
reverse of reality is an interesting expression used in this context, particularly in terms of the 
need to return to the norm, a dimension described in terms of an “interior.” The expression 
aliéné (“alienated”), referring to someone’s moi de poète (“poetic self”), figures as part of the 
same association. That is, for Artaud, it is while one is outside and alienated from the norm 
that one is able to develop a work, becoming, consequently, the possible target of the 
normalising forces, whose methods may include that of internment. If a “reversed reality” 
might threaten this state of things, it must be also related to the remote allusion, here, to the 
position of the bourgeoisie in this process.  
 In consonance with this aspect, Artaud situates everyday life as an element 
contributing to the situation of the poet as an enraged being: “et on a fermé la bouche à 
Lautréamont tout jeune afin d’en finir tout de suite avec cette agressivité montante d’un coeur 
que la vie de chaque jour catastrophiquement indispose”249  (Œuvres XIV 34). It seems, 
however, that for Artaud reality is not necessarily maleficent. It becomes so once one’s clear 
vision is poisoned. In the case of Ducasse, he was once able to see reality clearly, a fact to 
which his work testifies. This vision, though true, could not remain untouched: “à force de 
venins refoulés, de miasmes pesteux retenus … la réalité ait fini par en devenir maléfique”250 
(Œuvres XIV 186). One might ask whether the reversal of reality is not in fact Lautréamont’s 
act of showing, through images of gratuitous maleficence, the fact that reality is not 
necessarily maleficent. If this is the case, the bourgeoisie is interested in maintaining a world 
view of naturalised evil so that its own maleficent actions remain unnoticed. This leads to the 
question of what exactly Artaud sees in Les Chants de Maldoror. His answer is not consonant 
with the understanding of moral character contained in words such as “evil” and 
“maleficence.” According to Artaud, in Maldoror “tout est atroce”251 (Œuvres XIV 35). 
 At this point, the scope of Artaud’s hypothesis emerges: it concerns the practices 
undertaken by those forces in society that coincide with the norm and act towards the 
conservation of its homogeneity. Their targets are great individuals, those capable of 
disarraying the state of things while expressing the “transcendental” truths of the world. In 
the case of Ducasse, Artaud interestingly situates the origin of this process in his act of 
assuming the name Comte de Lautréamont. This is explained in the following passage: 
                                                            
249 “and Lautréamont’s mouth was shut while he was very young in order to put an immediate end to the rising 
aggressivity of a heart that everyday life had catastrophically injured” 
250 “by dint of repressed venoms, of retained miasma from plagues … reality has finally become evil” 
251 “everything is atrocious” 
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Et je dis que l’invention du nom de Lautréamont, si elle a servi à Isidore 
Ducasse de mot de passe pour couvrir et pour introduire la magnificence 
insolite de son produit, je dis que l’invention de ce patronyme littéraire, tel un 
habit au-dessus de la vie, a donné lieu, par son soulèvement au-dessus de 
l’homme qui l’a produit, au passage d’une de ces saloperies collectives 
crasses, don’t l’histoire des lettres est pleine, et qui a fait fuir, à la longue, 
l’âme d’Isidore Ducasse de la vie.252 (Œuvres XIV 35) 
 According to Artaud, Ducasse’s assumption of another name — and not just any 
name, but “un très beau nom, un très grand nom”253 (Œuvres XIV 35) — provoked an 
elevation above his human level, which in turn allowed the passage of the so-called 
saloperies (“misdeeds”). This notion introduces the idea that, when aiming at remarkable 
spirits, conservative and evil forces do not act at random, but collectively and with co-
ordination. At the same time, this process could only take place through some sort of 
collaboration, probably an unconscious one, on the part of Ducasse. Artaud identifies in 
Ducasse “un esprit qui voulait toujours laisser tomber Isidore Ducasse au profit du comte”254 
(Œuvres XIV 35). The existence of a spirit inside one’s own personality, and particularly one 
that acts against the survival of this same character, point to the different levels at which the 
conforming forces act. 
 It is important to note that, according to Artaud, “…c’est bien Isidore Ducasse qui a 
trouvé le nom de Lautréamont. Mais quand il l’a trouvé, il n’était pas seul.”255 (Œuvres XIV 
35). In the manner of a mystic dictation — in no way exceptional for his work — Artaud 
formulates the process followed by this operation:  
Je veux dire qu’il avait autour de lui, et de son âme, cette floculation 
microbienne d’espions, cette baveuse, acrimonieuse ruée de tous les parasites 
les plus sordides de l’être, de tous les revenants antiques du non-être, cette 
                                                            
252 “I say that the invention of the name of Lautreamont, if it served Isidore Ducasse as a password to cover and 
to introduce the unusual magnificence of his product, I say that the invention of this literary surname, as a 
garment worn on top of life, gave way, through the elevation of the man who produced it, to the passage of these 
crass collective misdeeds, of which the history of literature is full, and which made the soul of Isidore Ducasse 
flee, eventually, from life.” 
253 “a very beautiful name, a great name” 
254 “a spirit that always wanted to let Isidore Ducasse go in favour of the Count” 
255 “…it was Isidore Ducasse who found the name of Lautréamont. But when he found it, he was not alone” 
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teigne de profiteurs innés qui à son lit de mort lui a dit: “Nous sommes le 
comte de Lautréamont, et tu n’es qui Isidore Ducasse.”256 (Œuvres XIV 35-6) 
Once again, the qualifications given by Artaud are rich and provocative. Here the parasites of 
being meet the ancient revenants of non-being, giving place to a numerous and profuse fauna 
of malicious entities. In a variation of the text, Artaud names this “la conscience conformiste 
bestiale du plus grand nombre”257 (Œuvres XIV 187). Once it assumes the identity of the 
Count and replaces Ducasse as the author, it leads to his early and anonymous death. The 
motivation behind such activity occupies the next lines of Artaud’s text. 
 The belief that Ducasse was a genius is implicit from the opening lines of the text. His 
ability to see and express himself more clearly than most men is the reason for the wish for 
his abolishment. In Artaud’s words, Ducasse “regardait et tisonnait dans la jachère de 
l’inconscient encore inutilisé”258 (Œuvres XIV 36), opening the way for the expression of 
what had so far remained unknown. This naturally constituted a threat to the stability of the 
social order. However, for Artaud this unconscious space concerns only Ducasse, “car il n’y a 
pas dans notre corps de points où nous puissions nous rencontrer avec la conscience de 
tous”259 (Œuvres XIV 36). This intrinsic and almost absolute solitude within oneself stands in 
opposition to the world’s intentions: the world invades certain consciences in order to assure 
the access to everyone’s ideas (Artaud Œuvres XIV 36).  
 Here, in particular, Artaud seems to use the terms conscience and inconscient 
interchangeably while referring to the distinguishing vision of Ducasse. One may suppose 
that access to this “fallow land” of the unconscious is, at least partially, what allows the 
development of Ducasse’s great conscience.260 Even if he is able to access only his own 
unconscious, this entry gives an insight into the general consciousness, otherwise his vision 
would not be seen to be dangerous. In other words, it is only through one’s own body and 
experience, for Artaud, that valuable knowledge can be attained. Nevertheless, one’s own 
body is something one can only partially possess. 
                                                            
256 “I mean to say that around him and his soul was a microbial flocculation of spies, a slobbering, acrimonious 
rush of the most sordid parasites of being, all the ancient ghosts of non-being, this innate fungus of profiteers 
who on his deathbed said to him: ‘We are the Comte de Lautréamont, and you are no more than Isidore 
Ducasse’” 
257 “the bestial conformist conscience of the majority” 
258 “he looked and stirred in the fallow land of the still-unexplored unconscious” 
259 “because there is not one point in our body where we can meet with the conscience of all” 
260 In previous texts, such as “Fragments d’un Journal d’Enfer” (1926), access to the unconscious can result in 
states of paralysis, but also in the establishment of valuable knowledge. This ambiguous character is analysed 
closely in the next chapter. 
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 At this point, Artaud describes the clash between individual and collective in terms of 
“la partouze de l’inconscient interlope de tous contre la conscience interloquée d’un seul”261 
(Œuvres XIV 36). The insistence on a conflict of individual versus collective points to the 
significance of intellectual self-determination in Artaud’s work, a position he assumed openly 
in relation to his own work. In common with other writers evoked by Artaud, Lautréamont 
imprinted an archi-individualiste (“arch-individualist”) character on his writing (Œuvres XIV 
37). This is what the co-ordinated rise of conformist spirits threatens. Artaud explains:  
Car l’opération n’est pas de sacrifier son moi de poète, et, à ce moment-là, 
d’aliéné, à tout le monde, mais de se laisser pénétrer et violer par la 
conscience de tout le monde, de telle sorte qu’on ne soit plus, dans son corps, 
que le serf des idées et réactions de tous.262 (Œuvres XIV 36-7) 
To become the servant of the ideas and reactions of others: that is how Artaud describes the 
death of a poet, a writer, a “great conscience.” The diversion of the work from its individual 
character, in turn, is what the general consciousness attempts in order to neutralise the truth 
emanating from a “poète enragé par la vérité”263 (Œuvres XIV 37).  
 Whether the truth owned by the poet is capable of reversing reality can never be 
known. Artaud does not explain whether such forces have always accomplished a 
neutralisation of the vision of poets and artists, nor to what extent they can act once one of 
these testimonies of clarity reaches the public. It is quite possible that, considering the 
existence of a subjective level of action of these same conforming tendencies, the general 
consciousness remains intact, with a few exceptions here and there. That is why a position on 
the part of the public is required, and the question of whether one believes in the maleficent 
incantation or not constantly poses itself, through Artaud, to the public. To ignore and to 
forget, in this context, is also to be bewitched and take part in practices of enchantment. 
 Artaud’s view coincides, to some extent, with an ideological position that identifies 
the bourgeoisie with deep-rooted conservative and conforming forces. According to Lukács 
(History 11), for instance, it strives for the preservation of a structure of exploration, which is 
expressed particularly through the effort to maintain the illusion of the immutability of the 
categories created by capitalism. In “Lettre sur Lautréamont,” Artaud writes: “car le 
                                                            
261 “the orgy of the doubtful unconscious of all against the disconcerted consciousness of one” 
262 “Because the operation does not consist of sacrificing one’s poet self, and at that time, one’s alienated self, to 
everyone, but of allowing oneself be penetrated and violated by the conscience of everyone, so that one is, in 
one own’s body, no more than the serf of the ideas and reactions of all.” 
263 “poet enraged by the truth” 
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bourgeois hypocrite et méprisant, confit, dopé, poussah de la certitude méprisante, n’est, en 
réalité, que cette antiquité chapardeuse … [ce] antique escamoteur”264 (Œuvres XIV 33). By 
identifying the bourgeois with ancient villainous forces, but also with bygone conjurers, 
Artaud points to the double character of his own criticism. That the unconscious is implied in 
his analyses is consistent with the extent to which vague notions of mysticism and magic are 
intrinsic to the ideas of himself and his contemporaries, just as they integrate the thought of 
Freud. On the other hand, the fact that the bourgeoisie is unconsciously implicated in the 
criminal acts of society against its own development is only a consequence of the notion of 
class consciousness. According to Artaud, it is the bourgeoisie that instructs Lautréamont, in 
patronising tones, on the subject of his “atrocious” individualistic writing: “‘Mais ça ne se 
fait pas, non, ça ne se fait pas … Cesse. Rentre dans la norme.’”265 (Œuvres XIV 33). 
 
 4.10. Anti-Fascism and the Work of Art 
 Departing from a quote from Paul Valéry, who describes the relationship between the 
field of fine arts and the technical conditions of the late nineteenth century as being on the 
verge of a transformation, Benjamin proposes an analysis of this state of affairs aimed at 
producing revolutionary tools in terms of cultural politics. More precisely, he intends to 
hamper the use of the concepts emerging in this context “for the purposes of Fascism” 
(Benjamin Work of Art 218). This is the political tone with which Benjamin opens the famous 
article “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Anticipating the gap 
between revolutionary interests and his theses, Benjamin proposes that “they brush aside a 
number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery — 
concepts whose uncontrolled (and at present almost uncontrollable) application would lead to 
a processing of data in the Fascist sense” (Work of Art 218). 
 In 1936 Benjamin is in exile in Paris, living off his sparse publication of essays, as 
well as from a regular stipend from the Institut für Sozialforschung, of which he had been a 
member since 1935. For the last seven years of his life, Benjamin lived an émigrés life, 
making efforts “to be paid a decent fee for an occasional review, to avoid the attention of the 
French police … or to find somebody willing to help with a visa that would open the doors to 
England or the United States” (Demenz xvii-xviii). The essay on the work of art is destined 
                                                            
264 “because the hypocritical and contemptuous bourgeois, who is candid, doped, full of contemptuous certainty, 
is, in reality, nothing but this villain antiquity … this ancient conjurer” 
265 “’But one cannot do that, no, one cannot do that … Cease. Return to the norm.’” 
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for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (“Journal for Social Research”), the Institute’s 
publication, where it appears for the first time in 1936, in a French translation by Klossowski. 
The text approached here is that of its final version, from 1939, which appeared 
posthumously in Benjamin’s collected work. 
 That nowadays study of “The Work of Art…” takes place above all within the field of 
Media Studies is indicative of the neutralisation of the political content of Benjamin’s ideas, 
particularly of his marxism (Clark 81). This process can be observed in relation to other 
writers of this period, an irony if one considers the quasi-extemporaneous declarations of 
intentions found in texts such as this. Scholem characterises the context in which the essay 
was written as one of a still-hesitant marxism on the part of Benjamin. Having criticised his 
friend’s use of the notion of aura in what he called a “pseudo-marxist context” in the second 
section of the essay, Scholem sees Benjamin’s answer as a justification that his marxism was 
“not dogmatic but heuristic and experimental in nature” (Scholem Friendship 260). It is 
possible that this character has remained constant throughout his work. 
 By schematically retracing the history of the relationship between the work of art and 
the techniques of its reproduction in the first section of the article, Benjamin proposes that, on 
the one hand, the work of art has always been somehow reproducible while, on the other 
hand, the extent and form of its reproducibility changed dramatically from the turn of the 
century onwards (Work of Art 218-9). At this time technical developments acquired a place in 
artistic processes, as is exemplified, for instance, by the early use of photography by painters 
(Benjamin Photography 174). 
 Benjamin goes on to point out that technical reproduction has affected not only the 
authenticity of the work of art, but also its authority (Work of Art 220). Even where these 
notions can be considered as interlinked, however, the authority of a work of art remains 
more deeply modified by the fact that it can be reproduced independently of manual work 
than does its authenticity. That is, technical reproduction allows the copy to reach a much 
larger world than the original, particularly in terms of the public, which might range from an 
expectant audience to the walker of a busy street. Therefore, according to Benjamin, “the 
situations into which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch 
the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated” (Work of Art 221). 
 Benjamin defines authenticity as the essence that the work of art transmits and has 
transmitted since its creation. This definition recalls Benjamin’s treatment of language as the 
communication of the essences of things. The authenticity of an art object is also strictly 
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connected to “its testimony to the history which it has experienced” (Work of Art 221). The 
changes in the level of authenticity inevitably affect the historical legacy of a work of art. 
Benjamin envisions this as “jeopardised by reproduction when substantive duration ceases to 
matter” (Work of Art 221). This has consequences for the possibility of experiencing a work 
of art, as becomes clear in Benjamin’s approach to the notion of aura. 
 Initially presented as a constitutive element of the authority of the object, aura is 
further defined by Benjamin in relation to natural objects, as “the unique phenomenon of a 
distance, however close it may be” (Work of Art 222). The social basis of the decay of the 
aura, in turn, is considered to be the “increasing significance of the masses in contemporary 
life,” that is, their desire to “bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly” (Benjamin Work of 
Art 223). In this definition, Benjamin attests to the power of the masses, whose desire is 
ascribed the capability of generating deep transformations in social life, as well as in 
collective forms of perception. In relation to the processes of technical reproduction, the 
position of the masses is that of a definitive bent towards getting hold of an object “by way of 
its likeness, of its reproduction” (Benjamin Work of Art 223), that is, by somehow 
overcoming its uniqueness. What Benjamin refers to as the masses’ perception of a “sense of 
the universal equality of things” is the consequence of an adjustment of reality that has 
unprecedented effects on contemporary experience, having the work of art as a touchstone. 
 In opposition to this appropriation of objects from the perspective of likeness, 
Benjamin describes the uniqueness of a work of art as “inseparable from its being imbedded 
in the fabric of tradition” (Work of Art 223). Tradition, however, is not that of a fixed canon, 
but one that is extremely changeable in accordance with the social conditions in which a 
work of art is perceived. With this, Benjamin avoids the simplified argument of a positive 
liberation coming from a break with tradition. As should become clear in the following, he is 
neither a defender of tradition per se, nor blind to the interesting effects that this change has 
brought.  
 Benjamin situates the origins of the integration of the work of art into tradition in the 
cult, that is, the service of a magical-religious ritual (Work of Art 223). Its aura must then be 
related to this early ritual function. In this context, the definition of aura as distance is 
“nothing but the formulation of the cult value of the work of art in categories of space and 
time perception” (Work of Art 243), having the unapproachability of the cult image as its 
prototype. Therefore, the unprecedented situation created by mechanical reproduction is not 
comparable to the process of secularisation, which resulted, for its part, according to 
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Benjamin, in a “theology of art” expressed in the maxim l’art pour l’art. Mechanical 
reproduction gives rise not only to a decay of the aural function, but a situation in which, “for 
the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipated the work of art from its 
parasitical dependence on ritual” (Benjamin Work of Art 224).  
 According to Benjamin, the change in the quantitative availability of the work of art, 
facilitated by its reproduction, led to a change in its qualitative value. From being an early 
instrument of magic, to being a piece designed for exhibition, the work of art undergoes a 
transformation in which even its artistic function becomes incidental, despite the possibility 
that the features related to the magical context may have been retained as part of in the 
object’s values of uniqueness and authority. For Benjamin, both photography and cinema are 
the best examples of objects of art as bearers of exhibition values. 
 Regarding photography, Benjamin points to the processual change from the cult value 
of portraits, through the remembrance of absent loved ones, to the role of photography in 
establishing evidence of the world, as it is the case in Eugène Atget’s portraits of a deserted 
Paris (Work of Art 226). In relation to cinema, Benjamin notices the transformation of the 
actor’s performance into a commodity while the actor, in exile in relation to the public as well 
as to him/herself, “has to operate with whole living person, yet forgoing its aura” (Work of 
Art 229). The cult of the movie star is an imperfect substitute for the former aura of the stage 
actor.  
 The subsuming of film to a marketplace leads, according to Benjamin, to a situation 
in which “as a rule no other revolutionary merit can be accredited to today’s film than the 
promotion of a revolutionary criticism of traditional concepts of art” (Work of Art 231). If, on 
the one hand, Benjamin recognises the possibility that films promote some form of social 
criticism, on the other hand he describes their relationship to the public as generally taking 
the shape of non-engagement. The equipment is so intrinsically part of cinematic reality that 
reality itself, in films, becomes the height of artifice. As Benjamin puts it, “the sight of 
immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology” (Work of Art 233). 
However, such negative evaluation is not the full account of his assessment of cinema. 
 For Benjamin, notions of distance and proximity in relation to the work of art and its 
public become more complex with the advent of new media. He makes use of an analogy to 
exemplify this transformation, using the figures of the surgeon and the magician. While the 
latter heals a person by the laying on of his hands, the former does so by penetrating into the 
patient’s body. That is, “the magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and 
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himself; though he reduces it very slightly by the laying on of hands, he greatly increases it 
by virtue of his authority” (Benjamin Work of Art 233). The surgeon, for his part, keeps no 
physical distance from the patient, while abstaining from facing him “man to man.”  
 This does not mean, of course, that the surgeon sustains no authority; in fact he shares 
many features of the magician’s aura. However, Benjamin says, it is from the penetration that 
his authority emanates, in the same way that cinema gives an impression of ultimate truth 
through its “penetration into reality” by means of technology. The multiple fragments 
produced in the making of a film prescind from the notion of totality and uniqueness 
characteristic of the painting. Nevertheless, the impression of reality they give is not 
comparable to that of the painter, since, according to Benjamin, “it offers, precisely because 
of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality 
which is free of all equipment” (Work of Art 234). 
 This dual metaphor subsists in the text, and recurs in Benjamin’s reference to Freud’s 
revealing analysis of slips of tongue — in Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904) — as 
comparable to the extent to which film “has brought about a similar deepening of 
apperception” (Work of Art 235). In film, images present such preciseness that their artistic 
value becomes as fascinating as their scientific one. However contradictory it may seem at 
first, this particular feature is part of the revolutionary function of film, according to 
Benjamin. 
 The reason for this lies in increased awareness. That is, by exploring hidden details of 
the things around us, “the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the 
necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and 
unexpected field of action” (Work of Art 236). Benjamin further states: 
Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our 
railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. 
Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the 
tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we 
calmly and adventurously go traveling. (Work of Art 236) 
It is easy to see, from this excerpt, the kinds of experience to which cinema and technological 
development bring liberation. The similitude of tone with the theme of intoxication here is no 
coincidence, to the point that some commentators have identified in Benjamin an exaggerated 
optimism towards newer forms of media.  
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 To the informed reader, however, film is linked with other motifs in Benjamin’s work, 
which usually relate to contemporary currents of thought. They bring innovation in the same 
breath as announcing the decay of traditional forms of experience. This process of decay is 
however not all negative. Imagery expressing stuffy rooms, small streets, genteel railway 
stations and controlled factories had to find ways of escaping their own limitations. What is 
not certain, as Benjamin himself attests, is that the technological developments would bring 
about a liberation that did not bring with it other forms of limitation. 
 If for Benjamin film opens up spaces that have seem to have been closed off, it is 
because it reveals “entirely new structural formations of the subject” (Work of Art 236). That 
is, the maximum permeation of technology allows for a deepening of perception, an 
incremental increase of awareness in relation to elements that used to be retained, if at all, 
only unconsciously. The use of the notion of unconscious in this context is similar to the one 
in which the revelations provoked by photography are discussed in “Short Story of 
Photography” (1931). Here Benjamin uses the expression optical unconscious to refer to 
what photography reveals as present in the world and invisible to the human eye. It has a 
privileged connection with space rather than with the mind. According to Benjamin, “the fact 
is, it is a different nature that speaks to the camera than speaks to the eye; different above all 
in that, rather than a space permeated with human consciousness, here is one permeated with 
unconsciousness” (Photography 176). Since photographs show objects and landscapes as 
they appear, in principle, independently of the human eye and presence, the space they 
present is pervaded by unconsciousness. It is in this space, Benjamin argues, that magic used 
to be found. 
 Due to this feature, “faultless technique is capable of conferring on what is evoked a 
magical value such as, for us, a painting can no longer possess” (Benjamin Photography 
175). It seems that the expression of unknown aspects of reality assumes the provisional role 
of a space permeated by magic, while adopting, to the human eye, certain magical features. It 
is not as if, for Benjamin, technology has simply revealed that magic is not “out there.” On 
the contrary, technology exposes to view that matter still has unexpected facets, and can 
assume some of the features that used to be found in magic. It becomes somehow “magical” 
itself.  
 In the particular case of photography, Benjamin points out its ability to reveal 
unconscious registers of what has been “sufficiently tucked away to have found shelter in 
daydreams” (Photography 176). Once these pictorial worlds are visible, the differences 
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between technology and magic are illuminated: what distinguishes them is a historical 
variable. Benjamin argues that there is an interrupted passage from the ancient mystical world 
view to the viewpoint of reality as it is exposed by technology, having as a possible mediator 
the unconscious registers of the human mind. Here magic appears again as a remnant, to be 
found only in particular forms of current reality. What sets the concept as understood here 
apart from its occurrence in the essay on surrealism is the clear appeal to a notion of the 
unconscious, which Benjamin presents in accordance with Freudian ideas of repression and 
the emergence of repressed content through daydreams (Freud Dreams 537). In a further 
extract from the essay on photography, the ability of psychoanalysis to reveal unconscious 
contents serves as a model: “only photography can show him [oneself] the optical 
unconscious, just as it is only through psychoanalysis that he learns of the compulsive 
unconscious” (Photography 176).  
In the essay on the work of art, Benjamin repeats almost the same words he used for 
photography to speak of the enlargement of awareness occasioned by film: “evidently a 
different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye — if only because an 
unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored by man” 
(Benjamin Work of Art 236-7). By turning unconscious spatial perception into conscious data, 
the film, as well as the photograph, enlarge the human field of action. Here Benjamin seems 
to be aligned with the general thrust of psychoanalysis, since the awareness of “new 
structures of matter” carries in itself a powerful value, capable of engendering 
transformations, if not in reality, at least in the subject.  
If in the field of psychoanalysis, the narrative aspect capable of engendering meaning 
in the newly-emerged content proves to be more important than the content itself, the new 
material from the optical unconscious is not awarded similar treatment in Benjamin’s essay. 
Benjamin affirms: “the camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to 
unconscious impulses” (Work of Art 237). The fact that there is an introduction to the 
unconscious field seems to be the most important feature of the technology. This is perhaps 
the “pseudo-marxist” context evoked by Scholem in his criticism of the artificial optimism of 
Benjamin towards cinema (Scholem Friendship 260). The essay on the work of art takes up 
the idea of the role of this emerging content — coming from profane illuminations, from 
photographs, from films — in the mobilisation towards revolution, but it does not make 
explicit how this role might develop. 
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 Benjamin goes on to pair the effect provoked by a dadaist work of art, which aims 
ultimately, according to him, at diverting the public from contemplative immersion, with the 
audience’s response to the film. Both media are described as putting into action the act of 
distraction (Benjamin Work of Art 238). To some extent, Benjamin considers film to be a later 
manifestation of the issue at stake in dadaism. According to him, the latter “promoted a 
demand for the film, the distracting element of which is also primarily tactile, being based on 
changes of place and focus which periodically assail the spectator” (Work of Art 238). That is, 
distraction is the effect of the constant interruption of the public’s associations by moving 
images. In a statement that is key to the consideration of the notion of experience in 
Benjamin’s works, he attests that “this constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all 
shocks, should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind” (Work of Art 238). 
 This idea of shock informs Benjamin’s view on the general behaviour of the masses. 
He defines the masses, in this context, as “a matrix from which all traditional behaviour 
toward works of art issues today in a new form” (Work of Art 239). However, while trying to 
avoid the cliché that the masses seek distraction where art demands reflection, Benjamin 
affirms that “the distracted mass absorbs the work of art” (Work of Art 239), just as the 
inhabitants of a city absorb its architecture. That is, the masses’ mode of appropriation has 
more to do with the habits created through tactile and visual contact with objects than it has 
to do with attention and voluntary dedication. Distraction provides a change in perception 
that turns the public into a distanced critic or, in the words of Benjamin, an absent-minded 
examiner (Work of Art 241).  
 The consequences of this fact are explored in the article’s epilogue, in which 
Benjamin resumes the theme of the relationship between new forms of technical reproduction 
and fascism. The criterion is the notion of masses. For Benjamin, “…mass reproduction is 
aided specially by the reproduction of masses. In big parades and monster rallies, in sports 
events, and in war, all of which nowadays are captured by camera and sound recording, the 
masses are brought face to face with themselves” (Work of Art 251). That is, the mass 
reproduction of everything social participates in the constitution of the social category of the 
masses. This takes place not only because mass movements are more accurately perceived by 
mechanical apparatus than by the human eye, but also because the impact of mass 
reproduction in social relations brings about a detachment that allows the aesthetic 
experience of the masses to have itself as its object. 
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 Benjamin then describes one of the manoeuvres of fascism in relation to the self-
consciousness of the masses: this consciousness does not result in a social revolt that affects 
the structure of property. Fascism gives these masses “not their right, but instead a chance to 
express themselves” (Work of Art 241). The result, according to Benjamin, is the introduction 
of aesthetics into political life, including mass appreciation of mass movements as an 
aesthetic experience. However, the culmination of this spectacularised logic, according to 
Benjamin, is the fascist glorification of war, which presents itself, like the cult of the Führer, 
as immersed in ritual values. Benjamin quotes from the futurist manifesto, in which Marinetti 
presents war as the ultimate expression of a progressive aesthetics, the flagship of new forms 
of literature and graphic arts. 
 If the futurists, aligned with fascism, claimed war to be the resolution of the 
“millennial conflict” between man and nature, establishing in fact “man’s dominion over the 
subjugated machinery” (Marinetti qtd. in Benjamin Work of Art 241), Benjamin’s analysis 
points in the opposite direction. That is, “the destructiveness of war furnishes proof that 
society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology 
has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society” (Benjamin 
Work of Art 242). As a consequence, Benjamin envisions the increase in technical devices as 
a factor that increases the likelihood of its “unnatural” utilisation, of which war is an 
example. This will remain the case, according to him, as long as there is no change in the 
property system. It is implicit that the latter would bring to the employment of the means of 
production an actual utilisation of natural materials, aimed at improving life-sustaining 
structures. 
 In sum, Benjamin connects the changes in perception brought by technical 
reproduction, which both engender and propel the mass phenomena, with the aestheticising 
of politics. He concludes that fascism “expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a 
sense perception that has been changed by technology” (Work of Art 242). That the mass, in 
contemplation of itself, is capable of experiencing its own destruction as an aesthetic 
pleasure, is part of what Benjamin diagnoses as a process of self-alienation. Its nefarious 
consequences, in this particular situation, should not prevent one from realising the 
possibilities of liberation offered by the break with traditions in the field of imagery. 
Benjamin himself is perhaps inaccurate, but definitively innovative in pointing to 
potentialities in cinema and photography as forms of visual and emotional appropriation of 
surrounding objects, even if the popularity of such media signifies the expiry of other modes 
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of contemplation and reverence for the work of art. Benjamin is likewise inaccurate when he 
goes on to affirm that “all efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war” 
(Work of Art 241). Even if this were correct in the highly ideological milieu of the Third 
Reich, and even if it has remained accurate in nationalist perceptions up until today, the 
political actions of the masses have taken multiple aesthetic forms, of which self-alienation 
and politicisation of art remain part. 
 Benjamin’s claim for the acknowledgement of the connections between the 
splintering of the aura and the role of the masses in a process of adjustment of reality towards 
proximity and likeness, even if it takes place in a “pseudo-marxist” context, provides the 
material for an analysis of the ambiguous character of technology once it becomes part of the 
structures of perception. As Didi-Huberman suggests, Benjamin “avait articulé toute sa 
critique politique à partir d’un argument sur l’apparition et l’exposition réciproques des 
peuples et des pouvoirs”266 (29). The sphere of imagery, being the locus of deepening of 
awareness and enlargement of the human “field of action,” is also where the mutual 
engendering of the masses and their power takes place, a potential for transformation that can 
have multiple utilisations. 
 
 4.11. The Spirit of the Masses 
 In the analysis of texts from Artaud and Benjamin from the late thirties and forties 
presented here, one feature becomes clear, namely the significant increase in thematic scope 
of their writings. In terms of the treatment of the notion of magic, this takes the form of a 
sharpening of its importance in the political and general senses. For Artaud, magic assumes a 
principal role in the practices that contributed, amongst other things, to the events leading to 
his internment, from 1937 on. As his letters in Suppôts et Suppliciations suggest, “c’est de 
magie subreptice qu’il vit, ce monde, et pour rien au monde il n’aurait voulu que je le dise”267 
(Artaud Œuvres XIV 135). For Benjamin, the magic element that is somehow “tucked away” 
in the notion of aura, that of the decayed authority of the work of art, makes its reappearance 
in the new media created by technical progress. 
 The theme of decay in relation to an ancient form is well-known in Benjamin’s 
oeuvre. It represents not only the significant change occasioned by factors such as the 
                                                            
266  “had articulated his entire political criticism based on an argument on the development and reciprocal 
exhibition of peoples and powers” 
267 “it is on surreptitious magic that this world lives, and it would not for anything have wanted me to say so” 
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emergence of science, the ideology of progress and the modernisation of urban life; it is also 
a thematisation of the idea of a “natural” dispersion of everything incarnate. If one considers 
the theological foundations of Benjamin’s writings — a key influence on his thought, 
although it never appears in a pure form — the theme of decay can ultimately be associated 
with the constant exodus of matter from the outset of material existence, a notion rooted in 
Jewish mysticism (Scholem Mysticism 15). Decay, in this context, is a type of migration of 
form, from one modality to the other. Despite its flexible character, Benjamin continuously 
attempts to capture it in a detailed account, while establishing its social and psychological 
implications. 
 Aura is defined by Benjamins as “the unique phenomenon of a distance, however 
close it may be” (Work of Art 222). The distance is a derivative of the authority of certain 
images in magical-religious rituals, to be found at the origins of the insertion of works of art 
into tradition. The framework of this definition has appeared, as mentioned above, in other 
writings by Benjamin. It has been related to both the cosmic experience of ancient man — 
described as the act of realising “what is nearest to us and what is remote to us, and never of 
one without the other” (Benjamin One-way 93) — and to the object’s “ability to look at us in 
return” (Benjamin Motifs 188). Both of these ideas relate to the theme of a dialectics of 
distance presented by the 1939 essay. Here, distance encompasses at least two different 
aspects: one is the “proximity” that exists between works of art and the public, a closeness 
that dismisses the authority of the object and prevents an attitude of contemplation; another is 
the awareness allowed by the mass reproduction of “wide-shot” images of big parades and 
mass movements. In both these aspects, the notion of aura appears as shattered through a 
process that involves specialised techniques, but also through the social and psychological 
attitudes related to the material development.  
 The notion of the masses appears only towards the end of Benjamin’s text. It assumes 
a rather important position, however, once it leads to the connection between his analysis on 
the work of art and the political context in which he envisages the analysis as a tool. The 
connection can be described as follows: at the same time that technical development serves to 
enlarge human perception and the field of action, it also inaugurates the space for processes 
of manipulation. According to Benjamin, through photographic and filming devices the 
masses can see themselves face to face: a reassuring image that no human eye is able to 
grasp. Referring to the mass parades of Nazi Germany, Benjamin is convinced that the 
masses are sufficiently alienated from themselves to experience their own destruction as 
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aesthetic enjoyment. This kind of alienation would not be possible without the devices that 
allow the impression of the objects of perception, the masses being one of these, nor without 
the distracted mode of interaction established as the pattern for their relationship with the 
new media. Here, as in Benjamin’s essay on surrealism, there is the realisation of the 
revolutionary potential of a new form of perception, which could participate in changing the 
social structures.  
 In Artaud’s “Lettre sur Lautréamont,” the masses have a different role in the 
functioning of society. Through the engagement with the life and work of Isidore Ducasse, 
the Count of Lautréamont, Artaud refers to the process in which conforming forces or la 
conscience génerale (“the general consciousness”) act in order to preserve the status quo, 
particularly through the neutralisation of a few outstanding individuals. These are people 
described as being able to see through to society’s workings, particularly through their access 
to so-far unexplored aspects of the unconscious. The goal of the conforming forces, in turn, is 
to invade the extraordinary minds or consciences toujours seules (“single consciousnesses”), 
in order to prevent the emergence of their perception. The fear that mobilises them is related 
to the possibility that these individuals might provoke a “reversal of reality,” a notion that is 
not particularly clarified by Artaud. The hypothesis presented here is that it encompasses the 
revelation that reality in itself can assume forms different to its present one, which has only 
arisen as a result of the continuous investment of the conforming forces in it. Artaud 
describes the conforming forces as coinciding with the norm, to the extent that they are 
associated with the bourgeoisie in the social structure of that time. In this context, the 
atrocious character of Lautréamont’s work disturbs the conforming forces by reflecting the 
evil deeds that they perpetuate and continuously manage to forget.  
 While in Artaud the masses are the agents of homogenising processes, for Benjamin 
they are, at the same time, the subjects and the objects of different social tendencies. They 
incarnate the desire for likeness and homogeneity, one that manifests itself through different 
means, while entertaining a privileged relationship with magic. Benjamin and Artaud’s ideas 
on this politically-sensitive aspect of social life reflect a traditional usage that sees in the 
emergent urban population a conglomerate of incoherent particles that nevertheless forms one 
body. Benjamin in particular thematises Baudelaire’s use of foule (“crowd”) to describe the 
“amorphous crowd of passers-by” (Benjamin Motifs 165) imprinted as a hidden figure in the 
author’s poems. But perhaps the early writings of Marx and Engels, referred to by Benjamin 
in the same essay on Baudelaire, are those that best characterise the emergence of the masses 
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as a political concept. That is, at the same time that these authors describe, in a conglomerate 
urban scenario, the thousands of people that “rush past one another as if they had nothing in 
common or were in no way associated with one another” (Engels qtd. in Benjamin Motifs 
167), they mention that this “agglomeration of three and a half million people on a single spot 
has multiplied the strength of these three and a half million inhabitants a hundredfold” 
(Engels qtd. in Benjamin Motifs 166).  
 The combination of strength and distraction, of social significance and absent-
mindedness, is also present in the accounts of Artaud and Benjamin. The former, however, 
avoids the term “masses” in “Lettre sur Lautréamont,” even if it appears on many occasions 
in which enchanting practices are described in his work. Artaud’s most common expressions, 
as seen in the previous section, are l’inconscient de tous (“the unconscious of all”), la 
conscience de tout le monde (“the consciousness of everyone”) and finally “la conscience 
conformiste bestiale du plus grand nombre” 268  (Œuvres XIV 187). These formulations 
suggest a mindset that, despite originating within a particular group of interests, is 
experienced and reproduced as the opinion of the majority. The ambiguous features of 
strength and distraction do not entirely qualify the mindset of the masses, even if they are 
important consequences of the intrinsic reproductive aspect of it.  
 In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud gives an account of 
the interesting combination of consciousness and unconsciousness in the behaviour of 
groups. 269  He proposes an understanding of the masses in terms of their similitude to 
primitive mindsets. Above all, he identifies the phenomenon of “the influencing of an 
individual by a large number of people simultaneously, people with whom he is connected by 
something, though otherwise they may in many respects be strangers to him” (Freud Group 
70). Freud initially explores the nature of this connection through an analysis of Gustav Le 
Bon’s Psychologie des Foules (1895). Le Bon’s main argument is that individuals in a group 
exhibit an average character, guided by the unconscious foundations of their personality. 
Three elements are striking in relation to this idea. The first is that individuals in a group 
yield to instincts or the unconscious, “in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained 
as a predisposition” (Freud Group 74). The second is that groups are sensible to phenomena 
of hypnotic order, leading them to assume attitudes that are contrary to their individual 
                                                            
268 “the bestial and conformist conscience of the majority” 
269 In his translation of Freud’s essay into English, Strachey privileged the term “group” over “masses,” despite 
the fact that Freud’s use of the German Masse indicates a more comprehensive meaning. While referring to 
Freud’s text, we will use “group” and “mass” interchangeably. 
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nature. And finally, in the group the individual can be lead into a “state of ‘fascination’ in 
which the hypnotised individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser” (Freud Group 
75-6). 
 Many elements of this account can be related to the approaches of Artaud and 
Benjamin. Firstly, the association between the unconscious and evil, as the sphere to which 
the behaviour of the masses resorts, is akin to Artaud’s description of general consciousness. 
Its acts, even if they concern a certain “consciousness” — and here Artaud seems to be using 
this term in the sense of Bewußtsein, that is the awareness of a particular group of its social 
role — yield to the unconscious foundations of personality, engendering a process that takes 
place, in Freudian terms, at the limits between consciousness and unconsciousness. This is 
highlighted by the fact that individuals in a group are able to assume features that do not 
coincide with their personal characters, an element that fits in the framework of Artaud’s 
understanding of this conflict as that of individuality against collectivity. In this context, the 
collective sphere is envisioned as the domain of “invasion,” where exceptional thoughts and 
tendencies are overrun by the consciousness of everyone else, in their attempts at 
homogenisation. Benjamin, in this context, focuses on the “adjustment of reality” generated 
by the homogenising trends of the masses, that is, the perception of likeness and proximity 
that results from processes of artistic reproduction. However, Benjamin also points to the 
revolutionary potential created by the masses, and in that regard moves beyond the negative 
connotations present in the accounts of Freud and Artaud. His focus is on the role of the 
masses in organising a communist revolution. 
 The notion of distraction in Benjamin’s essay establishes a connection with Artaud’s 
account of the forgetfulness of the masses regarding their own evil deeds, while bearing an 
association with the above-mentioned “state of fascination” of the masses identified by 
Freud. Distraction, according to Benjamin, is the masses’ mode of relating with the work of 
art in an era of technical reproduction. It is defined in terms of “absorption,” as opposed to 
“contemplation”: “the distracted mass absorbs the work of art” (Benjamin Work of Art 239). 
The model for this relationship is to be found in the urban citizen’s engagement with the 
architectural form of art: it encompasses neither reflective thought nor meditation. It is 
instead based on the habits of the citizen in question in relation to the places where the 
particular architecture stands. The mode of examination, if any, is absent-minded, and marked 
by the interruption of associations, an issue that Benjamin and other writers found to be at the 
core of modern experience. The dialectic of proximity and distance is crucial here: while the 
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objects one sees on a walk through the metropolis, in cinema, and in petit-bourgeois interiors 
seem to be all transient and viewed from a distance, they are perceived in terms of their 
reproducibility and therefore lack the authority of a work of art. The “quality of their 
presence,” to use an expression from Benjamin, is subject to their accessibility.  
 The absent-mindedness of the masses in relation to the objects and images 
surrounding them allows an unprecedented distracted relationship with reality. This attitude 
enables, for Benjamin, the mobilisation of the consciousness of the masses, from a possible 
engagement with changing the structures of society, to the introduction of aesthetics into 
political life, so that the masses gain “a chance to express themselves” (Work of Art 241). The 
enjoyment associated with this activity is unlimited, as Guy Debord pointed out in his La 
Societé du Spectacle (1967), while the revolutionary potential of the masses is continuously 
prevented from emerging. Benjamin situates this process within the early tactics of European 
fascism, pointing to its important articulation with capitalism. Both Artaud and Benjamin 
identify a process in which amusement and gratification exploit the energies that might 
otherwise be engaged towards a revolution or “reversal of reality.” The collective willingness 
to remain ignorant holds a special place in the alienation process of the masses, one that is 
approached differently by the two authors. 
 For Artaud, the crimes carried out by the masses cannot be understood without an 
acknowledgement of the concept of dissimulation. The practices of enchantment aimed at 
erasing the exceptional awareness of some individuals of the operations of society encompass 
both forgetfulness and the forced disappearance of awareness. This aspect is mentioned in 
detail in the epistolary written by Artaud from the Psychiatric Hospital of Rodez, where he 
spent the period between 1943 and 1946. In a letter to Breton in June 1946, for instance, 
Artaud describes acts of enchantment in the following terms: “Cela se fait un peu partout. 
C’est pour vous dire en deux mots comme en quatre que tout le monde fait de la magie, 
jusqu’à votre épicier du coin, il ne le sait pas toujours, mais il l’a su et ça lui reviendra.”270 
(Œuvres XIV 134). The at times conscious, at times unconscious character of the enchanting 
acts is highlighted by the fact that magic is widely and repeatedly practiced. An association 
with Freud is propitious here, since while the acts of the masses express the unconscious 
foundations of personality, the individuals engaged in them remain conscious of their acts, 
even if they do not feel fully liable for them. Artaud proposes that these two dimensions are 
                                                            
270 “It is done everywhere. This is to tell you plainly that everyone is engaged in magic, even your local grocer; 
he may not always know it, but he knew it and it will return to him.” 
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united by the very nature of such practices, which is that of engaging individuals by means of 
their irrational features. It is through this engagement that individuals become a mass, in 
other words, magic engages them as a mass. 
 The theme of the gratification of the masses through acts of enchantment is mentioned 
in Artaud’s letter to Georges Braque, from January 1947. He says: “la conscience de cette 
soi-disant masse amorphe et inconsciente du grand public actuel est: faisons du mal à cet 
homme blessé et malade pour avoir voulu nos empêcher de profiter du superflu”271 (Œuvres 
XIV 159). This notion of “surplus” points here to an excess that the masses normally enjoy as 
part of lifting their morale, “de l’invocation à la jouissance pour elle, de la libido libérée et 
sans frein” 272  (Œuvres XIV 159). It is a surplus that can be acquired through erotic 
satisfaction. For having opposed this form of enjoyment, while attempting to stay pure, 
Artaud and other extraordinary consciousnesses are bound to suffer and satisfy the masses 
through their suffering. The enjoyment aspect that Benjamin identifies in the self-expression 
of the masses, while their own consciousness deviates from the natural path of engaging in 
the fight for its own development, corresponds, in the view of Artaud, to the self-indulgence 
of the masses through erotic means, while in the “figures of exceptional consciousness,” all 
potentially transforming knowledge is effaced. In this sense both authors diagnose a process 
of alienation and homogenisation that acknowledges a social situation perceived as 
deplorable. 
  According to Artaud, “Sur ce plan tout le monde est sorcier, tout le monde est ce 
magicien qui envoûte un artiste humble et retiré. J’ajoute que tout le monde le sait.”273 
(Œuvres XIV 159). As far as profiting from the suffering of artists is concerned, as well as 
enjoyment derived from their attempts to veer away from the generalised morale, everyone is 
a sorcerer. This is the extension of Artaud’s understanding of practices of enchantment: they 
concern the silencing of lucidity and abstinence in favour of a common and unrestrained 
enjoyment. This fact, according to Artaud, is no secret, but neither is it openly addressed in 
society: “cette magie, sur 5 milliards d’hommes il y en a plus de 3 milliards qui la font 
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sciemment et consciemment et envoûtent la flicaille et les psychiatres pour fermer la bouche 
aux lucidités”274 (Œuvres XIV 159). 
The theme of addressing in Artaud’s text gains a new implication. In the above-
mentioned 1946 letter to Breton, Artaud describes acts of enchantment as “des attitudes 
impératives de conscience que la masse à de certaines heures du jour ou de la nuit sort des 
interstices de son giron”275 (Œuvres XIV 133). Here is remarkable that the enchanting acts are 
not described as emanating from spirits or spiritual subjects, but as attitudes of the masses. 
Concerned, as he is, with the reader not as an individual, but as the portent of an attitude, the 
question that poses itself for Artaud is that of the extent to which a person passively 
participates in normalising acts. As mentioned above, acts of forgetting and ignoring are to be 
considered part of the performance of the masses. Reading Artaud’s texts as mere 
“literature,” without engaging with his assertions, is to be part of the acts of enchantment, 
whether consciously or unconsciously. In a letter to Colette Thomas in March 1946, Artaud 
writes: “le service que vous pouvez me rendre est de croire que toute la terre n’est qu’un 
immense théâtre truqué, un Châtelet de magie noire que les imbéciles ne veulent pas voir et 
que la crapule des initiés dissimule tant qu’elle peut”276 (Œuvres XIV 100). The only thing 
Artaud asks of others is to believe, however not in an abstract way. Kaufmann suggests, in 
relation to Artaud’s epistolary: 
Recevoir une lettre d’Artaud, c’est toujours avoir le “choix” entre prendre 
place, en tant qu’être de langage, parmi ses ennemis, ou se transformer en une 
“âme” et occuper un point d’un réseau télépathique planétaire voué à sa 
défense, au soutien de sa protestation contre l’Autre.277 (Kaufmann 149) 
For Benjamin, in turn, the notion of distraction, while representing the dismantling of 
a tradition based on elitism and privilege — but also on a meditative, transformative 
experience — is the sign of a distance that allows for an absent-minded absorption of the 
surrounding world. This state of affairs allows the masses to repeatedly “forget” the 
contingent character of the current structure of society, as well as their ability to change it. 
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Instead they inattentively observe the crimes against those who oppose this forgetfulness. The 
potential new space offered by technology is repeatedly occupied with compartmentalised 
fragments of self-expression that reiterate the general impression of enclosure. Benjamin, in 
consonance with Artaud’s hypothesis of “social amnesia,” characterises the modern 
experience by the forgetfulness of the shock, in which most daily impressions are perceived 
in such a haste that they are unfit to constitute a proper experience (Benjamin Motifs 163). 
However differently, Artaud and Benjamin both express the idea that the mass 
phenomenon precipitates an adjustment of reality, in which magic is assigned the role of the 
medium. Benjamin relates this to an assessment of the remnants of magical-religious rites in 
modern forms of ritual. In his article on photography, he identifies the passage of magical 
values from traditional beliefs to the products of technology. The technological apparatus 
explores the space where magic used to dwell, the aspects of reality that were mystified but 
that have remained unconsciously present. Like photography, film creates a state of 
fascination in relation to this new awareness, that is to the presentation of unknown aspects of 
reality that are brought closer, “spatially and humanly.” But magic is also present in the 
processes that stand between the potential of the masses and their accomplishments. The cult 
of the Führer, Benjamin reminds us, is embedded in ritual values, through which the masses 
appreciate mass movements as an aesthetic experience. It is as if magic is playing a trick, 
while any potentially positive consciousness is caught up in a manipulative process that limits 
the subject’s development. 
 Artaud speaks of a “trick” in the origin of practices of enchantment, one that initially 
concerns the writer. In “Lettre sur Lautréamont,” he describes the process in which Ducasse 
is assaulted by mauvais esprits (“evil spirits”). The writer’s process of production, within the 
“unused unconscious,” is subject to this trick, which succeeds in attributing the writer’s work 
to the general consciousness. Artaud reproduces the spirits’ speech: “mais je suis ce génie qui 
inspire ta conscience, et c’est moi qui écris tes poèmes en toi, avant toi et m[ieux]”278 
(Œuvres XIV 192). The writer is thus reduced to a mere instrument of the conforming forces, 
in a process that prevents him from expressing his individuality. As mentioned above, this 
trick ultimately leads to the disappearance of the writer. 
 The operation of the trick, in the case of Ducasse, is achieved through the use of 
names. According to Artaud, Lautréamont is, in relation to Ducasse, “une manière 
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d’indéfinissable assassin”279 (Œuvres XIV 35). Because the name elevates Ducasse above his 
original self, it opens up a space within which the spirits can insert themselves and perform 
their bewitchment. As mentioned above, Benjamin proposes in the essay “On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Men” that the magic feature of language lies in its ability to 
communicate the spirit of things. As far as human beings are concerned, this takes place 
through the act of naming, which bears a trace of the divine powers of men. On the one hand, 
this suggests that in the execution of a reminiscent divine power man can convey his specific 
and definitive essence, part of the highest expression of his humanity. On the other hand, it 
advances the idea that human beings are capable of expressing the spiritual essence of things 
— at least those they enter into communication with — as well as that this process takes 
place through denomination. It is through naming that the magic of communication is 
performed. 
 Artaud’s reference to the mistake made by Ducasse in taking up the name of 
Lautréamont can be inserted into this same logic. If the name is the portent of the magic 
powers of language within human acts, as well as the expression of the essences of things, in 
this case the human essence, Ducasse’s change of name could not but entertain a connection 
with his essence, as well as with the magic powers enacted in the process of naming. Even if, 
in Artaud’s writings, the reference to the notion of name is not easily traceable, it certainly 
profits from an approximation with the idea of a transformative act, connected with the 
essence of the thing denominated. Throughout his work, Artaud undergoes transformations 
which he expresses through the adoption of different names, Artaud-le-Mômo being the best 
known. Names occupy the threshold between finite and infinite language, the liminal space 
between the material world and the spiritual. 
 The trick concerning the masses is a process that normalises the extraordinary aspects 
of life. It is experienced collectively, consciously or unconsciously, and operates on different 
levels, openly but also surreptitiously, at times giving the impression of a deception that 
diverts thought and consciousness from their original course. In Artaud’s text, the 
intermingling of “traditional” magical forces — incarnated, for instance, in the monkeys of 
the Ramayana —, with a current form of enchantment points to the longevity of, and 
association between, these configurations in his understanding. It is as if the same maleficent 
attitude had engaged in acts of enchantment through the centuries, assuming different forms 
every time. In the current case Artaud identifies a bourgeois mode of thinking, as if 
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expressing the extent to which this class represents the root of many social problems. Here 
Artaud proposes a vague connection with marxism. 
 In a 1947 letter to Breton, however, Artaud questions the very notion of magic, 
pointing to his particular understanding of it. He states: “il n’y a pas d’occultisme et pas de 
magie, pas de science obscure, pas de secret caché, pas de vérité irrévélée, mais il y a 
l’effarante dissimulation psychologique de tous les tartuffes de l’infamie bourgeoise” 280 
(Œuvres 1211). This perhaps surprising testimony to the absence of magic comes, however, 
with the affirmation that acts of bewitchment take place continuously within civilised and 
bourgeois society. Artaud’s is a refusal to frame his beliefs in traditional structures of 
thought, in the context of the defence of a singular dimension of incantation. That is: “de la 
nature et des choses j’ai mon idée personnelle, et elle me ressemble en rien à celle de qui que 
ce soit et je n’admets pas que des civilisations, des nations, des religions et des cultures 
viennent m’emmerder avec leurs conceptions” 281  (Œuvres 1208). While the refusal to 
conform to established forms of knowledge and culture is Artaud’s act of autonomous 
“alienation,” his finding of the high penetration of enchanting practices signals the constant 
struggle within his thought. The variety of figures through which magical practices are 
realised points to Artaud’s dynamic understanding of the sphere of magic: while the 
conforming tendencies remain unaltered in their character despite different temporal 
registers, their appearance can change according to social configurations. 
 Benjamin and Artaud’s approaches to the notion of magic in the texts explored here 
point to the emergence of an understanding of the collective dimension of experience, 
particularly in terms of the masses, as an important aspect of their search for elements 
capable of revealing the true or revolutionary facets of reality. From being the indeterminate, 
disorganised human element of the city, one that is courted by the surrealists and Benjamin 
alike, the masses become the actors and the subjects of a variety of social techniques, and 
attain remarkable political importance. It could be said that it is only when the reproduction 
of certain notions reaches the level of a general worldview that a conglomerate of individuals 
becomes a mass. This process is engendered, according to Benjamin, in the context of the 
shattering of the experience of authenticity related to the work of art. While the quality of 
presence is depreciated, the reproduction of objects allows for the establishment of a 
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generalised perception of proximity, both “spatially and humanly” speaking. The desire for 
homogeneity, so important in Artaud’s account of the processes engendered by general 
consciousness, motivates the will to suppress extraordinary minds and their perceptive ideas. 
This process is akin to the imposition of a normalising veil that paints existing social 
structures as immutable. 
 The question that remains open, in both Artaud’s and Benjamin’s account, is the form 
that this sought-after transformation should take. For Artaud, it concerns the content known 
by the extraordinary consciousness, the truth that the masses make so much effort to erase. 
Artaud gives a clue to his understanding of this aspect in the notion of body. More precisely, 
the transformation is related to the moment when “l’architecture de l’homme sera refaite”282 
(Œuvres XIV 158). In the writings of Benjamin, the nature of change is related to an 
exploration of the dimension of images, in a way that enables the reconstruction, following 
the decay of traditional experience, of “synthetic” and aesthetic forms of living, taking into 
account bodies as important residues of social processes. 
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5. EXPERIENCE 
The discovery of the unconscious dimension of psychic life by Freud, and his 
inclusion of this dimension in a general understanding of human nature, represented a rupture 
in philosophical tradition, one that affected the conception of experience. The traditional 
notion of experience derived from these trends, discussed in the sections below, consists of 
the general idea that human beings, either through the senses or the intellect — or, most 
likely, through a straightforward combination of the two —, are able to formulate a 
satisfactory understanding of themselves and the world. Far from being the first to bring to 
light aspects of personality that shake this understanding, Freud popularised a conception of 
the self divided within itself, a conception that, albeit not without a good deal of 
simplification, captured the public imagination. Owning as much to the expansion of printing 
as to Freud’s teaching style, this understanding changed the notional foundations of modern 
experience. 
 If the concept of the unconscious represented the almost complete inaccessibility of a 
part of the human personality, it also pointed to the larger, unexploited aspects of psychic 
life. Freud’s followers and contemporaries envisioned the unconscious dimension with both 
suspicion and wonder. Surrealist explorations tried to give consistency to the unconscious as 
part of an experience with as many connection points with the imagination as with reality, 
particularly the reality-to-come concerned with revolutionary action. Artaud, an incorrigible 
surrealist, assumed the task of investigating the spiritual sphere from the point of view of 
fury, that is, of the intensities to be found within the self. Through the questioning of the 
notions of flesh and thought, Artaud followed the path of separation, or “cette puissance de 
détachement qui traverse la vie” 283  (Dumoulié Artaud 12), to its logical conclusion in 
experimental forms of experience, in which writing had a prominent place.  
 Benjamin, from his first published writings, addresses the notion of experience while 
pointing to different facets of the crisis he believed to be underway. His vision of experience 
as a gospel, transmitted by the adult, and curtailing the youth’s development, marks the 
beginning of his tendency to oppose plain, fully conscious, individual experiences against 
non-apprehensible, spiritualised and non-self-aware ones. To some extent, language is the 
model he uses for experience, citing its mediating role between the human, material 
dimension of life and the divine, mystical one. Benjamin envisions through surrealism an 
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integration of these dimensions, seeing the movement as proposing not just artistic forms, but 
also a form of experience, that of intoxication.  
 Through the exploration of the magic or mystical dimension of life, Artaud and 
Benjamin investigate and define a form of experience that not only elaborates a radical 
reading of the conditions of living in modernity, but also outlines the different forms taken by 
experience following the crisis of traditional definitions precipitated by the work of Freud. In 
the first texts approached in this chapter, Benjamin’s “Experience” (1913) and “On the 
Program of the Coming Philosophy” (1918), and a selection of Artaud’s writings and letters 
from the period between 1921 and 1923, together with “Correspondence with Jacques 
Rivière” (1924), the limitations and discontinuities of experience are thematised in different 
contexts, while the sense of impossibility of a traditional understanding of experience 
emerges. Artaud and Benjamin envision, through a combination of forms of communion and 
solitude, represented by language or writing and religious or spiritual transcendence, the 
possibility of both dramatising and gaining distance from their negative diagnosis of 
contemporary forms of living. 
 In a second section, the relationship between language and experience is explored 
through Artaud’s texts from the surrealist period, L’Ombilic des Limbes and Le Pèse-Nerfs, 
both from 1925, and the later “Fragments d’un Journal d’Enfer” (1927), together with 
Benjamin’s essays from the thirties, “Doctrine of the Similar” (1933) and “Problems in the 
Sociology of Language: An Overview” (1935). Language appears as related to an “original” 
sphere, in which both the fragmented and decayed forms of experience are explored, through 
the idea of the trace. In this section, the fundamental distance separating the writings of 
Artaud and Benjamin becomes evident: while the French author’s perspective is of a tragic 
nature, that of the irrevocable separation of being, in relation to which all union is artificial, 
even if longed for, the German critic departs from the diagnosis of breaks and changes in 
modern experience to aim for a hermeneutic restoration of an interpretation that combines the 
continuation and discontinuation between past and present forms.  
 If the distance between Artaud and Benjamin is not a complete alienation, this is 
partially due to both having attempted to create new forms of consistency from their analyses 
of the thresholds of experience, a theme explored in the third section of this chapter. Here 
Benjamin’s famous essays on experience from the thirties, “Experience and Poverty” (1933) 
and “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” (1936) are analysed, 
together with Artaud’s “Nouvelle Lettre sur Moi-Même,” “Position de la Chair” and 
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“Manifeste en Langage Clair,” once again all from 1925. The emergence of “synthetic” forms 
of experience — after the Greek sunthetikos, based on suntithenai ‘to place together’ — are a 
positive aspect in the writings of Benjamin and Artaud, a high-point of their attempts to 
overcome the dark forces of change. Although traditional forms of experience may no longer 
be experienceable, and the dissolution in understanding of thought and the self may have 
reached a point of no return, new conditions for experience are being slowly and tentatively 
constructed. Artaud and Benjamin testify to radically different, but essentially connected, 
forms of this construction. 
 
 5.1. Experience: A Short Review 
 According to Paul Foulquié in Dictionnaire de la Langue Philosophique (1962), two 
word-groups derived from the Greek peira (“attempt, trial”) have developed into the notion 
of experience. One of them, related to empeiria (“experience”), designates “la donné du fait 
brut”284 (Foulquié 255). As opposed to epistèmè (“science”), it is used to signify an activity 
that takes its inspiration d’après l’expérience (“from experience”), that is, a vulgar or 
immediate practice that has not undergone methodical control. The second is linked to the 
Latin experientia and experiri, meaning “the act of experiencing.” The first word, empeiria, 
was commonly used to refer to the medical profession — as in Sextus Empiricus (Sextus the 
Doctor) — because their practice takes place through immediate contact with the patient. Still 
impregnated with its medical context, the term has a negative connotation in the work of 
rationalist philosophers such as Leibniz. He wrote in Monadologie (1714): “les hommes 
agissent comme les bêtes … ressemblant aux médecins empiriques, qui ont une simple 
pratique sans théorie”285 (Leibniz qdt. in Foulquié 255). Its full philosophical use, however, 
comprises a much larger field. 
 Kant, in a derivation from the above usage, describes empirical experience as related 
to knowledge coming from the senses. In the above-mentioned Critique of Pure Reason, he 
states that the faculty of cognition is awakened “by means of objects which affect our senses, 
and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding 
into activity” (43). The pure elements of knowledge are those in which the representation, in 
the absence of the object, is independent from sensations. The notion of experience is here 
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based on a scientific description of reality, one that Benjamin criticises in an article in 1918, 
as detailed below. 
 Unlike Kant’s view, empiricism as a philosophical doctrine proposes that all 
knowledge is acquired through experience (Foulquié 256). On this concern, it opposes both 
rationalism and idealism. Some of its trends contend that experience is the basis of all 
knowledge. The scientifically-described reality appears as an ideal in this context, one that is 
explored through the inductive method. The philosophical principles, therefore, are 
conditioned by experience, and sensations, unlike in Kant, should not be absent from them. In 
an approximation with Leibniz, rational or metaphysical empiricism attempts a conjunction 
of sensation and reason, including the consideration of intuition and God, that is, mystical 
experience. Henri Bergson’s belief in the significance of immediate experience for an 
appropriate understanding of reality can be seen as part of this trend. According to Bergson in 
La Pensée et le Mouvement (1934), un empirisme vrai (“a true empiricism”) attempts at 
“approfondir la vie, et, par une espèce d’auscultation spirituelle, d’en sentir palpiter l’âme; et 
cet empirisme est la vraie métaphysique”286 (qdt. in Foulquié 257). 
 Here one can observe signs of the drifting from a science-oriented definition of 
empeiria towards a larger field of experience. In this context, it is neither sensations, nor 
rational intelligence, taken in isolation, that explain experience. In a sense, this notion 
expresses “un commerce de l’esprit avec les choses”287 (Rabier qdt. in Foulquié 257), one 
that is not contained in either empiricism or idealism. If both these trends agree on the fact 
that experience is organised by reason, they disagree in terms of the origins of this reason, 
which for one of them emerges from sensuous experience, while for the other from a rational 
structure that pre-exists it. From this scenario one more trend is worthy of consideration, that 
of nominalism, according to which knowledge of reality is organised and coordinated, by 
reason, into a system of statements that constitutes language. In its simplest form, philosophy 
assumes the role of a grammar of knowledge and science. 
 The second series of words derived from the Greek peira are related to the Latin 
experientia. According to Kirchner et al. in Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe 
(“Dictionary of Philosophical Terms,” 1998), this word first appeared in the work of 
Paracelsus. Usually related to a savoir-faire acquired through practice, this notion 
corresponds to the German Erfahrung, of which Kant, Freud and Benjamin make use. This 
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sense is present in the approaches mentioned above, its distinctive character being a more 
transcendental usage. That is, one can possess experience and be experienced, in the sense of 
experientia, without having experienced a specific thing, in the same sense that having 
sensuous experiences does not necessarily mean acquiring an experience. According to Kant, 
“though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all rises out of 
experience” (43). 
 If this form of experience cannot be identified with empirical knowledge, it is also 
true that the Latin experientia branched into a multiplicity of terms related to the notion of 
experiment. In this context, experience is an active means of instruction, one that is 
provoked, most commonly, in the attempt at the testing of a hypothesis: an observation 
becomes an experience, for instance, once it has undergone comparison and control (Foulquié 
259). The terms “experimental” and “experimentation” are related to this sense, at the same 
time as different types of mental operation, whether rational or not, are assigned the name of 
experience when they make use of evidence that is analogous to the direct intuition of things. 
This is the case, for instance, in a logical experience, as well as metaphysical or mathematical 
one. In a definition that is both cognitive and affective, to experience means to engage in an 
experiment with things, usually in a personal sphere — such as to experience solitude —, and 
to know them through experience. This use is similar to the German Erleben and the French 
éprouver (Foulquié 260). 
  One common element can be identified in the different terms derived from 
experientia, that of processual duration. While the uses rooted in empeiria keep the sense of 
immediateness, of relatively new and unprocessed perceptions or data, the notions springing 
from experiri and experientia involve transformation. As Jean Wahl suggests in Traité de 
Métaphysique (1953), with reference to the Greek origins of the notion of experience, one 
can observe “une sorte de dialectique dans les changements mêmes de la signification du 
terme ‘expérience’: ce qui, d’abord, était routine ensuite devint ce qui devait libérer l’homme 
de la routine”288 (Wahl qdt. in Foulquié 258). That is, the notion that evokes the given facts 
of life is the same one that, in an interesting twist, also evokes what is not given: the 
transcendental and transformative dimensions of experience.  
 Barbara Cassin, in Vocabulaire Européen des Philosophies (2004), relates the French 
word expérience to the Latin experientia, but also to a constellation derived from the root 
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per-, which means “quelque chose comme ‘aller de l’avant, pénétrer’” 289  (436). This 
constellation includes periculum (“test, risk”), peritus (“skilful, expert”) and peras (“limit”). 
Cassin states: “le mot connote ainsi à la fois une percée et une avancée en soi et dans le 
monde, un gain de connaissance et l’habilité cumulée d’un acquis”290 (436). The concepts of 
risk and limit express an important connotation of experience, one that is expressed by 
Foucault when he describes literary experience as the “crossing of a field,” the transgression 
of limits that imposes a change on both author and reader. Referring to the relationship with 
experience in a book, Foucault defines the term as “quelque chose que l’on fait tout à fait 
seul, mais que l’on ne peut faire pleinement que dans la mesure où elle échappera à la pure 
subjectivité et où d’autres pourront, je ne dis pas la reprendre exactement, mais du moins la 
croiser et la retraverser”291 (60). Here the features of subjective engagement and collective 
availability appear combined in the notion of experience. 
 Cassin (436) distinguishes two forms of experience: expérience intérieure (“interior 
experience”), related to the German term Erleben, and expérience comme connaissance 
(“experience as knowledge”), associated with Erfahrung.292 The first of these combines the 
senses of experimenting with life, the experience of oneself and the relationship between 
personal experience and morals. In the second, experience is a form of construction and 
knowledge, as well as the correlated issue of the relationship between subject and object. 
Under the entry for Erleben in the same vocabulary list — a section edited by Natalie Depraz 
—, this distinction is briefly historicised. From the classics to German idealism, Erleben is 
characterised through the trait of immediacy and passivity that designate the simple fact of 
living. The usual translations into French, however, express the notion of experience more 
than that of life. As Depraz states, “das war ein Erlebnis” becomes “c’était une expérience 
(marquante),” while the latter sentence would be translated back quite differently, appealing 
to the notion of Erfahrung. That is: “l’allemand fait immédiatement reference à un processus 
cognitive, même élémentaire (etwas erfahren: apprendre quelque chose, même par ouï-
dire)”293 (Cassin 370). 
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 The untranslatable aspect of experience, in this case, points to “un excès de la vie sur 
elle-même”294 (Cassin 369), one that assumes a distinguished form in Erfahrung: it concerns 
not only lived experience, but the process of having learned and earned a significative 
experience. Erleben becomes, in the nineteenth century, a fundamental concept in the theory 
of knowledge, and its use as “the simple fact of living” loses strength in favour of a notion of 
“interiority,” particularly within phenomenology. This is the context evoked above, in which 
the differentiation between Erleben and Erfahrung becomes prominent. The first continues to 
describe a state more than an action, and is characterised by the reflexivity of personal 
experience; the second is related to a process of learning and transformation, one that 
frequently expresses the inclusion into a community. The sense of experience, in its everyday 
usage, charts a course between these two different connotations. The French term expérience 
and the English word experience, while they carry and express within them the exploratory 
term experientia, do not express these two senses simultaneously.  
 Freud’s thought, occupied as it was with understanding “inner life” and its 
interdependence with the “outside world,” presupposes a notion of experience derived from 
unconscious dynamics. Rotstein and Bastos, in the essay “The Freudian Conception of 
Experience” (2011), reconstruct different moments on the Freudian trajectory of discussions 
around experience, although the notion is not highlighted as a specific theme in his work. 
Through discussion of the principles of pleasure and reality, Freud suggests that humans 
access reality as part of the search to appease a drive or satisfy a desire. The interest in 
knowledge is therefore not a primordial one. However, in humanity’s quest for satisfaction, 
reality must be constantly accessed and checked, otherwise the knowledge produced by it 
may be merely speculative, or even hallucinatory, without “recurrence to experience.” Freud 
characterises religion and philosophy as this type of knowledge, and opposes them to the 
sciences, which attempt to apprehend objective connections from material reality (Rotstein 
and Bastos 374). Experience, as approached here in the sense of access to reality, plays a 
fundamental role in the acquisition of knowledge, but it is secondary to the internal impulses. 
That is, if we turn to the world “in order to experience, we do so while expecting to find 
among its objects the one that is missing in us, the one that will bring us satisfaction”295 
(Rotstein and Bastos 374). 
                                                            
294 “an excess of life over itself” 
295 “a fim de experienciá-lo, é porque esperamos encontrar entre seus objetos aquele que nos falta e cuja 
obtenção traria satisfação” 
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 The notion of experience that can be surmised from Freud’s principles of pleasure and 
reality is one motivated by the search for something absent. This something, according to 
Freud’s early description of the psychic system, is to be found in “exteriority,” the material 
world. At the same time, as Rotstein and Bastos (374) suggest, the psychoanalytic form of 
research is one that goes beyond sensory experience, since its ultimate object of study, the 
unconscious, can only be described as being “out there,” in the “exterior facet” of traditional 
sensitivity and also logicality. Freud’s attempt to provide scientific basis for this form of 
research borrowed the empirical fundaments of the science of the time, which was largely 
influenced by the philosophy of Kant. The French physician Claude Bernard and the Austrian 
philosopher Ernst Mach proposed an influential incorporation of Kantian notions into general 
definitions of science, to which Freud and a whole generation of psychiatrists subscribed 
(Rotstein and Bastos 375).  
 Kant’s postulate that experience is a product of both the senses and of understanding 
culminates in the conception, presented by the above-mentioned authors, that scientific 
investigation rests on experience. Experience is defined as “the intellectual activity that seeks 
knowledge of things through a determinate orientation of the phenomena and the facts”296 
(Rotstein and Bastos 375). It is the result of the submission of sensory data to the rules of 
understanding. This use also denotes the author’s efforts to distance scientific activity from 
the negative connotations of empiricism mentioned above in relation to medicine, that is, of a 
practice without theoretical basis. To be based on experience means that science is, on the 
one hand, experimental, in the sense that its knowledge takes reality and the senses, rather 
than abstract ideas, as its starting point, and, on the other hand, that it is intellectual, since the 
sensory data is submitted to reason, and this leads to the hypotheses and principles that are 
then shared amongst the scientific community.  
 While this form of “experimental reasoning” gives an account of experience as one 
element in a mode of investigation, it does not explore the notion of experience at the basis of 
Freud’s practice, that is the experience that underlies and is referred to in his clinical practice. 
The clinical setting of psychoanalysis suggests that the “analytic” experience does not 
correspond to the scientific one, above all because the subject of investigation, the person 
being analysed, also performs the experience, preventing the complete control of 
manifestations taking place in such a setting (Rotstein and Bastos 378). There are, therefore, 
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fenômenos e dos fatos” 
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at least two notions of experience in Freudian thought, one, the scientific one, that describes 
experience as a means of achieving knowledge and another that is inseparable from the 
psychoanalytic technique, that is, an experience produced at the same time that it is 
investigated. A third notion of experience can be added, derived directly from Freud’s 
conceptualisation of psychical life, presented in the first chapter of this work.  
 The unconscious being the “true psychical reality” (Freud Dreams 607), the subject’s 
experience is fundamentally based on it. However its contents are filtered by the conscious 
and preconscious systems. This implies that one’s experience is permeated by the unknown, 
not only in the sense that the unconscious appears, transfigured, in dreams, daydreams, jokes 
and other formations, but also in the extent to which one’s motivations are, for the most part, 
not evident to oneself. In relation to day dreams, Freud suggests that they do not leave the 
impression of “an actual experience” on the subject, since, unlike dreams, the thoughts they 
express are not transformed into sensory images (Dreams 537). This suggests that 
unconscious formations only form part of experience in particular cases, of which dreams, if 
they are remembered, are one. They allow one to see from the perspective of primitive ways 
of looking at things, promoting a contact with traces of experiences that form “the core of our 
being.” These ancient elements, being unconscious and therefore primal to the formation of 
conscious thought, can neither be destroyed nor inhibited. They remain at the basis of life 
without ever touching consciousness, despite the latter’s continuous attempts to conceal them 
and prevent their emergence. 
 Freud proposes a problematic notion of experience: the approaches mentioned above 
identify it neither with the immediateness of consciousness and lived reality, nor with the 
transcendental knowledge acquired over time. It should be remembered, however, that Freud 
considered inner reality to be as inaccessible as external reality. Through this assertion, as 
mentioned above, Freud intended to restore the antithesis between conscious life and dream 
life to “legitimate proportions,” stating that they are at least equal in relation to the access one 
has to them. Knowledge of the unconscious is derived through discourse, within a dialogic 
process. What takes place, as suggested by Mosès (Rêves 37), is not the apprehension of an 
abstract truth, but the display of the process of discovering a possible truth. Freud proposes a 
new form of knowledge that differs from established science, and relies on a dialogical 
process rather than an objective one. This takes place in parallel with his defence of the 
scientific aspects of psychoanalysis. The experience that emerges from Freud’s theory is that 
of a suspension of certainty, of the permeation of known and unknown aspects into one’s 
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personality, of a knowledge of oneself and the world that takes place on different levels and 
never definitively. This can occur in a troubling as well as a clarifying context. 
 From the notion of experience suggested by Freud’s theory, to the philosophical 
approaches derived from the Greek term peira, the word for trial and essay, the sense of an 
open and continuous attempt to be part of the “liveliness of life itself” has remained present. 
The discussion of experience emerged together with questioning of the meaning of life, and 
whether this resides in the fact of living and staying alive, in the face of all known and 
unknown threats, or in a specific form of action, more keenly subject to the risks of cessation 
and transfiguration of life than ordinary activity? The answers that this work attempts to 
extract from the writings of Artaud and Benjamin make use of both extinct and current usages 
of the term experience. 
 
 5.2. Undesirable Wisdom 
 Benjamin’s occupation with the notion of experience appears to have started very 
early. In the short essay “Erfahrung” (“Experience,” 1913) he addresses the theme from the 
point of view of the admonishing and limiting function the notion exercises over young 
people. It is because of their focus on experiencing virtually “everything” that adults 
disregard juvenile values as transitory and inconsequential. The context in which the essay 
was written, as mentioned above, is that of Benjamin’s engagement in what is known today 
as Die Deutsche Jugendbewegung (“the German Youth Movement”). From when he was a 
secondary school student in Berlin, Benjamin published short essays in the periodical Der 
Anfang (“The Beginning”), run by student members of the movement. According to Howard 
Eiland (2), he dedicated his last two years of secondary school and the following two years of 
university to student activism, an engagement that culminated in his assuming the presidency 
of the Berlin University Freie Studentenschaft (“Independent Student Association”) in 1914, 
a post he held until the outbreak of the war. 
 At the time, Benjamin, particularly in his essays, took it as his mission “to restore 
people to their youth.” Youth here means, according to Eiland, “the capacity for experience 
that exceeds the rational framework of life, is readiness for a ‘radically new way of seeing’” 
(4). For Osborne and Charles, Benjamin’s concern with delineating an immediate and 
metaphysical experience of the spirit, filtered through the cultural ideals of the Youth 
Movement, “contrasts the empty, spiritless [Geistlosen] and unartistic ‘experiences’ 
accumulated over a life merely lived-through [erlebt] with that privileged kind of experience 
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which is filled with spiritual content through its enduring contact with the dreams of youth.” 
The short essay “Experience,” analysed below, is exemplary of Benjamin’s categorical 
opposition to an “empty” notion of experience imposed on youth. However, it is in the longer 
and more philosophical “Program der Kommenden Philosophie” (“On the Program of the 
Coming Philosophy”), written in 1918, that Benjamin provides a deeper expression of his 
early approach to experience. This section will address these two texts in order to give an 
account of this approach, the seeds of which were further cultivated in his later texts.  
 The short article “Experience” was published in Der Anfang in October 1913, under 
the pseudonym “Ardor.” It was, in fact, Benjamin’s last contribution to the journal organised 
by the Youth Student Movement at the University of Freiburg, where he spent the summer 
semesters of 1912 and 1913. “Experience” opens with the following lines: “In our struggle 
for responsibility, we battle someone who is masked. The mask of the adult is called 
‘experience.’” (Benjamin Early 116). The phrase “struggle for responsibility” is characteristic 
of the tone used by the movement, which is also preoccupied with the notion of der Geist 
(“the spirit”). Benjamin’s use of the term “awakening” in relation to youth is informative in 
this context: it denotes the reform of consciousness capable of bringing the rising generation 
to the point where it can achieve its mission of transforming society. The starting point, and 
perhaps the most relevant aspect of this transformation, is within young people themselves.  
 As Eiland (9) points out, in Benjamin’s early writings, youth has an “inevitable 
dissonant” sense of itself, one that is expressed through the communion and solitude required 
by the movement’s precepts. That is, youth can only take itself seriously when it feels the 
sense of a genuine community, defined as a collective of individual consciences, which in 
turn can only be attained through the “deepest solitude” of each of its members. The sense of 
responsibility, therefore, constitutes part of the moral element of the youth movement’s 
mission, that of transforming itself spiritually in order to achieve a community that can 
undertake a larger transformation.  
 The adult, in this context, makes use of his supposed accumulated experience to 
prevent the youth from engaging in a process of transformation. According to Benjamin, “in 
advance he devalues the years we will live, making them into a time of sweet youthful 
pranks, of childish rapture before the long sobriety of serious life” (Early 116). In this 
context, youth is envisioned as a “brief night” preceding the years of maturity. Benjamin 
defines the latter as the time “of compromise, impoverishment of ideas, and apathy” (Early 
116-7). The experience of adulthood contains no more than the realisation of the 
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meaninglessness of life and its brutality. It is precisely this feature, according to Benjamin, 
that leads to the adult’s use of the term “experience” as his gospel: because he has not “raised 
his eyes” to the transcendent, experience becomes “the warrant of life’s commonness” (Early 
117). 
  In “Experience,” Benjamin commonly refers to the adult as “the philistine,” in the 
sense of narrow-minded and anti-intellectual, a use that was also common amongst the 
German romanticists. Key to his conception of the philistine is the absence of a spiritual life. 
In comparison, youth knows that “there is truth,” and is faithful to it. Benjamin poses the 
question of whether the elders are right about one thing, “namely, that what we experience 
will be sorrowful and that only in the inexperienceable can we ground all courage and 
meaning” (Early 117). If this were so, he argues, life would be without solace: “Each of our 
experiences has its content. We ourselves will give it content from out of our spirit.” (Early 
117). It is youthful experience that endows its own meaning, and not a future life or goal. 
Error, in this context, is assigned the role of an aid to truth. According to Benjamin, the 
philistine dismisses discoveries of youth by rejoicing in “every new meaninglessness.” 
Thereby “he reassures himself: spirit does not really exist” (Early 118). While the dreams of 
youth are reminders of the call of the spirit, the philistine battles them: “he tells young people 
of that gray, overwhelming experience and teaches them to laugh at themselves” (Early 118).  
 Benjamin’s essay refutes the notion of experience in which the transforming and 
spiritual aspects of the youth are disregarded by the older generations, and reaffirms precisely 
these aspects as part of the most important mission of youth. By the end of “Experience,” he 
is suggesting an alternative approach to the notion expressed in his title, that is “a different 
experience”: “it is the most beautiful, most untouchable, most immediate, because it can 
never be without spirit while we remain young” (Early 118). The highlighted “we” in this 
sentence is characteristic of the polarising tone of Benjamin’s essay. In a reference to 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Benjamin states: “always one experiences only oneself” (Early 118). 
He resumes the theme of deep personal experience being the basis for the transformation to 
be achieved by youth. Above all, this “different” experience relies on the notion of spirit. In 
fact, “the youth will experience spirit, and the less effortlessly he attains to anything great, the 
more he will encounter spirit everywhere in his wanderings and in every person” (Early 118). 
The spirit appears here not only as the medium, but also as the very content of experience. In 
contrast, adulthood is de-spiritualised, referring to the spirit only to the extent that it allows it 
as a form of nostalgia, diminishing youth as the time of “foolish” dreams.  
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 Two distinct notions of experience had already emerged in Benjamin’s 1913 essay. 
However, while one is defined and detailed, even if expressed as a negative, the other is only 
touched upon, its full expression assigned to the future of current youth. Five years later, 
Benjamin would propose a philosophical approach to the notion of experience, while 
criticising Kant’s philosophy as based on “self-evident” experience. Scholem describes the 
context in which, around 1918, he and Benjamin discussed “On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy,” along with Hermann Cohen’s book Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (“Kant’s 
Theory of Experience”). For Scholem, Benjamin’s text presents a notion of experience that 
“encompassed man’s intellectual and psychological connection with the world, which takes 
place in the realms not yet penetrated by cognition” (Friendship 73). The criticism of Kant’s 
categories and the attempt to supersede his notion of experience is evident. For Benjamin, 
Kant had encouraged an inferior understanding of experience, one that he categorises, in his 
essay, as being of the “lowest order” (Philosophy 101). 
 The essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” remains unpublished in 
Benjamin’s lifetime. It aims at a “philosophy of the future,” and takes upon itself the task of 
sorting out “which elements of the Kantian philosophy should be adopted and cultivated, 
which should be reworked and which should be rejected” (Benjamin Philosophy 102). This 
goal is evidently based on recognition of the importance of Kant’s philosophy, at the same 
time as asserting its failings in regard to specific issues. Although in a very different form 
from the essay “Experience,” the 1918 article also relies on criticism of a common usage of 
the notion of experience, this time in the philosophical field, to launch the basis for a new 
approach that would only take shape in the years to come.297  
 Benjamin approximates the philosophy of Kant with that of Plato: “both of these 
philosophers share a confidence that the knowledge of which we can give the clearest 
account will also be the most profound” (Philosophy 100). He identifies a problem: Kantian 
epistemology is based on a “low” notion of reality. In his words, “the reality with which, and 
with the knowledge of which, Kant wanted to base knowledge on certainty and truth is a 
reality of a low, perhaps the lowest, order” (Philosophy 100). This notion of reality comprises 
the first element of Benjamin’s criticism of Kant. But the problem faced by Kant’s 
epistemology, according to Benjamin, was not only that of the lasting certainty of knowledge, 
but also of the belief in the integrity of an experience that is ephemeral. Kant wanted to “take 
                                                            
297 The following lines approach Benjamin’s article without going into the details of his criticism of Kant, which 
would fall outside the purpose of this text. 
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the principles of experience” from the sciences, particularly mathematical physics. What is at 
issue, Benjamin states, is “the concept of the naked, primitive, self-evident experience, 
which, for Kant, as a man who somehow shared the horizon of his time, seemed to be the 
only experience given — indeed, the only experience possible” (Philosophy 101). This 
experience, in other words, is that of the enlightenment.  
 Benjamin’s objection to this form of experience is firstly that it is “unique and 
temporally limited” (Philosophy 101). For Benjamin, it would be more appropriate to call it a 
world view, a view of the world that assigned a minimum of significance to knowledge 
acquisition. He suggests that this type of experience, “reduced to a nadir,” was perhaps a 
necessity of Kant’s work: “one can say that the very greatness of his work, his unique 
radicalism, presupposed an experience which had almost no intrinsic value and which could 
have attained its (we may say) sad significances only through its certainty” (Philosophy 101). 
Benjamin then proposes a “correction,” in the terms mentioned above, to this notion of 
experience, while evoking the restricting effect of it on Kantian thought. This correction 
consists in giving experience a “higher context,” one that illuminates the black spots he 
identifies in the enlightenment and beyond. That is: 
It is obviously a matter of that same state of affairs that has often been 
mentioned as the religious and historical blindness of the Enlightenment, with 
no recognition of the extent to which these features of the Enlightenment 
pertain to the entire modern era. (Benjamin Philosophy 101) 
 The “religious and historical blindness” identified by Benjamin in the modern era 
suggest a partial disclaimer of Kant, one that concerns the virtual absence of metaphysics in 
his philosophy. Benjamin identifies a “higher context” of experience that comprises the 
possibility of a theory of being. He states that “the notion of experience held in the Kantian 
age did not require metaphysics” (Philosophy 102). Benjamin thus assigns a historical cause 
to the blindness of the era, while identifying in Kant’s philosophy the “primitive elements” of 
an unproductive metaphysics — which were in fact the philosopher’s criticism of the 
“weakness or hypocrisy” of his contemporaries — that ultimately separate knowledge “from 
the realm of experience in its full freedom and depth” (Philosophy 102). At the basis of this 
separation are two ideas: Kant’s conception of knowledge as a relationship between subjects 
and objects, and Kant’s association between knowledge and human empirical consciousness.  
 Regarding the first of these, Benjamin suggests that the notion on which the 
distinction of subject and object is based, that is the notion of “an individual living ego which 
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receives sensations by means of its senses and forms its ideas on the basis of them” 
(Philosophy 103), is no more than a mythology. He then lists other forms of “epistemological 
mythologies,” such as primitive peoples’ identification with sacred plants and animals, to 
highlight the content underlying them: that the everyday sensory and intellectual knowledge 
of an epoch is very much an organised set of beliefs. In his own era Benjamin sees the 
clairvoyants and the insane as specimens of a claim to knowledge based on variant forms of 
object-subject relationships.  
 In relation to the second of the above-mentioned problems, that of the connection of 
human empirical consciousness with knowledge, Benjamin criticises the fact of experience 
being the mere object of knowledge in Kant’s scheme, and “specifically of its psychological 
branch” (Philosophy 103). This critique is similar to that of the 1913 essay, in which 
Benjamin’s envisioning of the significative and spiritual value of experience is ultimately 
incompatible with it being the object of a form of consciousness, particularly a psychological 
one. In 1918, Benjamin questions the extent to which “true experience” can be related to 
psychological consciousness. He proposes a rapprochement with the field of religion, and 
through this, it could be argued, with transcendental experience. He presents this approach 
from the point of view of the traditional link between philosophy and religion: 
Philosophy is based upon the fact that the structure of experience lies within 
the structure of knowledge and is to be developed from it. This experience, 
then, also includes religion, as the true experience, in which neither god nor 
man is object or subject of experience but in which this experience depends on 
pure knowledge as the quintessence of which philosophy alone can and must 
think god. (Benjamin Philosophy 104) 
 While in the first lines Benjamin reaffirms the scope of experience in Kant’s theory as 
developing from knowledge, he proposes, in the lines that follow, the inclusion of religion in 
this field. Benjamin defends religion as the perfect example of pure knowledge due to the 
indiscernibility of object and subject in religious experience. Here the “correcting” of Kant’s 
theory is visible in all its ambiguity: while the ultimate goal of the consideration of religion is 
the improvement of the Kantian system in terms of the establishment of an “autonomous” 
sphere of knowledge, in regard to the concepts of subject and object, this inclusion also 
allows the establishment of a new direction for this philosophy, that of “thinking god.”  
 Benjamin goes on in the article to repeat his plea for metaphysics, for its “universal 
power to tie all of experience immediately to the concept of God, through ideas” (Philosophy 
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104). Here, for the first time in the text, “God” appears capitalised, as a philosophical concept 
that allows Benjamin to unite the fields of “true experience,” pure knowledge and 
metaphysics. Benjamin’s criticism of the Kantian notion of experience takes the form here of 
a claim for the inclusion not only of generally-designated religious experience, but also of the 
realm of religion as a theological influence, that is, one that should occupy itself with the 
study of the nature of God.  
 While theology is, for Benjamin, one missing aspect in Kant’s theory, language is the 
other. Just as Kant had to find the principles of experience in science, the “new philosophy,” 
according to Benjamin, will have to find a reference-point from which to define its own 
guidelines. This should take place through the relating of knowledge to language. Here 
Benjamin evokes the philosopher Johann Georg Hamann, who he claims suggested this 
connection during Kant’s lifetime (Philosophy 107). Hamann’s appeal to affection and 
intuition would have a great influence on the authors of the Sturm und Drang: his ideas 
reached Benjamin’s generation via the “counter-enlightenment” thinkers. “On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Men” already bears traces of Hamann’s influence, particularly 
in the relating of the human and the divine through words. 
 According to Benjamin, “a concept of knowledge gained from reflection on the 
linguistic nature of knowledge will create a corresponding concept of experience which will 
also encompass realms that Kant failed to truly systematise” (Philosophy 108). Of these 
realms, the realm of religion is the foremost for Benjamin. His definition of language as a 
dimension that keeps the remnants of a divine language alive, as mentioned above, is active 
in this context. The new philosophy, Benjamin says, “in its universal element would either 
itself be designated as theology or would be superordinated to theology to the extent that it 
contains historically philosophical elements” (Philosophy 108). The reference to history, 
here, is perhaps related to what Benjamin calls the “historical point of view” of primitive 
peoples’ relationship with the cosmos. The question, for Benjamin, is of the relationship 
between knowledge in general and knowledge of religion. Only through considering 
transcendental experience can the Kantian system advance. In the article’s final lines, 
Benjamin suggests a definition that summarises his criticism: “experience is the uniform and 
continuous multiplicity of knowledge” (Philosophy 108). Here the concept of continuation 
denotes the intention to regard human consciousness as more than empirical intervals of 
awareness, and, perhaps, as mentioned above, as the overcoming of an experience that is 
ephemeral. 
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 While arguing for the inclusion of religion and other realms into the Kantian system, 
Benjamin criticises the “naked” notion of experience that emerges from this theory of 
knowledge, based as it is on an empirical notion of consciousness and a scientific notion of 
reality. Benjamin sketches an alternative notion of experience that emerges from the 
exploration of the relationship between knowledge and language, one that he argues exceeds 
the Kantian system, through the consideration of those aspects of knowledge in which subject 
and object are not easily differentiated, such as religion, and in which physical reality, as 
explained by the sciences, is extrapolated.  
 The notion of experience that emerges from the essays of Benjamin considered here is 
above all a transcendental one, in the sense that it is related to a spiritual realm. This notion is 
not particularly explored nor detailed in Benjamin’s pieces of criticism, but some aspects 
would have a lasting presence in his later writings, including the non-coincidence of 
experience and psychological consciousness, the relative inaccessibility of its contents in 
everyday life, and its connection to a notion of truth. Finally, the special relationship that the 
notion of experience entertains with the field of language, touched upon in these early 
writings, would remain a constant in Benjamin’s work, taking multifaceted forms, from 
discussion of the written script to different approaches to the concept of the image.  
 
 5.3. The Separation 
 In Artaud’s writings from the early twenties, a notion of experience can be sketched. 
It is composed of aspects of life that disrupt the order of things through enthusiastic uproar. 
For instance, while reviewing various art exhibitions for the magazine Demain in 1921, 
Artaud designates the most important aspect of painting as the expression of the ideals of the 
artist. If the object depicted is secondary, what gains prominence in painting is “tout ce qui, à 
travers le modèle, peut être dit de vie battante et trépidante, angoissée ou lénifiée”298 (Œuvres 
32). This sphere, close to a tragic world view, punctuates the writings of Artaud throughout 
his life. In connection with the issues of consciousness and unconsciousness in particular, it 
occupies an important place in some of the first texts he published in the twenties. 
 In another article destined for Demain, Artaud touches on the theme of consciousness 
while discussing cubism. This form of art, he says, presents different states of consciousness 
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as “plans séparés et sans rapports” 299  (Œuvres 33). Cubist paintings offer a mosaic of 
“subconscious images,” which follow an “irrational disorder.” To Artaud, this form of 
separation seems artificial, since it is based on an unsustainable exclusion. He asks: “qui 
admettrait seulement des sensations d’un ordre purement intellectuel, qui ne devrait rien à 
l’apport des sens proprement dits, des nerfs, en un mot, en nous”300 (Œuvres 33). Artaud 
suggests that the different planes of consciousness are not accurately expressed in cubism, 
and his belief in the interdependence of thought and feeling is the principle through which he 
challenges the “new art.” 
 In discussing the painting of Moïse Kisling, Artaud proposes the idea of an image of 
an experience impregnated with unconsciousness. He describes this in the following terms: 
“celui-ci [Kisling] ne s’attache qu’à nous rendre la vie, vue de son angle le plus aigu, chargée 
d’inconscience profonde et de sens”301 (Œuvres 34). The unconscious, in this context, is 
related to the possibility of envisioning life as a continuous state of novelty, an act capable of 
producing a new angle on reality. The unconscious is brought to light through the sensual 
intensity of painting. It is also approached in terms of a reservoir of sense, that is, it assumes 
a positive connotation that prefigures later surrealist writings of Artaud. 
 It is in the short texts concerned with the theatrical techniques of Charles Dullin, with 
whose company Artaud was involved between 1921 and 1923, that a more elaborate 
approach to consciousness takes form. Here consciousness is the domination of the 
movements of the soul that is necessary for the creation of the means and the spirit of theatre. 
In order to accomplish this creation, Artaud writes, “il fallait constituer un petit noyau 
d’acteurs parfaitement disciplinés, parfaitement au courant des exigences de leur métier, 
parfaitement conscients”302 (Œuvres 35). The demand to consider the soul’s movements, 
instead of merely figuring them, situates this activity as that of a possession, the opposite of a 
belief in the soul’s “natural” expressive ability. For Artaud, it is through conscious hard work 
that this movement becomes meaningful in theatre, providing it with increased significance. 
 Artaud’s belief in the need for a depuration of human activities is made explicit in the 
idea of theatre espoused here, that is, a theatre “outside” the text, a theatre in and of itself: 
                                                            
299 “separate and disconnected planes” 
300 “who would only admit feelings of a purely intellectual order, which should owe nothing to the contribution 
of the senses themselves, the nerves, in a word, in us” 
301 “ee aims to render our lives, seen from the most acute angle, charged with deep unconsciousness and sense” 
302 “it would be necessary to constitute a small kernel of actors, perfectly disciplined, perfectly aware of the 
demands of their job, perfectly conscious” 
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“Ça se passerait comme dans la vie. Mais une vie décantée, essentialisée.”303 (Œuvres 36). 
This form of life is made explicit through the immediate feelings arising in the scene, a 
“direct theatre” in which “plus loin que de jouer des textes, il y a un certain idéal du théâtre 
qui résiderait dans la figuration d’une vie vécu au moment même où elle se fabrique”304 
(Œuvres 36). The consciousness of the actor in relation to his or her expression is vital for the 
theatrical endeavour, in which life, more than figured, is lived within the scene. The positive 
status of consciousness in theatre, and the form of expression that this consciousness allows, 
is in consonance with the forms of life conveyed in painting, particularly when the “new art” 
is not fully occupied with breaking away from conventions. 
 In the personal sphere, while 1922 was marked by Artaud’s participation in plays with 
Dullin’s company, Atelier, he also suffered from extreme tiredness and frequent headaches 
(Grossman Œuvres 1714). In the letters and poems send by Artaud to Génica Athanasiou 
between 1922 and 1923, the discussion of consciousness, praised for its connectedness to life, 
acquires a more personal tone. Athanasiou and Artaud met at Atelier, of which she was part 
between 1920 and 1926, and soon began a romantic relationship. After his departure from the 
group, she took part in many of his shows, and they remained linked until 1927. In a letter 
written in July 1922, Artaud tells Athanasiou: “il me semble que je suis separé de mon propre 
corps”305 (Œuvres 52). He goes on to relate this situation both to the suffering caused him by 
the absence of Athanasiou, and to his own attempts to stop ingesting opium, which he had 
consumed, since 1919, “pour lutter contre des états de douleurs errantes et d’angoisses dont 
je souffrais depuis l’âge de 19 ans”306 (Œuvres 1712). Both situations resulted in a distancing 
from physical reality that intensified fundamental spiritual issues for Artaud. 
 A year later, in July 1923, Artaud would detail this feeling of separation in another 
letter to Athanasiou. He describes it as a sense of numbness, or “un sentiment 
d’engourdissement général et de faiblesse intense et qui serait en même temps une 
douleur”307 (Œuvres 55). Despite the apparent abstract character of this feeling, Artaud urges 
Athanasiou to consider “que cela soit vrai, corresponde à quelque chose, soit aussi vrai 
                                                            
303 “This would happen as in life. But in a decanted, essentialised life.” 
304 “much more than playing texts, there is an ideal theatre that represents a life lived at the same time that it is 
produced” 
305 “I feel as though I am separated from my own body” 
306 “to fight against the states of wandering pain and anguish that I have suffered since the age of nineteen” 
307 “a feeling of general numbness and intense weakness that is, at the same time, a pain” 
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qu’une douleur localisée, ou un choc, la rencontre d’un obstacle”308 (Œuvres 55). “As true 
as” a pain and a shock, this sensation dominates Artaud’s preoccupations at the time. The idea 
of an obstacle between Artaud and his own perception is central to his concern. While he 
identifies feelings of torpor in many parts of his body, he asserts them to be part of the same 
condition: 
la même sensation d’engourdissement, de séparation de moi-même de chacun 
de mes membres, de mes organes … et que lorsque je me touche, je n’aie pas 
le sentiment de ME toucher moi-même mais de rencontrer un obstacle 
conscient, que je me fasse la sensation d’être un squelette sans peau ni chair, 
ou plutôt un vide vivant309 (Œuvres 55) 
 The feeling that a “conscious obstacle” separates his perception from his actions 
brings Artaud unprecedented suffering, leading him to assert that he would exchange his 
entire life for a few moments of peace: “Il n’est pas question ici de médecine. Comprends 
enfin, une fois pour toutes, que je considère ma vie comme perdue.” 310  (Œuvres 56). 
Dramatised in the epistolary exchange, Artaud’s suffering lies “outside human reason.” He 
proposes the consideration of suffering, which is responsible for his ètat d’esprit, as a 
defining and unique character of his experience. In October 1923 he writes to Athanasiou: 
“…la chose primordiale, la chose qui est la question est l’INTENSITÉ de la souffrance. Tu me 
parles toujours de ma vie, de guérison future, mais comprends que l’idée de la souffrance est 
plus forte que l’idée de la guérison, l’idée de la vie.”311 (Œuvres 58). The idea that suffering, 
through its sheer intensity, can superimposes itself on the idea of life, is part of a defining 
element in Artaud’s writings, that of cruelty. 
 The only sense remaining in a suffering life is the search for a means to relieve the 
on-going pain. This search takes the form of an urge, preventing the emergence of any form 
of thinking. There is no possibility of contemplation or passive waiting. Artaud states: “mon 
                                                            
308 “that this is true, this corresponds to something, it is as true as a localised pain, or a shock, an encounter with 
an obstacle” 
309 “The same sensation of numbness, of separation from myself from each of my limbs, my organs... and when 
I touch myself I do not feel as though I am touching MYSELF but that of meeting a conscious obstacle, as I feel 
like a skeleton without skin or flesh, or rather a living emptiness.” 
310 “This is not a question of medicine. You should understand, once and for all, that I consider my life to be 
lost.” 
311 “…the primary issue, the issue that is at stake is the INTENSITY of suffering. You always talk to me about 
my life, my future cure, but you should understand that the idea of suffering is stronger than the idea of healing, 
than the idea of life.” 
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corps tordu, mon corps coupé, mon cerveau scié ne me donnent pas le temps d’attendre”312 
(Œuvres 58). Outside the reach of medicine, this state is not only chronic but also essentially 
immutable. Throughout the correspondence, Artaud reminds Athanasiou that this condition is 
not transitory, particularly not in relation to his personality traits. He often claims: “il aurait 
fallu me connaître avant tout ceci”313 (Œuvres 60), indicating that his state has a remote 
origin, the understanding of which could make apparent contradictions fade away.  
 This excruciating scenario is re-enacted, and launched to another level, in the letters 
exchanged between Artaud and the editor of La Nouvelle Revue Française (NRF), Jacques 
Rivière, between May 1923 and June 1924. As well as a correspondence, this was Artaud’s 
first publication to reach a wide audience, nowadays known as “Correspondance avec 
Jacques Rivière.” This work first appeared in the above-mentioned literary journal, in the 
September 1924 edition, under the title “Une Correspondance.” At that time Artaud, twenty-
six years old, was frequenting artistic circles, acting in cinema, and had published a collection 
of poems entitled Tric Trac du Ciel (1923). As the correspondence makes evident, he 
harboured some hope for the literary society of that time, and valued the recognition he was 
to receive from it. The correspondence began when Artaud sent some of his poems to the 
magazine, of which Rivière was the editor. The poems were rejected, and the two exchanged 
letters on the reasons for this. Artaud gives expression to his conceptions on writing and 
thought while attempting to make his “case” to Rivière.  
 The letters open with Artaud highlighting the fact he has not changed the poems 
addressed to the NRF following their rejection due to their coming from the profound 
incertitude of his thinking. He attests to his happiness when this incertitude is not 
overwhelmed by the sense of absolute non-existence, from which he suffers from time to 
time. He calls this non-existence “une véritable déperdition” 314  (Œuvres 70), and also 
describes it in terms of a “total absence.” It is faced with this fact that Artaud cannot conceive 
of “correcting” his poems. The question he addresses to Rivière expresses this conviction: 
“Pensez-vous qu’on puisse reconnaître moins d’authenticité littéraire et de pouvoir d’action à 
un poème défectueux mais semé des beautés fortes qu’à un poème parfait mais sans grand 
retentissement intérieur?”315 (Œuvres 70). Here the privileging of content over form, which 
                                                            
312 “my twisted body, my cut-up body, my sawed brain do not afford me time to wait” 
313 “you would have had to know me before all this” 
314 “a real loss” 
315 “Do you think that we can find less literary authenticity and power in a poem that is defective, but sown with 
much beauty, than in a poem that is perfect, but with little internal resonance?” 
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was present in Artaud’s short essays on painting, takes on a more complex form in relation to 
his process of creation.  
 The question that interests Artaud in the act of writing concerns not the form, but the 
content and the possibility of its expression. Considering the inseparability of spiritual 
products from the spirit itself, Artaud writes: “il ne s’agit pas pour moi de rien moins que de 
savoir si j’ai ou non le droit de continuer à penser, en vers ou en prose”316 (Œuvres 70). The 
correspondence with Rivière allows Artaud to question of his own thought. He addresses 
Rivière not as a confessor, however, but as a guarantor (Kaufmann 100). Through this 
dynamic, he attributes to his addressee the power to judge the validity of his writing, thought 
and existence, these aspects being interdependent in his view. At the same time, he protests 
his disregard for public opinion. The following excerpt from Artaud’s letter of 29th January 
1924 points to this aspect, but also to something beyond it. According to Artaud, “j’ai pour 
me guérir du jugement des autres toute la distance qui me sépare de moi”317 (Œuvres 72). 
While saying that his “mental confession” was not an attempt to justify himself in the eyes of 
Rivière, Artaud implies that other people’s judgements are generally a cause of harm, 
following which he makes use of the distance that “separates him from himself” to heal.  
 This distance, understood in the usual way, could mean the difference between the 
author-persona and one’s real self. In Artaud’s writings, however, it points in other 
directions. He seems to propose that his relationship with public opinion is analogous to his 
relationship with himself: a distance separates the two, and while this distance usually 
signifies an obstacle, it might also serve as a provisional aid. Artaud submits himself to a 
judgement that is equally or more severe than that of public opinion, so that the criteria for 
accessing his work lies elsewhere: “…si je juge très bien mon esprit, je ne peux juger les 
productions de mon esprit que dans la mesure où elles se confondent avec lui dans une espèce 
d’inconscience bienheureuse. Ce sera là mon critérium.”318 (Œuvres 73). 
 The “blissful unconsciousness” in which the spirit merges with its productions is the 
criteria for accessing his work that Artaud is searching for. While he does not possess these 
criteria, the correspondence enacts his projection of it onto Rivière, who, through an act of 
speech, could assure the validity and quality of Artaud’s writing. On the question of his right 
                                                            
316 “It is a question, for me, of nothing less than knowing whether or not I have the right to continue thinking, in 
verse or prose.” 
317 “To cure myself from the judgment of others I have all the distance that separates me from myself.” 
318 “…if I judge my spirit very well, I can only judge its productions while they merge with my spirit in some 
kind of blissful unconsciousness. This will be my criterion.” 
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to write, Artaud himself forges an answer in the post-script to the same letter: “je suis un 
homme qui a beaucoup souffert de l’esprit, et à ce titre j’ai le droit de parler”319 (Œuvres 74). 
The right to write à tout prix, which is assured, does not guarantee any form of recognition. 
Artaud’s insistence on knowing the destiny of his poems throughout the correspondence — 
that is, whether they will be published in the NRF or not —, testifies to the value he attaches 
to acknowledgement of his writing. Rivière assumes the position of the appeasing confidante, 
by stating the uncertainty of all souls, as well as the difficulty intrinsic to all creation. Artaud 
rejects his arguments, and continuously points to the singularity of his own case, as well as to 
the faulty analyses of his correspondent.  
 While the original rejection of Artaud’s poems was explained as being because of the 
lack of “une unité suffisante d’impression”320 (Rivière qtd. in Artaud Œuvres 71), the editor’s 
appreciation of Artaud himself shifts during the course of the correspondence. In his letter of 
25th March 1924, Rivière recognises the faults in his attitude, and describes it as “comme ces 
médecins qui prétendent guérir leurs patients en refusant de les croire, en niant l’étrangeté de 
leur cas, en les replaçant de force dans la normale”321 (Rivière qtd. in Artaud Œuvres 75). 
This does not prevent Rivière from continuously giving Artaud conciliatory advice, or from 
comparing his and his correspondent’s spiritual situations. In the same letter, Rivière suggests 
that the “erosion” of thought identified by Artaud might be due to “la trop grande liberté que 
vous lui [à l’esprit] laissez”322 (Rivière qtd. in Artaud Œuvres 76). This evidences the strictly 
literary approach of Rivière, while Artaud requests a spiritual, fundamental appreciation of 
his writings.  
  The different approaches of Artaud and Rivière are notable in some of the most 
famous lines in the correspondence. While answering Rivière’s proposition that he publish 
the letters under “invented names,” Artaud writes: “Pourquoi mentir, pourquoi chercher à 
mettre sur le plan littéraire une chose qui est le cri même de la vie, pourquoi donner des 
apparences de fiction à ce qui est fait de la substance indéracinable de l’âme, qui est comme 
la plainte de la réalité?”323 (Œuvres 79). That is, Artaud’s understanding of the fragility of his 
spirit and the erosion and destruction of his thought “in its substance” is a condition integral 
                                                            
319 “I am a man whose spirit has suffered greatly, and as such I have the right to speak.” 
320 “sufficient unity of impression” 
321 “like the doctors that claim to cure their patients while refusing to believe them, denying the strangeness of 
their case, restoring them to the norm through force” 
322 “the excessive freedom that you allow it [the spirit]” 
323  “Why lie, why seek to put on a literary footing something that is the cry of life, why give fictional 
appearances to what is due to the ineradicable substance of the soul, which is like the lament of reality?” 
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to the state of his soul. This is a subject that cannot profit from being fictionalised or 
romanticised.  
 The position assumed by Rivière in his letters seems to instigate Artaud to detail the 
singular condition of his soul throughout the correspondence. On 25th May 1924, Artaud 
describes the possible state of dominance of the spirit, which can never be total: “Un homme 
se possède par éclaircies, et même quand il se possède il ne s’atteint pas tout à fait. Il ne 
réalise pas cette cohésion constante de ses forces sans laquelle toute véritable création est 
impossible.”324  (Œuvres 79). In the face of the impossibility of full accomplishment of 
oneself, on which creation depends, Artaud defends the right of expression of even the most 
defective spiritual forms, simply because they exist. He also makes an important distinction 
between flawed forms of expression that are the effect of a cultural atmosphere, and those 
that, as in his own case, come from the profound incertitude of being. 
 Artaud relates arrêts et saccades (“discontinuations and cracks”) in his own poems to 
the faiblesse physiologique (“physiological weakness”) of his soul, while works by other 
people are said to be the result of a weakness characterised as part of l’air de l’époque. Here 
the idea of physiology is connected to a definition of the soul as “l’émanation de notre force 
nerveuse coagulée autour des objets”325 (Œuvres 79). It is a spiritual and, at the same time, 
“materialistic” notion that finds its ultimate medium in the nerves. In relation to the current 
cultural environment, Artaud mentions the writings of Tzara, Breton and Reverdy, then goes 
on to object: “mais eux, leur âme n’est pas physiologiquement atteinte, elle ne l’est pas 
substantiellement, elle l’est dans tous les points où elle se joint avec autre chose, elle ne l’est 
pas hors de la pensée”326 (Œuvres 79). A soul that has points of contact with the objects to 
which it applies itself, according to Artaud, cannot be considered lost. 
 The distinction made by Artaud between the spiritual weakness he experiences and 
the “infirmity” described by many authors of the same period intends to situate his writings 
as the expression of something other than cultural malaise. His experience is more accurately 
defined as suffering. As he says of the above-mentioned authors: “Il n’en reste pas moins 
qu’ils ne souffrent pas et que je souffre, non pas seulement dans l’esprit, mais dans la chair et 
dans mon âme de tous les jours. Cette inapplication à l’objet qui caractérise toute la 
                                                            
324 “A man possesses himself through fissures, and even when he does so, he does not quite reach himself. He 
does not accomplish that constant cohesion of his forces without which any real creation is impossible.” 
325 “the emanation of our nervous force coagulated around objects” 
326 “but them, their soul is not physiologically affected, it is not substantially so, it remains in all the points 
where it joins with something else, it is not outside of thought” 
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littérature, est chez moi une inapplication à la vie.”327 (Œuvres 80). The fact that the suffering 
pervades spirit, flesh and every aspect of daily life, is one element of the distinction. The 
other is to be found in the differentiation between the artistic dimension and the experiential 
one, indicating that the work of Artaud cannot be approached solely as an exercise of 
language, at least not while language is understood as separate from life.  
 The theme of “inapplicability” brought up by Artaud does not concern, in his case, 
only the “gaucheness” he refers to in his dealings with quotidian matters. It also describes his 
“indélébile impuissance à me concentrer sur un objet”328 (Œuvres 79), that is, the “erosion” 
of thought that Rivière, perhaps optimistically, sees as part of the normal functioning of the 
spirit. In the last letter of the correspondence, the editor of the NRF suggests that Artaud’s 
injured soul may be an advantage in his writing. From the point of view of clairvoyance, 
according to Rivière, a damaged soul can give access to special knowledge of oneself. His 
argument can be summarised in the following lines: “Comment distinguerons-nous nos 
mécanismes intellectuels ou moraux, si nous n’en sommes pas temporairement privés?”329 
(Rivière qtd. in Œuvres 83). Artaud contends, both here and in his writings in the period 
immediately following this, that weakness and discontinuity of thought allow for the 
emergence of a new form of knowledge, an intraduisible science that needs to be appreciated 
for the understanding of the spirit (Œuvres 146). Rivière, in turn, proposes a simple 
knowledge by contrast, as if forgetting that the condition referred to by Artaud does not offer 
an opposite. 
 This spiritual illness acquires a new facet in the last letter sent by Artaud to Rivière, 
on June 6th 1924. It reads:  
Il faut que le lecteur croie à une véritable maladie et non à un phénomène 
d’époque, à une maladie qui touche à l’essence de l’être et à ses possibilités 
centrales d’expression, et qui s’applique à toute une vie. Une maladie qui 
affecte l’âme dans sa réalité la plus profonde, et qui en infecte les 
manifestations. Le poison de l’être. Une véritable paralysie.330 (Œuvres 80) 
                                                            
327 “It nevertheless remains true that they do not suffer while I do, not only in spirit but in the flesh and in my 
every day soul. Such inapplicability to the object that characterises all literature, is in me an inapplicability to 
life.” 
328 “permanent inability to focus on an object” 
329 “How could we distinguish our intellectual or moral mechanisms, if we were not temporarily deprived of 
them?” 
330 “The reader must believe in a real disease and not in the phenomenon of an epoch, in a disease that touches 
the essence of being and its central possibilities of expression, one that applies itself to a whole lifetime. This is 
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Here the idea of illness, and particularly that of poisoning, introduces the theme of causality 
to the configuration of the soul that evolves in different directions. The poisoning, an 
“exterior” element, transforms the original state of the soul and deteriorates its functions. It 
opens the way for the consideration of forces alien to thought, and of the consequent bad 
intentions, into the cosmology of Artaud’s érosion de la pensée. 
 The introduction of these forces is related to what has been referred above as the 
“trick,” exemplified, for instance, in the invasion of the author’s thoughts by a general 
consciousness. In “Correspondance avec Jacques Rivière,” it is not clear whether the 
poisoning is actually an exterior element in relation to thought. However, Artaud’s words are 
unmistakable on the subject of the distinct nature of this element: “une volonté supérieure et 
méchante attaque l’âme comme un vitriol, attaque la masse mot-et-image, attaque la masse 
du sentiment, et me laisse, moi, pantelant comme à la porte même de la vie”331 (Œuvres 81). 
“Vitriol,” the archaic name for sulphuric acid, occurs here as an analogy for the action of the 
superior will. The linking of the idea of poisoning with that of a vicious superior force points 
to a possible externality of the illness’s causality. This is a recurring theme in Artaud’s 
writing; it is present in many letters from the forties, for instance, in the form of “Prussian 
poisons” associated with evil forces.  
  Artaud goes on to conjecture about his position in the “field” of writing. The above-
mentioned obstacles separating him from himself acquire here another spacial metaphor, that 
of him panting, either after having had to pursue the materials of writing — probably the 
“masses of word-images and sentiment” —, or after having had to escape the invasion of the 
superior force. While the “masses,” in this context, appear as being under attack, it is Artaud 
himself who is left out of breath “at the door of life,” separated from the latter as well as from 
other matter that he could, hypothetically, possess. It is not a poor image in the context of a 
violent poisoning of the creative process, one in which the author appears as the lowermost 
element. 
 This form of attack and its singular effects are what Artaud claims, if nothing else, to 
be particular to his writing. He asks his addressee: “et dites-moi si une œuvre littéraire 
quelconque est compatible avec de semblables états” 332  (Œuvres 81). Artaud ends by 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
a disease that affects the soul in its deepest reality, and infects its manifestations. The poison of being. A true 
paralysis.” 
331 “a superior and vicious will attacks the soul as a vitriol, attacks the mass word-image, attacks the mass of 
feeling, and leaves me panting, as if at the door of life itself” 
332 “and tell me if any literary work is consistent with similar statements” 
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professing his faith in the genius that his own work, paradoxically, simultaneously possesses 
and hides, while pointing to the error of public judgement: 
Ces œuvres hasardées qui vous semblent souvent le produit d’un esprit non 
encore en possession de lui-même, et qui ne se possédera peut-être jamais, qui 
sait quel cerveau elles cachent, quelle puissance de vie, quelle fièvre pensante 
que les circonstances seules ont réduits.333 (Œuvres 81) 
Just as the drama of writing cannot be reduced to language, since it requires consideration of 
the whole of spiritual and incarnated life, the act of writing stages the issues of life, and the 
non-accomplishment of an oeuvre and the non-accomplishment of the spirit are one and the 
same. 
 Unable to abdicate from the striving for expression, Artaud forwards, in his letter to 
Rivière of 29th January 1925, a newly-written piece, asking for the merciless judgement of his 
addressee: “Vous le jugerez, vous, du point de vue de l’absolu. Mais je vous dirait que ce me 
serait une bien belle consolation de penser que, bien que n’étant pas tout moi-même, aussi 
haut, aussi dense, aussi large que moi, je peux encore être quelque chose.”334 (Œuvres 73). To 
be capable of something, despite the impossibility of complete being: that is the ultimate plea 
of Artaud. That so much is at stake for him is indicative of more than doubts, also of dangers. 
 From his description of life as an essential and intense deliverance, related to the view 
of the unconscious as a reservoir, and to consciousness as a form of positive possession, 
Artaud goes on, in some of his first published writings, to identify and analyse the obstacles 
preventing a full spiritual and material experience. The finding of a véritable maladie puts 
him on the trail of an inquiry that would take different paths through the years, all of which 
were concerned with establishing the proper place of thought, and the related fruition of 
flesh, and in the search for which he can do no more, and no less, than write. 
  
 5.4. Experience Thresholds 
 The notion of experience, as expressed in the early writings of Artaud and Benjamin, 
is, to some extent, a notion established through contrasts. While Benjamin employs two 
                                                            
333 “These works of chance that often appear to you as the product of a spirit that has not yet possessed itself, 
and which, perhaps, never will, who knows what brains they conceal, what power of life, what feverish thinking 
that only the circumstances have reduced” 
334 “You will judge them, you, from the point of view of the absolute. But I would say that it would be a great 
consolation to me to think that, although I am not entirely myself, as high, as dense, as wide as myself, I am still 
capable of being something.” 
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different usages of experience, one from a relatively informal context, the other from the 
philosophical field, Artaud expresses, in short essays and correspondences, the theme of a 
fundamental separation of being, a subject that he details through the example of his personal 
case. Whereas the conceptualisation of experience emerges in a philosophical context, its 
presence in everyday discourse is marked by heterogeneous perspectives, making it 
sometimes difficulty to identify the precise nature of its usage in the writings of Benjamin 
and Artaud. The approach established in this section attempts to consider the extent to which 
their early texts propose a questioning and a modification of the meanings of experience, as 
outlined in the section above. 
 In the writings of Artaud, the exploration of a spiritual and material condition, 
particularly through epistolary writing, takes the form of a general criticism against the ideas 
of self-conscious, attainable, intelligible life. This scenario is first brought into question in 
Artaud’s articles on painting — where he mentions an “anguished or lenited life,” the 
“divorce of senses from reason” —, and on theatre. The latter art form is already understood 
here as offering a possibility for the appropriation of a “decanted, essentialised life,” by 
“perfectly conscious actors.” In both his letters to Athanasiou and his published 
correspondence with Rivière, this perspective is dramatised through a form of “self-writing” 
that attempts to express the obtuseness of accessing oneself. The ideas of separation, 
obstacle, illness within one’s being, and the correlated perceptions of incertitude, numbness, 
suffering and ultimately detachment from life enact Artaud’s testimony that experience is 
what one is prevented from determining, making use of and, ultimately, owning.  
 Artaud’s account of the non-disposability of oneself must be situated at the limits of 
the traditional notion of experience, while it is understood as the amount of insight and living 
baggage owned by a person. It neither coincides with the idea of an appropriating reflexivity 
expressed as expérience intérieur (Cassin 436). In a sense, the philosophical transposition 
that takes place from an “excess” of living to a cumulative knowledge of the self and the 
world is problematized in Artaud’s writings. On the other hand, it is precisely this 
“inhabitance at the margins,” which is anything but passive, that makes of Artaud the perfect 
candidate for a singular experience, that of producing creation in thought. Gilles Deleuze, in 
Difference and Repetition (“Difference and Repetition,” 2000), proposes that Artaud’s 
problem “was not to orientate his thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or 
to acquire application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage to think 
something” (Difference 147). While in Artaud thought is forcibly directed towards its own 
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natural powerlessness, the “fracture” that it demonstrates is also part of its greatest power. 
That is, Artaud’s experience is an interrogation of experience, in the sense that he 
acknowledges that thinking is not given, that it has to be engendered through the process of 
thought itself. The inability to think leads, in fact, to a revelation, not so much about the 
“nature” of thought as about its potency and operations.  
 Benjamin’s critique, in turn, considers a number of philosophical discussions of 
experience, as well as informal uses that he intends to enhance with a “superior” formulation. 
He writes the first of the texts approached above from the point of view of youth, more 
precisely the German student movement of the first decades of the twentieth century, through 
which he questions the suggestion of a meaningless experience as the only possible 
experience. The agent of this suggestion is the adult, described as devoid of spirit and 
disinterested in culture and intellectuality. Later on, in 1918, Benjamin criticises another 
approach to the notion of experience in terms of its “de-spiritualisation.” This is the notion 
stemming from the Kantian theory of knowledge, which Benjamin describes as being based 
on a poor vision of reality and a limited definition of consciousness.  
 Benjamin’s perception of the absence of a transcendental dimension in the above-
mentioned approaches to experience highlights his criticism of the limitations imposed on it, 
in both the concrete and the philosophical senses, through the disregarding of realms beyond 
the immediate, conscious, accessible aspects of reality. Benjamin’s critique of experience 
forms part of his general rejection of instrumentalisation. In the same sense that he pointed 
out the impoverishment inherent in the “bourgeois” use of language, and, later, of objects, 
here Benjamin highlights the reduction of experience to a manageable “thing” — a “warrant” 
of life’s commonness, as detailed in the essay “Experience,” and a mere content of 
consciousness, according to the article “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy.” 
 Artaud and Benjamin’s texts point to a problem in the definition of experience that, 
while not identical, in both cases, questions some of the same givens of the field, including 
the relation of experience to knowledge of oneself and the world, and consequently to 
thought. They also sketch forms of “experimental” experiences that emerge from the 
inaccessibility of some of these elements, a subject that Artaud details from his personal 
position, while Benjamin makes use of notions formulated elsewhere. Benjamin, on this 
concern, assigns a much more prominent place to experience than the one ascribed by the 
philistine and Kant. Experience, Benjamin states, has the spirit as its content, being related to 
higher realms of knowledge such as religion and language. A new notion of experience that 
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encompasses this feature would enable an investigation of the Kantian concept of “pure 
knowledge,” and, through it, of human spiritual capabilities.  
 For Artaud, the experimental form that emerges from having questioned the idea of 
ownership of experience seems to take place in the act of writing itself, that is, in the 
dramatisation of the inaccessibility of being, through the particular form of exposition 
allowed by composition. As Dumoulié points out, this in no sense means that the reflexivity 
of writing allows Artaud a recovering of the self. Ultimately, it is in consonance with Artaud’s 
finding that “l’automatisme inconscient des ‘êtres’ a pris la place du plus propre et lui dicte le 
texte de sa vie”335 (Dumoulié Artaud 5). According to Dumoulié, it is language, however, and 
particularly the epistolary form, that allows Artaud to “mettre sa douleur en scène sous le 
regard de l’autre” 336  (Artaud 9), an operation detailed below. Artaud and Benjamin’s 
suggested methods for dealing with a turning point in the discussion of experience both touch 
on the ideas of incomparable solitude and forged communion. 
 The theme of separation, essential to the problematisation of the concept of 
experience, and re-enacted in different forms in Artaud’s later texts, makes one of its first 
appearances in the letters sent to Athanasiou in 1922. While stating to feel “separated from 
his own body,” Artaud presents a scene in which his suffering is dramatised through the 
communicative dynamic of epistolary writing. This setting, as Kaufmann points out, is a 
“terrain vague … dissimulé entre la vie et l’œuvre”337 (8), where takes place the exploitation 
of a misunderstanding. That is, the letters seem to foster communication and proximity, but 
actually create and reinforce distance, something which Kaufmann equates to the emergence 
of literary writing. If, for some writers, the epistolary is a necessary step towards literature, 
for the majority it is at least a laboratory. In the case of Artaud, the distance allowed by the 
correspondence allows for the exploration of a deeper understanding of distance. 
 The finding of a conscious obstacle between him and himself leads Artaud into an 
analysis of the idea of separation. When writing to Athanasiou, Artaud mentions that she 
should have known him “before all this.” This should not be taken as a statement on a 
recently established situation: it is not that Artaud used to be different, it is, precisely, that the 
state he describes in himself is immutable, as are the effects it has had over him. If the 
expression of separation is favoured by the epistolary form, it is because it implies the act of 
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336 “put his pain on stage under the gaze of the other” 
337 “vague field … dissimulated between the life and the oeuvre” 
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establishing distance. In fact, the theme of separation, in Artaud’s writings, has the 
ambiguous feature of being able to recast, through the problematisation of what he sees as the 
corroded foundations of being, the “artifice” of creation.  
 In Artaud’s assertion to Rivière that his writing is non-literary, this ambiguous feature 
is explicited. The act of defence (of the non-literariness) takes place in the same gesture that 
exposes the problem of separation: “il faut que le lecteur croie à une véritable maladie et non 
à un phénomène d’époque”338 (Artaud Œuvres 80). In opposing maladie with phénomène 
d’époque, Artaud highlights the first as a chronic or immutable state of affliction, and the 
second as the cultural malaise that he and Rivière identify in the literary productions of the 
time. Literary artifice, in this sense, risks falsifying the true illness of being, however 
Artaud’s proposition to remain true to the condition affecting him is in fact an essentially 
literary act.  
 The “refusal to lie” serves to redouble the literariness of the writing, just as the 
original gesture of literature contains both separation from reality, and the promise of giving 
away its most precious secrets, perhaps the very cry of life. Artaud famously questions 
Rivière: “pourquoi mentir, pourquoi chercher à mettre sur le plan littéraire une chose qui est 
le cri même de la vie”339 (Œuvres 79). Artaud’s belief in the significance of sharing his 
experience is further expressed in his insistence, mentioned above, on having his poems 
published, because of the “interior resounding” of his loss rather than the perfection of their 
form. This suggests that an important aspect at stake in these texts is the possibility of 
communication of a deeply solitary condition. That the theme of inaccessibility to himself is 
evoked through correspondence points to the role of the other in Artaud’s explorations of the 
problem of creation. The distance enacted through the epistolary serves as a vehicle through 
which the distance of one’s thought from the actual act of thinking, to use an expression from 
Deleuze, can be expressed. But this expression is only possible if Artaud is able to dramatise, 
and put before the public — everyone from his close correspondents to all potential readers 
—, the drama of separation. 
 If Artaud, in the letters to Athanasiou, compares separation with pain and shock, this 
may be due to the intermediate character of these sensations, their status of belonging to both 
spirit and flesh. The notion of shock, in particular — also explored by Benjamin in “On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire” (1940) —, is described as leading to the impossibility of a proper 
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339 “why lie, why seek to put on a literary level something that is the cry of life itself” 
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registering of life’s impressions in the mind or the spirit, a useless form of perception that 
cannot engender any significative experience. The act of writing, in this context, is perhaps a 
privileged, though imperfect, palliative. As Freud suggests, it is a method that keeps at the 
same time that it conceals (Dreams 610). Artaud’s position in relation to his maladie is, 
analogously, a unique possession and a radical dispossession, in relation to which he can only 
write, but only on condition that “le corps momifié de l’œuvre ne se substitue pas au corps 
vivant de son auteur”340 (Dumoulié Artaud 5).  
 In Le Pèse-Nerfs (1925), discussed below, the act of negating an oeuvre is expressed 
as an attempt to sustain the author’s “alive body.” In the same text, Artaud states, while 
referring to the general misunderstanding about the unique condition of his spirit: “je suis le 
seul témoin de moi-même”341 (Œuvres 161). As the only testimony of himself, he re-enacts, 
through writing, the “artificial” distance that allows the expression of a more fundamental 
separation. For this, the presence of the other is a condition, however the author does not 
expect compassion from it. As suggested by Dumoulié (Artaud 9), Artaud is engaged more in 
a search for conviction. This might be related to the above-mentioned complicity of the 
reader with the forces engaged in preventing the accomplishment of thought, detailed in 
Artaud’s texts from the forties. 
 For Benjamin, it is the ideal of a forged community that first emerges as an 
experimental form of experience. From the rejection of “experience as meaninglessness,” 
proposed by the philistine, this community is necessarily of a spiritual nature, since the spirit 
is the very content of the experience of youth. This spiritual dimension also has a strong basis 
in an idea of individual conscience. As suggested above, youth appears as having an 
“inevitable dissonant” sense of itself, expressed through a combination of communion and 
solitude (Eiland 9). A genuine community is defined as a collective of individual consciences, 
which can only be attained through the “deepest solitude” of each of its members. Benjamin 
expresses this in a 1913 letter to Carla Seligson, a member of the youth movement: “…if we 
keep our gaze free to see the spirit wherever it may be, we will be the ones to actualise it. 
Almost everybody forgets that they themselves are the place where spirit actualises itself.” 
(Benjamin Early 8). 
 The definition of spirit in this context is not made particularly clear by Benjamin. It is 
something to be awaited and actualised by the youth movement itself, whose “mission” is to 
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remain attentive and open to it. Benjamin also calls it “soul,” stating, in the same letter: “This 
soul is something eternally actualising. Every person, every soul that is born, can bring to life 
the new reality” (Early 8). The fact that many members of the youth movement were Jewish 
is not irrelevant here, considering that this is the context in which Benjamin, according to 
Eiland, first felt his Jewishness as something more than an “exotic ‘aroma’ in his life” (8). 
That is, the imagined community in Benjamin’s critique must be related to Benjamin’s new 
awareness, gained through his participation in the youth movement, of his Jewishness. 
Nevertheless, the spiritual connotation of “Experience” cannot be directly identified with a 
Jewish context, even if it indirectly expresses the approximation of Benjamin to related 
themes, as highlighted in Scholem’s account of this period (Friendship 66-70).  
 A context for understanding the notion of spirit is suggested by some of the pieces 
written by Benjamin during this period. Eiland states, in fact, that running through the early 
writings of Benjamin, from the period 1910-1917, is “a dialectical mode of thought involving 
the transcendence — not abandonment — of traditional metaphysical oppositions (such as 
form and content, word and thing, spirit and nature), together with a critique of the 
instrumentalizing of spirit” (11). The first of these is particularly clear in the article “On the 
Program of the Coming Philosophy,” while the second is already present in “On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Man.” One facet of Benjamin’s critique of Kant is the 
proposition that religion and language are the realms from which, within the Kantian system, 
a new notion of experience might emerge. The essay from 1915, in turn, proposes the 
“expressly magic” feature of language, which contains, within its structure, the possibility of 
expressing the essence of things. 
 Examining Benjamin’s articles from 1915 and 1918, it is evident that the impossibility 
of distinguishing subject and object, a feature that Benjamin highlights as a contribution to 
Kant’s theory of knowledge that comes from religious experience, is already constituent in 
language. For Benjamin, humans express their own essence while also expressing the essence 
of things. This is more a form of spiritual exchange than it is the acquisition of knowledge on 
the part of a determined subject. The exchange represents the “decayed” form of 
communication, contrasted with a supposed “original” communion between language and 
things, but it is also the way in which essences can still be touched upon, assigning to 
language its intrinsic creative and spiritual character. The “higher” context in which 
Benjamin wants to insert Kant’s theory is a spiritual one, but only to the extent that it 
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represents “the transcendence of traditional oppositions,” that is, the inapplicability of 
specific notions of subject and object, as in the case of language.  
 If religion gives a spiritual context to Kant’s theory, it is because the notions of object 
and subject are also inapplicable to religious experience. The “true experience” is described 
by Benjamin, as mentioned above, as the one “in which neither god nor man is object or 
subject of experience” (Philosophy 104). This sense can be approximated to the idea of 
communion, at least in that it represents a transcendental alternative to both the scientific 
view of reality and the psychological understanding of consciousness. However, the frame of 
Benjamin’s essay does not allow an extrapolation of the philosophical field: the ultimate goal 
of his criticism is to motivate the establishment of metaphysics from Kant’s theory.  
 The “spiritual” approach identifiable in the two texts of Benjamin that deal with 
experience centres on his criticism of the use of the notion in an instrumental sense. Despite 
being a constant in Benjamin’s texts of the time, the concept of spirit can be understood more 
as a virtual point around which his criticism turns than a dimension that he explores 
specifically. It could be said, in fact, that the spiritual dimension remains an implicit 
vanishing point in Benjamin’s pieces on experience, considering that the positive approaches 
he elaborates in the thirties take the form of materialistic, rather than spiritual considerations. 
At most, they assume the hybrid shape of materialism infiltrated with “gothic” inspirations, 
as suggested by Löwy (Radical 18). In a note probably written in 1929, Benjamin comments 
on the essay “Experience” in view of his current approach to the notion:  
In an early essay I mobilised all the rebellious forces of youth against the word 
“Erfahrung.” And now this word has become a basic element in many of my 
things. Nevertheless I have remained true to myself. For my attack broke 
through the word without destroying it. It reached the centre of the matter. 
(Early 119) 
 As will become clear, the “centre of the matter” is Benjamin’s critique of experience 
as a form of “enclosed living,” a fixation on one’s own triviality, a recrudescence of the 
bourgeois notion of individuality. This once more represents the highlighting of a form of 
instrumentalisation. In these terms, the unique “testimony” of Artaud coincides with 
Benjamin’s approach. Neither the implicit notion of reality as accessible and achievable, nor 
immediate psychological consciousness are to be found in their versions of experience. In 
general terms, Artaud and Benjamin criticise, from different angles, the notion of subject, and 
the correlated conception of knowledge, part of the inheritance of the enlightenment. While 
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Benjamin makes the targets of his attack explicit without developing a positive formulation 
of experience, in Artaud the criticism is implicit in the description of a personal case that is 
anything but private. Artaud’s “testimony” in fact recalls Benjamin’s reference to Nietzsche 
in “Experience”: “always one experiences oneself” (Early 118). 
 The notion of spirit assumes different connotations in the writings of Benjamin and 
Artaud. In the letters sent to Athanasiou, for instance, Artaud describes his “exile” from the 
spirit as one of the elements of separation. As discussed above, Artaud’s commitment with 
the theme takes shape before his engagement with surrealism, even if the movement supplied 
him of a collective and perhaps defined agenda for this commitment. Exile from the spirit, in 
this context, leads to the impossibility of accessing a “land” that one feels to be one’s own, 
and obstacles to “going back.” This metaphor suggests that Artaud once felt at home in the 
spirit, or, at least, that the idea of a retreat into the spiritual plays a role in his thought. But the 
spirit is, above all, through its differentiation from the flesh, an indicator of detachment and 
separation. As Dumoulié suggests, “malgré ses rêves de fusion et de retour à l’origine, il 
[Artaud] sait que l’union est à jamais perdue. Naître, c’est se séparer.”342 (Artaud 12).  
 If the spirit is not the ultimate dimension in which Artaud and Benjamin’s criticisms 
might find resolution, neither is the dimension of language. It appears not as the promise of 
resolution, but as the necessary form for an attempt to find a way out of the limitations of 
experience. Considering Benjamin’s essays from 1915 and 1918 together, one has the 
impression that all experience is essentially linguistic. The theme of an experience sketched 
in and through language is not alien to Artaud either. In his texts, the act of writing is a 
dramatisation, that is, the “taking of a distance” from the excruciating separation. It does not 
express a belief in appeasement through communication with the other, but rather functions 
as a form of exorcism (in relation to the forces that invade and appropriate one’s being) that 
requires the other’s conviction. Here, a supposed non-literary text touches upon the mystery 
of language itself. 
 As distinct as the approaches of Benjamin and Artaud are, they both point to a 
problematisation of the notion of experience that focuses on much more than just their 
personal views, and at the same time are out of step with the thought of others of their time. 
A comparison of their writings suggests that experience, far from being a given, is a highly 
problematic notion, in abstract as well as practical terms, particularly at that historical 
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moment. The forms of “experience” described in Artaud and Benjamin’s texts at this point 
can be paralleled with the above statement from Foucault, in which experience appears in the 
interlacement of soliloquy and dialogue, inaccessibility and availability, uniqueness and 
absence of value. One is necessarily alone in relation to experience, but it can never be 
restricted to one’s subjectivity. The form of “communion” that Benjamin and Artaud attempt 
following their different diagnoses of the limitations of experience is a very particular one. It 
concerns the possibility of sharing, but not of homogenising. It presupposes the assumption 
of a form of communicability, but one that remains immersed in the condition of 
inaccessibility. Their approaches to language, detailed below, lead to the formulation of more 
elaborate, and affirmative, conceptions of experience, the foundations of which are contained 
in these early accounts of its limitations. 
 
 5.5. Mimesis and Phonetic Archive 
 Benjamin’s first exploration of language, the early article “On Language as Such and 
on the Language of Man,” is a “theological” reaction to the philosophical trend most 
prominently represented by Kant (Osborne and Charles). According to the view of the 
enlightenment, language has the least formative role in the process of universal rational 
thought. Benjamin intended to counter this with a notion of experience that was not based on 
the positivist tradition. Instead of placing experience in the encounter between the distinct 
instances of object and subject, he proposed the conjunction of knowledge and language in 
one instance, stating that “all communication of spiritual content is language” (Benjamin 
Early 251). This means that language exists even outside human experience, since inanimate 
as well as animate beings possess it. It also suggests that what language communicates is the 
“spirit” of a certain thing or event, its essence. According to Benjamin, the essence of things 
is their language, and the fact that man, in his own language, partakes of these essences, if not 
rendering the notions of “object” and “subject” in language, invalid, at least complexifies 
them. The relationship becomes that of an underlying kinship. 
 As discussed above, the distinctive feature of human language is its relationship to the 
language of things through the naming of them. That is, when human beings name things, 
they express their essence. For Benjamin, this denominative feature of man’s language is a 
re-enactment of God’s power. If the act of naming is, in itself, of a divine nature, for “in the 
name, the spiritual being of man communicates itself to God” (Early 255). This, perhaps, is 
the core of the “theological” element of Benjamin’s proposition. He has this in common with 
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counter-enlightenment thinkers such as Hamann, the German philosopher contemporaneous 
with Kant, who proposed an antithesis to the latter’s ideas. According to Hamann, language 
has a mediating role between God and humans, and represents creation as the physical 
imprint of the divine “Word of God” (Osborne and Charles). Benjamin himself quotes the 
German philosopher in his discussion of the idea of revelation through language: “language, 
the mother of reason and revelation, its alpha and omega” (Hamann qtd. in Benjamin Early 
258). 
 In the essays “Doctrine of the Similar” and “On the Mimetic Faculty” — which are, 
roughly speaking, the first and second drafts of the same text, one written in early 1933 in 
Berlin and the other reformulated later that year in Ibiza— Benjamin’s ideas on language 
appear under a different focus. As the titles suggest, the essays are concerned with the notions 
of mimesis and similarity. The term mimesis can be referred back to Aristotle, for whom it 
was the “imitation of reality.” Within literary studies, it has been used to describe the 
operation of aesthetic representation, involving the transfiguration and transformation of 
reality in an artistic piece. Erich Auerbach, known for his studies on mimesis, describes it as 
the master technique of literary creation. For the German critic, who was an acquaintance of 
Benjamin, mimesis is the operation through which political, social and ideological issues 
enter the literary field (Auerbach E. 253).  
 The fundaments of mimetic activity, in Benjamin’s view, are to be found in the natural 
correspondences presupposed by the earliest mimetic acts. As he states in the opening of 
“Doctrine of the Similar,” “nature produces similarities” (Benjamin Similar 65). Of all 
beings, humans are assigned the highest ability, that of performing the task of producing 
similarities. However, according to Benjamin, the human mimetic faculty used to be much 
more powerful than it is now. The mental world of primitive peoples included the perception 
of various similarities between different elements of nature, which they were capable of 
“reading.” Benjamin highlights that human perception, in its current form, does not allow one 
to speak, for instance, of the similarity between a constellation of stars and a person. He 
suggests, in turn, another form of determination of similarities: “the cases in which people 
consciously perceive similarities in everyday life are a minute of those countless cases 
unconsciously determined by similarity” (Similar 65). For Benjamin, language is the thing 
that emerged alongside disappearance of these abilities, since mimetic behaviour was 
“granted a place in the origin of language as the onomatopoetic element” (Similar 67).  
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 The relationship of language to sound, and of sound to things and events, even if it 
has remained present, does not allow in most modern languages for the realisation of the 
onomatopoetic element. It is for the most part impossible to determine the meaning of a word 
through its sound. Benjamin, aware of this impossibility, states that the onomatopoetic 
element is somehow concealed in language, through what he calls the non-sensuous 
similarities, based on unconscious determination (Similar 67). He suggests an exercise: to 
collect around a certain meaning the words corresponding to it in different languages. 
Benjamin envisions in this case a non-apparent but underlying resemblance, related to the 
relationship between sounds and meanings. If language has kept traces of these sorts of 
similarities, Benjamin states, it operates as the reminder of a lost experience, as the “archive” 
in which non-sensuous similarities were stored. He describes this aspect as, “if you will, [the] 
magical side of both language and writing” (Similar 68). The unconscious determination of 
similarities is to be found through language, while the investigation of this field, as Benjamin 
suggests in the opening lines of the essay, “has a fundamental importance for the illumination 
of large areas of occult knowledge” (Similar 65). 
 In relation to the change in the human ability to perceive similarities, Benjamin asks 
whether one should consider it a disappearance or a migration towards other forms of 
discernment. During the act of reading, he believes, the similar may unexpectedly emerge, in 
a “fleeting and transitory” time-moment (Zeitmoment). For Benjamin, “the nexus of meaning 
implicit in the sounds of the sentence is the basis from which something similar can become 
apparent instantaneously” (Similar 68). In other words, non-sensuous similarities can be at 
least partially perceived through the act of reading. He highlights the different uses of the 
verb “reading,” related to both the stars and printed words. In the first example, reading the 
position of the stars and reading the future from them are two facets of the same gesture. 
Benjamin believes this connotation to have remained present in the contemporaneous use of 
the word “reading.” 
 Benjamin’s supposition, therefore, is that the perception of similarities has not 
disappeared, but migrated to other forms of human expression, such as writing. This idea is 
present in at least two of Benjamin’s texts. One is the above-mentioned “On Language…,” 
which discusses the ways the essences of objects are expressed, passing through fleeting 
similarities, in the language of men. They no longer require, Benjamin notes, the sage or the 
augur. This is another example of Benjamin’s linking of magic and the unconscious. The 
second reference can be found in the mention, close to the end of “Doctrine of the Similar,” 
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to “transmission,” connected with the act of reading and its ability to unearth similarities in 
brief flashes. It is through this event that the reader — and one can add, the listener — takes 
part in the critical moment of transmission, which allows him or her not to “go away empty 
handed.” This idea is revisited in the essay “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of 
Nikolai Leskóv” (1936), discussed below.  
 According to Scholem, many of the issues explored in “Doctrine of the Similar” were 
anticipated by Benjamin in 1918, when the two friends discussed the subject of the worlds of 
myth and of prehistoric man. It is in this context that Benjamin located the beginning of 
reading in the emergence of constellations “on the surface of the sky,” a moment that 
coincided with “the formation of the mythic world age” (Scholem Friendship 75). It is, 
however, the primacy of the sensuous and onomatopoetic aspect of language over any form 
of semiotics what takes the forefront in Benjamin’s argument. Like “On Language…,” it also 
introduces a historical aspect, connected with the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins and 
development of the mimetic faculty. This must be related to Benjamin’s attempt to explore a 
link between his previous theory of language and historical materialism. According to Anson 
Rabinbach, Benjamin recognised, around 1931, that “his philosophy of language did contain 
the possibilities of a mediation to the mode of perception of historical materialism, but this 
course was ‘full of tension and problematic’” (60).  
 The shift in Benjamin’s view of language cannot, however, be entirely explained 
through his movement towards marxism. For Rabinbach (61), Benjamin’s aim in “Doctrine 
of the Similar” is close to that of “On the Program of Coming Philosophy,” that is, the 
introduction of a historical-anthropological dimension of experience. The recurrent references 
to anthropologists in another text on the subject — the scholarly “Problems in the Sociology 
of Language: An Overview” (1935) — show how distanced Benjamin’s view is from that of 
the linguists of the day, whose efforts were generally centred on the construction of an 
abstract system of language. In the 1935 piece, Benjamin summarises some of the trends that 
make up this general tendency, while reasserting his own commitment to a notion of language 
that considers onomatopoetic aspects. 
 “Problems in the Sociology of Language,” written on demand for Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung, shows that Benjamin’s position on current theories of language does not 
depart too far from his early view on the subject, as it appears in the texts approached so far. 
In relation to the disciplines that inspired his vision, he professes the necessity in the field of 
an eclectic approach, one that draws not only on the areas of linguistics and sociology, but 
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also of psychology and ethnology. In his words, “on close examination, we see that this area 
[Problemkreis] extends to a considerable number of other disciplines” (Benjamin Sociology 
68). Benjamin is here writing consciously as what he referred somewhat ironically to 
Scholem as “a scholar” (Rabinbach 63). 
 Benjamin considers a cardinal problem in the field of the sociology of language to be 
the investigation of the origins of language. He highlights the interest, alive from the 
seventeenth to the twentieth century — though with some significant intervals — in the 
phonetic aspects of it. Benjamin quotes Johann Herder, who highlights the hypothesis 
according to which “man himself invented language from the sounds of living nature” 
(Herder qtd. in Sociology 69). The importance of the onomatopoeic factor in these theories, 
according to Benjamin, has been constantly limited by scientific criticism, even if this 
criticism has not been successful in making the onomatopoeic tendency completely 
disappear.  
 Most authors who have remained attached to the onomatopoeic element of language 
see it as no more than “missed opportunities,” that is, as traces which are active only in 
particular parts of words. For Benjamin, “this is the case today, just as it was earlier” 
(Sociology 69). The onomatopoeic aspect of language has from some time been not the most 
prominent, despite being continuously present. It is, at best, according to Benjamin, “merely 
tolerated” by known languages. Likewise, linguistic theories have always been partially 
based on phonetic aspects and their particular effects on some elements of words. The more 
recent visions of language as a system of symbolic representation, however, attempt to 
subsume the onomatopoeic element to the position of an aspect that is “only partially 
valuable.”  
 In his attempt at exploring the onomatopoeic dimension Benjamin resorts, once again, 
to investigations into the “mentality of primitive peoples.” They are represented, in his essay, 
by the studies of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. In the book Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societés 
Inférieures (“The Mental Functions in Lower Societies,” 1918), Lévy-Bruhl presents the 
language of the Ewe tribes, from Togo, whose language “is richly endowed with the means of 
reproducing an impression directly through sounds” (Lévy-Bruhl qtd. in Sociology 70). This 
richness is a consequence of the tendency to imitate everything perceived. Lévy-Bruhl does 
not call this form of expression onomatopoeia, but “descriptive vocal gestures.” Benjamin, in 
turn, attributes to these gestures the magical quality of language in primitive cultures. At the 
same time, he notes, these very languages are usually ascribed an inclination to the concrete, 
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a position he opposes. Making use of references from Olivier Leroy, Benjamin refutes the 
positivist idea of opposing “primitive” to “rational” — without however abandoning such a 
denomination in his own text. According to Leroy, primitive languages are inseparable from 
their social and economic conditions, and these should be investigated in the search for their 
inner logic, rather than merely compared with “more civilised ones” (Sociology 72). 
 In this context, Benjamin introduces Leroy’s position on witchcraft. Opposing the 
psychological interpretations of “primitive magic,” Leroy demands that “the degree of reality, 
or of evidentiality, attributed to the objects of magical beliefs by the community upholding 
such beliefs” is taken into account (Sociology 16). His underlying argument is that such 
beliefs are not necessarily restricted to “primitive states” of mind, since their inner logic can 
be analogous to the order organising other forms of culture, such as the Europeans. Here 
Benjamin resumes his position on the need to combine different fields of knowledge in order 
to formulate a general understanding of language, particularly in relation to its origins. The 
sociology of language should not abandon any of the other disciplines potentially relevant. 
On the theme of the “magical use of words,” according to Benjamin, psychopathology is 
particularly relevant (Sociology 73).  
 At this point, Benjamin risks a few associations between the state of psychosis and 
“primitive” languages, centred on the idea, borrowed from Lévy-Bruhl, that primitive people 
did not have a fully-developed consciousness of their own identity. That is, in both cases “it 
is possible to experience the identity — not the likeness or similarity — of two different 
objects or situations” (Benjamin Sociology 73). Benjamin gives as an example the case in 
which the members of a tribe sacrifice a certain bird, at the same time but in different 
locations, defining the birds as being the same whichever place they are in. According to 
Benjamin, just as, in the case of psychosis, a psychological explanation is given for the acts 
in question, in the case of “primitive” cultures, a historical explanation should be sought. 
 Here, in a leap that is common of his writings, Benjamin moves from an abstract 
discussion of magic to interest in the material realities of the world. He quotes the work of 
Nikolaus Marr, who, pointing out the important role of the human hand in early 
communication, suggests it to be “entirely inconceivable that the hand could have been 
replaced as the producer of a mental value — language— before it was replaced by tools as 
the producer of material goods” (Marr qtd. in Sociology 74). Likewise, the possible origin of 
language — here defined in terms of a pre-Indo-European linguistic family called “Japhetic,” 
allegedly spoken from the Caucasus to the Pyrenees — is here based on class movements. 
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That is, the Indo-European languages are not connected to a specific race or people, but to a 
dominant class (Benjamin Sociology 74). In this sense, the Japhetic languages can be 
considered “pre-historic,” while the Indo-European should be considered “historic.” This 
argument represents a new typological formation in the field of language study, that is, a 
historical configuration, rather than the identification of the languages of defined peoples. 
Marr dismisses the existence of national languages connected to populations.  
 Benjamin then briefly approaches an allegedly forgotten aspect of the sociology of 
language, namely the correlation between languages and material conditions. In another 
reference to Marr, he qualifies “the sociological problems concealed in the languages of 
oppressed strata of populations” (Sociology 75). This attempt is not dissimilar from Leroy’s 
call for a better understanding of the social and economic scenarios that can more accurately 
contextualise “primitive” languages in relation to current ones. Benjamin also describes the 
work of Alfredo Niceforo, who dedicated a book to the study of slang. This is defined, 
strictly, as the “vernacular,” or “one of the weapons with which the suppressed people attacks 
the ruling class it sets out to displace” (Niceforo qtd. in Sociology 75). Language being a 
weapon in the class struggle, at the service of revolutionary experience, its operation is 
described as that of “shifting images and words toward a vividly material realm” (Niceforo 
qtd. in Sociology 75). 
 Other texts evoked by Benjamin on this subject mostly concern technical approaches 
to the field of labour, such as Rudolf Meringer’s considerations on the penetration of 
technical words in the language of migrant labour forces. These issues, Benjamin says, 
occupy the margins of linguistics, and are concerned with its demarcations (Sociology 76). 
The main trend is to be found in the new logical procedures, influenced by Hermann Paul and 
Ferdinand de Saussure, and summarised by Bühler as the transposition of methodological 
categories to a historical perspective. In these theories, the development of language is 
described as following typical phases of presence and then absence of the objects referred to: 
Within the broad development of human language, we can imagine that 
single-class systems of deictic utterances were the first stage. But then came 
the need to include what was absent, and that meant severing the direct link of 
utterance to situation… The liberation of linguistic expression from the field 
of showing — from the demonstratio ad oculos — had begun. (Bühler qtd. in 
Benjamin Sociology 79) 
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The genealogy of language is here understood as a continuum between the early contextual 
calls and the later linguistic signs, which appear in response to the object’s absence. 
However, while signs are “liberated” from concrete linguistic situations, they are also subject 
to a new symbolic order. 
 In opposition to these “progressive” trends, Benjamin highlights the existence of 
other, conservative approaches. These make use of notions such as race and peoples in order 
to defend the idea of the “nation.” They are characterised by what he describes as “the 
irrationalism which is usually the norm in nationalistic literature” (Benjamin Sociology 80). 
According to Benjamin, the authors of these theories are significantly inferior in relation to 
those who advocate multidisciplinary approaches, and the scope on which they base their 
affirmations is described as highly limited. Benjamin then turns to psychological research, 
which he considers able to address, even if indirectly, many of the problems of the sociology 
of language. 
 In a conceptualisation that recalls Freud, Benjamin proposes an analysis of the 
ontogenesis of language, that is, its development within an individual life, to be a 
counterpoint to the ethnological approach adopted so far in his text. Through references to 
Lev Vygotski and Jean Piaget, he affirms that “egocentric” language —that spoken by the 
infant without full-developed communicative aims — “takes exactly the place reserved at a 
later stage for the thinking process itself” (Sociology 82-3). In this sense, the grammatical 
development precedes the logical development or, as Benjamin has already mentioned earlier 
in his text, the intellectual operations are independent from language, if we understand the 
latter as a set of interdependent signs.  
 Benjamin focuses on the theories he feels could lead to far-reaching conclusions. He 
mentions in particular that elaborated by Richard Paget, who departs from a definition of 
language as “gesticulation of the speech organs” (Sociology 83). The gesture is envisioned 
first in relation to sound. In fact, according to Paget, the phonetic element of language is 
founded upon the mimicry-gestural element. That is, the gestures are accompanied by the 
sounds, which are described, in this context, as “laryngo-mouthed gestures” capable of 
retaining their original concrete sense for a long time. A detailed study of the origins of every 
sound, according to this theory, might allow for the establishment of its initial concrete 
correlative. Benjamin argues that the “…articulation as the gesture of the speech organs falls 
within the large sphere of bodily mimicry. Its phonetic element is the bearer of a 
communication, the original substrate of which was an expressive gesture” (Sociology 84). 
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The mimetic element of this theory has a much broader scope when compared to the same 
element in the onomatopoeic approach: in this case the sound is also a gesture, one that is 
figured through the resonant body parts.  
 In general terms, Benjamin says, “from the metaphysical speculations of Plato to the 
findings of modern thinkers, language theory forms a broad, vaulted arch” (Sociology 84). 
What connects the different theories of which Benjamin gives a positive account is their 
intuition that spoken language is just another form of animal instinct, that of expressive 
mimicry. He proposes, for instance, in reference to dance as the expression of elemental 
forms of human existence, that “linguistic expression and choreographic expression are 
rooted in one and the same mimetic faculty” (Sociology 84). The term “physiognomy of 
language” — already used by Heinz Werner — is chosen by Benjamin to express the mimetic 
faculty capable of uniting different human expressions under the same sign. In a statement 
reminiscent of some expressions in of “On Language…,” Benjamin asserts, regarding 
Werner, that “the expressive means of language are as inexhaustible as its representational 
means” (Sociology 85). This assertion of inexhaustibility opposes, on one level, the 
instrumentalist and bourgeois use of language, and, on another, the understanding of language 
as an arbitrary system of symbols. 
 Paget, referring to the admirable fact that civilised men have not abandoned the 
simplest meaningful gestures, such as moving the head and the hands, conjectures that the 
full potential of voice has not yet been learned. According to him, “all the existing works of 
literature and eloquence are as yet merely elegant, inventive applications of formal or 
phonetic elements of language which, in themselves, are wholly wild and uncultivated” 
(Paget qtd. in Sociology 85). Benjamin, in turn, sees that such an approach connects the 
sociology of language with important ancient tendencies, which he is interested in recovering 
in order not only to understand, but also to change language. These are expressed in the view 
of language not as a mere instrument, but as a manifestation of the human’s innermost being. 
 Benjamin considers the idea of manifestation or revelation in language as, explicitly 
or tacitly, the point of departure for the entire sociology of language. The idea that language 
is not an instrument but a manifestation, a revelation of human essence, both in its intimate 
and its social aspects, had already been asserted by Benjamin elsewhere, in his discussions of 
the humanly divine feature of communication. With the addition of his notion of non-
sensuous similarities, which make language the archive of the original connectedness 
between objects, sounds and words, Benjamin’s understanding of this rich field of human 
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creation and communication borders on the magical or intoxicated experience he wanted to 
align with revolution. Finally, if the origin of language is to be found in gestures, Benjamin’s 
“discovery,” and that of the authors mentioned above, that sound is just a gesture expressed 
through resonant body parts, the onomatopoeic element gains prominence in an 
understanding of language. As the expression of the animal instinct of mimicry, language has 
attained diverse, but perhaps still wholly unexplored, forms of phonetic development. 
 
 5.6. The Stupefaction of Language 
 The theme of language in the writings of Artaud is inextricably intertwined with that 
of separation. In “Correspondance avec Jacques Rivière,” the quest for language as that for a 
form that is not completely disposable or, as Cermakian suggests, a language that is en route 
“vers un langage épuré — auquel on ne parvient de toute façon jamais entièrement sur cette 
terre,”343  intersects with Artaud’s query on his right to think, “in verse or prose.” The 
moment at which the correspondence becomes a literary oeuvre is central to this 
investigation, since it launches the discussion of the meaning of writing to the level of a 
literary piece in itself. Kaufmann, for instance, considered Artaud’s epistolary and his desire 
for it not to be taken as literature in the terms already mentioned above, that is, as the 
definition of literary writing per se: “ses lettres, c’est déjà de la littérature”344 (98).  
 As mentioned above, the supposed non-literary writing of Artaud here touches on the 
fundaments of language. His is a work that evokes the absence of work, but in a radically 
different way to that of his contemporaries, and even to those who followed him. In April 
1924, he writes in a letter to Edmond Jaloux: “Ce que j’écris n’est qu’un pis aller, un moyen 
de me prouver à moi-même qu’il n’y a pas rien dans mon esprit. Mais la valeur exacte de ce 
que j’écrit je l’ignore, je ne la sens pas bonne, voilà tout, et m’en réfère à l’avis des 
autres.”345 (Œuvres I,2 109). The function of writing is similar to that of a covering, one that 
does not hide an absence, but instead proves its existence. However, there is no intention or 
belief in the act of writing as a liberating, artistic act. Writing itself is a palliative that relies 
on the view of others to acquire value. At the same time, as mentioned above, the spiritual 
and material experience is strictly connected with the intricate and flawed functioning of 
                                                            
343 “to a pure language - which cannot in any case ever succeed fully on this earth” 
344 “his letters are already literature” 
345 “What I write is only a stopgap, a way to prove to myself that there is nothing in my mind. But the exact 
value of what I write I do not know, I just do not think it is good, that's all, and I refer myself to the opinion of 
others.” 
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language: “et pour tout dire mes pensées exprimées ne sont pas du tout à l’hauteur de mes 
pensées matérialisables, extériorisées”346 (Œuvres I,2 109). 
 In a text from April 1924 that accompanies “Paul les Oiseaux ou La Place de 
l’Amour” — probably called “Une Prose pour l’Homme au Crâne en Citron” (“A Prose for 
the Man with a Lemony Skull”) — Artaud elaborates on the particular dramaturgy that 
allows for the blending of spirit with production, here not restricted to writing. He begins by 
defining an object, that is, “l’Esprit se fixe arbitrairement sur un thème, sur un effet, le thème 
réclame sa consistance et les mots leur sonorité”347 (Œuvres 89). A fusion between spirit and 
object then takes place, from which develop “tous les plans, toutes les qualités, tous les 
courants”348 (Œuvres 89). Here Artaud clarifies that everything real is interesting, and any 
subject can produce significant effects on the spirit. What he calls “sautes brusques de 
l’impuissance”349 (Œuvres 89) are not absent from this process, and should be carefully 
registered. More importantly, what gives validity to the enterprise is the truth of the emerging 
materials, and not necessarily the form in which they are arranged. Artaud’s “guidance” 
touches upon the notion of mimesis, the artful expression acquired through approximation.  
 The products of the spirit, particularly writing, should be one with the spirit itself. The 
detail in which Artaud’s subsequent publications deal with this subject points to a persistent 
concern for him, which would combine with his surrealist preoccupations in a singular 
manner. Grossman writes on Artaud’s texts from the period 1924-1925: “tous les textes qu’il 
écrit dans ces années-là oscillent ainsi entre l’exaltation surréaliste des ‘mots écrits avec la 
vitesse de la lumière’ (‘Lettre aux écoles du Bouddha’) et la souffrance de l’impuissance à 
écrire, la douleur d’être ‘un abîme complet’ (Le Pèse-Nerfs)”350 (Œuvres 65). L’Ombilic des 
Limbes and Le Pèse-Nerfs — the latter followed by “Fragments d’un Journal d’Enfer” in an 
edition from 1927 — herald an investigation into the spirit that extrapolates from the precepts 
of surrealism. Appearing in mid-1925, a few months after Artaud’s formal inclusion into the 
group, both pieces combine texts of different formats. 
                                                            
346 “and frankly my expressed thoughts are not at all comparable to my materialised, externalised thoughts" 
347 “The Spirit fixes arbitrarily on a theme, on an effect, the theme requires consistency, and the words, their 
sound” 
348 “all levels, all grades, all currents” 
349 “sudden leaps of impotence” 
350 “the texts he wrote in those years range from the surreal exaltation of ‘words written at the speed of light’ 
(‘Lettre au écoles du Bouddha’) to the suffering through writer’s block, the pain of being in an abyss” (Le Pèse-
Nerves)” 
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 In L’Ombilic des Limbes, published in July 1925, alongside a portrait of Artaud by 
André Masson, Artaud advances his by now well-known formula concerning life and work: 
“là où d’autres proposent des œuvres je ne prétends pas autre chose que de montrer mon 
esprit”351 (Œuvres 105). In opposition to the detached work of art, Artaud proposes the 
œuvrement of his own spirit. If the accomplishment of a work is dependent on the 
accomplishment of spiritual expression, Artaud also proclaims the urge to be done “avec 
l’Esprit comme avec la littérature”352 (Œuvres 105), a statement that can be understood to 
refer to the sense in which these two instances have become separated. In opposition to this, 
he proposes “que l’Esprit et la vie communiquent à tous les degrés”353 (Œuvres 105), while 
suffering is situated at the point of stratification. That is, “je souffre que l’Esprit ne soit pas 
dans la vie et que la vie ne soit pas dans l’Esprit”354 (Œuvres 105). 
 Artaud proposes that his own book, L’Ombilic des Limbes, should function as a 
“porous” object in relation to life and to himself: “ce livre je le mets en suspension dans la 
vie, je veux qu’il soit mordu par les choses extérieures, et d’abord par tous les soubresauts en 
cisaille, toutes les cillations de mon moi à venir”355 (Œuvres 105). This idea of porosity is 
also expressed in terms of Artaud’s desire to produce a book “qui soit comme une porte 
ouverte … une porte simplement abouchée avec la réalité”356 (Œuvres 105). The ideal “work 
of art,” therefore, seems to function as a mediator between “external things” and the “future 
self,” a precious role in Artaud’s description. At the same time, it holds no secrets in relation 
to the spirit and the reality that has “engendered” it, a claim that recalls Benjamin’s praise of 
Nadja and other surrealist productions as books of portes battantes, their openness being 
characterised as highly revolutionary (Benjamin Surrealism 183). 
 Among texts and poems addressing tortuous physical states, the benefits of drugs, 
theatrical scenarios and parodies, Artaud describes, in L’Ombilic des Limbes, the “de-
corporalisation of reality” in relation to which “les mots pourrissent à l’appel inconscient du 
cerveau, tous les mots pour n’importe quelle opération mentale, et surtout celles qui touchent 
                                                            
351 “where others propose œuvres, I claim no other than to show my spirit” 
352 “with the Spirit as well as with literature” 
353 “that life and the Spirit communicate on every level” 
354 “I suffer from the Spirit not being in life, and life not being in the Spirit” 
355 “this book, I put it into suspension in life, I want it to be bitten by external things, and first of all by all the 
shredded turmoil, all the blinks of my future self” 
356 “which is like an open door ... a door simply tied up with reality” 
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aux ressorts les plus habituels, les plus actifs de l’esprit” 357  (Œuvres 110). Words are 
described as failing the unconscious call, incapable of expressing the intentions of the spirit. 
This scenario complements Artaud’s description, in the section addressed to the “Legislator 
of the Narcotics Act,” of different troubles graves de la personalité (“severe personality 
problems”). Apparently, the condition of failing to find words is related to the particular 
condition that Artaud tells Rivière distinguishes him from his friends.   
 The problem being discussed is that of avoir de la pensée (“having thought”). Artaud 
states: “Il ne s’agit pas cependant que cette pensée joue à faux, qu’elle déraisonne, il s’agit 
qu’elle se produise, qu’elle jette des feux, même fous. Il s’agit qu’elle existe. Et je prétend, 
moi, entre autres, que ja n’ai pas de pensée. Mais ceci fait rire mes amis. Et cependant!”358 
(Œuvres 115f). Having a false, or unreasonable thought is not opposed to thinking. Here 
Artaud assumes the terms identified by Deleuze (Difference 147), of engendering thinking 
through thought. Avoir de la pensée means being capable of manifesting thought to oneself, 
in response to the various circumstances of sentiment and life. According to Artaud, thinking 
can be summarised as “se répondre à soi”359 (Œuvres 115). Here spiritual, intellectual activity 
is again related to the need to overcome separation. This is possibly why “the most familiar 
springs of the spirit,” referred to above, are those for which words fail the most. 
 The interconnectedness of thought and expression, which appears in L’Ombilic des 
Limbes, takes the form of a concern with the activity of writing in Le Pèse-Nerfs, first 
published in August 1925. There Artaud presents the “cosmology” surrounding his idea of 
writing, while refuting the traditional notion of oeuvre. This denial is related to the 
impossibility of disposing of one’s life in an instrumental way. The well-known sentence of 
Le Pèse-Nerfs expresses this negation in radical tones, while the subtleties of it tend to be 
obscured. Artaud writes, in the context of disregard for the “professionals of language and the 
spirit”: “Toute l’écriture est de la cochonnerie.”360 (Œuvres 165). 
 The text opens with a description of the operations of fixation, segmentation and mise 
en monument on states and elements of the spirit, before actual thought takes place. This is 
related to what Artaud calls “cette obstination de l’esprit à vouloir penser en dimensions et en 
                                                            
357 “words rot before the unconscious call of the brain, all words for any mental operation, and especially those 
related to the most familiar springs of the spirit, the most active amongst them” 
358 “It is not, however, that thought plays false, that it rambles, it is that it happens, it lights fires, even crazy 
ones. It is that it exists. And I claim, among others, that I have no thought. But this makes my friends laugh. 
And yet!” 
359 “answering oneself” 
360 “All writing is [of the order of] crap.” 
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espaces”361 (Œuvres 159). This form of “thinking in segments” means, according to Artaud, 
that thought is not in uninterrupted communication with things: there are gaps and 
crystallisations, which are necessary for “the good condition of creation.” However, even 
more surprising is the illusion that these fixed segments of the soul appear “comme s’ils 
étaient une grande page plastique et en osmose avec tout le reste de la réalité”362 (Œuvres 
159). The ambiguous aspects of segmentation and apparent osmosis here introduce the theme 
of writing as an operation based on both characteristics of the spirit: its crystallisation of 
states of the soul, and the subtle, tenuous nature of its connection to reality. 
 In the sections of Le Pèse-Nerfs that follow, Artaud mentions “un impouvoir à 
cristalliser inconsciemment,”363 as well as a difficulty of “trouver sa place et de retrouver la 
communication avec soi” 364  (Œuvres 162). The above-mentioned aspects of the spirit, 
crystallisation and closeness to reality, are here found to be missing. Artaud describes the 
absence of a point of cohesion, in which the “flocculation” of things can be reassembled. The 
other name he assigns to this point is “inspiration,” described in terms already discussed 
above: “a point of magic utilisation of things,” one that is favoured by an individual 
“cosmogony,” that is a form of personal mystique. In other words, Artaud situates expression 
as dependent on one finding one’s own place amidst the spiritual dispositions of things.  
 Artaud finds this kind of cohesion to be lacking in himself. He asserts in a section that 
opens with the vocative Chers Amis (“Dear Friends”): “ce que vous avez pris pour mes 
œuvres n’était que les déchets de moi-même, ces raclures de l’âme que l’homme normal 
n’accueille pas”365 (Œuvres 163). In relation to a defective functioning of life — namely the 
inability to find a point of cohesion amongst the spiritual fixations of reality, or, in other 
words, the lack of a personal consistency through which reality, as filtered by the soul, can be 
approached —Artaud describes his works as being no more than the debris of himself. 
Notably, this inability is strictly related, in Le Pèse-Nerfs, to what he calls the “stupéfaction 
de ma langue”366 (Œuvres 163). The ideas of oblivion and perplexity in relation to language, 
expressed by the use of the term stupéfaction, here evoke a mixture of amazement and 
                                                            
361 “this obstinacy of the spirit in wanting to think in dimensions and spaces” 
362 “as though they were a large plastic page and in osmosis with the rest of reality” 
363 “the inability to unconsciously crystallise” 
364 “finding one’s place and in regaining communication with oneself” 
365 “what you took to be my work was nothing more than the wreckage of myself, these scrapings of the soul 
that the normal man does not welcome” 
366 “stupefaction of my language” 
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paralysis. That is, Artaud’s identified “malformation of thought” must be related to the terms 
in which his thought is able to express itself. 
 According to Artaud, “tous les termes que je choisis pour penser sont pour moi des 
termes au sens propre du mot, de véritables terminaisons”367 (Œuvres 163). The words or 
expressions used by Artaud are at the same time the media and the termination of his thought. 
He describes being vraiment localisé (“truly located”), as well as vraiment paralysé (“truly 
paralysed”) by these terms. The terms are equivocal in relation to his thinking, but they are 
also essential to it. According to Artaud: “en ces moments ma pensée, je ne peux que la faire 
passer par ces termes … sous peine de m’arrêter à ces moments de penser”368 (Œuvres 163). 
The interconnectedness of thought and language are at the core of the problem of expression, 
here presented in terms of a limitation imposed by language over thought, based on the 
abstract idea that the spirit can only express itself through language. This idea appears in a 
transformed form in other texts by Artaud around the same period, as discussed below. It also 
acquires a transitory sense in the light of the last phrase of Le Pèse-Nerfs, presented in rather 
apocalyptic terms: by the time his work has been understood, the language has stiffed and 
silenced, and the spirits have dried up: “je n’aurais plus besoin de parler”369 (Œuvres 166). 
 In the next sections of Le Pèse-Nerfs, Artaud “stages” dialogues in which his 
description of his state is set against commentaries by other people, probably his friends and 
acquaintances. This device allows him to demonstrate the extent to which the situation he 
evokes is unique, at the same time as granting him an incontestable knowledge as “celui qui a 
mieux senti le désarroi stupéfiant de sa langue dans ses relations avec la pensée”370 (Œuvres 
164). In response to detached statements such as “mais c’est normal, mais à tout le monde il 
manque des mots, mais vous êtes trop difficile avec vous-même,”371 Artaud answers: “vous 
êtes des cons … je me connais parce que je m’assiste, j’assiste à Antonin Artaud”372 (Œuvres 
164). 
 In an aside to the dramatisation above, Artaud announces and details the broad 
categories of cochons (“pigs”) in relation to which he states that “toute l’écriture est de la 
                                                            
367 “all the words I choose to think are for me terms, in the true sense of the word: terminations” 
368 “at these times, I can only make my though pass through these terms ... otherwise I risk stopping thinking at 
these times” 
369 “and I won’t need to talk anymore” 
370 “he who has really felt the most the amazing confusion of his language in its relations with thought” 
371 “but that is normal, everyone lacks words, you're too hard on yourself” 
372 “you idiots ... I know myself because I attend to myself, I attend to Antonin Artaud” 
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cochonnerie”373 (Œuvres 165). The cochons are, for instance, literary people, those who 
possess their language, the spirits of their epoch, those for whom certain words have certain 
meanings, and for whom sentiments can be classified. In sum, Artaud despises all who view 
language as an instrument of peaceful thinking, able to analyse and guide. He ends his 
enumeration by announcing his negation of traditional notions concerning the field of 
writing: “Et je vous l’ai dit: pas d’œuvres, pas de langue, pas de parole, pas d’esprit, rien. 
Rien, sinon un beau Pèse-Nerfs. Une sorte de station incompréhensible et toute droite au 
milieu de tout dans l’esprit.”374 (Œuvres 165). As mentioned above, the Pèse-Nerfs denotes a 
point at which the spirit engages with the calibration and production of a form of thinking. It 
represents the cohesion that Artaud apparently lacks. What follows is a nonetheless 
enthusiastic description of certain acts, intervals and imminent situations that occupy Artaud, 
while they escape “all the others.” Once again, impossibility is the opposite of renunciation: 
“je n’ai plus ma langue, ce n’est pas une raison pour que vous persistiez, pour que vous vous 
obstiniez dans la langue”375 (Œuvres 166). 
 The last lines of Le Pèse-Nerfs describe a vague future in which Artaud’s propositions 
will be understood, in which his mystique will be so evident and accessible that it will be 
used “like a hat.” In this context, as mentioned above, all languages will have been pinned 
down and silenced, all spirits will have dried up, and the “lubrifiante membrane continuera à 
flotter dans l’air”376 (Œuvres 166). This scenario suggests that the multiplicity of languages 
and spiritual products have to recede for absolute knowledge to emerge. The membrane, an 
element that encompasses both the connection and the separation of different types of matter, 
is a manifestation of the singular form of permeated segmentation envisioned by Artaud in 
relation to oneself, the spirit and its products, a theme that will be further analysed below. 
 “Fragments d’un Journal d’Enfer,” the short text that follows Le Pèse-Nerfs in the 
edition published by Cahiers du Sud in 1927, presents language in a slightly modified 
fashion. While Artaud also discusses paralysis in this text, he again evokes other people’s 
opinions, in the following: “on me parle des mots, mais il ne s’agit pas de mots, il s’agit de la 
durée de l’esprit”377 (Œuvres 178). The theme of duration can be linked with the description 
                                                            
373 “all writing is crap” 
374 “And I have told you: no work, no language, no speech, no spirit, nothing. Nothing, except a good Pèse-
Nerfs. A sort of incomprehensible station straight ahead amidst everything in the spirit.” 
375 “I no longer have my language, it's not a reason for you to persist, for you to persist in language.” 
376 “lubricating membrane will continue to float in the air” 
377 “they speak of words, but it is not about words, it is about the duration of the spirit” 
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of avoir de la pensée, in L’Ombilic des Limbes, that of being able to maintain thought. In this 
context, the word is one of the threads through which life is connected with the spirit, but it is 
not sufficient to establish duration within thought. Here Artaud also introduces the idea that 
the soul fails language just as much as language fails the spirit, the important aspect being 
“que cette rupture trace dans les plaines des sens comme une vaste sillon de désespoir et de 
sang”378 (Œuvres 178). The domain of senses is affected by this rupture, and it therefore also 
undermines the l’étoffe des corps (“fabric of the body”). 
 Artaud highlights the fact that, in the failure to connect between language and the 
spirit, no more than an étincelle (“spark”) is lost. The fact that it is a fragment, and also an 
“abyss,” does not prevent this spark from gaining “avec soi toute l’étendue du monde 
possible, et le sentiment d’une inutilité telle qu’elle est comme le nœud de la mort”379 
(Œuvres 179). The fragility of moments of indiscernibility within the separation is patent, 
even more in the designation of writing as a thread or rope. When this thread is able to find 
lines of passage from Artaud’s intelligence and unconscious, in his own words, “c’est une vie 
nouvelle qui renaît, de plus en plus profonde”380 (Œuvres 179). Artaud qualifies his own 
position in this context as that of someone “elected by a fatality,” despite the fact that the 
aspects he highlights, as mentioned above, cannot be restricted to his personal case. Having 
abdicated from clarity, Artaud describes himself as someone who has chosen “le domaine de 
la douleur et de l’ombre comme d’autres [ont choisi] celui du rayonnement et de 
l’entassement de la matière”381 (Œuvres 180). 
 The field of language, in the writings of Artaud, is under constant scrutiny, as an 
intrinsic element of the (im)possibility of clarity, communication and thinking. Above all, 
these issues are problematised in terms of the relationship that they maintain or allow one to 
maintain with oneself. Artaud declares that he writes in order to prove the emptiness of his 
spirit, in order to explore a “body” that allows only fragile connections between separate 
instances in life. Whether the products of this exploration are debris, crap or portents of “new 
life,” they should never take the place of the oeuvre, from which another level of separation is 
established. Artaud’s insistence on the need not to dispose of oneself through writing is no 
less than a testimony of the power of thinking in relation to language, and of the small, 
limited role of the individual in accomplishing such power. 
                                                            
378 “that this rupture traces in the plains of the senses something like a vast furrow of despair and blood” 
379 “with itself the scope of the possible world, and a sense of futility as it is like the crux of death” 
380 “it’s a new life being reborn, and becoming deeper and deeper” 
381 “the domain of pain and shadow just like others [have chosen] that of radiation and crowding of matter” 
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 5.7. Language and Experience 
 André Queiroz, in “O Teatro Artaudiano ou a Metafísica da Carne” (“The Artaudian 
Theatre or the Metaphysics of Flesh,” 1991), suggests an approximation of Benjamin and 
Artaud through the theme of the “primordial” and its remains. He sees, in both writers, an 
attempt to restore a previous state of affairs, identified with the integrity of language. While 
for Benjamin this means restoring linguistic nominative powers in relation to things, for 
Artaud it concerns the recuperation of language by “evading word’s evasion”382 (Queiroz 
122). The theme of original states is highly ambiguous in both Artaud and Benjamin’s 
writings. Queiroz touches upon a crucial point, that of the role played by language in the 
approach to experience of both authors. In relation to the idea of the primordial, while in 
Benjamin’s writings this must be understood in terms of restoration, but also of dispersion, 
for Artaud the origins of being can only encompass violence and chaos, despite his recurring 
fantasies of fusion, as Dumoulié observes (Artaud 12).383 
 As the texts approached in the last section suggest, language is a presence in the 
experimental forms of experience outlined by Artaud and Benjamin in their early writings. 
Benjamin privileges language as a model of experience since, together with religion, it 
transcends the divisions operating in the Kantian system, allowing for the emergence of a 
broader and more elaborate definition. According to Osborne and Charles, in Benjamin’s 
early essays “language serves a medium of experience that binds the ostensible ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ in a more profound, perhaps mystical, relationship of underlying kinship.” As 
mentioned above, the theme of experience taking place in and through language is not alien 
to Artaud either. In his early texts, the act of writing is a dramatisation that allows the gaining 
of distance and some insight into thought. Language appears, once again, not as the promise 
of a resolution to the limitations of experience, but as the necessary path towards an attempt 
to overcome them, one that is explored at the crossroads of solitude and communion. 
 This section investigates the extent to which language is involved in Artaud and 
Benjamin’s definitions of experience, as expressed in their writings from the twenties and 
thirties. What is evident in the texts approached above is that language represents a genuine 
moment of experience, which touches on both the lost worlds of ancient experience and the 
                                                            
382 “furtar-se ao furto da palavra” 
383 The theme of origins, approached briefly in the chapter on magic, will be further explored in the last section 
of this chapter. 
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projected state of coherence from which new forms may emerge.384 While in Benjamin this 
relationship is investigated through the thematisation of the human perception of similarities 
and the role played by sound in primeval and modern languages, in Artaud the topic of fusion 
between the spirit and its products, as well as the point of cohesion between separate spiritual 
dimensions, point to writing as an equivocal, but essential, “thread” of connection amid 
spiritual matters. 
 Between the early articles on experience and his writings from the thirties, Benjamin 
seems to have undergone a shift in perspective, related to a political analysis that privileges, 
through different approaches, a speculative concept of experience. This is the case in One-
Way Street and the essay on surrealism, both from the late twenties. In the latter, as 
mentioned above, Benjamin evokes the sensitivity of the surrealists to forms of intoxication, 
which he urged should be part of a revolutionary experience, permeated by non-materialistic 
elements. In both cases, as suggested by Osborne and Charles, an “immersion into the depths 
of things” must first take place, the city furnishing the sensory, imagistic material to 
constitute experience.  
 In the articles on language discussed above, written by Benjamin during the thirties, 
the ancestor of language is to be found in mime. Speech mimics the gesture that it used to 
follow. Nowadays, the similarities that man used to draw on to establish the connections 
between words and objects are no longer part of ordinary awareness. They have been tucked 
away into the unconscious, and can only be accessed through the various ways this dimension 
can be brought to light: unintentionally, partially, and through transforming its character. 
Benjamin highlights reading as one form of access, due to the privileged position of sound 
midway between mimicry and modern language. Through reading, flashes of similarities may 
become momentarily perceptible, pointing to the role of the transmission of experience 
assigned to language. The unconscious is here an active and changing reservoir of awareness, 
like that revealed by clairvoyance.  
 The idea that spoken language is just another animal instinct, that of expressive 
mimicry, leads to some common ground in the writings of Artaud and Benjamin. In 
“Problems in the Sociology of Language,” it is as if Artaud’s testimony has found some 
correspondence in the academic understanding of language. In the approach of Paget to the 
potentiality of voice, the “high” point attained by literary production actually represents no 
                                                            
384 The notion of coherence, present in both Artaud’s and Benjamin’s texts, is further explored by Paul Ricoeur 
in relation to language and experience. Please see Hartmann S. “Walter Benjamin and Paul Ricoeur: Narration 
and Experience to Come” (2015). 
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more than “savage and uncultured” linguistic forms, a logical reversal that is analogous to 
Artaud’s designation of the great “spirits of the time” and their writings as cochonnerie. At 
the same time, Benjamin’s definition of language as a manifestation of being, rather than an 
instrument of it, goes beyond the propositions of his earlier “On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man.” It suggests that the blend of spirit and life which, according to Artaud, is 
summoned, through the act of writing, is a radical manifestation of the conception of 
language as the communication of essences, here in terms of the individual’s relationship 
with her or himself and the world. In the words of Kurt Goldstein, language is “a revelation 
of our innermost being and of the bond linking us to ourselves and to our fellow human 
beings” (Goldstein qtd. in Benjamin Sociology 86). 
 It is no less significant that Artaud’s attempt to achieve, through language, an 
immediate utterance of life, takes the form of screams and roars. As in Pour en Finir Avec le 
Jugement de Dieu (“To Have Done With the Judgment of God,” 1947), the radio broadcast 
full of musical noise, language is treated as raw and living part of material of life. But while 
there are hints of overlap with ideas of Benjamin here, they are superficial compared to the 
significant differences in their approaches to language and experience. What connects them is 
more an “underlying kinship,” to borrow an expression from Osborne and Charles, than a 
“wordy” or “worldly” similarity. 
 Benjamin describes language, in “Doctrine of the Similar,” as a canon capable of 
expressing, albeit obscurely, extrasensory similarities. Traces of ancient similarities are still 
present in the acts of speaking and writing. They are the basis of the constitution of language, 
even though humans no longer perceive them. According to Benjamin, instead of magic 
rituals, “it is now language which represents the medium in which objects meet and enter into 
relationship with each other, no longer directly, as once in the mind of the augur or priest, but 
in their essences, in their most volatile and delicate substances, even in their aromata” 
(Similar 68). Paradoxically, language seems to perform what was once considered impossible 
to perform, because it was an inherent feature of life. 
 The act of incorporating into language materials that were originally distinct from it 
points to the problematic constitution of this field. This problematic is expressed by Artaud 
through the question of how life can be expressed without overwhelming and replacing it in 
the act of expression, that is without allowing for the “dead bodies” that are words to dictate 
the contents of life itself? This is relevant to Artaud’s claim in L’Ombilic des Limbes, that 
instead of oeuvres, he proposes to exhibit his spirit, to offer a distillation of his life. This does 
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not mean the mere dissection of his personal case. Rather, he considers that spirit and life 
“communicate at all levels,” and that writing must be a porous intermediary, open to 
transformation by both the interior and the exterior worlds, or by nothing at all.  
 The concept of writing as an intermediary, pertinent to Artaud’s personal experience, 
also suggests it could be a sort of beacon in the context of the pain of separation, albeit an 
equivocal one. If, for Benjamin, language is the archive of a lost world of experience, that 
can reappear and transform present experience, for Artaud it is, at this point, the sphere in 
which the problem of expression and the possibility of its capture by language is dramatised, 
a sphere that nonetheless allows for the establishment of a provisory interjacent instance 
between spirit and life. Here words are defined as deficient before the “unconscious call” of 
the spirit, while they can still serve as evidence of Artaud’s supposed n’avoir pas de pensée 
(“absence of thought”). 
 In the section of L’Ombilic des Limbes entitled “Lettre à Monsieur le Législateur de la 
Loi sur les Stupéfiants,” Artaud details his ideas on dispossession. This is his inability to 
maintain the act of thinking, since “avoir de la pensée, pour moi, c’est maintenir sa pensée, 
être en état de se la manifester à soi-même et qu’elle puisse répondre à toutes les 
circonstances du sentiment et de la vie” 385  (Œuvres 115f). Even though his thought is 
conscious of its own weaknesses and discontinuities, he says, it lacks the minimum 
requirement for thinking life, the ability to reach the form of words, without which the soul is 
incapable of living: “penser c’est pour moi autre chose que n’être pas tout à fait mort, c’est se 
rejoindre à tous les instants, c’est ne cesser de à aucun moment de se sentir dans son être 
interne”386 (Œuvres 116).  
 Artaud’s ambitious definition of thought, and its relation to language, is that thinking 
is much more than “not being dead”: the condition of being able to “re-join” oneself at any 
given time, which is essential to thought, seems to pass through language. Artaud’s 
proposition is that the minimum for thinking life equates to a minimum of material that can 
take the form of words. The question of duration comes to the forefront here: language must 
be consistent, or at least consistently tied up with reality, so that the access to oneself, 
however fragile, can be maintained. It is from a form of cohesion, and “personal 
consistency,” that Artaud expects to be able to se répondre à soi (“answer to himself”). 
                                                            
385 “having thought for me means keeping one’s thought, means being able to manifest thought to oneself, and 
that it can respond to all the circumstances of feeling and life” 
386 “thinking is for me something other than being not quite dead, it is to reach out to oneself at all times, it is to 
never stop feeling in one’s inner being” 
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 In Le Pèse-Nerfs, Artaud attempts a definition of writing that includes these 
considerations, while outlining different moments at which life is transmuted into language. 
Writing arises initially from the “crystallisation” of spiritual contents, whose counterpart is 
the tenuous connection between the spiritual and the real. While this crystallisation provides 
the elements necessary for creation, their apparent “osmosis” with reality guarantees that the 
written products are not separate forms. This mode of functioning is apparently deficient in 
Artaud, so that what he produces is no more than “debris” of himself. As mentioned above in 
relation to the notion of the “trace,” debris here implies something reminiscent of a previous 
configuration, in this case of language. It is underscored by the attempt towards unity, even in 
the face of an incontrovertible fragmentation. Benjamin’s definition of language as the 
archive of a past experience, particularly of one that dispensed with language, also deals with 
the idea of traces.  
 A letter sent by Artaud to Dr. Toulouse in August 1923 contains some of the book’s 
most significant expressions. Here is an excerpt: 
Maintenant comme alors je travaille dans la douleur et l’impossession de moi-
même, et ma vie est tout aussi empoisonné. Toutes les discussions à ce sujet 
me paraissent stériles et sans porté. Que mon mal depuis lors ait avancé ou 
reculé, la question pour moi n’est pas là, elle est dans la douleur et la 
sidération persistante de mon esprit. Ce que vous prenez pour mes œuvres, 
n’est, maintenant comme alors, que les déchets de moi-même, ces raclures de 
l’âme que l’homme normal n’accueille pas.387 (Œuvres I,2 103). 
While the dialogical aspect of the book, that of an implicit “discussion” with the opinions of 
others, is visible in the letter, Artaud also expresses his personal pain and dispossession, in 
the context of which his writings are “scrapings of the soul.” He states, however, that he 
works within the pain and dispossession, denoting that this situation is part of the setting, if 
not the condition, of what he produces. It does not prevent him from working, while what 
actually appears as sterile and unprofitable are the discussions on the ups and downs of his 
condition. Artaud’s position on his situation does not express a determination to talk or write 
about it, but rather from it. 
                                                            
387  “Now as then I work in the pain and dispossession of myself, and my life is entirely poisoned. All 
discussions on this subject seem sterile and useless to me. Whether my trouble since then has evolved or 
retreated, the question for me is not there, it is in pain and the persistent stunning of my spirit. What you take to 
be my work, is, now as then, no more than waste of myself, scrapings of the soul that the normal man does not 
welcome.” 
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 The book’s title, on its publication in 1925, was dedicated to Toulouse: “Le titre de ce 
dernier petit livre sera: LE PÈSE-NERFS. Depuis l’ombre et la dejection.”388 (Œuvres I,2 120). 
The idea of dejection evokes a fall in relation to a “higher” state, as the Latin term deject- 
(“thrown down”) indicates. The designation of “waste” where others see an oeuvre also 
assumes these connotations. The “shadow” evokes Artaud’s proposition that he has chosen 
“le domaine de la douleur et de l’ombre comme d’autres [ont choisi] celui du rayonnement et 
de l’entassement de la matière”389 (Œuvres 180). This is related to Artaud’s concept of the 
étincelle (“spark”), which is lost with the failure to establish a thread between language and 
spirit. It is a spark that contains within itself “the scope of the possible world.” Here the idea 
of trace recurs, in the form of a fragment, capable of connecting two different dimensions, 
pointing to another possible correspondence with Benjamin’s notion of Spur. However, while 
in both cases the link is limited and fragile, in Artaud’s text it points to a profound and 
immediate problem in the concept of language, in relation particularly to the expression of 
the “underground tides” of the spirit. Artaud’s account of the fragility of moments of 
connection between the spirit and reality, attainable through the word, is a further example of 
the questioning of notions of subject and the possibility of knowledge that underscores his 
writings. For Benjamin, the “trace” is a possible connection between different temporalities. 
It presupposes a singular epistemological understanding, which it does not question. 
 For Benjamin, the definition of language as archive includes the idea of registers of 
traces from past experience in the unconscious. Language supposedly emerged from the 
process of decay of a certain mode of perception, the onomatopoeic element being is the 
closest aspect, within modern languages, of this perception. The traces appear, as mentioned 
above, as a limited form of access, restricted to a “time-moment” characterised by the 
emergence of similarities. While in Benjamin’s writings they are qualified as precious 
remnants, providing the fleeting inspiration of a past moment in the present, and to be 
explored in the search for new forms of experience, for Artaud they are, as suggested by 
Pollock, “tout ce qu’il a pu sauver d’un ‘effondrement central de l’âme’”390 (22). The sense 
of surviving particles is connected with that of déchets (“waste”) and raclures (“scrapings”).  
 All this considered, the different foundations of the works of Artaud and Benjamin 
are perhaps particularly clear in their approaches to language. While Benjamin’s notion of 
                                                            
388 “The title of this last short book will be: LE PÈSE-NERFS. After the shadow and dejection.” 
389 “the domain of pain and shadow just like others [have chosen] that of radiation and the crowding of matter.” 
390 “all that he could save from a ‘central collapse of the soul’” 
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language is a hermeneutically-oriented notion, aiming, ultimately, at the restoration of an 
interpretation that allows the unveiling of other worlds within the present one, Artaud’s is a 
tragically-oriented version, concerned with the irrecoverable fragmentation of the soul, 
preventing the formation of univocal meaning. Although Benjamin does not envision any 
ultimate resolution or restoration, and indeed at times expresses the fragmented dimension as 
the only experienceable one, and although Artaud recurrently nourishes ideas of recuperation 
and the joining of fragments into some new form of consistency, the thoughts of the two 
writers cannot be closely compared, let alone combined.  
 Corroborating this, in “Fragments d’un Journal d’Enfer,” Artaud introduces the idea 
that the soul fails language just as much as language fails the spirit. The moments of 
accomplishment are represented by a thread or rope, while the “fabric of the body” suffers 
modifications from these accomplishments or failures. This is perhaps the meaning of a point 
of cohesion, equating to a “personal consistency,” the ability to overcome the “paralysation” 
and “localisation” that Artaud describes as effects of the use of language. Artaud is unable to 
escape the “stupefaction of his language,” that is, the amazement and oblivion inherent to his 
position, but he is also able to glimpse a unique form of knowledge. His writings remain 
“crap,” his productions mere debris of himself. But the position au milieu de tout dans 
l’esprit (“amidst all in the spirit”), evoked in Le Pèse-Nerfs, seems to allow for the creation 
of a framework for the contents that occupy Artaud, and which escape all others.  
 Perhaps the concept described by Benjamin as “language physiognomy,” related to 
the animal instinct for creating impressions, could serve as an interesting analogy for the 
original dimension of language that occupies Artaud’s digression in the last lines of Le Pèse-
Nerfs. In it, languages and spiritual products have hardened and silenced. If this passage can 
be read in terms of the retrocession of the multiplicity of linguistic and spiritual contents as a 
condition for the establishment of a unified form of knowledge in a vague future, one that is 
not dependent on Artaud having to talk, it also points to the conception of language as a 
return to the origin. Pollock discusses this impulse in relation to Artaud’s Le Moine (1930), in 
which it is characterised by the presence, and eventual subsuming, of the mother figure. As 
the finalité and fin (“purpose” and “end”) of sexual desire, the mother evokes both appetite 
and disgust. Stripped of its imaginary and symbolic determinations, however, the concept is 
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“un reste, un déchet … le retour à l’anorganique; mais aussi ce dont le corps se sépare du fait 
de son organisation sexuée”391 (Pollock 121).  
 Nothing befits to this definition so well as the theme of the membrane, the 
“lubricating surface” that, after all else has ceased, “continuera à flotter dans l’air” 392 
(Œuvres 166). While alluded to by Artaud in terms of the separation and communication of 
different segments of life, it is a theme that hovers like a phantom around his writings, just as 
he describes it floating in the air, representing the “eternal” character of separation. This 
membrane, like the mother theme, can be characterised only ambiguously, since, in its origin, 
it donates life but also implies an individuated detachment from it. As Dumoulié highlights 
on the subject of the membrane, “tout ce qui vit doit se détacher d’elle pour exister, mais elle 
est la Vie et, cruellement, ce qui existe tombe comme mort” 393  (Artaud 23). There is, 
therefore, an “eternally living thing” that renders notions of life and death, subject and world, 
vain. In relation to this dimension, the theme of a return to the origin, implied in the 
regression of language and the reaching of the inorganic (the “original” dimension before 
life), assumes the feature of the blend proposed by Artaud of spirit and oeuvre. Once again, 
the term is also the termination, the aim is the end. The original dimension of language, as 
suggested by Benjamin, is the one in which language, strictly speaking, does not exist. Where 
one is removed from language, where similarities are fully perceived and immediately read. 
Gestures, and the resonant gestures that are sounds, are the last elements of this form of 
perception to disappear, and they constitute the closest approximations to the body’s original 
expressive abilities. As Artaud states, in the context of this form of retreat from multiplicity: 
“je n’aurais plus besoin de parler”394 (Œuvres 166). 
 The passage between experience and language is far from smooth, and is marked by 
misapprehension. As Kaufmann suggests, while questioning the defining criteria of literature: 
“si l’écrivain voulait communiquer, il n’écrirait pas” 395  (8). Language, in the works of 
Benjamin and Artaud, appears more accurately as built on misapprehensions, on the 
disappearance of a form of perception, derived from the inescapable fragmentation of being. 
                                                            
391 “a remnant, a waste ... the return to the inorganic; but also the element from which the body separates, as a 
result of its sexual organisation” 
392 “will continue to float in the air” 
393 “all that lives must detach from it to exist, but it is Life and, cruelly, what exists falls down dead” 
394 “and I will no longer need to talk” 
395 “if the writer wanted to communicate, he would not write” 
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Artaud and Benjamin however assume different positions in relation to language, as well as 
in connection with what is described here as experience. 
 In Artaud’s writings, language appears as intrinsic to the fragmentation of being. The 
most significant aspect of the relationship he sees between language and experience is 
expressed in the short sentence: “avoir de la pensée, c’est se répondre à soi”396 (Œuvres 115). 
Here the necessary mediation of language into life reveals its importance, while at the same 
time, the à soi highlights the highly personal attachment taking place in thought, whose most 
precise form takes the form of accessing and reporting to oneself, and from which the 
abstract notions of pure thought, as well as, significantly, the expressions of unconscious 
undercurrents, derive.  
 As suggested by Dumoulié, in Artaud, “la souffrance vécue dans son corps et son 
esprit trouveront à se projeter, à se dépersonnaliser, en suivant une ligne de fêlure que 
permettra de hisser le drame individuel au plan de l’événement même de l’Esprit”397 (Artaud 
12). The creation of an attainable drama, particularly through writing, produces a distance 
that situates the individual sphere as part of the events of the spirit. These events — in the 
sense of événement, that is, an event that takes place within both the factual and the 
transcendental spheres (Deleuze Logique 172) — is perhaps that of the non-identification of 
thought with itself, that is, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “de ce manque singulier qu’est 
la pensée” (qtd. in Dumoulié Artaud 19). While the “case of Artaud” cannot have its 
singularity effaced, what ails him, explicitly or implicitly, ails every spirit, so its absolute 
uniqueness is open to question. Artaud himself, as suggested by the essay on Lautréamont, 
situates his case as one more “act” in the general drama of thought, interpreted through many 
more characters (Œuvres XIV 34-5).  
 Benjamin’s understanding of the relationship between language and experience, while 
receiving a privileged position throughout his work, appears most clearly in the early 
writings. In these, language plays a mediating role between the human and the divine. In the 
texts from the thirties approached here, language is assigned an ambiguous place as the 
archive of experience, offering and limiting access to various psychosocial dimensions, 
which Benjamin is increasingly inclined to valorise as he moves towards the development of 
his “philosophy of history.” The notion of extrasensory or non-sensory similarities, defined in 
“Doctrine of the Similar,” also mediates between past and future, passing through 
                                                            
396 “to think is to answer to one’s self” 
397 “the suffering experienced in his body and spirit will be able to project itself, to de-personalise itself, 
following the link of a crack that will raise the individual drama to the level of an event of the Spirit itself” 
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unconscious registers. It reappears in Benjamin’s discussion of correspondances in the work 
of Charles Baudelaire. In the context of his work for the Passagenwerk, Benjamin states, in 
1939: “the correspondances record a concept of experience which include ritual elements” 
(Motifs 181). The ancient, vanished aspects of ritual experience re-emerge in modern urban 
life, which is undergoing its own crisis. 
 Fundamental differences and subordinate kinships underlie the approaches of Artaud 
and Benjamin to language and experience. This is also evident in a consideration of the 
relationship between their different conceptions of the idea of the image. Considered a form 
of language, it has an expressive relationship with the aspects of experience outlined by 
Benjamin and Artaud. The following section compares Benjamin’s understanding of modern 
experience, and Artaud’s suggestion that imagery is a form of “clear language.” In Benjamin 
description of the inaccessibility of traditional experience, and Artaud’s of the emergence of 
a new awareness of his intimate loss, the notion of image emerges as part of new forms of 
experience arising in response to the absence or decay of the traditional ones. 
 
 5.8. Decay or Extinguishing of Experience? 
 In parallel with his articles on language, Benjamin wrote a few essays in the thirties 
that elevated the concept of experience to a principal position in his work. In his discussions 
of surrealism in 1929, Benjamin had already praised the movement for championing a form 
of experience, relating to intoxication and to the precedence of image and language over the 
self (Surrealism 178-9). Benjamin’s materialism has as its goal, in this context, a movement 
beyond the sphere of thought and towards the sphere of image, body and political action 
(Auerbach A.). This sphere would remain a lasting interest for Benjamin, as the writings 
explored in this section indicate. They are “Experience and Poverty” (1933) and “The 
Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” (1936). 
 In 1933, twenty years after his first essay on experience, Benjamin wrote the short 
“Experience and Poverty,” in which he discusses the decay of the value attributed to 
experience by society at that time. In contrast to his 1913 essay, Benjamin here assumes the 
position of valuing the experience transmitted by the older generation, “with the authority of 
age,” “either as threats or as kindly pieces of advice” (Poverty 731). He then asks: “Where 
has it all gone? … And who will even attempt to deal with young people by giving them the 
benefit of their experience?” (Poverty 731). If in 1913 Benjamin had despised the use of the 
word “experience” by the adult, as a form of imposing “meaninglessness,” in 1933 he 
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diagnoses a void in the meaning of the notion of experience, perhaps of the same nature as in 
1913, which prevents the very possibility of accessing experience. 
 What Benjamin calls the decay in the valuing of experience is related to the fact that 
one generation had undergone, from 1914 to 1918, “some of the most monstrous events in the 
history of the world” (Poverty 731). Even as he was writing about the catastrophic effects of 
the First World War, Hitler and the National Socialist Party were being given “The Enabling 
Act” in Germany, a symbol of the path the country was to take in the years to come. This is 
certainly not a coincidence, even if it could not be known what the rise of Nazism would 
ultimately mean. In the last paragraph of the essay Benjamin makes clear that while 
discussing the events of 1914-18, he felt another war looming on the horizon. He states in 
1933: “the economic crisis is at the door, and behind it is the shadow of the approaching war” 
(Poverty 735).  
 In the years that followed, the already venomous air of the interwar period began to 
rot further. Benjamin reviews the period in the following lines: “With this tremendous 
development of technology, a completely new poverty has descended on mankind. And the 
reverse side of this poverty is the oppressive wealth of ideas that has been spread among 
people.” (Poverty 732). The relationship between the poverty of experience and technical 
development, particularly the abundance of information that characterises mass culture, is a 
theme that Benjamin would deepen in his essay on the work of art, from the period 1936-39.  
 Benjamin asks, in 1933: “For what is the value of all our culture if it is divorced from 
experience?” (Poverty 732). The “valuable piece of experience” passed on by the old, the 
lessons to last a life-time, the ability to tell a captivating story: these vanishing scenarios 
suggest that the notion of experience outlined by Benjamin is tied up with the possibility of 
duration and the appropriation of living matter, of a sharing of sensations between giver and 
receiver. A culture divorced from experience becomes a culture devoid of collective 
meaning. According to Gagnebin, this type of Erfharung (“experience”) presupposes a 
communion of life and discourse that the rapid development of capitalism has destroyed 
(Prefácio 10). Benjamin states: “Indeed (let’s admit it), our poverty of experience is not 
merely poverty on the personal level, but poverty of human experience in general. Hence, a 
new kind of barbarism.” (Poverty 732). 
The poverty mentioned by Benjamin being primarily related to the absence of 
valuable experiences, that is, living knowledge gained through a layered accumulation of 
practical wisdom, he announces his wish to “introduce a new, positive concept of barbarism” 
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(Poverty 732). The word had already been mentioned in his previous works, from the period 
around 1915-16, but without being closely explored. He now defines a positive barbarism, 
part of the attitude of “the best minds” of the period, as “a total absence of illusion about the 
age and at the same time an unlimited commitment to it” (Poverty 733). Barbarism is seen as 
the building of some form of humanity from profound poverty, which in itself also acquires a 
relatively positive connotation. The ambiguous attitude of disillusionment and commitment 
seen in those advocating this form of barbarism is the consequence of their rejection of 
former civilised ways of living, and their urge to construct something new from what little is 
left. These people, Benjamin points out, “reject the traditional, solemn and noble image of 
man, festooned with all the sacrificial offerings of the past,” turning instead to “the naked 
men of the contemporary world” (Poverty 733). 
Benjamin’s use of the word barbarism to highlight a positive attitude on the part of 
the impoverished man, living in an impoverished society, seems to take direct inspiration 
from the avant-garde movements, and the general mood that they represented. Benjamin 
echoes the dadaist and surrealist gesture mentioned above, that of disdain in relation to the 
values of civilisation, which they envision as responsible for preventing man from having 
direct contact with life, amongst other things. The references to the consequence of the war, 
the material and spiritual misery caused by technical developments, the transformation of the 
hungry masses into consumers, all point to this link. Considering the context in which 
Benjamin was writing, as a German Jew in increasingly Nazi Germany, his defence of 
positive barbarism might appear to be an eccentricity, despite the fact that in his final lines he 
defines the “few powerful people” of the time as “more barbaric, but not in the good way” 
(Poverty 735). The essay as a whole has a tone of subdued desperation, with Benjamin 
exhorting the reader to find meaning in the facts he presents. The numerous questions he asks 
add to this impression. 
The notion of experience evoked in the opening of “Experience and Poverty,” related 
to the authority accorded to the act of transmission, and the accumulated learning of shared 
wisdom, seems to be one of the most enduring ideas for Benjamin. His praise of the 
experience of poverty, as concerned not only with wealth, but more importantly with the 
qualities of possessiveness and secrecy of bourgeois society, takes the form of an attempt to 
give a positive allure to a condition that the essay begins by describing in negative terms. 
Benjamin states, in this second evaluation of the concept of experience: 
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Poverty of experience. This should not be understood to mean that people are 
yearning for new experience. No, they long to free themselves from 
experience; they long for a world in which they can make such pure and 
decided use of their poverty — their outer poverty, and ultimately also their 
inner poverty — that it will lead to something respectable. (Poverty 734) 
 While these lines evoke the 1913 essay on experience, they also point to the 
differentiation between two forms of experience that Benjamin proposes in “The Storyteller: 
Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov,” a differentiation that gathers together all of his 
writings on experience, even if it assumes various, and at times contradictory, forms. The 
particular sense of the terms “barbarism” and “poverty” proposed in “Experience and 
Poverty” would reappear in the 1936 essay in the context of discussion of the bourgeois 
experience of “internalisation,” whose correspondent narrative form is the novel, while an 
experience of transmission and collective engendering would be much more detailed.398 
 “The Storyteller” is concerned with the figure of the storyteller, described as being on 
the edge of disappearance, and identified by Benjamin in the nineteenth-century Russian 
writer Nikolai Leskov. Leskov portrays the customs of small ethnic groups in Russia, with 
whom he made contact through various trips around the country. According to Buck-Morss 
(218), Benjamin decided to write about Leskov following a controversy in the Soviet Union, 
where an avant-garde artist had put a piece by Leskov to music, generating criticism on the 
part of leaders of the Soviet state. Benjamin’s position defended the contemporary artist, 
pointing to the nostalgic tone of the essay. Having been rooted in the working class, Leskov 
continued to be evoked by writers such as Gorky and Tolstoy as a major representative of the 
people’s voice. 
 The diagnosis of experience presented in 1936 is very similar to the opening section 
of “Experience and Poverty,” even resuming some of the positions presented in 1933. 
Benjamin relates the disappearance of the narrator figure to the vanishing of something “that 
seemed inalienable” to humanity: “the ability to exchange experiences” (Storyteller 83). A 
correlated fact is that the “communicability of experience is decreasing” (Storyteller 86), a 
process that Benjamin links to the dying out of the “epic” side of truth. This process, he 
highlights, has been going on for a long time, and can be described as a “symptom of decay” 
aligned with modernity. Benjamin’s diagnosis is, characteristically, double-faceted: it points 
                                                            
398 On the eve of the Second World War, Benjamin assigns a very different sense to barbarism in “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History” (1939). It appears in a negative context, as the necessary cost of all forms of civilisation. 
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to the perishing of a cultural form, and with it of interesting modalities of expression and 
experience, while also accentuating the opening up of new possibilities through the change.  
 In relation to the decrease in communicability of experience, Benjamin tells us: 
It is, rather, only a concomitant symptom of the secular productive forces of 
history, a concomitant that has quite gradually removed narrative from the 
realm of living speech and at the same time is making it possible to see a new 
beauty in what is vanishing. (Storyteller 87) 
These “secular productive forces” are related to the gradual process of secularisation that 
Lukács (Novel 30) identifies in the decline of the epic world view. At the same time, the 
situation evoked by Benjamin refers to his description of the traditional forms of narrative as 
being partially based on artisanal work environments or, as Gagnebin suggests, on “pre-
capitalist forms of work organisation” 399  (Prefácio 10). The decline of the communal 
language and milieu, in any case, prevents the occurrence of traditional narrative forms. 
 As a “concomitant symptom” of these processes, Benjamin aligns the changes in 
experience with his approaches to modern art and cinema, part of mass consumerism and the 
reorganisation of the productive forces (Work of Art 223). His analysis again focuses on 
conceptualising the possible effects of change in terms of new ways of experiencing; he is 
particularly concerned with the progressive possibilities offered by these art forms. Here, as 
in the 1933 essay, “new beauty” assumes revolutionary features. While nostalgia does play a 
part in it, this “constructive” aspect of Benjamin’s writing prevents a fully nostalgic approach 
to his work (Gagnebin Prefácio 10). The recognition of a loss forms the basis for a new kind 
of experience, one that opposes the bourgeois sentimentalism in favour of a form of 
“objectivity.”  
 On another front, Benjamin relates these changes to the rise of the novel. This recalls 
Breton’s referencing of the novel in the first surrealist manifesto (Manifestes 19), and also 
partially coincides with the diagnosis of Lukács in The Theory of the Novel. Benjamin 
connects the novel with the decrease in the oral story-telling tradition, through its privileging 
of the printed form. While the storyteller tells from experience, and “makes it the experience 
of those who are listening” (Storyteller 87), the novel usually expresses isolated incidences of 
life, related to the solitary individual “who is no longer able to express himself by giving 
examples of his most important concerns” (Storyteller 87). The experience expressed here is 
an Erlebnis (“lived experience”), concerning the thoughts, dilemmas and transformations of 
                                                            
399 “organização pré-capitalista do trabalho” 
Hartmann 269 
an individual life. The novel takes to the extreme the expression of incommensurable in 
individual life, it bestows on lived experience the power to give sense to life, in such a way 
that it speaks to readers, but transmits no form of instructive wisdom. It concerns the fullness 
of one life, or a few lives, in relation to which one engages with perplexity, but not with 
active learning. It lacks the practical orientation that Benjamin envisions in the traditional 
forms of narrative, while offering a self-contained world that is missing in collective life.  
 The decrease in the communicability of experience is compounded by the 
“explicitness” of information. The press, one of the most important instruments of developed 
capitalism, proposes facts as “understandable in themselves,” and allows for no 
differentiation between intelligent news coming from afar, and petty neighbourhood 
occurrences. In this form of communication, explanations abound, while, in turn, “it is half 
the art of storytelling to keep a story free from explanation as one reproduces it” (Storyteller 
89). This does not imply, according to Benjamin, that traditional stories are vague. Instead, 
what is missing in storytelling is the psychological connections between events, which is 
never imposed on the reader. Analogously, the lifespan of information is very short, it lasts 
only as long as it is “new,” while traditional lessons can retain their power for a long time, 
and acquire new senses beyond their original context. Benjamin presents classic stories as an 
example of this power of preservation. Here explicitness is set against the durable 
meaningfulness. 
The power of storytelling lies in its ability to become integrated with one’s own 
experience. For this to happen, Benjamin points out, something like boredom or self-
forgetfulness is required, states of mind usually made impossible by the psychological 
engagement required by the novel. Another important aspect of this integration lies in the 
assumption of a certain authority for what is narrated, related to the above-mentioned epic 
facet of truth. Benjamin mentions the importance of the visibility of death to the authority of 
transmissible experience. That is, man’s knowledge and wisdom, like his life as a whole, 
“first assumes transmissible form at the moment of his death” (Storyteller 94). Just as the 
dying are taken away from the public view, the sanction of every possible story, connected 
with the authority of the dying, is also distanced away. On the other hand, the novel’s ability 
to present “the meaning of life,” which derives from the novel’s characters, is quite possibly 
expressed through the death of these characters. Benjamin states: “the novel is significant … 
because this stranger’s [the character’s] fate by virtue of the flame which consumes it yields 
us the warmth which we never draw from our own fate” (Storyteller 101). That is, we enrich 
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our lives through the explicit and recognisable meaning that we read about, isolated in the 
form of the novel, a type of meaning we will probably not experience in relation to our own 
lives. 
In contrast with this one-to-one scenario, the storyteller is never alone in the act of 
telling a story. According to Benjamin, the story is, in itself, collectively constructed, from 
reminiscences of other stories and other storytellers. The relationship between the storyteller 
and the listener or reader is that of companionship (Storyteller 100). While the reader of the 
novel “swallows up” the contents of individual lives, making them his own, the reader or 
listener of a traditional narrative lets the story inhabit him or her, mostly in a distracted form, 
while remembering it, perhaps in order to communicate it further. The storyteller, therefore, 
expresses a collective experience, both in the sense of its multiple origins, and in the implicit 
creative act of transmission. Benjamin suggests the image of the ladder to describe the 
relationship of the storyteller to experience: “a ladder extending downward to the interior of 
the earth and disappearing into the clouds is the image form of a collective experience to 
which even the deepest shock of every individual experience, death, constitutes no 
impediment or barrier” (Storyteller 102). The storyteller is the one capable of moving up and 
down the levels of experience, able to access even the most traumatic event experienced by 
the individual. 
The transformation of personal experience into collective experience by the storyteller 
is an act that can only be questioned once this figure is threatened with disappearance, that is, 
from a perspective that perceives both dimensions, the individual and the collective, as 
distinct. For Benjamin, Leskov is this marginal figure, at the borders of two modalities of 
narration and experience. He says: 
In fact, one can go on and ask oneself whether the relationship of the 
storyteller to his material, human life, is not that of a craftsman’s relationship, 
whether it is not his very task to fashion the raw material of experience, his 
own and that of others, in a solid, useful, and unique way. (Storyteller 108) 
Precisely through this activity, the storyteller joins the teachers and the sages. The novelist, in 
comparison, tells of the fullness of one or many individual lives, while suggesting a meaning 
to be found in them. 
Benjamin’s article proposes that a transformation has taken place in the sphere of 
experience, one that is particularly perceptible in the disappearance of the art of storytelling, 
but he also suggests new forms that emerge with the novel and mass information, without 
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providing much detail about the experience to be found through these forms. The description 
of the solitary individual, concerned with the fullness of his life as the ultimate form of 
experience, is one image that seems to fit this new experience. It is evident that Benjamin 
perceives intricate connections between experience and the themes of narration, writing and 
literature.  
Through the envisioning of the sphere of experience as being at a crossroads between 
disappearing traditional configurations, related to transmissible forms of wisdom, and a new 
impoverishment of experience leading to the possibility of a “start from scratch,” Benjamin 
explores the field of storytelling as the link between two different modes of experience, 
expressed in the words Erfahrung and Erlebnis. The future of experience remains in doubt, in 
both Benjamin’s work and that of his contemporaries. The construction of new basis for what 
Benjamin would call “synthetic” forms of experience, following the decay of traditional 
configurations, would be based in particular on literary experimentation.  
 
5.9. Un Abominable Savoir 
From 1922, in the letters Artaud exchanges with Athanasiou, he discusses the 
paralysis affecting him, which he relates to a “conscious obstacle” placed “between him and 
himself.” The separation that seems to be at the origin of such paralysis, as mentioned above, 
is not perceived as a momentary state, nor one that derives from an unproblematic state of 
union. It is instead related to what Artaud sees as the eternal divisions between man and 
world, spirit and flesh, life and death. As one of those who have been “elected by fatality,” he 
follows the path of separation rigorously, experiencing the suffering, restlessness and insight 
that it occasions. This section intends to approach some more texts of Artaud from the rich 
period around 1925, in which he attempts to identify the elements concerned with the 
emergence of a conscience nouvelle from the state of separation. They are “Nouvelle Lettre 
sur Moi-Même,” “Position de la Chair” and “Manifeste en Langage Clair.” 
 In “Adresse au Pape,” written in January 1925, Artaud states: “le monde c’est l’abîme 
de l’âme, Pape déjeté, Pape extérieur à l’âme, laisse-nous nager dans nos corps, laisse nos 
âmes dans nos âmes, nous n’avons pas besoin de ton couteau de clartés”400 (Œuvres 133). In 
this context, the couteau (“knife”) seems to denote a schism in the spirit, as opposed to a state 
in which body and soul are identified with themselves. The “knife of clarities” also evokes 
                                                            
400 “the world is the abyss of the soul, misshapen Pope, Pope outside the soul, leave us to swim in our bodies, 
leave our souls in our souls, we do not need your knife of clarities” 
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the institutionalisation of spiritual matters, here represented by the Pope and the church. The 
theme of the conflictive dynamics between established conventions and new ideas of flux 
seems to be a constant in Artaud’s writings, one to which the notion of separation, here 
figured by the knife, is related. 
The conventional and fixed facet of this dynamic is also expressed by Artaud in terms 
of an “ordinary reality.” In Le Pèse-Nerfs the theme of the segmentation of matters of the 
soul in the face of thought, discussed above, is expressed as a dispossession, a physical and 
essential loss. Surreality appears as a form of control, capable of questioning and holding 
ordinary reality at bay, allowing subtle and rarefied encounters to take place (Œuvre 159). 
Artaud’s identified methods for dealing with dispossession also appear in “Fragments d’un 
Journal d’Enfer” as the emergence of new consciousness. He states: “je sens que des facteurs 
nouveaux interviennent dans la dénaturation de ma vie et que j’ai comme une conscience 
nouvelle de mon intime déperdition” 401  (Œuvres 175). From the experience of néant 
(“nothingness”), Artaud builds a more or less stable “architecture,” which he names, at this 
point, metaphysics. 
 Later that year, in October 1925, the short text “Nouvelle Lettre sur Moi-Même” 
appeared in La Révolution Surréaliste. In it Artaud identifies what he calls l’agrégat de la 
conscience, that is, the assemblage of elements that constitutes consciousness, or at least the 
perception and idea of consciousness: “ce qui me fait rire chez les hommes, chez tous les 
hommes, c’est qu’ils n’imaginent pas que l’agrégat de leur conscience se défasse”402 (Œuvres 
145). Artaud testifies to the experience of “dissolution” of the different elements of 
consciousness. While consciousness is envisioned as a frail assemblage, easily dissipated, the 
activity of thinking, according to Artaud, does not result on any content in particular. The 
highest product of thinking is the act of thinking itself, which is not a tautology in terms of 
the functioning of thought: “ce qui est capable d’arracher les hommes à leurs terres, à ces 
terres figées de l’esprit enfermé dans son cercle, c’est ce qui sort du domaine de la pensée 
proprement dite, ce qui pour moi est au-dessus des relations de l’esprit”403 (Œuvres 145). 
 Artaud suggests the existence of a dimension “outside” thought, capable of diverting 
it from its fixed tracks, a dimension that is also exterior to the dynamics of the spirit. Here he 
                                                            
401 “I feel that new factors are involved in the denaturation of my life and that I have a new awareness of my 
intimate loss” 
402 “what makes me laugh in men, in all men, is that they do not imagine that the aggregate of their conscience 
sheds itself” 
403 “that which can snatch men from their lands, from these fixed lands of the mind locked in its circle, is that 
which comes out of the realm of thought itself, which for me is above the relationships of the spirit” 
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introduces the theme of magnetism, the illumination or privileging of ideas, which he says he 
is unable to experience. Rather than seeing ideas as encounters between spiritual beings, 
Artaud sees them as “simples assemblages d’objets”404 (Œuvres 145). The operation of the 
intellect, for Artaud, looses its necessity and novelty, and becomes simply the movements 
and operations of thought. In Artaud’s words, from the lack of clarity about what is thinkable, 
from the detachment from any cumulative effect of thought, what results is “une illumination 
descriptive du monde, et quel monde!”405 (Œuvres 146). The dimension au-dessu, capable of 
shaking up the train of thought, is perhaps to be found in an exposure of its flaws. 
 A particular awareness seems to emerge from this turmoil. That is, “mais au milieu de 
cette misère sans nom il y a place pour un orgueil, qui a aussi comme une face de 
conscience” 406  (Œuvres 146). The connaissance par le vide (“knowledge through 
emptiness”) turns out to be an abominable savoir (“terrible wisdom”). Artaud expresses this 
knowledge as profoundly important: 
Mon esprit s’est ouvert par le ventre, et c’est par le bas qu’il entasse une 
sombre et intraduisible science, pleine de marées souterraines, d’édifices 
concaves, d’une agitation congelée. Qu’on ne prenne pas ceci pour des 
images. Ce voudrait être la forme d’un abominable savoir.407 (Œuvres 146) 
In response to this unique science, related to the subterraneous areas of his spirit, Artaud 
demands silence, “mais un silence intellectuel si j’ose dire”408 (Œuvres 146). If the fragile 
assemblage of consciousness has been disrupted for Artaud, giving rise to a detached system 
of unattractive ideas, it is also the same process that allows for the emergence of a rare and 
uncommon knowledge, which he details with a certain pride. This particular form of savoir 
does not correspond to consciousness in any absolute sense, but contains elements of it, and 
perhaps allows for the disruption of the endless circle of impossibility of thought, in order 
that the thinker may continue living, even though, for Artaud, “le problème est justement que 
je vis”409 (Œuvres 145). 
                                                            
404 “mere assemblages of objects” 
405 “a descriptive illumination of the world, and what world!” 
406 “but in the midst of this nameless misery there is room for certain pride, which also has as a face of 
conscience” 
407  My spirit opened itself up through the stomach, and is from the bottom that it piles up a dark and 
untranslatable science, full of underground tides, concave buildings, frozen agitation. One should not take these 
for images. This is the form of a terrible knowledge.” 
408 “an intellectual silence, if I daresay” 
409 “the problem is precisely that I am alive” 
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 “Position de la Chair,” published in December 1925 in La Nouvelle Revue Française, 
develops Artaud’s definition of this form of knowledge. It becomes clear that the 
experiencing of the limitations of thought is indispensable to this new consciousness. Artaud 
says: “il faut avoir été privé de la vie, de l’irradiation nerveuse de l’existence, de la 
complétude consciente du nerf pour se rendre compte à quel point le Sens et la Science de 
toute pensée est caché dans la vitalité nerveuse des moelles”410 (Œuvres 146). The idea of a 
conjunction of sense and science is here equivalent to the inseparable presence, in human 
beings, of flesh and spirit, vitality and nerve. Dual “instances” such as these, for Artaud, can 
only be considered together. The highest expression of their inseparability is “le magnétisme 
incompréhensible de l’homme … ce que, faute d’une expression plus perçante, je suis bien 
obligé d’appeler sa force de vie”411 (Œuvres 146). 
 The forces that animate life, that provide humans with their magnetism, “ces force qui 
du dehors ont la forme d’un cri”412 (Œuvres 146), are what Artaud calls la Chair (“the 
Flesh”). By this he means not a body separated from its intellectual activities, but the 
inseparability of thought and flesh. While here the magnetism of the body has a positive 
connotation, in “Nouvelle Lettre sur Moi-Même” it is what is lacking in Artaud’s perception 
of ideas. Even more, “j’en suis au point où je ne sens plus les idées comme des idées, comme 
des rencontres des choses spirituelles ayant en elles le magnétisme”413 (Œuvres 145). If the 
ideas themselves do not have enough magnetism to make them attractive, this is the result of 
the detachment between life and thought, their absence of “fleshy” magnetism. On the one 
hand, Artaud testifies to a new form of consciousness that emerges from detachment, while 
on the other hand he points to the connecting function of this new knowledge and awareness, 
locating the core of this “savoir” in the flesh, that is, in the “dark,” “agitated” aspect of the 
spirit.  
 Having presented himself, in “Position de la Chair,” as “un homme qui a perdu sa vie 
et qui cherche par tous les moyens à lui faire reprendre sa place”414 (Œuvres 147), Artaud 
situates his “position” in relation to the théorie de la Chair or de l’Existence as l’Excitateur 
                                                            
410 “one must have been deprived of life, of the nervous irradiation of existence, of the conscious completeness 
of the nerve to realize the extent to which the Sense and Science of all thought is hidden in the nervous vitality 
of the marrows” 
411 “the incomprehensible magnetism of man ... which, for lack of a more apt expression, I am obliged to call his 
life force” 
412 “these forces that from the outside take the form of a cry”  
413 “I’m at the point where I no longer feel ideas as ideas, as meetings of spiritual things with magnetism inside 
them” 
414 “a man who has lost his life and who attempts, through all means, to make it recover its place” 
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(“the Exciter”) of his own vitality. For Artaud, this vitality “m’est plus précieuse que la 
conscience, car ce qui chez les autres hommes n’est que le moyen d’être un Homme est chez 
moi toute la Raison”415 (Œuvres 147). It is not evident what is meant by Reason in this 
context, but it might be analogous with “Flesh,” in the sense of the complétude du nerf 
(“completeness of nerve”) that can be attained through the special knowledge described 
above. It is precisely because a limitation to being takes place that vitality becomes an issue: 
Artaud, as the exciter of his own vitality, has to direct the one feature able to speak to spirit 
and body alike. Consciousness, here, is simply the grouping of different thoughts or, as 
Artaud would say, an assembly of objects. This notion brings together the elements that do 
not belong to the Flesh and, therefore, lack magnetism.  
 Due to his position in relation to the Flesh, Artaud is searching for paths that might 
lead to the strengthening of his vitality. The milieu in which this exploration takes place, he 
suggests, is “dans les limbes de ma conscience”416 (Œuvres 147). This knowledge can only 
be “an indescribable science,” whose potential owners are ignorant of it. According to 
Artaud, “il faut aller à pas lent sur la route des pierres mortes, surtout pour qui a perdu la 
connaissance des mots”417  (Œuvres 147). Language being lost, this knowledge can only 
emerge obscurely. Here the ideas of clarity and logic are rejected once more, in the same tone 
adopted in the surrealist texts, that is, throughan affirmation of the necessity of obscuring 
important meanings. In fact, as mentioned previously, Artaud considers that “toute vraie 
connaissance est obscure”418 (Œuvres 147). 
 Artaud ends by describing the forms of interaction between Flesh and Spirit, which 
are, at least partially, the contents of the knowledge gained through separation. According to 
Artaud, there is a spirit in the flesh, “mais un esprit prompt comme la foudre”419 (Œuvres 
147). The flesh participates in the higher functions of the spirit by bursting and shaking. As 
Artaud states: “pour moi qui dit Chair dit avant tout appréhension, poil hérissé, chair à nu 
avec tout l’approfondissement intellectuel de ce spectacle de la chair pure et toutes ses 
                                                            
415 “is more precious to me than consciousness, because that which in other men is no more than the means of 
being a Man is for me, all of Reason” 
416 “in the limbo of my consciousness” 
417 “one must go slowly on the road of dead stones, especially he who has lost the knowledge of words” 
418 “all true knowledge is obscure” 
419 “but it is a spirit as fast as lightening” 
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conséquences dans le sens, c’est-à-dire dans le sentiment”420 (Œuvres 147). Regarding the 
last of these elements, sentiment is described by Artaud as “presentiment,” that is, direct 
knowledge, a “communication retournée et qui s’éclaire de l’intérieur”421 (Œuvres 147). The 
awareness effected by the Flesh is also appropriation “absolue de ma douleur à moi-même”422 
(Œuvres 147), that is, pertaining to the most intimate aspects of being. It results in a unique 
and s olitary form of knowledge, defined as la pensée, in Le Pèse-Nerfs, as a method of 
responding to oneself. 
 “Manifeste en Langage Clair” was published together with “Position de la Chair.” In 
the context of his discrediting of values such as good and evil, Artaud says: “s’il n’est rien 
dans l’ordre des principes à quoi je puisse raisonnablement accéder, le principle même en est 
dans ma chair”423 (Œuvres 148). Disregarding reason, he professes to believe only in the 
evidence that emerges from his moelles (“marrows”). At the same time, the principles to be 
found through the flesh are intimately connected with the spirit, since this is not just any 
flesh, but “ma chair irriguée de nerfs”424 (Œuvres 148). Artaud here details the formation of 
notions through the flesh: 
Dans le domaine de l’impondérable affectif, l’image amenée par mes nerfs 
prend la forme de l’intellectualité la plus haute, à qui je me refuse à arracher 
son caractère d’intellectualité. Et c’est ainsi que j’assiste à la formation d’un 
concept qui porte en lui la fulguration même des choses, qui arrive sur moi 
avec un bruit de création.425 (Œuvres 148) 
The realm introduced here is characterised by troubled assessment of affections. It is 
interesting to note that the process Artaud describes as beginning with the nerves and ending 
in concepts takes places through images, produced by the nerves and immediately raised to 
the level of “highest intellectuality.” The connectedness to the flesh seems to guarantee that 
the concept is the bearer of the “fulguration of things,” and not a notion detached from 
                                                            
420 “for me to speak of Flesh is to speak, above all, of apprehension, bristling hair, bare flesh with all the 
intellectual depth of this spectacle of pure flesh and all its consequences in sensation, that is to say, in 
sentiment” 
421 “a returned communication clarified from the inside” 
422 “absolute [appropriation] of my pain to myself” 
423 “if there is nothing in the order of principles to which I can reasonably access, the principle itself is in my 
flesh” 
424 “my flesh irrigated with nerves” 
425 “In the field of the affective imponderable, the image provided by my nerves takes the form of the highest 
intellectuality, whose intellectual character I refuse to snatch. This is how I see the formation of a concept that 
carries in itself the very lightning flash of things, that reaches me with the noise of creation.” 
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reality. Artaud says: “le conflit éternel de la raison et du cœur se départage dans ma chair 
même”426 (Œuvres 148). 
 In relation to the role of images in the emergence of notions and concepts, Artaud 
suggests that “aucune image ne me satisfait que si elle est en même temps Connaissance, si 
elle porte avec elle sa substance en même temps que sa lucidité”427 (Œuvres 148). The use of 
the terms “substance” and “lucidity” indicates that Artaud identifies in the images that 
emerge from his nerves the possibility of uniting features usually attributed separately to the 
flesh and the spirit. He sets these images in opposition to “mon esprit fatigué de la raison 
discursive”428 (Œuvres 148), that is, they allow for the emergence of knowledge outside 
discourse. Since the images are not the medium but themselves the knowledge, this 
conception has much in common with Benjamin’s discussions of the Denkbild (“thought-
image”) produced by literature, one form of dialektisches Bild (“dialectical image”) of 
surrealism. Images here are not the portents of contest to be described or considered 
elsewhere. They realise thought in and within themselves. 
 The relationship between images and reason is also approached by Artaud in this text. 
According to him, “Ce qui est du domaine de l’image est irréductible par la raison et doit 
demeurer dans l’image sous peine de s’annihiler. Mais toutefois il y a une raison dans les 
images, il y a des images plus claires dans le monde de la vitalité image.”429 (Œuvres 149). 
Here he relates reason, on his first mention of it, with the raison discursive mentioned above. 
Submitting images to the order of discourse risks annihilating them. Images themselves 
possess reason, a form of clarity forged “inside” the pictorial field. 
 It can be supposed that the theme of “clear language,” as the title of the text indicates, 
concerns the language of images, through which un nouveau Sens, from “inside the spirit,” 
can emerge. It is in this context that the topic of the “knife” reappears. According to Artaud, 
the discovery of the new sense expressed through images is a kind of order in the chaos, logic 
amidst the illogicality of the spirit. Artaud says: “Je ne renonce à rien de ce qui est l’Esprit. Je 
                                                            
426 “the eternal conflict of reason and heart is decided in my flesh” 
427 “no image satisfies me unless it is at the same time Knowledge, if it carries with it both its substance and its 
lucidity” 
428 “my spirit tired of discoursive reason” 
429 “That which comes from the domain of the image is irreducible by reason and must remain within the image 
under penalty of annihilation. There is, however, reason in images. There are clearer images in the world of 
pictorial vitality.” 
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veux seulement transporter mon esprit ailleurs avec ses lois et ses organes.”430 (Œuvres 149). 
Artaud’s exploration of spiritual matters, therefore, takes the form of controlled automatism. 
In his words: “Je me livre à la fièvre des rêves, mais c’est pour en retirer des nouvelles lois. 
Je recherche la multiplication, la finesse, l’œil intellectuel dans le délire, non la vaticination 
hasardée. Il y a un couteau que je ne oublie pas.”431 (Œuvres 149). 
 Is the knife, in this context, the tool that allows Artaud to find new laws of dreaming, 
a conceptual visual power through delirium? Or does it represent a previous state of chaos 
without order, of impossibility of sense and consequent suffering and pain? In other words: is 
the knife part of the emergence of a new logic, or of the immersion in the illogical? The 
image of the knife certainly contains the idea of cutting and selecting, but it could also 
express entry and penetration. The image seems to be located, for Artaud, in a remote past. 
He states, in “Manifeste en Language Clair”: “mais c’est un couteau à mi-chemin dans les 
rêves, et que je maintiens au-dedans de moi-même, que je ne laisse pas venir à la frontière 
des sens clairs”432 (Œuvres 149). In the midst of dreams, this knife seems to lance the flesh, 
in a previous stage in the development of lucid images. It operates, as Artaud highlights, as a 
reminder, one that can perhaps be placed at the moment of desordre, before the “conquête de 
l’esprit sur lui-même”433 (Œuvres 148).  
 As well as being an element that condenses the state of suffering and participates in 
the transition to an incarnated form of knowledge, the knife is a double edge that, 
paradoxically, operates far away from the boundaries of “clear sense.” This can be attributed 
to Artaud’s loyalty to the dimension of flesh or matter in relation to thought. As he expresses 
it: “La vérité de la vie est dans l’impulsivité de la matière. L’esprit de l’homme est malade au 
milieu des concepts. Ne lui demandez pas de se satisfaire, demandez-lui seulement d’être 
calme, de croire qu’il a bien trouvé sa place. Mais seul le Fou est bien calme.”434 (Œuvres 
149). 
                                                            
430 “I will give up nothing that is of the Spirit. I simply want to transport my spirit elsewhere, with its laws and 
its organs.” 
431 “I give myself over to the fever of dreams, but this is to draw new laws from it. I seek the multiplication, the 
finesse, the intellectual eye in delirium, not the ventured vaticination. There is a knife that I will not forget.” 
432 “but it is a knife at the halfway point in dreams, and one that I keep inside myself, one that I do not allow to 
come to the borders of clear meaning” 
433 “the conquest of the spirit over itself” 
434 “The truth of life is in the impulsiveness of matter. The spirit of man is sick amid concepts. Do not ask him 
to be satisfied, ask him no more than to be calm, to believe that he has found his place. But only the Fool is 
really calm.” 
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 If separation is a constituent part of life from its beginning — an idea implied in 
Artaud’s dealing with the theme of death as something that “has already happened” 
(Dumoulié Artaud 20) — the path of separation is marked, as Artaud points out, by suffering, 
but not only by this. The pursuit of points of cohesion, of clear expression and existence 
amidst the segmentation of abstract concepts and the absence of magnetism of ideas are only 
small incisions, fragile escapes. They can, however, produce a new awareness, a terrible kind 
of learning. Language, as mentioned above, is one of these forms, intrinsically ambiguous 
like all others, that allows an experimental experience of separation. In its pursuit, Artaud 
suggests, calmness is possible only in the case of absence of awareness. 
 
5.10. Synthetic Experience 
In “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” (1940), Benjamin gives evidence of having 
maintained the reading of experience he professed in the mid-thirties, that of the break-up of 
a communal word and milieu, partially related to pre-capitalist work organisation. In 1940, he 
assigns the term “atrophy of experience” to “the replacement of the older narration by 
information, [and] of information by sensation” (Motifs 159). Benjamin’s statement is 
connected with the assumption, demonstrated by Karl Kraus, of the “great extent to which the 
linguistic use of newspapers paralysed the imagination of the readers” (Motifs 159). The 
isolation of information from experience means that the former is not a part of tradition. It 
does not engage in transmission or integration into long-established customs. In the same 
essay, Benjamin evokes the work of Marcel Proust to demonstrate the effort required to 
restore the features of storytelling, as opposed to information in the contemporaneous 
conditions — a restoration that can only take place under “synthetic” conditions.  
Benjamin’s exact statement is: “Proust’s work À la Recherche du Temps Perdu may 
be regarded as an attempt to produce experience synthetically, as Bergson imagines it, under 
today’s conditions, for there is less and less hope that it will come into being naturally” 
(Motifs 157). While the word synthetic etymologically means “place together” — from the 
Greek sunthetikos, based on suntithenai — it has developed into at least three meanings, all 
of them evoked by the use of Benjamin. The first of them can be derived from the etymology, 
the same to be found in “synthesis.” The second of them means producing something 
artificially by imitating a natural product. And the third meaning emerges in a philosophical 
context. It means, of a proposition, that the truth or falsity of it is determinable by recourse to 
experience.  
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The use of “synthetic” by Benjamin opposes “naturally” and appears in connection 
with Henri Bergson. Bergson defines the mental ability of intuition as the synthetic 
recovering of data that has been analysed by intelligence. Intuition, according to this 
understanding, can take place either in the term of an intellectual effort, or spontaneously 
(Coelho). Between the means at someone’s disposal to express a particular subject, and the 
intuition of it, there is a leap of incommensurable nature. Bergson describes the philosophical 
activity as intuitive par excellence. The sense of a synthetic production of experience can be 
described, therefore, as the act of combining different matters, and by that very act, 
exceeding the matters in question, while producing a form that does not derive naturally from 
them. Given that the conditions for experience are in decay, a synthetic production of 
experience takes place by the reconstruction of an artificial form of experience. It imitates the 
natural one, while exceeding the materials made available to it. 
Proust’s operation in particular is described by Benjamin in the following terms: 
“where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual 
past combine with material of the collective past” (Motifs 159). Here the character of 
combination is explicit, while the materials are designated to be the individual and collective 
past. Considering the elaborations mentioned above, it is possible to see that this synthetic 
form puts together elements that belong, on the one hand, to the collective experience 
brought up by the figure of the storyteller, and, on the other hand, to the individual 
experience expressed most prominently by the novel. The synthesis, represented here by 
Proust’s novel, allows the crossing of the individual field of experience towards its opening 
to the collective dimension, all while maintaining the novel’s framework. 
 Some further elements of this construction can be found in Benjamin’s essay “The 
Image of Proust” (1929), published thus before the articles on experience from the thirties. In 
its opening lines, Benjamin describes Proust’s work as the “unconstruable synthesis” of 
different genres into one, that of autobiography. He then evokes the extremely unhealthy 
conditions in which this work was produced, to state that “the image of Proust is the highest 
physiognomic expression which the irresistible growing discrepancy between literature and 
life was able to assume” (Image 202). The title’s reference to image, therefore, points to a 
strange form of synthesis, that of a “physiognomic expression” related to the indication of a 
general character in Proust’s image. This character can be summarised in the following: 
while the French author draws a book from his lived experience, he offers an image of the 
growing separation taking place between literature and life. One could add that the vanishing 
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figure of the storyteller also gives a testimony of this growing separation. Benjamin envisions 
the work of Proust as the crossing of individual experience, referred to above as Erlebnis, 
towards the production of a new form of experience, which he describes as being 
synthetically produced. 
 In the texts of Artaud and Benjamin approached above, the emergence of new modes 
of experiencing takes place from the identification, set off much earlier, of the inaccessibility 
of the conditions of traditional experience. In Benjamin, this diagnosis is linked to the decay 
of a psychosocial configuration, related to both the epic world (Lukács Novel 30) and the 
magical relationship of ancient men with the cosmos (Benjamin One-Way 92-4). In Artaud, 
this diagnosis concerns the theme of separation, described as life’s eternal power of 
detachment. In both cases, a form of individual experience is concerned; in Benjamin, as the 
term of the decay of traditional experience, and in Artaud, as the departing point of all 
experiencing, in the sense that “one always experiences oneself,” even when it implies not 
having a complete access to one’s own experience.  
 At the same time, both these individual experiences, presented by the authors as 
unconditional in the current historical period, have their inner limitations at times 
extrapolated in favor of other forms, which are ventilated with elements of traditional 
configurations. This is no surprise, considering, for instance, how Benjamin described 
traditional experience, in particular in the essay “The Storyteller…,” as suffering a moment 
of decay, but not extinction. The same can be said about Artaud, for whom the character of 
separation does not completely prevent the occurrence of moments of fusion, as much 
evanescent and fragile as they are. In Artaud’s writings, this is the background of the 
affirmation presented above: the author, in this case, Artaud, continues to live, when the 
problem is precisely that he lives (Œuvres 145). While being born implies separation from 
the original matter of life, identified above with the membrane, the fact of being alive also 
encompasses the possibility, and perhaps the necessity, of escaping separation.  
 A short access to the considerations of Didi-Huberman on the decay of experience, 
and the forms of pessimism and optimism related to it, are informative in this context. In his 
analysis, the author resumes the work of Benjamin, while criticising, in this context, the 
critical approach of Giorgio Agamben. For Didi-Huberman (65), the notion of decay of 
experience implies transformation and crisis, but not necessarily destruction and absence. In 
the diagnosis of decay of traditional experience, Benjamin would have made use of a 
catastrophic world view, in order to express the radical changes taking place in the interwar 
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period. This world view, however, was not an end in itself, but a means to reach another form 
of experience. Benjamin’s exact phrase on this decay made reference to a decrease of value: 
“Experience has fallen in price”435 (qtd. in Didi-Huberman 104).  
 Benjamin presents the conditions in which certain ways of seeing, narrating, 
wandering, in one word, experiencing, started to vanish, to give place to new forms. His 
attitude while describing these processes was not always free from nostalgia — perhaps, one 
should say, nostalgia was never completely absent —, but neither was Benjamin 
unwelcoming towards the emerging formations. He attempted to identify progressive 
tendencies among them. The argument of Didi-Huberman, on this concern, is that the process 
of decay is never complete. There are always remainders, rests of the previous configuration 
lingering in the current one. These surviving forms do not possess any redemptive power. 
They cannot restore the previous configuration. The best format to be assigned to them, in 
fact, is that of images, since they have the character of reminiscence, and never the 
completeness of an object (Didi-Huberman 72). Here Did-Huberman borrows his definition 
from Benjamin’s notion of dialectical image, that is, the one that renders a certain period of 
time visible, pointing to both its location in the past, and its reappearance in the present. 
 If the production of synthetic experience implies the conjunction of distinguished 
matters, and the imitation of a natural form, it necessarily draws from the aspects of 
traditional experience that remain somehow present in the modern experience. In the writings 
of Artaud, this experience appears at first under the sign of control, that is, the attempt to 
prevent life from consisting of mere encounters with ordinary reality (Œuvres 159). As 
opposed to this, Artaud is interested in subtle, rarified contacts, in connection to the invisible 
reality or surreality. Artaud’s description reminds of the evocation of Benjamin on the 
distracted wanderer of the big cities, to which everything appears as a spectacle, allowing 
him or her to withdraw from any form of engagement (Work of Art 239). In this context, 
Artaud suggests that surrealism, in its appeal to an enlarged notion of reality — containing 
the material and the spiritual — prevents the subject from having no more than ordinary 
experiences. The synthetic experience of intoxication, the remarkable product of surrealism 
in Benjamin’s view (Surrealism 179), could be described in the same terms. The theme of 
control evoked by Artaud would reappear under the name of cruelty in his writings from the 
thirties.  
                                                            
435 “Die Erfahrung ist im Kurse gefallen” 
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 On another front, the above-mentioned assemblage of new factors that intervene in 
the dénaturation (“denaturation”) of Artaud’s life — an interesting term to be related to the 
conscience nouvelle (“new consciousness”) — point to the intimate loss that he experiences 
in relation to his own being (Artaud Œuvres 175). However, the theme of déperdition, which 
can be translated both as loss and fading, suggests that Artaud suffers from a transformation, 
a processual perdition that, as if to his own surprise, appears as a new form of consciousness. 
From the experience of nothingness, “c’est une vie nouvelle qui renaît, de plus en plus 
profonde”436 (Œuvres 179). In this context, the evocation of a laugh at the vain human beliefs 
in the indestructible duration of consciousness, in the first lines of “Nouvelle Lettre sur Moi-
Même,” points not only to Artaud’s pride, but also to the possibility of situating himself from 
another perspective, that of having gained a consciousness of his process of fading. 
 The synthetic character of this new consciousness is further suggested by the theme of 
magnetism. When ideas lack attraction, Artaud envisions them as no more than static objects 
and movements: a descriptive view of the world (Œuvres 146). This situation is evoked as 
une misère sans nome (“a nameless misery”). However, it is in the midst of this impoverished 
experience that emerges an abominable savoir (“terrible wisdom”). The process of this 
emergence is described by Artaud in terms of a connaissance par le vide (“knowledge 
through emptiness”), an evocation that aligns the themes of néant, misère and vide as the 
conditions for a new form of experience. Just like in Benjamin’s “Experience and Poverty,” 
Artaud suggests that new experiences are preceded by moments of absolute destitution. 
Benjamin stated that the unprecedented poverty brought up by the war and the economical 
crisis in the interwar period, a material but also spiritual form of poverty, created the extreme 
sense of disillusionment that could only make use of poverty in a positive sense (Poverty 
734). This was related to the possibility to start from scratch after the failure of bourgeois 
values, and move towards a revolutionary experience. Once again, the radically personal 
character of Artaud’s writings, and the cultural analysis of Benjamin are at the same time 
confronted and reflected in each other. 
 The terrible wisdom described by Artaud as having emerged from the fading of his 
being demands no more than “an intellectual silence” (Œuvres 146). That is, this wisdom, as 
an untranslatable science, cannot be framed within the existing knowledge. It requires a new 
form of expression, apart from discourse and the metaphorical use of images. In “Position de 
la Chair” and “Manifeste en Language Clair” this position is clarified. The Flesh is described 
                                                            
436“it’s a new life being reborn, becoming deeper and deeper” 
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as an instance in which elements are reunited that usually appear separated in society, such as 
thought and vitality. The nerves are understood as the instances irrigating the Flesh with 
material for the elaboration of notions. This material consists of images. In Artaud’s words: 
“l’image amenée par mes nerfs prend la forme de l’intellectualité la plus haute … et c’est 
ainsi que j’assiste à la formation d’un concept qui porte en lui la fulguration même des 
choses”437 (Œuvres 148). Images, being in themselves the content seized by nerves and a 
form of intellectuality, participate in the formation of concepts, which, instead of being 
abstract signs of things, have kept the latter’s sparkle.  
 Artaud’s formulation evokes the description of Freud, mentioned above, in which the 
image is the privileged form adopted by all materials that intend to reach consciousness. In 
the dream-formation, for instance, the unconscious excitation or thought-formation has to 
associate with memories couched in visual form, close to the perceptive system, to be able to 
trespass the preconscious censorship (Freud Dreams 543). Images, in the Freudian theory, are 
somehow the most inoffensive form to be adopted by the psychic ideational content. At the 
same time, they correspond to a form of knowledge and language that, being richer in 
associations, allow the hiding of unconscious wishes in them. In the same logic, Freud 
suggests that the content of the dream should be transported to the narrative form, since 
images are not good for analysis purposes, for the amount of associations that they evoke. In 
the use of Artaud, the image allows the resolution of an eternal conflict between reason and 
heart, once the form of knowledge produced by it is material and spiritual at the same time. 
While both authors alluded to the richness of images, for Freud images are different from 
thought-formations, even if they are involved in thinking activities. 
 The image opens the possibility, for Artaud, of “possessing” his own pain, since it is a 
form of clear language that allows not only the gaining of a relatively distanced perspective 
of himself, but also of an obscure knowledge. Artaud’s experience, as has been mentioned 
above, is an interrogation of experience. But this interrogation, just like Benjamin’s 
catastrophic perspective in the thirties, produces nevertheless one experience, synthetic in 
relation to the supposed original ones. Moreover, while Artaud acknowledges that the activity 
of thinking is not given, that it suffers from intrinsic absence, discontinuity and misery, he 
attests to the great power of thinking in exceeding the given matters offered to it, and in 
extrapolating, as himself suggests, the very realm of thought (Œuvres 145). 
                                                            
437“the image provided by my nerves take the form of the highest intellectuality … this is how I attend to the 
formation of a concept that carries in itself the same fulguration of things” 
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 If the notion of image is already present in the experience of intoxication, which 
seems to appear, in different forms, in the writings of Artaud and Benjamin, it is also 
remarkable that the space of political action revealed by surrealism, according to Benjamin, is 
the space reserved for images. These images are not destined to aesthetic contemplation, what 
would lead to a non-dialectical experience. When Benjamin identifies the need to organise 
pessimism, which can be related here to the vision of decay as destruction, this means, on the 
one hand, to abandon an anarchist attitude towards an organisation in the form of 
communism, and, on the other hand, “to expel moral metaphors from politics and to discover 
in political action a sphere reserved one hundred percent for images” (Benjamin Surrealism 
191). 
 This space of images, it should be remembered, is also the one through which the 
mass acquires consciousness of itself, even if it is a limited one. When the technical 
development, particularly within fascism, allowed the production of images of the masses to 
somehow attest to their existence, and to prove the support of a political regime, the powerful 
sphere of images was being manipulated, from a potentially revolutionary consciousness, to a 
self-centred one (Benjamin Work of Art 251). This points to the importance of images in the 
processes of self-awareness and consciousness, personally and collectively speaking. Artaud, 
having somehow traversed the expropriation of his own experience, suggests that the form of 
knowledge brought up by images, even if it is an obscure and fragile wisdom, allows the 
gaining of new principles, of lucidity amid disorder. 
 If the sphere of images is that of survival, it must be due to the unconscious 
predilection for the imagery form. In his essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin states, while making 
references to Dilthey and Bergson, that “Experience is indeed a matter of tradition, in 
collective experience as well as in private life. It is the product less of facts firmly anchored 
in memory, than of a convergence in memory of accumulated and frequently unconscious 
data.” (Motifs 157). This data is precisely the one that appears in dreams, and in those rare 
moments in which an image is capable of giving someone hold of her or his experience. If 
that is so, even the images misused by fascism must have kept a trace of the class-
consciousness they could have given rise to. This is the context in which both the collecting 
of images of intoxication by surrealism, and the elevating of psychic images to the level of 
valuable expressions of the spirit by Freud, gain their significance. However, just like the 
moment in which Freud realises that one cannot explain the psychic process taking place in 
dreams, “since to explain a thing means to trace it back to something already known” (Freud 
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Dreams 515), the explanation of new forms of experience, in the writings of Artaud and 
Benjamin, remain vague. Their openness does not weaken their importance. This importance 
is related to task of identifying, in the works of Artaud and Benjamin, a constructive 
character, in opposition to the common pessimistic interpretations. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 The relationship between magic and experience in twentieth-century Europe can be 
understood as the perception of the limitations of enlightened reason and ideology, due partly 
to the culmination of technical development and the material and spiritual catastrophe 
brought by the wars. The emergence of the very notion of experience took place in two 
different contexts, that of perceptions and immediateness, and that of conceptions and 
processual duration. As previously discussed, experience, while it expresses the given facts of 
life, it also evokes what is not given: the transcendental and transformative dimensions of 
life. 
 The question of how to constitute transformative experience made use of aspects that 
were somehow repressed by the enlightened wave, though they did not completely disappear. 
Humanism and the traditional concept of experience were questioned, and there was a new 
interest in magic and mysticism. According to Grossman, the issue at stake was that of, “à 
partir de la mort de cette figure traditionnelle de l’homme … réinventer — peut-être — un 
nouvel (un autre?) humanisme pour les siècles à venir, qui prenne en compte l’inhumain”438 
(Déshumanités 49). 
 The hypothesis proposed by this work is that Antonin Artaud and Walter Benjamin 
share a criticism of modern forms of experience, in particular those of the turn of the 
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. Their criticism includes 
contemporary expressions of artistic, philosophical and private experiences. For Benjamin, 
the times were marked by a disconnection from the ritualised, shared forms of experience that 
had previously allowed the passage, from generation to generation, of living learning 
repeated, and transformed, across centuries. Artaud saw the multiple separations inflicted on 
consciousness and being as processes in which the mechanisation of the soul’s functions 
resulted in great losses of living wisdom, and a replacing of significative experiences with no 
more than caricatures of life. 
 At the time of his rupture with surrealism, Artaud was defending the importance of a 
transformation of life concerned primarily with the spirit, part of his insurrection against his 
perception that it was being restricted in various ways. Benjamin perceived that a decline in 
traditional experience would provoke irrevocable changes in our ways of referring to 
ourselves. The possibility of reconstruction that he saw in literature related to these changes, 
                                                            
438 “from the death of the traditional human figure ... reinvent - perhaps - a new (another?) humanism for the 
centuries to come, one that takes the inhuman into account” 
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and to the possibility of re-framing the present through contact with the past. Artaud’s 
interest in experiences taking place outside mainstream European culture, in turn, points to 
the belief that modern reason had separated the elements of a world that a true culture used to 
hold together. This criticism of modern society resonates for both authors. From very 
different perspectives, they envisaged the unconscious as a privileged source of register and 
expression of alternative forms of experiencing. It is also the place where current and past 
magic perceptions, intuitions and engagements — such as practices of enchantment — can 
occur. 
 From the insertion of dreams into a schematic explanation of the functioning of the 
mind, Freud proposed that the activities of the unconscious are focused on the fulfilment of 
wishes, that is: the unconscious impulses move the psychic system in order to find discharge 
in consciousness (Dreams 542). Freud’s schematic explanation of psychic life shows how the 
most complicated achievements of thought are possible without the assistance of 
consciousness. However, for Freud’s assumptions to be accepted, as his own method 
exposes, one must feel comfortable to proceed by inference from a conscious effect, which is 
the only way to learn of the existence of unconscious formations, to the unconscious 
psychical process itself. In relation to approaches to dreams that had appeared before, Freud 
is responsible for a differentiation within the unconscious, one part of it being inadmissible to 
consciousness, and the other being able to reach the conscious mind after having fulfilled 
certain rules — namely, the unconscious and the preconscious. In this scenario, 
consciousness is presented as no more than a sense-organ, susceptible to be excited by 
contents emerged elsewhere but unable, like the perceptive system, to retain traces of 
alterations provoked by such perceptions. Thoughts are then occupied with the connections 
between different contents present in consciousness, and nothing more. 
From these assumptions, Freud affirms that, since every conscious process could be 
traced back to its unconscious origin, the unconscious must be the larger sphere of psychical 
life, indeed “the true psychical reality” (Dreams 607). But due to the censorship imposed on 
this reality, it is as unknown to humans as is the reality of the external world; both of them 
accessing consciousness through certain filters. With this conceptualisation, Freud is isolating 
the psychological system in relation to both realities, the material and the psychical one, as if 
they were equally inaccessible to human beings. This seems to be a retreat from his previous 
positions, which veer towards a general relativism, in which everything outside 
consciousness is considered to be unknown, despite the fact that material reality had not 
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suffered any questioning of this kind, being in addition considered to be the ultimate source 
of dream-material, in the form of memories of experiences. 
 While the unconscious is at the centre of psychical life, it should not be held 
responsible for its actions, i.e. the expression of unconscious impulses must refer to the 
psychical reality, and not to the factual one (Dreams 95). This expresses the singular place 
assigned to the unconscious from the establishment of the Freudian theory: a special, limited 
and not entirely attainable dimension of life, which is nevertheless at the basis of all human 
actions. Therefore, if on the one hand, dreams, day-dreams, and other formations that give 
partial access to the unconscious are described by Freud as no more than a faint expression of 
an already transformed portion of such constitutive materials, on the other hand, within 
dreams and day-dreams one may, as some authors in addition to Freud have put it, have a 
taste of a life of the soul which is somehow free from the limitations and moral impositions 
from consciousness.  
 Freud, having started his book by opposing incorrect accounts of the world of dreams, 
counting amongst them the mystical interpretations, finishes the volume by giving an 
ambiguous account of the relationship between dreams and premonition: that there is 
similitude between past and future unconscious contents. He presents superstition and 
popular culture as “closer to the truth” than the ruling scientific approach. Freud’s intention 
to situate his theory within the patterns of nineteenth century science — which required the 
repudiation of superstitious beliefs — did not exclude the recurrent realisation, throughout 
The Interpretation of Dreams, of the similitudes between his own approach and pre-scientific 
accounts of the nature of human experience, together with a common basis for some of its 
deep sources. As a matter of fact, the unconscious is the dimension in which all these 
elements are to be found. Freud proposes, therefore, a new form of knowledge that differs 
from the ruling science, and relies on a dialogical process instead of an objective one. This 
suggests, as mentioned above, that there are two notions of science operating in Freud’s 
book. One of them concerns the “limited,” “fixed” science of the time, which is hostile to 
Freud’s theory. The second is Freud’s idea of science, which relies on scientific precepts, 
while also being open to new forms of scientific knowledge. 
 If there are two notions of science, there are also two ideas of mysticism operating in 
the book, that is to say, the one in which Freud finds the intuitions that are close to the 
propositions of psychoanalysis, and the one that inaccurately attributes sense to dreams as 
well as to other psychical phenomena, usually making use of fixed symbolism in the 
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treatment of signs. Freud’s own “prescientific” beliefs were followed by his growing effort to 
integrate the “mystical” discoveries of psychoanalysis into scientific patterns. This gesture of 
integration is what dominates Freud’s relationship with prescientific knowledge in The 
Interpretation of Dreams. It points to his recognition of a form of truth in it, while 
highlighting the need to submit it to scientific precepts. Freud’s trajectory demonstrates that 
the process leading to the disclosure of the unconscious in the context of modern knowledge 
and civilisation has brought along traces of various non-modern beliefs. 
 And finally, the fact that Freud’s theory is committed to the expression of the 
unconscious shows to what extent it belongs to the general trends of Western modernity, in 
which the pre-eminence of the subject, even if it is a non-conscious subject, is much 
emphasised. If on the one hand, Freud is referring to the rigidity of contemporary science, on 
the other hand, he acknowledges the lack of rigor in the statements of popular culture. The 
scientific work undertaken throughout The Interpretation of Dreams is not in complete 
accordance with the dominant science of the nineteenth century, making it wrong to assume 
that Freud’s scientific intentions are completely superimposed on the sources coming from 
popular and ancient culture. At the same time, science being the field from which Freud 
expects the acceptance of his discoveries, he struggles for a change in its patterns. The two 
operative notions of science in the book can be summarised as the ruling science and the 
science practiced by Freud. The proposition advanced here, in relation to the emergence of 
the unconscious in Freud’s theory, is that it is as close to nineteenth-century science as it is to 
pre-scientific knowledge on dreams and other psychic formations. 
 The ambiguous origins of the notion of unconscious, while it nearly disappeared in 
the subsequent appropriation of the work of Freud, is further explored in surrealism, as well 
as by Artaud and Benjamin. Freud represented, to the surrealist movement in general, a 
potential revelation, an important espoir (“hope”). As Breton states in 1924, Freud’s work 
represented the end of an era of disregard for the dream in philosophical, physiological and 
even artistic spheres. Surrealism took part in this movement of rediscovery, but with a very 
different project. It proposed, on the one hand, to explore the unconscious beyond the 
boundaries of Freud’s doctrine, the unconscious in its “pure state.” On the other hand, it 
intended to submit these discoveries to reason, establishing a kind of method from the 
exploration of dark aspects of the personality. As Breton writes: “je crois à la résolution 
future de ces deux états, en apparence si contradictoires, que sont le rêve et la réalité, en une 
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sorte de réalité absolue, de surréalité, si l’on peut ainsi dire”439  (Manifestes 24). If surrealism 
contradicts Freud’s theory, it also brings to the fore contributions from nineteenth-century 
parapsychology, different forms of occultism, and, after 1927, marxism. 
 As part to the European avant-garde current, this movement combined heterogeneous 
manifestations of the will to break with current cultural values. Together with the negation of 
certain modern ideologies, surrealism questions in particular the dominance of science in the 
quest for knowledge. It initiates a search for other sources that allow an appreciation of the 
“true value of life,” sources lying outside the normalising framework of logic. In this sense, 
surrealism recovers, alongside Freud’s official legacy and in spite of the psychiatrist’s own 
methods, the kind of references he tried to subsume to science. The thematisation of 
occultism, madness and oriental culture, and the different approaches to the matter of 
otherness, can be considered a part of surrealism’s exploration of pre-scientific knowledge.  
 The movement’s attempt to enlarge the comprehension of the real and potential role 
of the unconscious in human experience, particularly in relation to waking life, proposed an 
interesting off-shoot of psychoanalytic theory. While Freud integrates the marginal contents 
of mysticism into his own scientific discourse, surrealism seems to be attempting the same in 
relation to occult practices, by engendering a discourse that is also self-instituting. However, 
while Freud focuses on getting his work accepted by a scientific community, and therefore 
promotes the submission of popular culture to the test of science, the surrealists seek the 
establishment of enlarged perception of reality, of which the unconscious, to some extent 
stripped of its scientific character, is an important source.  
 In the late twenties, the effort to prove the compatibility between the interpretation of 
dreams and a revolutionary perspective, undertaken by Breton in the second manifesto and in 
the book Les Vases Communicants, establishes some meeting points between trends of 
marxism and the surrealist elaboration of the legacy of Freud. At this moment, Artaud’s 
vision grows incompatible with the position assumed by the surrealists, when the form of 
revolution becomes prescribed by the movement’s appropriation of marxism. At the same, as 
mentioned previously, the distancing of Artaud seems to lie more in a change of perspective, 
on the part of the surrealists, towards Artaud, than towards the fundamental forms to be 
adopted by the surrealist revolution. 
 Despite its engagement with communism, surrealism judges there to be no need for it 
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to review the methods it has used so far. Instead, it celebrates la donné freudienne (“the 
Freudian given”): the important contribution of Freud to the critique of the dominance of 
rational thinking. As part of this, the second manifesto testifies, as the First did in relation to 
dreams, to the importance of acknowledging supernatural powers, such as those of mediums, 
which, though rare, according to the surrealists, do exist. This rehabilitation of excluded 
forms of knowledge appears, for instance, in references to famous names in alchemy and 
hermeticism, alongside Sade and Lautréamont, in Breton’s writings in particular. The 
integration of occultist sources together with the other fields previously explored by the 
movement is part of the effort to enrich the revolutionary process with aspects that go beyond 
those experienced by consciousness. However, despite all of these trends, the idea of 
revolution occupies centre stage.  
 In a general sense, the notion of unconscious that emerges from the surrealist 
experience is detached from the cultural context in which it was conceived by Freud, that is, 
it is isolated from established scientific thinking as well as from the cultural milieu within 
which Freud’s theory sat. The “sacred enthusiasm” for the supernatural aspects of psychic 
life, prolonged by nineteenth-century psychiatry and still significant in Freud’s theory of 
dream interpretation, is refreshed by the surrealists in the form of practices that combined 
fabulous inspiration with automatic availability. The dictation of thought made men mere 
receptacles for marvellous contents, operating at the limits of reverie and concrete life. 
Dialectic materialism could enrich the meaning of concrete life, while itself being enriched 
by incursions into reverie.  
 The original and controversial conjunction represented by the approach of surrealism 
to the unconscious, psychoanalysis, unconventional forms of knowledge and the methods and 
ideology of dialectic materialism was an important influence on the works of Artaud and 
Benjamin. The comparison between the two authors allows for an understanding of the extent 
to which, in their works, these forms of “deviation” in relation to rational thinking play an 
active part in building the conditions for a transformative experience. Through the notion of 
magic as a trace, that is, the remaining inscription of a different, earlier mind-set to be found 
in current forms of living, the early texts of Artaud and Benjamin explore the access channels 
to a dimension that goes beyond both material reality and human perception. In voluntary as 
well as fortuitous actions — such as hypnosis, sleep and the act of reading — this access 
takes place through the dialectical relationship between different world views or 
configurations.  
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 Artaud and Benjamin propose different locations where these traces have remained 
present and, therefore," powerful, in contemporary experience. While Benjamin envisions 
traces of magic persisting in language, Artaud mentions actual magical practices as those 
through which a sense of another world can be explored. Having defended the existence of a 
remaining link between the human and the superior dimensions, he situates the souffle 
(“breath, spirit”) as the connecting element. While this notion shares an “identical essence” 
with the other world, it also points to a connection with the material body. For Benjamin, the 
magical aspects of language represent a particular way of performing communication in 
modernity, which he describes as instrumental and “bourgeois.” For him, the act of naming is 
the sign of a spiritual communication between men and things, the magic immediacy of 
language. The spiritual content of this denomination is its relationship to ancient meanings. 
Artaud, on the other hand, proposes the states of sleep and hypnosis as channels for the 
magical dimension, while remaining suspicious of the methodic incursions into these 
proposed by scientific approaches. He also evokes a set of “quasi-historical” figures, whose 
incantation practices are incomparable to the contemporary ones. The extent to which they 
can be actualised remains a question for Artaud. 
While they point to a different psycho-social configuration, in which magic is 
assigned a prominent role, the writings of Artaud and Benjamin evoke the two different 
modes of civilisation proposed by Lukács (Novel 30), the integrated and the problematic, 
which are related, respectively, to the worlds of the epic and the tragedy in ancient Greece. 
Benjamin’s description is close to the “rounded world” of epic configuration, but the 
dimension that the human spirit bridges, for Artaud, is not an epic one. It consists, more 
likely, of a recovered totality, made from heterogeneous elements. Here the seed of the 
fundamental difference between the writings of Artaud and Benjamin is already visible. 
The idea of trace holds that the interaction between the two dimensions leads to the 
occurrence of inscriptions, which function as portents of magical experience. Therefore, as a 
remnant, the magic dimension is at the same time a sign of conflictive development and a 
trace that allows the reactivation of some of its aspects. The question of how exactly one 
should explore the remaining magical dimension, and for which purposes, remains relatively 
open, while the texts of Artaud and Benjamin suggest that contact with the magical 
dimension retains the meaning of an encounter with the unconscious, however in a variated 
from in relation to the Freudian text. Here the traces are the cultural imprints of a different 
world configuration which, despite being generally understood as historically completed, are 
Hartmann 294 
presented as constitutional elements of the present forms, and therefore in a constant 
dialectical relationship with them. The consideration of magic as a trace illuminates the 
importance and the role of this aspect in their works, while their points of convergence and 
departure with the work of Freud is of key interest. 
 Artaud and Benjamin’s texts on surrealism, in turn, propose an interesting relationship 
between the notions of revolt and revolution, on the one side, and magic or the mystic 
dimension of experience, on the other. In Benjamin’s approach, this subject takes the form of 
an analysis of the means through which surrealism is able to mobilise the energies of magic 
towards revolution. For Artaud it is the quest for a revolution of the spirit, and the issue of 
surrealism as a form of mystique or magic. For both of them, to advance towards revolution 
requires an engagement with the magic and mystic aspects of life. While Artaud explicitly 
refuses the limitation of the idea of revolution to what he calls “les cadres désespérants de la 
matière” 440  (Œuvres 238), the materialism that Benjamin envisions in surrealism is 
permeated with non-materialistic elements. 
 However, while the surrealists, in Benjamin’s vision, approach the spiritual world 
from the standpoint of material reality, for Artaud the material dimension is secondary to the 
spirit. As the expression une nouvelle sorte de magie (“a new form of magic”) denotes, 
Artaud and the surrealists possibly consider magic as a remnant of a different social 
configuration, in relation to which a new form of magic can be established, rather than magic 
itself. Despite the surrealist references to the Middle Ages, for Artaud, the ultimate status of 
magic must remain open. For Benjamin, as mentioned above, the intoxication to be found in 
surrealism is a re-enactment of the magical relationship between ancient man and the cosmos, 
a relationship that has disappeared in modern society.  
 In the profane illumination proposed by Benjamin, the material world, in its 
immediate presence, is united with the marvellous features associated with a remote point in 
time. The surrealist illumination proposed by Artaud and his colleagues, on the other hand, is 
connected with what they call “a state of fury.” It expresses the spiritual insight and 
clarification gained through an exploration of the “eternal” aspects of the spirit, as well as 
through an attack on all instances of its oppression. As such, it keeps the same sense of a 
revealing an ecstatic inspiration, but without the explicit references to either cosmic 
experience or the material world in terms of places and objects. 
 Both Artaud and Benjamin identify in the pessimistic attitude of surrealism a 
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limitation to action. Artaud opposed materialism as offering a profoundly immutable and 
static notion of reality. He considers engagement with the “invisible” forces of the “spiritual 
centre of the world” to be indispensable in the pursuit of any form of revolution. The 
inclusion of these immaterial energies in the revolutionary cause is also a necessity for 
Benjamin, even if the realms of spirit and matter are not clearly distinguished in his essay. 
For Benjamin, surrealism should fully engage with the mobilisation of the “ecstatic energies” 
as part of its methodical preparation for the revolution, to take a full commitment to 
communism. 
 Conceptualisations of the magical, spiritual dimension of modern experience are 
envisioned, for Artaud as well as for Benjamin, in close relationship with an urge to 
transform both spiritual and material reality. A comparison of their views allows for a better 
understanding of the revolutionary aspect of Artaud’s thought, for instance, as a highly 
spiritual, but also material transformation. However, Benjamin praises the fact that surrealism 
allows for the loosening of individuality, and Artaud, that it allows the ultimate expression of 
one’s spirit. Both reveal surrealism’s nexus with the rich space of images drawn from its 
contact with spiritual energies, the act of “revelation” also being an important aspect in their 
own thought. That is, to organise pessimism, as mentioned above, means “to discover in 
political action a sphere reserved one hundred percent for images” (Benjamin Surrealism 
191). This notion of image encompasses much more than optical perceptiveness, as suggested 
in the discussion on the consciousness of the masses through an image-based depiction of 
themselves. Images must be taken as impressions, representations and ideas in themselves.  
 After 1937, Artaud assigns magic a principal role in the practices that contributed, 
amongst other things, to the events leading to his internment. In “Lettre sur Lautréamont,” the 
masses or la conscience génerale (“the general consciousness”) appear as engaging in the 
processes that preserve society’s status quo, particularly through the neutralisation of a few 
outstanding individuals. While in Artaud the masses are the agents of homogenising 
processes, for Benjamin they are, at the same time, the subjects and the objects of different 
social tendencies. Even if such notion appears only towards the end of Benjamin’s text, it 
assumes a rather important position, once it leads to the connection between his analysis on 
the work of art and the political context in which he envisages the analysis as a tool: the fight 
against fascism.  
 The notion of distraction in Benjamin’s essay establishes a connection with Artaud’s 
account of the forgetfulness of the masses regarding their own evil deeds, while bearing an 
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association with the “state of fascination” of the masses identified by Freud. However 
differently, Artaud and Benjamin both express the idea that the mass phenomenon 
precipitates an adjustment of reality, in which magic is assigned the role of the medium. The 
emergence of an understanding of the collective dimension of experience, particularly in 
terms of the masses, integrates their search for elements capable of revealing the true or 
revolutionary facets of reality. The question that remains open, in both Artaud’s and 
Benjamin’s account, is the form that this sought-after revelation or transformation should 
take. For Artaud, it concerns the content known by the extraordinary consciousness, the truth 
that the masses intent to erase. In the writings of Benjamin, the nature of change is related to 
an exploration of the dimension of images, in a way that enables the reconstruction, 
following the decay of traditional experience, of “synthetic” and aesthetic forms of living, 
taking into account bodies as important residues of social processes. 
 The sphere of magic, in the writings of Artaud and Benjamin approached here, 
appears as the dimension in which ancient, repressed, at times evil, but also potentially 
revolutionary aspects can be accessed and exploited. The unconscious is the dimension 
through which magic is present in the contemporary world. Magic is envisioned from the 
point of view of a residual position, in the sense that the authors do not consider it to be a 
dominant dimension of reality. An exception to this can be found in Artaud’s writings from 
the forties, in which magic, surreptitiously, is the means through which different aspects of 
life are managed and organised. However here the notion of magic is presented through 
incantation practices that take place, for the most part, unconsciously. 
 Perhaps this is the reason why Artaud states, in his 1947 letters to Breton, his disbelief 
in occultism and magic. Artaud’s statement comes together with the affirmation that acts of 
bewitchment take place continuously within civilised society. For Benjamin, in turn, magic is 
reminiscent in the sense that it used to be integrated into the very fabric of experience, but 
different material transformations caused the world view related to it to retrocede. The traces 
of this world view can be accessed, and can give a glimpse of the magic powers that are still 
contained, although in a repressed form, in the modern world. Artaud, in the same context as 
that quoted above, expresses the current status of magic in the following way: “il n’y a pas de 
cosmos et chaque homme est son monde à lui tout seule, à lui donc à s’y initier en le faisant 
vivre”441  (Œuvres 1209). Here the themes of incantation practices and personal cosmogony 
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are placed together. 
 Freud’s theory proposed an ambiguous incorporation of pre-scientific forms of 
knowledge into his supposedly scientific understanding of the unconscious. The ontological 
aspect of his theory, even if it was not particularly elaborated, implied a notion of experience 
that was very different from the philosophical currents of the time. If the concept of the 
unconscious represented the almost complete inaccessibility of a part of the human 
personality, it also pointed to the larger, unexploited aspects of psychic life. In the early 
writings of Artaud and Benjamin, the notion of experience is, to some extent, established 
through contrasts. While Benjamin employs two different usages, one from a relatively 
informal context, the other from the philosophical field, Artaud expresses, in short essays and 
correspondences, the theme of a fundamental separation of being, a subject that he details 
through the example of his personal “case.” Artaud and Benjamin’s suggested methods for 
dealing with a turning point in the discussion of experience both touch on the ideas of 
incomparable solitude and forged communion. 
In the writings of Artaud, the exploration of man’s spiritual and material condition, 
particularly through epistolary writing, takes the form of a general criticism of the ideas of 
self-conscious, attainable, intelligible life. The experimental form that emerges from his 
questioning of the idea of the ownership of experience seems to take place through the act of 
writing itself, that is, in the dramatisation of the inaccessibility of being, through the 
particular form of exposition allowed by written composition. As Dumoulié (Artaud 5) points 
out, this in no sense means that the reflexivity of writing allows a recovery of the self for 
Artaud. If the expression of separation is favoured by the epistolary form, it is because it 
implies the act of establishing distance.  
 In fact, the theme of separation, in Artaud’s writings, has the ambiguous feature of 
being able to recast, through the problematisation of what he sees as the corroded foundations 
of being, the artifice of creation. In “Correspondance avec Jacques Rivière” (1924), Artaud 
makes explicit the idea that literary artifice risks falsifying the true illness of being. 
Nevertheless, Artaud’s proposition to remain true to the condition affecting him is in fact an 
essentially literary act. The “refusal to lie” serves to redouble the literariness of the writing, 
just as the original gesture of literature contains both separation from reality, and the promise 
of giving away its most precious secrets, perhaps the very cry of life. Artaud famously 
questions Rivière: “pourquoi mentir, pourquoi chercher à mettre sur le plan littéraire une 
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chose qui est le cri même de la vie”442 (Œuvres 79). 
 Artaud’s position in relation to his maladie is, analogously, a unique possession and a 
radical dispossession, in relation to which he can only write, but only on condition that “le 
corps momifié de l’œuvre ne se substitue pas au corps vivant de son auteur” 443 (Dumoulié 
Artaud 5). For Benjamin, it is the ideal of a forged community that first emerges as an 
experimental form of experience. From the rejection of “experience as meaninglessness,” 
proposed by the adult, this community is necessarily of a spiritual nature, since the spirit is 
the very content of the experience of youth. The definition of spirit in this context is not made 
particularly clear by Benjamin. It is something to be awaited and actualised by the youth 
movement itself, whose “mission” is to remain attentive and open to it. The spiritual 
approach identifiable in the two texts of Benjamin that deal with experience centres on his 
criticism of the use of the notion in an instrumental sense. Despite being a constant in his 
texts of the time, the concept of spirit can be understood more as a virtual point around which 
his criticism turns than a dimension that he explores specifically.  
 Benjamin’s critique of experience centres on “enclosed living,” a fixation on one’s 
own triviality, a recrudescence of the bourgeois notion of individuality. This once more 
represents the highlighting of a form of instrumentalisation. In these terms, Artaud’s unique 
“testimony” partially coincides with Benjamin’s approach. Neither the implicit notion of 
reality as accessible and achievable, nor immediate psychological consciousness are to be 
found in their versions of experience. In general terms, Artaud and Benjamin criticise, from 
different angles, the notion of subject, and the correlated conception of knowledge, part of the 
inheritance of the enlightenment. While Benjamin makes the targets of his attack explicit 
without developing a positive formulation of experience, in Artaud the criticism is implicit in 
the description of a personal case that is anything but private. 
 If the spirit is not the ultimate dimension in which Artaud and Benjamin’s criticisms 
might find resolution, neither is the dimension of language. It appears not as the promise of 
resolution, but as the necessary form for an attempt to find a way out of the limitations of 
experience. As distinct as the approaches of Benjamin and Artaud are, they both point to a 
problematisation of the notion of experience that focuses on much more than just their 
personal views, and at the same time is out of step with the thought of others of their time, as 
Artaud’s correspondence, and Benjamin’s criticism of Kant, suggest. However, a comparison 
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of their writings suggests that experience, far from being a given, is a highly problematic 
notion, in abstract as well as practical terms, particularly at that historical moment.  
 Language plays an important role in the approach to experience of both authors. It 
represents a genuine moment of experience, which touches on both the lost worlds of ancient 
experience and the projected state of coherence from which new forms may emerge. For 
instance, the idea that spoken language is just another animal instinct, that of expressive 
mimicry, leads to some common ground in the writings of Artaud and Benjamin. In 
Benjamin’s “Problems in the Sociology of Language” (1935), it is as if Artaud’s account of 
language had found some correspondence in the academic understanding. But while there are 
hints of overlap with Benjamin’s ideas here, they are superficial compared to the significant 
differences in their approaches to language and experience. 
 While Benjamin’s notion of language is hermeneutically-oriented, aiming, ultimately, 
at the restoration of an interpretation that enlarges the comprehensibility of the world, 
Artaud’s is a tragically-oriented notion, concerned with the irrecoverable fragmentation of 
the soul, preventing the formation of meaning. As mentioned above, although Benjamin does 
not envision any ultimate resolution or restoration, and indeed at times expresses the 
fragmented dimension as the only experienceable one, and although Artaud recurrently 
nourishes ideas of recuperation and the joining of fragments into some new form of 
consistency, the thoughts of the two writers cannot be aligned, let alone combined.  
 The concept of writing as an intermediary, pertinent to Artaud’s personal experience, 
also suggests it could be a sort of beacon in the context of the pain of separation, albeit an 
equivocal one. If, for Benjamin, language is the archive of a lost world of experience, that 
can reappear and transform present experience, for Artaud it is, at this point, the sphere in 
which the problem of expression and the possibility of its capture by language is dramatised, 
a sphere that nonetheless allows for the establishment of a provisory interjacent instance 
between spirit and life. The original dimension of language, as suggested by Benjamin, is the 
one in which language, strictly speaking, does not exist. In it, one is removed from language: 
similarities are fully perceived and immediately read. Gestures, and the resonant gestures that 
are sounds, are the last elements of this form of perception to disappear, and they constitute 
the closest approximations to the body’s original expressive abilities. As Artaud states, in the 
context of this form of retreat from multiplicity: “je n’aurais plus besoin de parler” 444 
(Œuvres 166).  
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 Fundamental differences and subordinate kinships underlie the approaches of Artaud 
and Benjamin to language and experience. This is also evident in a consideration of the 
relationship between their different conceptions of image. Considered a form of language, it 
has an expressive relationship with the aspects of experience outlined by Benjamin and 
Artaud. Benjamin described the new forms of experience that emerge from the decay of 
traditional configurations as “synthetically produced” experiences (Motifs 157). This form of 
engendering experience can be described as the act of combining different materials, and by 
that very act, exceeding the materials in question. Given that the conditions for experience 
are in decay, a synthetic form of production of experience takes place through the “artificial” 
reconstruction of experience. It imitates the natural one, while exceeding the materials made 
available to it. 
 In the texts of Artaud and Benjamin, the emergence of new forms of experiencing 
departs from the identification, begun much earlier, of the inaccessibility of the conditions of 
traditional experience. In Benjamin, this diagnosis is linked to the decay of a psycho-social 
configuration, related to both the epic world (Lukács Novel 30) and the magical relationship 
of ancient man with the cosmos (Benjamin One-Way 92-4). In Artaud, this diagnosis 
concerns the theme of separation, described as life’s eternal power of detachment. In both 
cases, a form of individual experience is involved; in Benjamin, as the location of the decay 
of traditional experience, and in Artaud, as the point of departure of all experiencing, even if 
that means not having complete access to one’s own experience.  
 At the same time, both these forms of individual experience, presented by the authors 
as unconditional in the historical period in which they found themselves, are formed from a 
contact with elements of traditional configurations of experience. This is no surprise, 
considering, for instance, Benjamin’s description of traditional experience as suffering a 
moment of decay, but not extinction. The same can be said about Artaud, for whom the 
character of separation does not completely prevent the occurrence of moments of fusion, as 
evanescent and fragile as they may be. If the production of synthetic experience implies the 
conjunction of distinct types of matter, and the imitation of a natural form, it necessarily 
draws on the aspects of traditional experience that remain somehow present in modern 
experience.  
According to Benjamin, the constant stimuli offered by modern life produce 
immediate effects on consciousness. However, occupied as we are with our own survival, we 
cannot process such effects completely, but must deal with them as quickly as possible. The 
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result is that stimuli do not become a memory trace, are not fixed as deeper, unconscious 
memories, making it hard for them to become part of meaningful experiences. This is the 
Schokerlebnis (“shock experience”), the only possible experience for the modern subject, 
according to Benjamin. Modernity, in his work, is characterised as unconducive to 
meaningful and transformative experiences. However, in the same essay, Benjamin points to 
Baudelaire in discussing the identification of a new situation, that of the reconstruction of 
conditions of experience through literary work (Motifs 193-4). 
The idea of déperdition (“loss, fading”) in the work of Artaud, in turn, suggests that 
he suffers from a transformation, a processual perdition that, seemingly to his own surprise, 
appears as a new form of consciousness. Detailing the formation of notions through the flesh, 
Artaud states: “l’image amenée par mes nerfs prend la forme de l’intellectualité la plus 
haute”445 (Œuvres 148). In Artaud’s usage, the image allows for the resolution of an eternal 
conflict between “reason and heart,” as the form of knowledge produced by it is material and 
spiritual at the same time. While for Benjamin significant and transformative images might 
emerge through literature, for Artaud this is a fruitless field. He wrote to Rivière: “vous avez 
mis le doigt sur une côté de moi-même; la littérature proprement dite ne m’intéresse qu’assez 
peu”446 (Œuvres 78). 
The notion of image is present in the experience of intoxication, which appears, in 
different forms, in the writings of both Artaud and Benjamin. The space of political action 
revealed by surrealism is, according to Benjamin, the space reserved for images. This space, 
it should be remembered, is also the one through which the masses acquire a form of 
consciousness, albeit a limited one. This points to the importance of images in the processes 
of self-awareness, both personally and collectively speaking. Artaud, having somehow 
traversed the expropriation of his own experience, suggests that the knowledge propitiated by 
images, while obscure and fragile, allows for the gaining of new principles, for lucidity 
amidst disorder. In Artaud’s later texts, it is the idea of cruelty that assumes the form of 
control and contact with the living forces. As a sign of excess, la cruauté is identified with 
the exigency of human existence. 
Through their explorations of the magic or mystical dimensions of life, Artaud and 
Benjamin investigate and define a form of experience that not only suggests a radical reading 
of the conditions of experiencing in modernity, but also outlines the different forms taken by 
                                                            
445 “the image provided by my nerves takes the form of the highest intellectuality” 
446 “you have touched a portion of myself; actual literature interests me very little” 
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experience following the crisis of traditional definitions precipitated by the work of Freud. 
The unconscious in Artaud and Benjamin’s writings, not always explicitly approached here, 
is present in the frequent recurrence of states that suggest the disintegration of individuality 
and established social forms, such as death, intoxication, bewitchment, dreams, boredom and 
ecstasy. 
Benjamin envisions the unconscious as a fundamental element of modern experience, 
being the dimension in which the remnants of a magical past are contained and occasionally 
revealed in contemporary activities, such as in language, in images of inebriation, and in the 
products of technology that present previously unknown aspects of reality. These partially 
represent the experimental reconstruction of experience from the analysis of the decay of 
traditional modes of living.  
In the writings of Artaud, the unconscious is a source, one that can provide as much 
release as restriction. For if full human experience is constantly prevented, it is because 
human beings themselves, partially through unconscious operations, deny it the possibility of 
plentifulness, as beings “qui eurent besoin de la mort pour savoir ce que c’était que vivre”447 
(Œuvres XIV 50). Artaud’s vision is concerned, above all, with the possibility of authenticity 
in the face of inner and outer impositions on the spirit; hence he denounces the participation 
of the unconscious in manipulative actions.  
The prevention of possession of one’s own body, thought and experience, and, at the 
same time, the finding of one’s inner voice and modes of action in the face of this absence, 
are some of the issues at stake for Artaud and Benjamin in the problematic scenario relating 
to the possibility of experience in the twentieth century. The other facet of this situation 
concerns the atmosphere of revolt and revolution that had been alive in Europe since the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and assumed acute urgency immediately before the 
World Wars. Artaud and Benjamin express the necessary occupation, for twentieth-century 
authors, with both the negative and positive aspects of this context, that of a crisis of the 
rational mind, and the need to enlarge the human field of action, expressed through lucid 
diagnosis, disillusioned attitudes of disillusionment and constructive propositions. 
 
  
                                                            
447 “who would need death to know what it was like to live” 
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